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We agreed that if we have had one or more ministerial consultations, this meeting could take place later this year. I can't remember off the top of my head whether we invited 100 or 150 politicians, but I wouldn't think that Zelensky would come – said Péter Magyar while returning home from the EU summit to 444. #EUcsúcs #ukránoroszháború #migráció (translated)

The maximum price of a liter of diesel (B7) rises by 1.6 cents and now amounts to 2.444 euros, while the price of heating oil decreases by 1.97 cents to 1.5452 euros for orders of at least 2,000 liters, according to an announcement from the SPF Economy. #Diesel #PrixDesCarburants #Economie (translated)

Peter Magyar spoke to 444 about the significance of the diesel agreement, emphasizing that the American president's decisions are important for Hungary as well, while also commenting on the migration fine and a future visit to Ukraine. #dízelmegállapodás #politika #migráció (translated)

The author criticized Dubyna's post, accusing him of misrepresenting the division of powers, the competences of the Council of Ministers, the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal, and the concept of a coup d'état. He wrote that the appointed team analyzing the systemic effects of the court and tribunal rulings did not seize judicial power and had no authority to overturn judgments, change decision-making panels, or issue orders to judges. The author stated that Dubyna referred to Article 190 of the Constitution while omitting the difference between the finality of Constitutional Tribunal rulings and the analysis of their legal effects. He also accused him of failing to take into account the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Xero Flor v. Poland and the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-448/23, which — as he wrote — concerned fundamental irregularities in the functioning of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The author considered the designation of the appointment of the government analytical team as a coup d'état to be a manifestation of a misunderstanding of the principles of state functioning. He also criticized the comparison of the situation to a totalitarian system, stating that it was historically unfounded and offensive to those repressed by the communist state. He added that the use of capital letters and exclamation marks did not lend any legal or intellectual value to the statements. #prawo #konstytucja #Polska (translated)

Boris Šťastný stated that the round-trip ticket for Petr Macinka to New York in business class for 197,447 CZK and five round-trip tickets for his companions in economy class for a total of 164,481 CZK, or 32,896 CZK each, represented usual prices. The rental of a private Hawker 900XP plane for 365,000 CZK for approximately 7.5 hours of flight and waiting in Prague on the Casablanca–Prague route and back for Petr Pavel, on the other hand, he described as unusually and suspiciously cheap. According to him, the media campaign was clearly intended to distract attention from this fact. #letenky #cestování #mediálníetika (translated)

The author wrote that Italian exports had grown by 9% in August on a year-over-year basis and had reached 444 billion euros in the first eight months of 2026, 5% more than the same period in 2025. He attributed the result to the dynamism of businesses and the increasing competitiveness of the country. #ExportItaliano #Competitività #Economia #IT (translated)

Starting Saturday, the price of diesel at the pump will rise slightly, with an increase of 1.6 cents per liter to 2.444 euros, while the price of heating oil will decrease by 1.97 cents to 1.5452 euros per liter for orders of 2,000 liters or more. #PrixDuCarburant #Économie #Diesel (translated)

FLORENTIA wrote that accounts from a neighboring country dealt with the so-called "gray areas" instead of the natural disaster in their country, which, as noted, had caused human losses and significant material damage. Quoting data attributed to the Geographic Army Service, she stated that 29,372 standalone geographic elements of land had been recorded in Greek territory. She added that the conventional number used by the Greek Tourism Organization and encyclopedias was about 6,000 islands and islets, as it included those exceeding a marginal size. According to her post, 446 had an area of over 1 km², while the permanent population ranged from 117 to 227, depending on the census; the remaining 29,000 or more were uninhabited islets and rocks. FLORENTIA argued that the Treaty of Lausanne defined the limit as 3 miles from the Asian coasts and that, beyond that, the islands and islets of the Aegean were outside Turkish sovereignty. She presented as positions of the accounts she criticized the claims that unmarked areas had "ambiguous" sovereignty, that Turkey's renunciation only concerned the then Great Powers or the Middle East, and that Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire retained territories that had not been explicitly ceded elsewhere. She asserted that these positions had no legal basis and that the reference to island complexes, the 3-mile limit, and Turkey's renunciation based on Article 16 excluded any dispute over Greek sovereignty. She concluded that there was no point in further discussion with these specific accounts and, referring to Sophocles, expressed the view that circumstances should not prevail over justice. #Ελλάδα #ΔιεθνέςΔίκαιο #Γεωπολιτική (translated)

Actu Foot indicated that France had increased its lead over Portugal in the race for 5th place in the UEFA index. According to the published figures, England had 105.130 points, Italy 89.446, Spain 84.743, Germany 82.830, France 70.296, and Portugal 66.550. The account added that maintaining 5th place would allow Ligue 1 to have 7 European spots in 2028-2029, including 3 direct qualifications for the Champions League and one place in the 3rd qualifying round. The publication also mentioned L'Équipe. #UEFA #Ligue1 #Football (translated)

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Jardon Sinnerismo had praised Cissè's performance, claiming that he had been transformed into the new Ronaldinho, and had compared Hutchinson to Robinho. He had written that Salzburg had been humiliated and that the team was the only Italian one to win in Europe. He had also said that Ramos had been brought in to score and gain confidence, calling the result yet another miracle of Ruben. https://t.co/44T2upqbVc #calcio #sport #Europa (translated)

Antonio Tabet described a publication as biting satire and humorous criticism of a political agent who, according to him, should endure being the target of public mockery. He stated that humor and freedom of expression were protected by the Constitution, by ADPF 130, and by ADI 4451, and said he had seen the content on Gustavo Vilela's Instagram. Tabet added that the visual joke with musical parody did not mean that the Bolsonaro family was the family linked to militias that he might have mentioned before. In the end, he stated that the text had been written by his legal team to avoid further censorship. #Sátira #LiberdadeDeExpressão #Humor (translated)

Archaeologists have discovered the oldest known shipwreck in the world near the Turkish island of Kekova, dated to be between 4400 and 4700 years old, which could provide valuable insights into seafaring and trade networks of the Bronze Age. #Schiffswrack #Archäologie #Bronzezeit (translated)