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In August 2025, @svtnyheter reported an analysis stating that "around 200 reporters and journalists" had been killed during the war in Gaza up to that point. @sr_ekot has also continuously covered the issue and relayed similar information. The Israeli military (IDF) claims that it has determined that 170 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, who were alleged to be journalists after their deaths, were in fact members of terrorist groups. "After extensive investigations, the IDF can now disclose that 170 Gazans who were killed during the war, and who have been presented as journalists and media workers, were actually acting as terrorists for terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip – primarily Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad," the army states. According to the military, 118 of the journalists were active within Hamas's military branch, 49 within Islamic Jihad, two were members of the People's Resistance Committees, and one belonged to the Mujahideen Brigades. Seventeen of these journalists, also terrorists, are said by the army to have participated in the attacks on Israeli territory on October 7, 2023. Some of the journalists on the IDF's list have also worked for international media, including Reuters, CNN, Australian ABC, BBC, AFP, AP, and Le Monde. The 170 cases have been published by the IDF on a special website. For each person, their name and role as a journalist and terrorist activist are recorded, along with their civilian and military ID numbers. The military states that it publishes "verified evidence, including images and documents produced by the terrorist organizations, some of which have been found on site, which show these terrorists' organizational affiliation and the roles they had within the terrorist organizations." The IDF emphasizes that various international media outlets during the course of the war "have repeatedly, and without presenting verified information, accused Israel and the IDF of intentionally harming journalists." "This despite the fact that terrorist organizations in some cases have themselves presented these individuals as terrorists within their own ranks and even claimed responsibility for them," the IDF claims. "The information now being revealed illustrates the gap between the image presented to the world and the reality on the ground. It provides further and crucial evidence that the IDF does not intentionally and systematically target journalists, but rather terrorist organizations and their terrorists in accordance with international law," adds the military. Link to the report in the next tweet. (translated)

The grandmothers against the right are calling for not donating to my work. Campact is calling on companies to boycott advertising on my channel. Die ZEIT accuses me of fascism. The Amadeu Antonio Foundation is publicly warning about me. Who else is missing from my list, what medal do I need? (translated)

Life in Germany is getting more and more expensive. In September, inflation rose to over three percent. In terms of energy, the increase is even at 14.9 percent. The biggest price driver is fuel. Consumers had to pay almost 50 percent more for fuel in September compared to a year earlier. And what is the federal government doing? They are giving citizens a measly 17 cents, which doesn't even fully reach the consumer. The fuel discount, which comes into effect on October 1 after months of inaction by the Merz government, is a bad joke considering the enormous inflation! Not 17 cents, one euro would be appropriate! A price cap of 1.50 euros for fuel in Germany is urgently needed. This is possible if the CO2 price is abolished, the energy tax is halved, and the value-added tax on fuel and energy is reduced to 7 percent. (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

What a good airline @LATAMAirlines (sarcasm) ☺️ Nothing like sitting in your seat and having no space for your cabin luggage! And being told that tomorrow they will see how to send it to you, and they don’t ask for the address of where you are going to stay or how you can make a claim 😍! That the flight attendants rudely do not want to help and that the passengers themselves have to tidy up the luggage to help each other! And guess what? There was space, but they were annoyed to be able to help the FIVE OR SIX PEOPLE who had no space for their suitcase even with empty seats available :D Damn airline, good thing I was able to fit my things in a bag but that wasn’t the case. (translated)

💬 At the Bloomberg Luxembourg Investment Summit 2026, I spoke about the growing need to invest in defence and the defence industrial & technological base. The war in Ukraine teaches a brutal truth: warfare is evolving faster than bureaucracy. We must adapt. https://t.co/02aNX8f3O0 #Defence #Investment #Warfare #LU #UA

🚨 BACKSTAGE: Jorge Jesus reached a verbal agreement with the Brazilian National Team before Ancelotti's hiring. The talks lasted more than 4 months, between the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025. After the early elimination in the Copa América and the inconsistent performance of the team, Ednaldo Rodrigues, former president of CBF, matured the idea of dismissing Dorival Júnior. In December, two CBF officials traveled to Portugal and reached a VERBAL AGREEMENT with Jorge Jesus. The coach only requested to participate in the Asian Champions League with Al-Hilal. After Argentina's 4-1 thrashing of Brazil, CBF made new contact with JJ and REINFORCED the verbal agreement. It was decided that Jorge Jesus would replace Dorival. • POLITICAL PRESSURE CHANGES PLANS Ednaldo began to face pressure in a process that threatened his permanence at CBF. Desperate, the executive sought a significant popular appeal to gain political strength and expedited the coach's change. As Jorge Jesus could not leave Al-Hilal immediately, Ednaldo resumed discussions with Ancelotti. In poor form at Real Madrid, the Italian agreed to rebuild the frustrated agreement from 2023 but requested a few weeks before the announcement to avoid repercussions before the Copa del Rey final. • HASTY ANNOUNCEMENT CBF intended to announce Ancelotti after the end of LaLiga on May 24. However, pressured by the possibility of his process being judged at any moment, Ednaldo rushed into CBF’s headquarters and ORDERED Ancelotti's announcement on May 12, surprising even close officials and people from Real Madrid. Three days later, Ednaldo was removed from the presidency and did not return to the position nor personally received Ancelotti. Jorge Jesus, who never hid his frustration at being 'abandoned' by Ednaldo and wasting the dream of leading Brazil, took over Portugal after the 2026 World Cup. 🗞️ @ESPNBrasil | @pedroivoalmeida 📸 Portugal National Team | Rafael Ribeiro/CBF (translated)

For 37 years, the political and media class has explained to us that patriotism and nationalism are xenophobia and almost fascism, because there is only the individual, their consumption, Europe, and a person being a citizen of the whole world. And now that same political class wants to say that Poles should fight. (translated)

"After four years of fascism, dismantled democracy, and ruthless deportation policies – is it not strange that the defenders of democracy still do not have a common will to put an end to this, but still seem to want to let the forces of darkness begin the attempts at forming a government?" (translated)