Kaarlu

The Transitional Logic of Political Violence A recurring problem in revolutionary and religious political movements is that violence may be justified as a temporary measure for establishing a new political order, while the institutions created to suppress perceived enemies can become permanent. In Marxist-Leninist theory, the transition from capitalism to communism involved a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The coercive state was ultimately expected to “wither away” once class conflict disappeared. In practice, however, revolutionary governments developed extensive systems of repression. The Russian Revolution was followed by the Red Terror, Stalin’s purges institutionalized persecution of alleged internal enemies, and Mao’s Cultural Revolution demonstrated how political repression could re-emerge long after revolutionary power had been established. A comparable dynamic can be examined in some interpretations of Islamic political thought, although the ideological foundations are different. Ridda (apostasy) has, in certain historical contexts, been associated with both religious and political disloyalty. The early Ridda Wars illustrate how religious and political boundaries could become intertwined. In modern history, the 1988 executions of political prisoners in Iran provide another example of religious or ideological accusations being used to justify state violence. The important question is not whether these traditions are identical—they are not—but whether their political applications can create similar institutional dynamics. When governments define groups as existential threats, extraordinary measures may initially be presented as temporary. Once institutionalized, however, the definition of the “enemy” can expand. The fundamental risk is that a transitional period of coercion may lack a mechanism for returning to normal political conditions. If authorities can continually redefine internal enemies, emergency powers can become permanent. The broader lesson is universal: political systems should be judged not only by the order they promise, but also by the safeguards that prevent temporary coercive powers from becoming permanent.