Premierul ungar Péter Magyar l-a provocat pe Viktor Orbán la o dezbatere publică în România, subliniind importanța discuțiilor autentice în cadrul taberei de vară de la Băile Tuşnad, unde contribuabilii ungari au investit semnificativ, și a îndemnat ca liderul său să nu fie laș în a accepta invitația. #Ungaria #ViktorOrban #PéterMagyar
O femeie din Franța, participând la un eveniment în București, acuză că a fost agresată de jandarmi într-o secție de poliție, unde a fost lovită și maltratată, incidentul fiind făcut public de Asociația ACCEPT, care o sprijină în demersurile legale împotriva forțelor de ordine. #violenta #drepturileomului #transgeneri
Vom continua să ne pronunțăm împotriva încălcărilor dreptului internațional și în favoarea unei asistențe umanitare sporite. Guvernul a acceptat impunerea de sancțiuni pentru a intensifica presiunea asupra administrației Netanyahu. Extinderea așezărilor ilegale și violențele excesive ale coloniștilor duc la o deteriorare continuă a situației, făcând ca soluția bazată pe coexistența a două state să devină tot mai greu de realizat.
O femeie transgender din Franța, pe nume Belle Haze, acuză că a fost bătută de doi polițiști într-o secție de poliție din București, după ce a fost reținută în urma unui incident, iar Asociația ACCEPT a depus o plângere la Parchetul Militar, solicitând anchetarea celor implicați. #agresiune #transgender #ACCEPT
Je n'accepterai pas que cet incident reste sans conséquence.
Asociația ACCEPT a sesizat Parchetul Militar după ce o femeie trans din Franța a fost agresată în mod brutal de polițiști într-o secție de poliție din București, la scurt timp după ce a fost victima unei agresiuni sexuale. #agresiune #femeietrans #parchetmilitar
| JULY 2026 | The Guard State How the largest Arab nation became a security contractor at the gates of its own people By Adham Hasanin Egyptian journalist and political writer, based in the Netherlands In June 2025, hundreds of activists from forty countries landed at Cairo airport. Doctors from France, lawyers from Australia, students from the United States, pensioners from the Netherlands. They carried no weapons and no banned slogans; they carried backpacks, walking shoes, and a single intention: to march from Arish to the Rafah crossing — entirely on Egyptian soil — to demand that food be allowed through to a people starving behind the gate. Not one of them reached Rafah. More than two hundred were detained before the march could begin. Around five hundred foreign nationals were deported from airports, hotels, and checkpoints. Passports were confiscated, activists were pulled out of downtown Cairo cafés, and the Global March to Gaza was cancelled on 16 June without taking its first step. And the world watched. This was no secret operation in a dark basement; it happened in the open, documented by the deportees’ own phone cameras, carried by every international news agency. The world watched an Arab state arrest Europeans, Americans, and Africans for wanting to walk towards Palestine. A state guarding the gate of a siege — from the side that was supposed to be the side of rescue. Hold that image, because it is the key to everything that follows. This was not an aberration in Egyptian policy, nor an isolated security decision. It is the function — the complete function around which the Egyptian state has been redefined over the past decade, and which it is time to call by its proper name: the Guard State. I. The Name — What Do We Mean by the Guard State? Political economy has long described states that live off the rent of their location rather than the production of their people. But what has crystallised in Egypt over the past decade goes beyond traditional geographic rent — the Suez Canal, say — into something far graver: the conversion of sovereignty itself into a commodity for hire. The Guard State does not sell its location; it sells its function. It collects its wages not for what it produces, but for what it prevents: it prevents the refugee from reaching Europe, the activist from reaching Gaza, its own people from reaching politics, and the resistance’s weapons from reaching their destination. Four gates, guarded by a single machine, whose wages are paid in loans, deposits, and perpetually renewed rescue packages. This is not a rhetorical metaphor; it is an economic structure with numbers attached. When the Egyptian economy collapsed in 2024, it was rescued not by productive reform but by a single deal whose subject was location: Ras el-Hekma — thirty-five billion dollars for a stretch of coastline. And whenever negotiations with the IMF stall, the tranches are unlocked by explicit European pressure whose subject is migration: nine billion euros from the European Union in the 2024 “Strategic Partnership,” whose own documents place “migration management” at its core. Europe does not pay Egypt to prosper. It pays Egypt to guard. Thus the model is complete: income in exchange for prevention, external legitimacy in