Array ( [0] => {{Short description|State of being real}} [1] => {{Other uses}} [2] => {{Use American English|date=April 2024}} [3] => {{Use mdy dates|date=April 2024}} [4] => {{Redirect|Being}} [5] => {{Good article}} [6] => [[File:Existential quantifier.svg|thumb|alt=Existential quantifier|The [[existential quantifier]] ∃ is often used in [[logic]] to express existence.]] [7] => [8] => '''Existence''' is the state of having '''being''' or [[reality]] in contrast to '''nonexistence''' and [[nonbeing]]. Existence is often contrasted with [[essence]]: the essence of an entity are its essential features or qualities, which can be understood even if one does not know whether the entity exists. [9] => [10] => The main philosophical discipline studying existence is called [[ontology]]. According to the orthodox view, existence is a second-order [[Property (philosophy)|property]] or a property of properties. For example, to say that lions exists means that the property of being a lion is instantiated. A different view holds existence is a first-order property or a property of [[Particular|individuals]]. This means existence is similar to other properties of individuals, like color and shape. [[Alexius Meinong]] and his followers accept this idea and hold not all individuals have this property; they state there are some individuals, such as [[Santa Claus]], that do not exist. Universalists reject this view; they see existence as a universal property of every individual. [11] => [12] => Various types of existence are discussed in academic literature. Singular existence is the existence of individual entities while general existence refers to the existence of [[Concept|concepts]] or [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]]. Other distinctions are between [[abstract and concrete]] existence; between [[Subjunctive possibility|possible]], [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]], and [[Metaphysical necessity|necessary]] existence; and between [[Matter|physical]] and [[Mind|mental]] existence. A closely related issue is whether different types of entities exist in different ways or have different degrees of existence. [13] => [14] => A key question in ontology is whether there is a reason for existence in general or [[Why there is anything at all|why anything exists at all]]. The concept of existence is relevant to various fields, including [[logic]], [[mathematics]], [[epistemology]], [[philosophy of mind]], [[philosophy of language]], and [[existentialism]]. [15] => [16] => == Definition and related terms == [17] => Existence is the state of being real, and to exist means to have being or to participate in [[reality]].{{multiref |1={{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} |2={{harvnb|MW staff|2023}} |3={{harvnb|CUP staff}} }} Existence sets real entities apart from imaginary ones,{{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} and can refer both to individual entities or to the totality of reality.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} |2={{harvnb|MW staff|2023}} |3={{harvnb|CUP staff}} |4={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} }} The word "existence" entered the English language in the late 14th century from [[old French]] and has its roots in the [[medieval Latin]] term {{lang|la|[[:wiktionary:en:exsisto#Latin|ex(s)istere]]}}, which means "to stand forth", "to appear", and "to arise".{{harvnb|Hoad|1993|p=160}} Existence is studied by the subdiscipline of [[metaphysics]] known as [[ontology]].{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} |2={{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section}} |3={{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=xi}} }}{{efn|Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that investigates the most basic aspects of [[reality]], such as existence, [[Subject and object (philosophy)|objects]] and their [[Property (philosophy)|properties]], possibility and necessity, [[space]] and [[time]], [[Causality|causation]], [[matter]], and [[mind]].{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–3}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ What Is an Introduction?}} }} As its subdiscipline, ontology examines the nature of existence and the [[categories of being]].{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=10–14}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ The Categories Of Being}} }}}} [18] => [19] => The terms "being", "reality", and "actuality" are often used as synonyms of "existence",{{multiref |1={{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} |2={{harvnb|MW staff|2023}} |3={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=2}} }} but the exact definition of ''existence'' and its connection to these terms is disputed.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=493}} |2={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, §2. Meinongianism}} }} According to [[Alexius Meinong]] (1853–1920), all entities have being but not all entities have existence. He argues merely possible objects like Santa Claus have being but lack existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, §2. Meinongianism}} |3={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49]}} }} Ontologist Takashi Yagisawa (20th century–present) contrasts existence with reality; he sees "reality" as the more-fundamental term because it equally characterizes all entities and defines existence as a relative term that connects an entity to the world it inhabits.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Divers|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/DIVWAI 570–574]}} |2={{harvnb|Yagisawa|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGPOW 270–272]}} }} According to [[Gottlob Frege]] (1848–1925), actuality is narrower than existence because only actual entities can produce and undergo changes, in contrast to non-actual existing entities like [[Number|numbers]] and [[Set (mathematics)|sets]].{{harvnb|Chakrabarti|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bLStBgAAQBAJ&pg=PT106 106–107]}} [20] => [21] => Existence contrasts with nonexistence, which refers to a lack of reality. Whether objects can be divided into existent and nonexistent objects is a subject of controversy. This distinction is sometimes used to explain how it is possible to think of fictional objects like dragons and unicorns but the concept of nonexistent objects is not generally accepted; some philosophers say the concept is contradictory.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Reicher|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/ lead section, §1. The Concept of a Nonexistent Object]}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=8}} |3={{harvnb|Liu|Berger|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=p5nOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT150 150]}} }} Closely related contrasting terms are [[nothingness]] and nonbeing.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Dobrez|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=h8FMAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA109 109]}} |2={{harvnb|Heisig|Kasulis|Maraldo|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GVgEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA830 830]}} |3={{harvnb|Leclerc|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_B2KaiGu038C&pg=PA49 49]}} |4={{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }} Existence is commonly associated with mind-independent reality but this position is not universally accepted because there could also be forms of mind-dependent existence, such as the existence of an idea inside a person's mind. According to some [[Idealism|idealists]], this may apply to all of reality.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}} | {{harvnb|Waxman|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UwGAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA211 211]}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=30, 33–34}} }} [22] => [23] => Another contrast is made between ''existence'' and ''[[essence]]''. Essence refers to the intrinsic nature or defining qualities of an entity. The essence of something determines what kind of entity it is and how it differs from other kinds of entities. Essence corresponds to what an entity is, while existence corresponds to the fact that it is. For instance, it is possible to understand what an [[Object (philosophy)|object]] is and grasp its nature even if one does not know whether this object exists.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=2}} |2={{harvnb|Ceylan|1993|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20840134 329–337]}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |4={{harvnb|Platter|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=U148EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT28 28]}} }} [24] => [25] => According to some philosophers, like [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938), existence is an elementary concept, meaning it cannot be defined in other terms without involving circularity. This would imply characterizing existence or talking about its nature in a non-trivial manner may be difficult or impossible.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=1–2}} |2={{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=16}} |3={{harvnb|Balthasar|2000|p=82}} |4={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA47 47–48]}} }} [26] => [27] => Disputes about the nature of existence are reflected in the distinction between [[Thin concept|thin]] and [[thick concept]]s of existence. Thin concepts of existence understand existence as a logical property that every existing thing shares; they do not include any substantial content about the metaphysical implications of having existence. According to one view, existence is the same as the logical property of [[Law of identity|self-identity]]. This view articulates a thin concept of existence because it merely states what exists is identical to itself without discussing any substantial characteristics of the nature of existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139|loc=7. Can We Make Sense of the Idea That God's Existence Is Identical to His Essence?