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The elected officials on the left, particularly from LFI, are right to be present with the high school students. It's their role! They are not elected to hide in the Assembly or in the Town Halls with their allowances. Where are the other cowards? Why this hypocritical silence? (translated)

FLASH | A statue of the Virgin Mary was VANDALIZED and torn from its pedestal during the night in Porto-Vecchio, Corsica. Several individuals have been identified, apprehended, and placed in police custody. Videos circulated on social media show a young man clinging to the statue and making sexual remarks. Mayor Jean-Christophe Angelini, who filed a complaint, demands a judicial response "of extreme severity." The statue will be replaced "as soon as possible" (Le Parisien) (translated)

Simple question: If you are as sure of yourself as you claim, why didn't you choose the direct citation? You could have gone directly to the correctional court and obtained a hearing in a very short time. A judgment could have been made in a few months. Instead, you chose a much longer procedure, the outcome of which we probably won't know for a long time. So the question is simple: why avoid the fastest route to have the matter decided publicly by a court? (translated)

Simple question: If you are as sure of yourself as you claim, why didn't you choose the direct citation? You could have filed directly with the correctional court and obtained a hearing in a very short time. A judgment could have been made in a few months. Instead, you chose a much longer procedure, the outcome of which we probably won't know for a long time. So the question is simple: why avoid the quickest route to have the matter publicly decided by a court? (translated)

French democracy is very sick. Petitions that reached more than 500,000 signatures were not followed by debates in the National Assembly. This was the case for the petitions against the Duplomb law and the "permit to kill" law. The result of the 2024 legislative elections has not been respected. They say to respect democracy. We do, but not them! With us, the people will regain their power. We will implement the citizen initiative referendum and the recall referendum. (translated)

After their last C1 win and the arrival of Mbappe that was taking shape, he was convinced that Barça was FINISHED to the point where he considered his Super League by getting cozy with Laporta with his speech at the time “we need a competitive Barça” strangely Negreira did not exist at that moment 😂 In his head, there was absolutely NO scenario where his team would collapse after Mbappe's arrival and in the other direction Barça would become strong again Result? A 3rd blank season on the horizon. This has the consequence not only of putting obstacles in the way of his SAD project that he wanted to implement for a long time but even worse…his risk of resignation that has been looming since last season Last resort then? Negreira but the clock is ticking old man…Laporta will make you resign for the 2nd time. (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

🚨 SDM has just SOLD OUT his CONCERT DATE at the STADE DE FRANCE !! More than 80,000 tickets 🤯 🗓️ MAY 29, 2027 (translated)

🎀 PINK OCTOBER 2026 | "ACT FOR LIFE" On the occasion of Pink October, a month dedicated to raising awareness and fighting breast cancer, a special thought was expressed at the opening of our work for women affected by this disease, those who continue their fight, and the families who support them. The fight against breast cancer is a major public health issue. It requires collective and sustainable mobilization around prevention, awareness, and early detection. This year's campaign, themed "Act for Life," invites us to strengthen our commitment and support those who work daily in this struggle, particularly the Senegalese League Against Cancer. Our institution reaffirms its commitment to contribute to awareness-raising efforts, promote early detection, and support initiatives in favor of the fight against breast cancer. On this occasion, we pay tribute to all those who have passed away and express our solidarity to all the women fighting against the disease, as well as to their families. Act, raise awareness, detect: together for life. 🎀 (translated)

🚨 OFFICIAL! Isack Hadjar receives a 5-place penalty on the grid for the Bahrain Grand Prix in Malaysia due to the change of a component in the power unit of his car. #F1 #BahrainGP (translated)

We do not fully realize the social drama to come These young people have NO PLACE in the job market in the era of Super AI Our future: REVOLUTION plus LEBANIZATION (translated)