exchange for guarding, and international silence about domestic tyranny in exchange for keeping the gates controlled. To see how the model works on the ground, consider the bloodiest gate of all: the gate of Gaza. II. The Gaza Gate — The Guard Who Is Himself Searched The first paradox must be nailed down with facts: Egypt is not a sovereign guard of its own crossing; it is a searched guard. Egyptian relief trucks — ninety-two thousand food parcels in a single convoy this month — are subject to Israeli inspection before entering the Strip: from Egyptian soil, through a crossing that bears an Egyptian name. The state that guards the gate does not hold its key. It owns the threshold, but not the door. Then the October 2025 truce added a new layer to the function. Under the fifteen-point roadmap sponsored by the international envoy together with the “guarantor states” — Egypt foremost among them — Cairo is to train the civilian police force that will replace Hamas in administering the Strip, under the slogan of “one authority, one law, one weapon.” Let us call things by their names: the state that could not — or would not — deliver a loaf of bread without Israeli permission is now qualifying to graduate the security apparatus that will oversee the disarming of the resistance. From guarding the siege to administering what comes after the siege — a promotion within the same project. And meanwhile, what is happening behind the guarded gate? Since the truce, more than one thousand one hundred Palestinians have been killed by Israeli fire — the latest, just two days ago, a ten-year-old boy named Motaz Abu Shaar, carried to his grave in Khan Younis by his mother, Warda. A United Nations commission of inquiry has concluded that Israel is “deliberately targeting children in an ongoing genocide.” This is what the guarantors’ official language calls a “ceasefire.” What meaning is left in the word “guarantor”? A guarantor that the gate stays firmly shut — however high the dead pile up behind it. III. The Mediterranean Gate — The Guard Europe Pays For The second gate faces north. Since 2016, Cairo has boasted — through its officials at every European forum — that “not a single irregular migration boat has departed from Egyptian shores.” This is very nearly true. But the forbidden question is: at what political price has this “efficiency” become an instrument of mutual blackmail? Europe — which condemns Egypt’s human rights record in its parliamentary resolutions — is the same Europe that signed the nine-billion-euro partnership, and the same Europe that stays silent about sixty thousand political prisoners because the alternative, in its calculations, is boats that never stop. And Cairo understands the game and has mastered it: whenever human rights pressure intensifies, the official discourse turns up the volume on “Egypt hosts millions of refugees” and “the last line of defence.” The result is a perfect structure of mutual blackmail: Europe buys its conscience’s silence, the regime sells its location, and the people — Egyptian and refugee alike — are the commodity in the transaction. The democracies that lecture on values are financing the guard who keeps the victims from knocking on their doors. This is not passing hypocrisy; it is a structural partnership in the Guard State model — one that makes Brussels and Berlin shareholders in everything this state produces, from domestic repression to external siege. IV. The Interior Gate — Guarding the People Against Politics But the most dangerous gate is not on any border; it is inside. The Guard State cannot perform its external function unless it first guards an internal gate: the people’s gate to politics. The function requires a people that does not ask: why are we guarding the siege of our brothers? Why are our trucks searched on our own soil? Why are guests deported for coming to walk in peace? To guarantee the question is never asked, the largest silencing machine in the country’s history was built: sixty thousand prisoners of opinion, a press ranked 166th out of 180 worldwide, and a state security case number waiting for anyone who writes. I write these lines from experience, not from reading reports. When I continued writing from my Dutch exile, the machine reached me across continents: accounts shut down by coordinated mass-reporting campaigns, documented threats, a family harassed inside Egypt as leverage — and my name entered into Case 1282 of 2024, not for any act I committed, but for opinions written from free European soil. This is not a personal complaint; it is a job description: the Guard State guards even beyond its borders, because the free word — wherever it is written — threatens the entire contract of guardianship. The logic is perfectly self-consistent: a regime that sells “stability” abroad cannot tolerate a voice revealing that the stability on offer is the stillness of graveyards. This is why the arrest of the foreign activists in June 2025 was inevitable, not