}} |2={{harvnb|Novotný|Novák|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} |3={{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} |4={{harvnb|Bottani|Davies|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=15LIl3X8SnUC&pg=PA126 126]}} }} Thick concepts of existence encompass a metaphysical analysis of what it means that something exists and what essential features existence implies. According to one proposal, to exist is to be present in space and time, and to have effects on other things. This definition is controversial because it implies abstract objects such as numbers do not exist. [[George Berkeley]] (1685–1753) gave a different thick concept of existence; he stated: "to be is to be perceived", meaning all existence is mental.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139|loc=7. Can We Make Sense of the Idea That God's Existence Is Identical to His Essence?}} | {{harvnb|Novotný|Novák|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} | {{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|p=22}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=96_CBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9]}} }} [28] => [29] => According to some philosophers, there is a difference between entities and the fundamental characteristics that make them the entities they are.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–374]}} |2={{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}} |3={{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=1}} }} [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) introduced this concept; he calls it the [[ontological difference]] and contrasts individual beings with being. According to this view, being is not an entity but the background context that makes all individual entities intelligible.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–358]}} |2={{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}} |3={{harvnb|Boyle|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GqhFDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA133 133]}} |4={{harvnb|Inwood|1999|pp=89–100}} }}{{efn|In [[Heideggerian terminology|his own terminology]], Heidegger reserves the terms "''Existenz''" and "''Ek-sistenz''" to characterize the mode of being of [[Dasein]], which is the mode of being characteristic of human beings.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reck|2000|pp=155–156}} | {{harvnb|Aho|2021|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/eksistence-eksistenz/C78548237FFDBE1D518259C7DFA0BC9C 268–270]}} | {{harvnb|Inwood|1999|p=60}} }}}} [30] => [31] => == Types of existing entities == [32] => Different [[Theory of categories|types of existing entities]] are discussed in academic literature. Many discussions revolve around defining those types, the existence or nonexistence of entities of a specific type, the ways entities of different types are related to each other, and whether some types are more fundamental than others.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Hofweber|2023|loc=§ 3.1 Different Conceptions of Ontology}} |3={{harvnb|Livingston|Cutrofello|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yztcCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT63 63–64]}} |4={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=3–4}} |5={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} }} Examples are the existence or nonexistence of [[soul]]s; whether there are abstract, fictional, and universal entities; and the existence or nonexistence of [[possible world]]s and objects besides the actual world.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=493}} |3={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=3–4}} |4={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} }} [33] => [34] => === Singular and general === [35] => There is a distinction between singular existence and general existence. Singular existence is the existence of individual entities. For example, the sentence "[[Angela Merkel]] exists" expresses the existence of one particular person. General existence pertains to general concepts, properties, or [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]]. For instance, the sentence "politicians exist" states the general term "politician" has instances without referring to a particular politician.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Lambert|1994|pp=3–4}} |2={{harvnb|Rescher|1957|pp=65–69}} |3={{harvnb|Hailperin|1967|p=251}} |4={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA52 52–53]}} }} [36] => [37] => Singular and general existence are closely related to each other, and some philosophers have tried to explain one as a special case of the other. For example, according to Frege, general existence is more basic than singular existence. One argument in favor of this position is that singular existence can be expressed in terms of general existence. For instance, the sentence "Angela Merkel exists" can be expressed as "entities that are identical to Angela Merkel exist", where the expression "being identical to Angela Merkel" is understood as a general term. [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] (1908–2000) defends a different position by giving primacy to singular existence and arguing that general existence can be expressed in terms of singular existence.{{harvnb|Lambert|1994|pp=3–4}} [38] => [39] => A related question is whether there can be general existence without singular existence. According to philosopher [[Henry S. Leonard]] (1905–1967), a property only has general existence if there is at least one actual object that instantiates it. [[Nicholas Rescher]] (1928-2024), by contrast, states that properties can exist if they have no actual instances, like the property of "being a unicorn".{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Rescher|1957|pp=65–69}} |2={{harvnb|Hailperin|1967|p=251}} }} This question has a long philosophical tradition in relation to the existence of universals. According to [[Platonism|Platonists]], universals have general existence as [[Platonic forms]] independently of the particulars that instantiate them. According to this view, the universal of redness exists independently of the existence or nonexistence of red objects.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=133–134}} |2={{harvnb|Balaguer|2016|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#1 § 1. What is Platonism?]}} }} [[Aristotelianism]] also accepts the existence of universals but says their existence depends on particulars that instantiate them and that they are unable to exist by themselves. According to this view, a universal that has no instances in the spatio-temporal world does not exist.{{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=138}} According to [[Nominalism|nominalists]], only particulars have existence and they deny universals exist.{{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=3–4, 137}} [40] => [41] => === Concrete and abstract === [42] => There is an influential distinction in ontology between [[abstract and concrete|concrete and abstract objects]]. Many concrete objects, like rocks, plants, and other people, are encountered in everyday life. They exist in space and time, and influence each other; they have [[Causality|causal powers]] and are affected by other concrete objects. Abstract objects, like numbers, sets, and types, have no location in space and time, and lack causal powers.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Falguera|Martínez-Vidal|Rosen|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/ lead section, § 1. Introduction]}} |3={{harvnb|Stadler|Stöltzner|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ftrmBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA89 89–91]}} |4={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=498–499}} }} The distinction between concrete objects and abstract objects is sometimes treated as the most-general division of being.{{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|pp=670–671}} [43] => [44] => The existence of concrete objects is wide agreed upon but opinions about abstract objects are divided. [[Philosophical realism|Realists]] accept the idea abstract objects have independent existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Belfiore|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IQp5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 110]}} |2={{harvnb|Faulkner|Gregersen|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5-JhDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA298 298]}} |3={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=498–499}} }} Some realists say abstract objects have the same mode of existence as concrete objects while according to others, they exist in a different way.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=493, 498–499}} }} [[Anti-realism|Anti-realists]] state abstract objects do not exist, a view that is often combined with the idea existence requires a location in space and time or the ability to causally interact.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Plebani|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pkNb_3NYyz0C&pg=PA5 5]}} }} [45] => [46] => === Possible, contingent, and necessary === [47] => A further distinction is between merely possible, [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]], and [[Metaphysical necessity|necessary]] existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=157–158}} |3={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49, 52]}} }} An entity has necessary existence if it must exist or could not fail to exist. Entities that exist but could fail to exist are contingent while merely possible entities do not exist but could exist.