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Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin reported on Sunday that 512 Ukrainian drones heading for the capital region were destroyed in 24 hours starting from 8:30 AM on Saturday, 127 of them near Moscow. According to Sobyanin, in the week following last Saturday, air defense neutralized 2,730 unmanned aerial vehicles directed at the Moscow region, 534 of which were in the capital area. #dróntámadás #Szentpétervár #ukránkonfliktus (translated)

2730 drones flew towards the Moscow region. Most of them were destroyed by air defense forces farther from the capital. 534 drones were neutralized as they approached Moscow. In addition, for the whole week so far, Sobyanin says the following: "2730 drones flew towards the Moscow region. Most of them were destroyed by air defense forces farther from the capital. 534 drones were neutralized as they approached Moscow." #Москва #дронове #летища (translated)

In Calabria, the protest by truck drivers continues against the rise in diesel prices, with queues on the SS 534 and protests also along the SS 18, while companies in the sector face economic difficulties due to high costs. #Carburanti #Gasolio #ProtestaAutotrasportatori (translated)

Magdalena Majkowska reported that due to concerns about the pacification of the town near the Constitutional Tribunal during the Saturday demonstration, lawyers from Ordo Iuris were ready to provide free legal assistance. She emphasized that peaceful assembly is a constitutional right and not a privilege granted by authorities, and provided the phone number 531 738 774. She advised detained individuals to immediately request a lawyer, memorize the official's badge number, and not sign any protocols they do not agree with, but to submit their objections to it. She added that a suspect may refuse to make statements. #OchronaPrawna #Prawo #Manifestacja (translated)

Emilia Kamińska asked why the police were hiding recordings from the body cameras of the officers and questioned who was the perpetrator, the victim, and who was lying. She claimed that there is a complete, uncensored recording and encouraged its dissemination with the hashtag #ExposePoliceRecording. #UjawnićNagraniePolicji https://t.co/53WTe9Dvzy #Policja #Nagranie #UjawnićNagranie (translated)

EFIEBER asked Karl Lauterbach if he was aware of Tesla's plans for the Grünheide site. According to the author, the US company planned an additional production hall there with around 536,000 m², an annual production of up to 1 million vehicles, and 3,500 additional jobs. EFIEBER wrote that Tesla's investments could benefit employees, suppliers, craft businesses, the local economy, as well as indirectly daycare centers, schools, and infrastructure. He described remarks from a German politician as completely out of place and stated that Tesla had long been part of the German automotive industry; the Model Y is produced in Germany. #Tesla #Deutschland #Automobilindustrie (translated)

Daniel Schatz wrote that Hassan Abadir, the substitute for the Left Party in parliament, was 34 votes away from being elected. According to Schatz, Bulletin showed that Abadir was granted debt relief in August 2022 for debts of 827,534 kronor, after the Enforcement Authority assessed that he lacked payment ability. He stated that Abadir therefore did not need to pay anything and that the creditors received no compensation. Schatz also wrote that several dozen new cases had been registered with the Enforcement Authority since the fall of 2023, including for unpaid vehicle tax, congestion tax, and parking fines, and that several were still unpaid. He asked if the Left Party accepted that standard for its parliamentary candidates. https://t.co/In8OQAsnv5 #Vänsterpartiet #politik #skuldsanering (translated)

