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The author reported that Antwerp hosted a commemoration of the October 7, 2023 massacre, which they described as a genocidal jihadist attack and the largest mass killing of Jews since the Holocaust. They also praised Raz Shifer’s testimony, identifying him as a survivor of the Nova massacre and calling his account brave, emotional and powerful. https://t.co/nSjN04yazE #Antwerp #Holocaust #NeverAgain #IL

The author said they spoke after Piers Morgan and Mehdi Hasan had finished what they described as grandstanding. They claimed that Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists had posed as journalists and said the IDF had named 170 of them. The author also said Morgan had not acknowledged fault. https://t.co/XkTrGWFQZ6 #Hamas #Journalism #IDF #IL

Dr. Jan van de Beek wondered whether warnings about the far right were really what they seemed. He wrote that in 2026 many politicians considered right-wing extremism, populism, and Islamophobia to be more dangerous than jihadism or left-wing extremism. According to him, it was possible that the AIVD and the NCTV were periodically responding to this in order to maintain political support, and he did not rule out a sophisticated double game. https://t.co/owIjuQYJyQ #AIVD #Extreemlinks #Extreemrechts #Jihadisme #NCTV #Extreemrechts #Populisme #Politiek (translated)

Dennis Mitzner criticized Timo Stewart for suggesting that he believed Israel was an obstacle to the two-state solution. Mitzner argued that the Palestinians had not accepted Israel's state proposals in direct negotiations, the latest of which were the Camp David and Taba offers in 2000–2001, as well as Ehud Olmert's offers in 2008. He added that Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005. According to Mitzner, the PLO's decades-old support for the two-state solution did not indicate that the Palestinians accepted Israel's existence as a Jewish state. Mitzner wrote that Stewart viewed the destruction of Hamas's ideology as unrealistic without killing all people. Mitzner interpreted this to mean that Stewart considered all Gazans as supporters of Hamas's ideology, but he himself said he would not go that far. He referred to Hamas's election in Gaza and claimed that no Gazan had attempted to help Israeli hostages in the past couple of years. Mitzner compared the situation to the Allies' victory over Nazism and the defeat of Japan, as well as the actions of the United Arab Emirates against the Muslim Brotherhood. He stated that the Western left should stop rewarding Palestinian violence and anti-Semitism. According to Mitzner, Stewart claimed that there was no Palestinian state because Israel occupied the territory and did not allow it to become independent. Mitzner denied this and described the area's history: according to him, it belonged to the British mandate from 1917 and prior to that to the Ottoman Empire. He wrote that the Arab leadership rejected the UN's 1947 partition plan, after which Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt controlled Gaza without establishing a Palestinian state. According to Mitzner, the territories came under Israeli control in the 1967 war, which Jordan, Egypt, and Syria initiated with the intent to destroy, and the Arab world's negative attitude towards Israel continued with the Khartoum resolution of the three no's. Mitzner claimed that Stewart ignored Palestinian actions and concluded by asking whether the dispute ultimately related to the fact that the opposing side was the Jewish state of Israel. #IsraelinVastaisetAsenteet #Palestiinalaiskysymys #KansainvälinenPolitiikka (translated)

The author hailed IDF personnel as heroes, saying that three years after October 7 they were still killing Hamas and Islamic Jihad members almost every day. The author also accused mainstream journalists and politicians of acting as though this wartime reality did not exist. #IDF #Hamas #WarNews #IL #PS

The author wrote that, three years after October 7, the IDF was still killing Hamas and Islamic Jihad members whom they described as terrorists almost every day. They said mainstream journalists and politicians acted as though this wartime reality did not exist. #Israel #Hamas #MiddleEast #IL #PS

A co-pilot from Flydubai, who had previously been suspended by Oman Air due to radicalization and extremist content, is now being interrogated by investigators after allegedly attacking his colleague during a flight to Tel Aviv, with the Israeli government considering it a possible jihadist terrorist act. #Flydubai #Terrorismus #Sicherheitsrisiko (translated)

The author asked when De Morgen, De Standaard, Het Nieuwsblad, HLN, VRT, and VTM would thoroughly correct what he described as fake news from the past years about Hamas and Islamic Jihad members who, according to him, were presented as journalists. #Nieuws #Journalistiek #Misinformatie #IL (translated)

In August 2025, @svtnyheter reported an analysis stating that "around 200 reporters and journalists" had been killed during the war in Gaza up to that point. @sr_ekot has also continuously covered the issue and relayed similar information. The Israeli military (IDF) claims that it has determined that 170 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, who were alleged to be journalists after their deaths, were in fact members of terrorist groups. "After extensive investigations, the IDF can now disclose that 170 Gazans who were killed during the war, and who have been presented as journalists and media workers, were actually acting as terrorists for terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip – primarily Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad," the army states. According to the military, 118 of the journalists were active within Hamas's military branch, 49 within Islamic Jihad, two were members of the People's Resistance Committees, and one belonged to the Mujahideen Brigades. Seventeen of these journalists, also terrorists, are said by the army to have participated in the attacks on Israeli territory on October 7, 2023. Some of the journalists on the IDF's list have also worked for international media, including Reuters, CNN, Australian ABC, BBC, AFP, AP, and Le Monde. The 170 cases have been published by the IDF on a special website. For each person, their name and role as a journalist and terrorist activist are recorded, along with their civilian and military ID numbers. The military states that it publishes "verified evidence, including images and documents produced by the terrorist organizations, some of which have been found on site, which show these terrorists' organizational affiliation and the roles they had within the terrorist organizations." The IDF emphasizes that various international media outlets during the course of the war "have repeatedly, and without presenting verified information, accused Israel and the IDF of intentionally harming journalists." "This despite the fact that terrorist organizations in some cases have themselves presented these individuals as terrorists within their own ranks and even claimed responsibility for them," the IDF claims. "The information now being revealed illustrates the gap between the image presented to the world and the reality on the ground. It provides further and crucial evidence that the IDF does not intentionally and systematically target journalists, but rather terrorist organizations and their terrorists in accordance with international law," adds the military. Link to the report in the next tweet. #Gaza #Journalism #IDF (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Based on current information, the case of the Flydubai flight appears to involve a possible jihadist terrorist attack, which has similarities to the 9/11 attacks in attempting to destroy a civilian aircraft. The motive of the attacker has not yet been clarified, but the act seems... #terrorismi #lentoturvallisuus #jihadismi #FI (translated)

In the debates about the NPO, I have been banging on for years about the unbearable leftism of the state broadcaster. The response from the left is always: we are not talking about the content. But when the NOS reports on a jihadist attack with possibly hundreds of dead, this PRO-senator says: please downplay it, NOS. It was just ONE UNPLEASANT INCIDENT. #NPO #NOS #media (translated)