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=157–158}} |2={{harvnb|Albertazzi|Jacquette|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wkQrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA87 87]}} |3={{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=1–2}} |4={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA52 52]}} }} [48] => [49] => {{multiple image |perrow=2 / 1 |total_width=300 |image1=Avicenna lithograph - cropped.png |alt1=Lithograph of Avicenna |link1=Avicenna |image2=Thomas Aquinas by Carlo Crivelli.png |alt2=Painting of Thomas Aquinas |link2=Thomas Aquinas |footer=[[Avicenna]] and [[Thomas Aquinas]] argued that God has necessary existence.}} [50] => [51] => Most entities encountered in ordinary experience, like telephones, sticks, and flowers, have contingent existence.{{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=1–2}} It is an open question whether any entities have necessary existence. According to one view, all concrete objects have contingent existence while all abstract objects have necessary existence.{{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=1–4}} According to some theorists, one or several necessary beings are required as the explanatory foundation of the cosmos; for instance, according to philosophers like [[Avicenna]] (980–1037) and [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1225–1274), God has necessary existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=157–158}} |2={{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=1–6}} |3={{harvnb|Haan|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=XV75DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA381 381]}} |4={{harvnb|Turner|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Dik3_ZjWo-MC&pg=PA238 238]}} }} A few philosophers, like [[Baruch Spinoza]] (1632–1677), see [[Pantheism|God and the world as the same thing]], and say all entities has necessary existence in order to provide a unified and rational explanation of everything.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lin|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OWIwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA152 152]}} | {{harvnb|Nadler|2023|loc=§ 2.1 God or Nature}} }} [52] => [53] => There are many academic debates about the existence of merely possible objects. According to [[actualism]], only actual entities have being; this includes both contingent and necessary entities but excludes merely possible entities.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} |2={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49–50]}} }} [[Possibilism (philosophy)|Possibilists]] reject this view and state there are also merely possible objects besides actual objects.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49–50]}} }} For example, [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] (1941–2001) states that possible objects exist in the same way as actual objects in order to provide a robust explanation of why statements about what is possible and necessary are true. According to him, possible objects exist in possible worlds while actual objects exist in the actual world. Lewis says the only difference between possible worlds and the actual world is the location of the speaker; the term "actual" refers to the world of the speaker, similar to the way the terms "here" and "now" refer to the spatial and temporal location of the speaker.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} | {{harvnb|Weatherson|2021|loc=§ 6. Modal Metaphysics}} }} [54] => [55] => The problem of contingent and necessary existence is closely related to the ontological question of [[why there is anything at all]] or why is there something rather than [[nothing]]. According to one view, the existence of something is a contingent fact, meaning the world could have been totally empty. This is not possible if there are necessary entities, which could not have failed to exist. In this case, global nothingness is impossible because the world needs to contain at least all necessary entities.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} | {{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §4. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2009|pp=109–112}} | {{harvnb|Morin|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8HkxEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46]}} | {{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section, §1. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=157–158}} | {{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=4–5}}}} [56] => [57] => === Physical and mental === [58] => A further distinction is between entities that exist on a physical level in contrast to mental entities.{{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=Lead Section}} Physical entities include objects encountered in everyday life, like stones, trees, and human bodies, as well as entities discussed in [[modern physics]], like electrons and protons. Physical entities can be observed and measured; they possess mass and a location in space and time.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, §Types of Materialist Theory}} |2={{harvnb|Markosian|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lQ2xDwAAQBAJ 486–487]|loc=Physical Object}} }} Mental entities like perceptions, experiences of pleasure and pain as well as beliefs, desires, and emotions belong to the realm of the mind; they are primarily associated with conscious experiences but also include unconscious states like unconscious beliefs, desires, and memories.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Kim|2006|loc=[https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 § 1. Introduction]}} |2={{harvnb|EB staff|2023}} |3={{harvnb|Addis|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6ZEN6vByUC&pg=PA49 49–50]}} |4={{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5G_iBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT183 183]}} }} [59] => [60] => The ontological status of physical and mental entities is a frequent topic in metaphysics and [[philosophy of mind]]. According to [[materialists]], only physical entities exist on the most-fundamental level. Materialists usually explain mental entities in terms of physical processes; for example, as brain states or as patterns of neural activation. Idealists reject this view and state that mind is the ultimate foundation of existence while physical entities have a derivative form of existence, for instance, as mental representations or products of consciousness. [[Mind–body dualism|Dualists]] like [[Rene Descartes]] (1596–1650) believe both physical and mental entities exist on the most-fundamental level. They state they are connected to one another in various ways but that one cannot be reduced to the other.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AFwr3CCoqAEC&pg=PA87 87–88]}} |2={{harvnb|Goldschmidt|Pearce|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QgJCDwAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix]}} |3={{harvnb|Darvill|2009|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199534043.001.0001/acref-9780199534043-e-1926 Idealism]}} |4={{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, §Types of Materialist Theory}} }} [61] => [62] => === Others === [63] => Fictional entities are entities that exist as inventions inside works of [[fiction]].{{efn|Some [[Empiricism|empiricist]] philosophers also include entities that are [[Unobservable|not directly observable]], like powers and moral obligations.{{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}}}} For example, [[Sherlock Holmes]] is a fictional character in [[Arthur Conan Doyle]]'s book ''[[A Study in Scarlet]]'' and the [[One Ring]] is a fictional object in [[J. R. R. Tolkien]]'s book ''[[The Lord of the Rings]]''.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=493}} }} According to anti-realism, fictional entities do not form part of reality in any substantive sense. Possibilists, by contrast, see fictional entities as a subclass of possible objects while creationists say that they are artifacts that depend for their existence on the authors who first conceived them.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=§ 1. The Metaphysics of Fictional Entities}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=§ 2. Deflationary theories, § 3. Hospitable theories}} }} [64] => [65] => [[Intentionality#The problem of intentional inexistence|Intentional inexistence]] is a similar phenomenon concerned with the existence of objects within mental states. This happens when a person perceives or thinks about an object. In some cases, the [[intentional object]] corresponds to a real object outside the mental state, like when accurately perceiving a tree in the garden. In other cases, the intentional object does not have a real counterpart, like when thinking about [[Bigfoot]]. The [[Intentionality#The problem of intentional inexistence|problem of intentional inexistence]] is the challenge of explaining how one can think about entities that do not exist since this seems to have the paradoxical implication that the thinker stands in a [[Relation (philosophy)|relation]] to a non-existing object.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jacob|2023|loc=2. Intentional inexistence}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2007|pp=307–308}} | {{harvnb|O’Madagain|loc=§ 2. Intentional Objects}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018}} }} [66] => [67] => == Modes and degrees of existence == [68] => Closely related to the problem of different types of entities is the question of whether their modes of existence also vary. This is the case according to ontological pluralism, which states entities belonging to different types differ in both their essential features and in the ways they exist.