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Retired Colonel Maciej Korowaj assessed that the 17.1 trillion rubles earmarked for defense in the Russian budget for 2027 does not constitute a barrier to mobilization, but it does not signal it either. He pointed out that the overt mobilization stance remains marginal, and the contract model is exhausting its social base. In his opinion, part of the increase in defense spending may stem from transferring payments for the wounded and the families of the deceased to this sector, which were previously included in a classified section called "Social Policy." This would mean that part of the growth finances the costs of losses, rather than new capabilities. Korowaj wrote that, regardless of the budget, Russia's legal-administrative capacity to mobilize people is increasing. He noted that a decree from December 30, 2025, directed contract reservists to protect critical facilities in 2026, and a decree from July 27, 2026, increased the armed forces' personnel by 25,000, to 1,535,000 soldiers. According to him, this was the third such increase in the year, formally tied to the creation of military-construction units. He also referenced an assessment by the Ukrainian HUR that Russia aims to recruit about 600,000 people in 2026–2027, utilizing the electronic register and digital summonses, which would enable mobilization without public announcement. Korowaj identified the system's capacity as the main limitation. He wrote that Russian losses currently amount to 30,000–35,000 killed or wounded per month, and according to NATO estimates, most recruits still end up on the front lines as reinforcements. With an intake of about 30,000 people per month, the army, in his opinion, is essentially restoring its personnel rather than creating surpluses for new formations. Citing OSINT, he noted that 4,799 out of 7,342 pre-war tanks stored in depots had been used, leaving about 19% remaining. Korowaj assessed that in the short term, it would be possible to draft several hundred thousand people as reinforcements and rear echelon personnel, but not quickly create a second army capable of maneuver warfare. He emphasized that mass mobilization would require the identification, selection, training, and equipping of hundreds of thousands of individuals, while the military apparatus is busy sustaining the front. He also referred to a report by Andrei Belousov for Vladimir Putin from December 2025: in 2025, five divisions, 13 brigades, and 30 regiments were to be formed, while four divisions, 14 brigades, and 39 regiments were planned for 2026. He pointed to the establishment of the 44th Army Corps in Karelia, the elevation of brigades to the rank of divisions, including the 71st Guards Mechanized Division on the Kola Peninsula, and a rocket brigade with Iskanders. In his view, these formations mainly consisted of conscripts and trained reinforcements. He added that according to Finnish sources, the expansion of bases in Petrozavodsk, Pechenga, and Baltiysk would enable the support of 80,000–115,000 soldiers only after the war in Ukraine concludes. Korowaj agreed with the ISW assessment that, in the short term, ground operations against NATO are unlikely, as the majority of Russia's potential is engaged in Ukraine. He also cited a report from a closed NATO briefing in Ankara, during which an Alliance representative purportedly spoke about the re-establishment of the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts, at least one new corps, and three divisions, but also mentioned a lack of signs of an intention to conduct a rapid attack. He concluded that the budget finances a long war with Ukraine and creates opportunities for the period after it is frozen, but it does not indicate preparations for an attack on NATO or a withdrawal of the Kremlin from such an option. #Rosja #wojna #defensywa (translated)

Three people were killed and six were injured in the biggest Russian drone attack in central Ukraine, according to the local governor, who also announced that 26 sites were hit and that 536 out of the 580 Russian drones that attacked the country during the night were shot down. #Ουκρανία #ΔημόσιαΑσφάλεια #Πόλεμος (translated)

AlkoInwestor described how during the infection season in the office, he compared the costs of using kitchen towels, grey toilet paper, and tissues. According to his calculations, one nose blow cost 0.0258 PLN net, 0.0054 PLN net, and 0.0366 PLN gross, respectively. The author noted that kitchen towels were nearly five times more expensive than toilet paper, and toilet paper only stopped being the cheaper option after using five sheets. Assuming that 40 people blew their noses 10 times a day for about 120 working days, AlkoInwestor estimated the total number of such actions to be 48,000. He wrote that using kitchen towels would cost the company 981 PLN net for the season, and factoring in the tax shield — 795 PLN. Tissues, as he pointed out, did not generate a cost for the employer because they were purchased by employees. The author reported that he presented a recommendation to the boss for employees to finance their own tissues or use grey toilet paper, while leaving towels for kitchen purposes. The boss rejected the idea of sending instructions to employees. The next day, Mariusz reached for a roll of paper brought by Kuba, but instead of taking one half sheet, he tore off three. AlkoInwestor summarized that the standard began to be implemented from the bottom up. #FIRE #biuro #zdrowie #finanse (translated)

EFIEBER reported that Tesla plans to expand its Gigafactory in Grünheide further. A production hall of 536,000 m² is intended, more than twice the size of the existing one, as well as a long-term capacity of up to one million vehicles per year. An own substation and an expanded water treatment facility are also planned. According to EFIEBER, the permit applications should be submitted in December 2026; construction could start in 2027. The expansion is expected to take about ten years. EFIEBER referred to the project as a signal for the industrial location Germany. #Tesla #Gigafactory #Deutschland (translated)

Amaya Echevarría, president of Novartis Spain, has emphasized at the CREO Forum the urgency of reducing the time it takes for patients to access new medical treatments, currently at 537 days, stressing that if innovation does not reach the patient, it is of no use. #InnovaciónSalud #AccesoMedicamentos #ForoCREO (translated)

Teacher salaries in Poland in 2026, depending on the level of professional advancement, range from 5,308 PLN gross for beginners to around 10,000 PLN gross for certified teachers, which, in the context of work in other countries, indicates significant differences in teacher salaries worldwide. #wynagrodzenie #nauczyciele #Polska (translated)