incidental: a peaceful march reaching Rafah would have revealed, before the world’s cameras, that the gate opens when it is wanted open — and that the one keeping it shut is a partner, not a mediator. V. What Has Egypt Lost? — The Guard’s Bill An apologist might argue: what is the harm? A state monetising its location as Norway monetises its oil. The answer lies in the essential difference: Norway sells a resource; Egypt leases its will. And the difference between the two is the difference between trade and bondage. Let us tally what Egypt has paid for this model, in bare facts. It lost its water sovereignty: the Renaissance Dam was completed and filled without the state — owner of “the largest defence headquarters in the world” — daring anything beyond statements of concern; for the guard does not make trouble for the international order that employs him. It lost its regional standing: in the Iran–America war halted just weeks ago, Cairo was neither party nor mediator nor even consultant — Pakistan brokered the deal, while Egypt absorbed the economic shrapnel of Hormuz’s closure like a bystander caught in a battle whose parties it does not know. It lost its place in the conscience of its nation: the state that liberated its land in 1973 and led the Arab world for a century has become, in the eyes of the Arab street from the Atlantic to the Gulf, the gatekeeper of the siege. This loss, specifically, no loan or deposit can repay — because it is the only capital that cannot be printed. And it lost — here is the crux — the very national security in whose name the guarding is justified. The model proved its fragility at the moment of testing: when Israel feared an Iranian response last year, it cut off Egypt’s gas by unilateral decision within hours. The guard who believed himself a partner discovered he was merely a hireling whose wages stop the moment danger arrives. VI. The Alternative Is Not a Slogan — It Is the Recovery of the Original Function I will not close with an essay on “the solution lies in Arab unity”; worn-out words kill more surely than silence. The alternative is specific, and it begins with redefining the function. The state is not a guard; the state is the agent of its people’s will. Every foreign policy not derived from that will is — by definition — functional servitude, however it is wrapped in the language of wisdom and moderation. And the Egyptian will is known and needs no referendum: no people in this region accepts that its country serve as warden of the siege of Gaza, or as Europe’s border post. Practically, the recovery begins with three measurable steps. Open the Rafah crossing fully and sovereignly, by purely Egyptian decision — that alone would overturn the equation of the siege. Break the negotiating bondage by linking any cooperation on migration to concrete European positions on Palestine, not statements of concern. And open the interior gate — release the prisoners and lift the hand from the written word — because a state that fears an article will never dare face an occupier. I know the current regime will do none of this; guarding is its founding contract and its financial artery. But this article is not written for the regime. It is written for memory, and for the generation that will inherit the gates — so that it knows that what is presented to it today as “the fate of geography” is no fate at all. It is an employment contract, signed by a regime without a mandate from its people. And contracts, however long they run, end when one of their parties does. And the world — I return to where I began — is a witness that requires no further proof. It watched the deportees at Cairo airport; it watched the searched trucks; it watched Warda Abu Shaar carry her son to his grave behind a firmly guarded gate. The question is no longer: what is happening? The only question left is: who dares to name it? This article is a naming. Adham Hasanin is an Egyptian journalist and political writer based in the Netherlands, covering Arab and European political affairs.
Nu simt că am puterea necesară pentru a-mi asuma responsabilitatea istorică de a reuni o naţiune divizată şi, prin urmare, nu pot accepta această invitaţie
Dr. Toni Popescu a avertizat că reducerea sporului pentru gărzi de weekend și sărbători legale de la 100% la 30% va descuraja medicii să mai accepte aceste ture, ceea ce ar putea afecta grav sistemul sanitar, întrucât mulți colegi ar putea opta pentru gărzi în timpul săptămânii pentru a avea mai mult timp liber pentru familie. #LegeaSalarizării #Medici #Sporuri
Nu simt că am puterea de a-mi asuma responsabilitatea istorică de a uni o națiune divizată și, prin urmare, nu pot accepta invitația
Het is onmenselijk en dit is iets wat we als atleten eigenlijk niet zouden moeten accepteren, want iedereen weet dat slaap de enige manier is om te herstellen. En als dat verstoord wordt, maakt het het herstellen nog moeilijker. Ik hoop dat dit in de toekomst niet meer gebeurt, want het is respectloos.