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|McDaniel|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8F0vDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT89 77]}} }} This position is sometimes found in theology; it states God is radically different from his creation and emphasizes his uniqueness by saying the difference affects both God's features and God's mode of existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|McDaniel|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8F0vDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT17 5–6]}} }} [69] => [70] => Another form of ontological pluralism distinguishes the existence of material objects from the existence of [[space-time]]. According to this view, material objects have relative existence because they exist in space-time while the existence of space-time itself is not relative in this sense because it just exists without existing within another space-time.{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} [71] => [72] => The topic of degrees of existence is closely related to the problem of modes of existence. This topic is based on the idea some entities exist to a higher degree or have more being than other entities, similar to the way some properties, such as heat and mass, have degrees. According to Plato (428/427–348/347 BCE), for example, unchangeable [[Platonic form]]s have a higher degree of existence than physical objects.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Poidevin|Peter|Andrew|Cameron|2009|pp=227–228}} |2={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} }} [73] => [74] => The view there are different types of entities is common in metaphysics but the idea they differ from each other in their modes or degrees of existence is often rejected, implying that a thing either exists or does not exist without in-between alternatives.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=5–8}} }} [[Peter van Inwagen]] (1942–present) uses the idea that there is an intimate relationship between existence and quantification to argue against different modes of existence. [[Quantification (science)|Quantification]] is related to the counting of objects; according to Inwagen, if there were different modes of entities, people would need different types of numbers to count them. Because the same numbers can be used to count different types of entities, he concludes all entities have the same mode of existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|Berto|Plebani|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Jy3bBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60]}} }} [75] => [76] => == Theories of the nature of existence == [77] => [[File:Bellerophon riding Pegasus and killing the Chimera, Roman mosaic, the Rolin Museum in Autun, France, 2nd to 3rd century AD.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Mosaic depicting Pegasus|One of the topics covered by theories of the nature of existence concerns the ontological status of fictional objects like [[Pegasus]].{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}}]] [78] => [79] => Theories of the nature of existence aim to explain what it means for something to exist. The central dispute about the nature of existence is whether it should be understood as a [[Property (philosophy)|property]] of individuals.{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} An individual is a unique entity, like [[Socrates]] or a particular apple. A property is something that is attributed to an entity, like "being human" or "being red", and usually expresses a quality or feature of that entity.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orilia|Paolini Paoletti|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=683}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }} The two main theories of existence are first-order and second-order theories. First-order theories understand existence as a property of individuals while second-order theories say existence is a second-order property, that is, a property of properties.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=Lead Section}} |3={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section}} |4={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }} [80] => [81] => A central challenge for theories of the nature of existence is an understanding of the possibility of coherently denying the existence of something, like the claim: "Santa Claus does not exist". One difficulty is explaining how the name "Santa Claus" can be meaningful even though there is no Santa Claus.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}} | {{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} }} [82] => [83] => === Second-order theories === [84] => Second-order theories, which are often seen as the orthodox position, understand existence as a second-order property rather than a first-order property.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }} For instance, the [[Empire State Building]] is an individual object and "being {{convert|443.2|meters|abbr=out|spell=us}} tall" is a first-order property of it. "Being instantiated"{{efn|A property is instantiated if an entity has this property.{{harvnb|Orilia|Paolini Paoletti|2022|loc=Lead Section}}}} is a property of "being 443.2 meters tall" and therefore a second-order property. According to second-order theories, to talk about existence is to talk about which properties have instances.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} }} For example, this view states the sentence "God exists" means "Godhood is instantiated" rather than "God has the property of existing". [85] => [86] => A key motivation behind theories describing existence as a second-order property is that existence is in important ways different from regular properties like ''being a building'' and ''being 443.2 meters tall'': regular properties express what an object is like but existence does not.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }} According to this view, existence is more fundamental than regular properties because without it, objects cannot instantiate any properties.{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} [87] => [88] => According to second-order theorists, [[Quantifier (logic)|quantifiers]] rather than [[Predication (philosophy)|predicates]] express existence.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} |4={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }} Predicates are expressions that apply to and classify objects, usually by attributing features to them, such as "is a butterfly" and "is happy".{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fasold|Connor-Linton|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=E85VAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA141 141–143]}} | {{harvnb|Ellis|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DmLfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT39 39–40]}} }} Quantifiers are terms that talk about the quantity of objects that have certain properties. Existential quantifiers express that there is at least one object, like the expressions like "some" and "there exists", as in "some cows eat grass" and "there exists an even prime number".{{multiref | {{harvnb|Magnus|2005|pp=52–53}} | {{harvnb|Uzquiano|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }} In this regard, existence is closely related to counting because to claim something exists is to claim the corresponding concept has one or more instances. [89] => [90] => Second-order views imply a sentence like "[[Monotremes|egg-laying mammals]] exist" is misleading because the word "exist" is used as a predicate in them. These views say the true logical form is better expressed in reformulations like "there exist entities that are egg-laying mammals". This way, "existence" has the role of a quantifier and "egg-laying mammals" is the predicate. Quantifier constructions can also be used to express negative existential statements; for instance, the sentence "talking tigers do not exist" can be expressed as "it is not the case that there exist talking tigers".{{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} [91] => [92] => [[File:Bertrand Russell 1949.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of Bertrand Russell|upright=0.8|[[Bertrand Russell]] proposed his [[theory of descriptions]] to dissolve paradoxes surrounding negative existential statements.]] [93] => [94] => Many ontologists accept second-order theories provide a correct analysis of many types of existential sentences. It is, however, controversial whether it is correct for all cases.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }} Some problems relate to assumptions associated with everyday language about sentences like "[[Ronald McDonald]] does not exist". This type of statement is called ''negative singular existential'' and the expression ''Ronald McDonald'' is a [[singular term]] that seems to refer to an individual. It is not clear how the expression can refer to an individual if, as the sentence claims, this individual does not exist. According to a solution [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872—1970) proposed, singular terms do not refer to individuals but are [[Theory of descriptions|descriptions of individuals]]. This theory states negative singular existentials deny an object matching the descriptions exists without referring to a non-existent individual. Following this approach, the sentence "Ronald McDonald does not exist" expresses the idea: "it is not the case there is a unique happy hamburger clown".{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} |2={{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} }} [95] => [96] => === First-order theories === [97] => According to first-order theories, existence is a property of individuals. These theories are less-widely accepted than second-order theories but also have some influential proponents. There are two types of first-order theories; according to Meinongianism, existence is a property of some but not all entities, which implies there are nonexistent entities; according to universalism, existence is a universal property instantiated by every entity.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §2. Existence as a First-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }} [98] => [99] => ==== Meinongianism ==== [100] => Meinongianism is a view about existence first formulated by Austrian philosopher [[Alexius Meinong]]. Its main claim is that there are some entities that do not exist, meaning [[objecthood]] is independent of existence. Proposed examples of nonexistent objects are merely possible objects such as flying pigs, as well as fictional and mythical objects like Sherlock Holmes and Zeus. According to this view, these objects are real and have being, even though they do not exist.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }} Meinong states there is an object for any combination of properties. For example, there is an object that only has the single property of "being a singer" with no additional properties. This means neither the attribute of "wearing a dress" nor the absence of it applies to this object. Meinong also includes impossible objects like round squares in this classification.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} }} [101] => [102] => [[File:Meinong.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Photo of Alexius Meinong|upright=0.8|According to [[Alexius Meinong]], there are some entities that do not exist.]] [103] => [104] => According to Meinongians, sentences describing Sherlock Holmes and Zeus refer to nonexisting objects. They are true or false depending on whether these objects have the properties ascribed to them.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} |3={{harvnb|Tymieniecka|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mprnCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA208 208]}} }} For instance, the sentence "Pegasus has wings" is true because having wings is a property of Pegasus, even though Pegasus lacks the property of existing.{{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}} [105] => [106] => One key motivation of Meinongianism is to explain how negative singular existentials like "Ronald McDonald does not exist" can be true. Meinongians accept the idea that singular terms like "Ronald McDonald" refer to individuals. For them, a negative singular existential is true if the individual it refers to does not exist.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Penelope|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}} }} [107] => [108] => Meinongianism has important implications for understandings of quantification. According to an influential view defended by [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], the domain of quantification is restricted to existing objects. This view implies quantifiers carry [[ontological commitments]] about what exists and what does not exist. Meinongianism differs from this view by saying the widest domain of quantification includes both existing and nonexisting objects. [109] => [110] => Some aspects of Meinongianism are controversial and have received substantial criticism. According to one objection, one cannot distinguish between being an object and being an existing object. A closely related criticism states objects cannot have properties if they do not exist. A further objection is that Meinongianism leads to an "overpopulated universe" because there is an object corresponding to any combination of properties. A more specific criticism rejects the idea that there are incomplete and impossible objects.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |3={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |4={{harvnb|Jacquette|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7jswCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA78 78–79, 180]}} }} [111] => [112] => ==== Universalism ==== [113] => Universalists agree with Meinongians that existence is a property of individuals but deny there are nonexistent entities. Instead, universalists state existence is a universal property; all entities have it, meaning everything exists. One approach is to say existence is the same as self-identity. According to the [[law of identity]], every object is identical to itself or has the property of self-identity. This can be expressed in [[predicate logic]] as \forall x (x=x).{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2b. Universalism}} [114] => [115] => An influential argument in favor of universalism is the claim that to deny the existence of something is contradictory. This conclusion follows from the premises that one can only deny the existence of something by referring to that entity and that one can only refer to entities that exist. [116] => [117] => Universalists have proposed different ways of interpreting negative singular existentials. According to one view, names of fictional entities like "Ronald McDonald" refer to [[abstract object]]s, which exist even though they do not exist in space and time. This means, when understood in a strict sense, all negative singular existentials are false, including the claim "Ronald McDonald does not exist". Universalists can interpret such sentences slightly differently in relation to the context. In everyday life, for example, people use sentences like "Ronald McDonald does not exist" to express the idea Ronald McDonald does not exist as a concrete object, which is true.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2b. Universalism}} }} Another approach is to claim negative singular existentials are neither true nor false but [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaningless]] because their singular terms do not refer to anything.{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} [118] => [119] => == History == [120] => === Western philosophy === [121] => [[Western philosophy]] originated with the [[Presocratic philosophy|Presocratic philosophers]], who aimed to replace earlier [[Greek mythology|mythological accounts]] of the universe by providing rational explanations based on foundational principles of all existence. Some, like [[Thales]] (c. 624–545 BCE) and [[Heraclitus]] (c. 540–480 BCE), suggested concrete principles like water and fire are the root of existence. [[Anaximander]] (c. 610–545 BCE) opposed this position; he believed the source must lie in an abstract principle that is beyond the world of human perception.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Graham|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Presocratic Thought}} |2={{harvnb|Duignan|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MfBS-RXJ5RsC&pg=PA9 9–11]}} }} [122] => [123] => [[File:"The School of Athens" by Raffaello Sanzio da Urbino (cropped).jpg|left|thumb|alt=painting of Plato and Aristotle|upright|Plato and his student Aristotle disagreed on whether form and matter depend on one another for their existence.]] [124] => [125] => [[Plato]] (428/427–348/347 BCE) argued that different types of entities have different degrees of existence and that shadows and images exist in a weaker sense than regular material objects. He said unchangeable [[Platonic forms]] have the highest type of existence, and saw material objects as imperfect and impermanent copies of Platonic forms.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Poidevin|Peter|Andrew|Cameron|2009|pp=227–228}} }} [126] => [127] => While [[Aristotle]] (384–322 BCE) accepted Plato's idea that forms are different from matter, he challenged the claim that forms have a higher type of existence. Instead, he believed forms cannot exist without matter.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Trott|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=SHsxEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA109 109–110]}} |2={{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Aristotle}} }} He stated: "being is said in many ways" and explored how different types of entities have different modes of existence. For example, he distinguished between [[Ousia|substances]] and their [[Accident (philosophy)|accidents]], and between [[potentiality and actuality]].{{multiref | {{harvnb|Poidevin|Peter|Andrew|Cameron|2009|pp=228–229}} | {{harvnb|Menn|2021|loc=§1. The Senses of Being and the Necessity of Δ. 7}} | {{harvnb|Kung|1986|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/27743750 3–4]}} }} [128] => [129] => [[Neoplatonists]] like [[Plotinus]] (204–270 CE) suggested reality has a hierarchical structure. They believed a transcendent entity, called "the One" or "the Good", is responsible for all existence. From it emerges the intellect, which in turn gives rise to the soul and the material world.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 6. Post-Hellenistic Thought}} |2={{harvnb|Adamson|2015|pp=209–215}} |3={{harvnb|Furley|2005|pp=357–388}} |4={{harvnb|Camus|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=e_myYMkRuN4C&pg=PA45 45]}} |5={{harvnb|Lawson|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1AY1ALzh9V0C&pg=PA200 200]}} }} [130] => [131] => [[File:Anselm of Canterbury2.png|thumb|alt=Painting of Anselm of Canterbury|upright=.7|[[Anselm of Canterbury]] is known for his formulation of the ontological argument aiming to prove the existence of God.]] [132] => [133] => In [[medieval philosophy]], [[Anselm of Canterbury]] (1033–1109 CE) formulated the influential [[ontological argument]], which aims to deduce the existence of God from the concept of God. Anselm defined God as the greatest conceivable being. He reasoned that an entity that did not exist outside his mind would not be the greatest conceivable being, leading him to the conclusion God exists.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Anselm}} |2={{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} |3={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=493–494}} }} [134] => [135] => [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1224–1274 CE) distinguished between the essence of a thing and its existence. According to him, the essence of a thing constitutes its fundamental nature. He argued it is possible to understand what an object is and grasp its essence, even if one does not know whether the object exists. He concluded from this observation existence is not part of the qualities of an object and should be understood as a separate property. Aquinas also considered the problem of [[creation from nothing]] and said only God has the power to truly bring new entities into existence. These ideas later inspired [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]]'s (1646–1716) theory of creation; Leibniz said to create is to confer actual existence to possible objects.