Le résultat de nombreuses années à se foutre de sa gueule et à la rabaisser sur son physique, c'est tellement triste, les gens l'ont tellement complexé... #Bienveillance #ConfianceEnSoi #Acception
@FrenchRapUS Ce que les critiques et les insultes sur le physiques peuvent amener à faire même si c’est pas une raison de le faire #RapFrançais #Corps #AcceptationDeSoi
In zijn opinieartikel reflecteert Robin Ravensbergen op de jaarlijkse herinnering van de Pride Month aan de blijvende strijd voor acceptatie in Nederland, waar ondanks de vieringen nog steeds veel homofoob en racistisch geweld plaatsvindt, zoals blijkt uit vandalisme van pridevlaggen en negatieve opvattingen onder jongeren. #Pride2026 #LGBTQ+ #Acceptatie
Eu susțin că răspândirea articolelor de îmbrăcăminte contrafăcute, a jucăriilor nesigure, a produselor cosmetice periculoase și a altor produse ilegale și dăunătoare nu este un cost inevitabil al cumpărăturilor online, ci o nerespectare din partea AliExpress a obligațiilor sale conform Actului legislativ privind serviciile digitale. Nu accept scuze legate de scară; trebuie să identific și să abordez riscurile în mod sistematic pentru a mă asigura că consumatorii pot face cumpărături online în condiții de siguranță.
Nederland is gastland van het Strafhof, in de stad van vrede en recht, en daarom kunnen we dit niet accepteren
🚨 « 𝗣𝗥𝗘́𝗦𝗜𝗗𝗘𝗡𝗧, 𝗖’𝗘𝗦𝗧 𝗩𝗢𝗧𝗥𝗘 𝗣𝗥𝗘𝗠𝗜𝗘𝗥𝗘 𝗖𝗗𝗠, 𝗠𝗢𝗜, 𝗟𝗔 𝗧𝗥𝗢𝗜𝗦𝗜𝗘̀𝗠𝗘. 𝗩𝗢𝗨𝗦 𝗜𝗠𝗔𝗚𝗜𝗡𝗘𝗭 𝗤𝗨’𝗨𝗡 𝟭/𝟴𝗲 𝗢𝗨 𝗨𝗡 𝟭/𝟰 𝗡’𝗢𝗡𝗧 𝗣𝗔𝗦 𝗗𝗘 𝗩𝗔𝗟𝗘𝗨𝗥 ? » C’est ce qu’a répondu Kylian Mbappé 🇫🇷 à Philippe Diallo, qui voulait verser des primes aux Bleus QU’EN CAS DE 1/2 FINALE, et non plus de 1/8e comme avant. Le capitaine a obtenu ce qu’il voulait. ✅ 👉 Diallo voulait aussi distribuer 2 places en tribune par joueur à chaque match, Mbappé en voulait 8. DIALLO A FINALEMENT ACCEPTÉ D’EN DONNER 6. (@lequipe) #Mbappé #Football #CDM
Heel normaal straattafereel in Amsterdam. Het ziet er niet alleen verschrikkelijk uit, het is ook een gevaar voor de volksgezondheid. Na de falende PvdA'er Hester van Buren is nu de raaskallende PRO'er Lian Heinhuis ('niet normaal dat mensen geld in prullenbakken mikken') verantwoordelijk voor de gemeentereiniging. Als inwoners betalen we zo'n 200 miljoen per jaar om die zooi op te laten ruimen. "We want our money back" zei Margaret Thatcher ooit. Hoogste tijd dat we als Amsterdammers haar dat gaan nazeggen. Deze wanprestatie is niet langer te accepteren. #Amsterdam #Volksgezondheid #Gemeentereiniging
This thread raises a real barrier to the deployment of electric cars: why is it so difficult for charging stations to accept credit cards, like gas stations? @AllianceDecarb (translated)