{{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=494}} [136] => [137] => Both [[David Hume]] (1711–1776) and [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804) rejected the idea that existence is a property. According to Hume, objects are [[Bundle theory|bundles of qualities]]. He said existence is not a property because there is no impression of existence besides the bundled qualities.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=495}} }} Kant came to a similar conclusion in his criticism of the ontological argument; according to him, this proof fails because one cannot deduce from the definition of a concept whether entities described by this concept exist. Kant said existence does not add anything to the concept of the object; it only indicates this concept is instantiated.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} }} According to [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831), there is no pure being or pure nothing, only becoming.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rosen|2014|pp=15, 113–114}} | {{harvnb|Magee|2010|pp=47–48}} }} [138] => [139] => [[File:Franz Brentano in Vienna, 1875.png|thumb|left|alt=Photo of Franz Brentano|upright=.7|Franz Brentano defended the idea that all judgments are existential judgments.]] [140] => [141] => [[Franz Brentano]] (1838–1917) agreed with Kant's criticism and his claim that existence is not a real predicate. Brentano used this idea to develop his theory of judgments, which states all judgments are existential judgments; they either affirm or deny the existence of something. He stated judgments like "some zebras are striped" have the logical form "there is a striped zebra" while judgments like "all zebras are striped" have the logical form "there is not a non-striped zebra".{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Kriegel|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Yz5MDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA103 103–104, 119]}} |2={{harvnb|Brandl|Textor|2022|loc=Lead Section, §1.3 Part III: Existential Judgements, §2. Brentano and His Precursors on Existential Judgement}} |3={{harvnb|Rollinger|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6FJFBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA226 226]}} |4={{harvnb|Husserl|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ikqzDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA184 184]}} |5={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=495–496}} }} [142] => [143] => [[Gottlob Frege]] (1848–1925) and [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) aimed to refine the idea of what it means that existence is not a regular property. They distinguished between regular first-order properties of individuals and second-order properties of other properties. According to their view, existence is the second-order property of "being instantiated".{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }} Russell further developed the idea that general sentences like "lions exist" are at their most fundamental form about individuals by stating that there is an individual that is a lion.{{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=496–498}} [144] => [145] => Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) followed Frege and Russell in accepting existence as a second-order property. He drew a close link between existence and the role of quantification in formal logic.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} }} He applied this idea to scientific theories and stated a scientific theory is committed to the existence of an entity if the theory quantifies over this entity. For example, if a theory in biology claims "there are populations with genetic diversity", this theory has an ontological commitment to the existence of populations with genetic diversity.{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification, §2a. Meinongianism}} Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) was an influential critic of second-order theories and developed the alternative view that existence is a property of individuals and that not all individuals have this property.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} }} [146] => [147] => {{clear}} [148] => [149] => === Eastern philosophy === [150] => {{main|Eastern philosophy}} [151] => [[File:Raja Ravi Varma - Sankaracharya - cropped.png|thumb|left|upright=.7|alt=Painting of Adi Shankara|[[Adi Shankara]] taught that only the divine exists on the most fundamental level.]] [152] => [153] => Many schools of thought in Eastern philosophy discuss the problem of existence and its implications. For instance, the ancient [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] school of [[Samkhya]] articulated a metaphysical dualism according to which the two types of existence are pure consciousness (''[[Purusha]]'') and matter (''[[Prakriti]]''). Samkhya explains the manifestation of the universe as the interaction between these two principles.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Leaman|2002|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA77 77–78]}} |2={{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Classical Period of Indian Philosophy}} |3={{harvnb|Ruzsa|2023|loc=Lead Section, §4. Metaphysics}} }} [[Adi Shankara]] (c. 700–750 CE) developed a different approach in his school of [[Advaita Vedanta]]. Sankara defended a metaphysical monism by claiming the divine (''[[Brahman]]'') is the ultimate reality and the only existent. According to this view, the impression there is a universe consisting of many distinct entities is an illusion (''[[Maya (religion)|Maya]]'').{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Medieval Period of Indian Philosophy}} |2={{harvnb|Dalal|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Life and Works}} |3={{harvnb|Menon|loc=Lead Section}} |4={{harvnb|Leaman|2002|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA77 77–78]}} }} The essential features of ultimate reality are described as ''[[Satcitananda|Sat Chit Ananda]]''—meaning existence, consciousness, and bliss.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Vanamali|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QGAoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT53 53–54]}} |2={{harvnb|Mahapatra|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tRveDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 110]}} }} [154] => [155] => A central doctrine in [[Buddhist philosophy]] is called the "[[three marks of existence]]", which are ''[[anicca|aniccā]]'' (impermanence), ''[[anattā]]'' (absence of a permanent self), and ''[[dukkha]]'' (suffering). ''Aniccā'' is the doctrine that all of existence is subject to change, meaning everything changes at some point and nothing lasts forever. ''Anattā'' expresses a similar state in relation to persons by claiming people do not have a permanent identity or a separate self. Ignorance about ''aniccā'' and ''anattā'' is seen as the main cause of ''dukkha'' by leading people to form attachments that cause suffering.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smith|Worden|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8emELTpHWSEC&pg=PA18 18]}} |2={{harvnb|Coakley|Shelemay|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sQULdfIlBIYC&pg=PA110 110]}} }} [156] => [157] => [[File:Head of Laozi marble Tang Dynasty (618-906 CE) Shaanxi Province China.jpg|thumb|upright=.7|alt=Bust of Laozi|Laozi saw [[dao]] as a fundamental principle that constitutes the root of all existence.]] [158] => [159] => A central idea in many schools of [[Chinese philosophy]], like [[Laozi]]'s (6th century BCE) [[Daoism]], is that a fundamental principle known as ''[[dao]]'' is the source of all existence. The term is often translated as "the way" and is understood as a cosmic force that governs the natural order of the world. Chinese metaphysicians debated whether ''dao'' is a form of being or whether, as the source of being, it belongs to non-being.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Perkins|2019|loc=Lead Section, §3.1 Monism}} |2={{harvnb|EB staff|2017|loc=§ Periods of Development of Chinese Philosophy}} |3={{harvnb|Wang|Bao|Guan|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gSfXDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA6 6–8]}} |4={{harvnb|Csikszentmihalyi|Ivanhoe|1999|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ssS4tFD-CvwC&pg=PA35 35]}}}} [160] => [161] => The concept of existence played a central role in [[Islamic philosophy|Arabic-Persian philosophy]]. [[Avicenna]] (980–1037 CE) and [[Al-Ghazali]] (1058–1111 CE) discussed the relationship between existence and essence, and said the essence of an entity is prior to its existence. The additional step of instantiating the essence is required for the entity to come into existence. [[Mulla Sadra]] (1571–1636 CE) rejected this priority of essence over existence, and said essence is only a concept that is used by the mind to grasp existence. Existence, by contrast, encompasses the whole of reality, according to his view.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Leaman|2002|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA77 77–78]}} |2={{harvnb|DeGrood|1976|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3vYOp1AGpVUC&pg=PA37 37]}} }} [162] => {{Clear|left}} [163] => [164] => == In various disciplines == [165] => === Formal logic === [166] => {{main|Logic}} [167] => [168] => Formal logic studies [[Deductive validity|deductively valid arguments]].{{multiref |1={{harvnb|MacFarlane|2017}} |2={{harvnb|Corkum|2015|pp=753–767}} |3={{harvnb|Blair|Johnson|2000|pp=93–95}} |4={{harvnb|Magnus|2005|loc=§ 1.6 Formal Languages|pp=12–14}} }} In [[first-order logic]], which is the most-commonly used system of formal logic, existence is expressed using the [[existential quantifier]] (\exists). For example, the formula \exists x \text{Horse}(x) can be used to state horses exist. The variable ''x'' ranges over all elements in the [[Domain of discourse|domain of quantification]] and the existential quantifier expresses that at least one element in this domain is a horse. In first-order logic, all singular terms like names refer to objects in the domain and imply the object exists. Because of this, one can deduce \exists x \text{Honest}(x) (someone is honest) from \text{Honest}(Bill) (Bill is honest).{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Shapiro|Kouri Kissel|2022|loc=§2.1 Building Blocks}} |2={{harvnb|Cook|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JfaqBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA111 111]}} |3={{harvnb|Kind|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oDhjDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT236 236]}} |4={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} }} If only one object matching the description exists, the [[Uniqueness quantification|unique existential quantifier]] \exists ! can be used.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Roberts|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NjBLnLyE4jAC&pg=PA52 52]}} | {{harvnb|Johar|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JnPsEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 38]}} }} [169] => [170] => Many logical systems that are based on first-order logic also follow this idea. [[Free logic]] is an exception because it allows the presence of empty names that do not refer to an object in the domain.{{harvnb|Nolt|2021|loc=Lead Section, §1. The Basics}} With this modification, it is possible to apply [[logical reasoning]] to fictional objects instead of limiting it to regular objects.{{harvnb|Nolt|2021|loc=§5.4 Logics of Fiction}} In free logic one can express that Pegasus is a flying horse using the formula \text{Flyinghorse}(Pegasus). As a consequence of this modification, one cannot infer from this type of statement that something exists. This means the inference from \text{Flyinghorse}(Pegasus) to \exist x \text{Flyinghorse}(x) is invalid in free logic, even though it is valid in first-order logic. Free logic uses an additional existence predicate (E!) to say a singular term refers to an existing object. For example, the formula E!(Homer) can be used to say [[Homer]] exists while the formula \lnot E!(Pegasus) states Pegasus does not exist.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Morscher|Hieke|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zn3oCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA118 118]}} |2={{harvnb|Nolt|2021|loc=Lead Section, §1. The Basics, §5.4 Logics of Fiction}} |3={{harvnb|Sider|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GK8SEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA129 129]}} }} [171] => [172] => === Epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language === [173] => The disciplines of [[epistemology]], [[philosophy of mind]], and [[philosophy of language]] deal with [[Mental representation|mental]] and linguistic representations in their attempt to understand the nature of knowledge, the mind, and language. This brings with it the problem of reference or how representations can refer to existing objects. Examples of such representations are beliefs, thoughts, perceptions, words, and sentences. For instance, in the sentence "Barack Obama is a Democrat", the name "Barack Obama" refers to a particular individual. In relation to perception, the problem of reference questions whether and to what extent perceptual impressions put the perceiver in contact with reality by presenting existing objects rather than illusions.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Urban|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xLS3AwAAQBAJ&pg=PT33 33]}} |2={{harvnb|Raftopoulos|Machamer|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=80ZitZBNao4C&pg=PA1 1–2, 142]}} |3={{harvnb|Michaelson|Reimer|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction}} |4={{harvnb|Martinich|Stroll|2023|loc=Lead Section, § The Nature of Epistemology}} |5={{harvnb|Audi|2006|loc=§ Epistemology, § Philosophy of Mind, § Philosophy of Language}} }} [174] => [175] => Closely related to the problem of reference is the relationship between true representations and existence. According to [[truthmaker theory]], true representations require a truthmaker, i.e., an entity whose existence is responsible for the representation being true. For example, the sentence "kangaroos live in Australia" is true because there are kangaroos in Australia; the existence of these kangaroos is the truthmaker of the sentence. Truthmaker theory states there is a close relationship between truth and existence; there exists a truthmaker for every true representation.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Asay|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Smith|Mulligan|Simons|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RNg2n2yVrCUC&pg=PA9 9–10]}} }} [176] => [177] => === Others === [178] => Many of the individual sciences are concerned with the existence of particular types of entities and the laws governing them, such as physical things in physics and living entities in biology.{{harvnb|Ney|2014|p=xiii}} The [[natural science]]s employ a great variety of concepts to classify entities; these are known as [[natural kinds]], and include categories like protons, gold, and elephants. According to [[Scientific realism|scientific realists]], these entities have mind-independent being while [[Scientific anti-realism|scientific anti-realists]] say the existence of these entities and categories is based on human perceptions, theories, and social constructs.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brzović|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Metaphysics of Natural Kinds}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=Lead Section, § 1.2 Natural Kind Realism}} | {{harvnb|Liston|loc=Lead Section}} }} A similar problem concerns the existence of social kinds, which are basic concepts, including race, gender, and disability, that are used in the [[social sciences]].{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ásta|2017|pp=[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315768571-27/social-kinds-%C3%A1sta 290–291]}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=§ 2.4 Natural Kinds and Social Science}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=259–263}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=185–186}} }} [179] => [180] => [[Existentialism]] is a school of thought that explores the nature of human existence. One of its key ideas is that [[existence precedes essence]], meaning that existence is more basic than essence and the nature and purpose of human beings are not pre-existing but develop in the process of living. According to this view, humans are thrown into a world that lacks pre-existing intrinsic meaning. They must to determine for themselves their purpose and what [[Meaning of life|meaning their life]] should have. Existentialists use this idea to explore on the role of freedom and responsibility in actively shaping one's life.{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Burnham|Papandreopoulos|loc=Lead Section, §1c. Freedom, §1e. Existence, §1f. Irrationality/Absurdity}} |2={{harvnb|Aho|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }} Existentialism has influenced various reflections on the role of human existence in [[sociology]]. Existentialist sociology examines the ways humans experience the social world and [[Social constructionism|construct reality]].{{harvnb|Melnikov|Kotarba|2015|loc=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeose083.pub2 Existential Sociology]}} Existence theory is a relatively recent approach that focuses on the temporal aspect of existence in society and how the existential milestones to which people aspire influence their lives.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baert|Morgan|Ushiyama|2022|pp=7–8}} | {{harvnb|Flisbäck|Bengtsson|2024|pp=1–2}} }} [181] => [182] => Mathematicians are often interested in the existence of certain [[mathematical object]]s.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chihara|1990|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Lucas|1990|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jklsb5JUgoQC&pg=PA75 75]}} }} For example, number theorists ask how many [[prime number]]s exist within a certain interval.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vinogradov|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rSay9ZPucccC&pg=PA8 8]}} | {{harvnb|Borwein|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Qm1aZA-UwX4C&pg=PA63 63]}} }} The statement that at least one mathematical object matching a certain description exists is called an [[existence theorem]].{{harvnb|Lucas|1990|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jklsb5JUgoQC&pg=PA75 75]}} Metaphysicians of mathematics investigate whether mathematical objects exist not only in relation to mathematical [[axiom]]s but also as part of the fundamental structure of reality. This position is affirmed by [[Platonists]] while [[nominalists]] believe mathematical objects lack a more-substantial form of existence, for instance, because they are merely useful fictions.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Davis|Davis|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tWr_CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA133 133]}} | {{harvnb|Chihara|1990|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Lucas|1990|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jklsb5JUgoQC&pg=PA75 75–76]}}| {{harvnb|Balaguer|2023|loc=Lead Section}}}} [183] => [184] => Many debates in theology revolve around the existence of the divine, and various arguments have been presented for and against God's existence. [[Cosmological argument]]s state God must exist as the first cause to explain facts about the existence and aspects of the universe.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reichenbach|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Ratzsch|Koperski|2023|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} }} According to [[teleological argument]]s, the only way to explain the order and complexity of the universe and human life is by reference to God as the [[intelligent design]]er.{{harvnb|Ratzsch|Koperski|2023|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} An influential argument against the existence of God relies on [[the problem of evil]] since it is not clear how evil could exist if there was an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent God.{{harvnb|Beebe|loc=Lead Section}} Another argument points to a lack of concrete evidence for God's existence.{{harvnb|Clark|loc=§ 2. The Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God}} [185] => [186] => == See also == [187] => {{Portal|Philosophy}} [188] => * ''[[Cogito, ergo sum]]'' [189] => * [[Solipsism]] [190] => [191] => == References == [192] => === Notes === [193] => {{notelist}} [194] => [195] => === Citations === [196] => {{reflist|22em}} [197] => [198] => === Sources === [199] => {{refbegin|30em}} [200] => * {{cite book |last1=Adamson |first1=Peter |title=Philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-872802-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J5_oCQAAQBAJ |language=en |series=A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps |volume=2 |access-date=2023-05-25 |archive-date=2023-07-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230711181007/https://books.google.com/books?id=J5_oCQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }} [201] => * {{cite book |last1=Addis |first1=Laird |title=Mind: Ontology and Explanation: Collected Papers 1981-2005 |date=2013 |publisher=Walter de Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-032715-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6ZEN6vByUC&pg=PA49 |language=en |access-date=1 September 2023 |archive-date=18 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230818070148/https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6ZEN6vByUC&pg=PA49 |url-status=live }} [202] => * {{cite web |author1=AHD staff |title=Existence |url=https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=existence&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |website=American Heritage Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins |access-date=10 August 2023 |date=2022 |archive-date=11 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230811074250/https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=existence&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |url-status=live }} [203] => * {{cite book |last1=Aho |first1=Kevin |title=The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon |date=2021 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-00274-6 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/eksistence-eksistenz/C78548237FFDBE1D518259C7DFA0BC9C |chapter=Ek-sistence (Ek-sistenz) |access-date=2023-12-27 |archive-date=2023-12-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231227095707/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/eksistence-eksistenz/C78548237FFDBE1D518259C7DFA0BC9C |url-status=live |editor-last1=Wrathall |editor-first1=Mark A. }} [204] => * {{cite web |last1=Aho |first1=Kevin |title=Existentialism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 August 2023 |date=2023 |archive-date=19 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191019074750/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/ |url-status=live }} [205] => * {{cite book |last1=Albertazzi |first1=Liliana |last2=Jacquette |first2=Dale |title=The School of Alexius Meinong |date=2017 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-351-88226-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wkQrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA87 |language=en |access-date=1 September 2023 |archive-date=18 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230818070146/https://books.google.com/books?id=wkQrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA87 |url-status=live }} [206] => * {{cite web |author1=American Psychological Association |title=Intentional Inexistence |url=https://dictionary.apa.org/intentional-inexistence |website=APA Dictionary of Psychology |language=en |date=2018 |publisher=American Psychological Association}} [207] => * {{cite web |last1=Asay |first1=Jamin |title=Truthmaker Theory |url=https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=14 August 2023 |archive-date=24 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124032018/https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/ |url-status=live }} [208] => * {{cite book |author1=Ásta |title=The Routledge Handbook of Collective 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Material Discoveries of the Ancient Sages of India |date=2015 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-62055-387-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QGAoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT53 |language=en |access-date=1 September 2023 |archive-date=17 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230817085522/https://books.google.com/books?id=QGAoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT53 |url-status=live }} [357] => * {{cite book |last1=Vinogradov |first1=Ivan Matveevich |title=Algebra, Mathematical Logic, Number Theory, Topology |publisher=American Mathematical Society |isbn=978-0-8218-3096-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rSay9ZPucccC&pg=PA8 |language=en |date=1986 |access-date=April 8, 2024 |archive-date=April 8, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240408083147/https://books.google.com/books?id=rSay9ZPucccC&pg=PA8 |url-status=live }} [358] => * {{cite book |last1=Wang |first1=Yueqing |last2=Bao |first2=Qinggang |last3=Guan |first3=Guoxing |title=History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key 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|date=2021 |archive-date=January 27, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240127072301/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/ |url-status=live }} [361] => * {{cite web |last1=Wheeler |first1=Michael |title=Martin Heidegger |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 August 2023 |date=2020 |archive-date=6 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220206061907/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |url-status=live }} [362] => * {{cite journal |last1=Yagisawa |first1=Takashi |title=Précis of Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise |journal=Analytic Philosophy |date=2011 |volume=52 |issue=4 |pages=270–272 |doi=10.1111/j.2153-960X.2011.00534.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGPOW |access-date=2023-09-01 |archive-date=2023-08-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230830123531/https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGPOW |url-status=live |issn=2153-9596}} [363] => {{refend}} [364] => [365] => == Further reading == [366] => * {{cite book |author=Aristotle |translator1-last=Lawson-Tancred |translator1-first=Hugh |title=The Metaphysics |date=1998 |publisher=Penguin Books |isbn=978-0-14-044619-7 |ref=none}} [367] => * {{cite book |last1=Thalheimer |first1=Alvin |title=The Meaning of the Terms: 'Existence' and 'Reality' |date=1920 |publisher=Princeton University Press |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JCWqKvkMy7IC |language=en |oclc=7940545 |ref=none}} [368] => * {{cite book |last1=Williams |first1=Christopher John Fardo |title=What Is Existence? |date=1981 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-824429-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i9XEwAEACAAJ |language=en |ref=none}} [369] => * {{cite book|author1=[[William Kneale|W. Kneale]]|author2=[[G. E. Moore]]|title=Symposium: Is Existence a Predicate?|series=Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume|volume=15|issue=1|date=July 15, 1936|pages=154–188 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|doi=10.1093/aristoteliansupp/15.1.154|doi-access=free |ref=none}} [370] => [371] => == External links == [372] => {{Wiktionary|existence}} [373] => *{{Wikiquote-inline}} [374] => * [http://www.ontology.co/existence.htm The Concept of Existence: History and Definitions from Leading Philosophers] [375] => [376] => {{Philosophy topics}} [377] => {{Metaphysics}} [378] => {{Authority control}} [379] => [380] => [[Category:Metaphysical properties]] [381] => [[Category:Ontology]] [382] => [[Category:Reality]] [] => )
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Existence

Existence is the state or fact of being present, real, or occurring. It is the fundamental concept in philosophy, ontology, and metaphysics, and has also been explored in various scientific and cultural contexts.

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It is the fundamental concept in philosophy, ontology, and metaphysics, and has also been explored in various scientific and cultural contexts. In philosophy, existence is often related to questions about the nature of reality, the criteria for determining what exists, and the possibility of existence for abstract entities. In science, existence is typically studied through empirical observation and experimentation, aiming to discover and understand the physical and biological phenomena that exist in the natural world. Culturally, existence has been explored through religious, spiritual, and existentialist perspectives, attempting to understand the meaning and purpose of human existence. The concept of existence has been a subject of debate and speculation throughout history, and continues to be an important area of exploration in multiple fields of study.

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