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Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Here is the new Gears of War. I don't want to overdo it, I really liked it. This is the best Gears. 🔥 An incredibly spectacular war drama that I don't understand how it turned out so well with hardly any changes to the gameplay. AWESOME and that's it. More in Aputest. (translated)

🔴 We know more about the tensions between Esteban Ocon and Haas since last season, according to @wearetherace! 🔍 Haas has gradually blamed the Frenchman for not taking enough responsibility for his difficulties, becoming defensive when the results were not forthcoming. Despite a collective effort at the beginning of 2026 to better align Ocon and his side of the garage, tensions reportedly resurfaced with the team's struggles. Haas finds him too combative internally, questioning the specifications of the cars and the performance gaps with Bearman, while exploring what are deemed futile adjustment avenues. For his part, Ocon would simply feel he is being frank and demanding to help the team progress, as requested upon his arrival. Haas would therefore be turning against him what it initially expected from him. Upon returning from the summer break, Komatsu would have informed him that he had little chance of being retained. Given his results at that moment, Haas felt it could no longer justify his multi-million dollar salary. However, money would have played a secondary role in the choice of his replacement: if Haas were to prioritize only finances and marketing, Hirakawa would be the obvious choice, according to the British media 💰 #F1 (translated)

🚨 ANDY DIOUF EN ARRIÈRE GAUCHE : ZIDANE RELANCE UNE VIEILLE TRADITION DES BLEUS ! 🇫🇷🔄 En alignant le milieu de terrain (déjà transformé en piston droit à l'Inter Milan) au poste de latéral gauche face à la Belgique, Zinédine Zidane tente un coup osé. Mais dans l'histoire de l'équipe de France, reculer des milieux d'un cran a connu des fortunes diverses ! Les réussites : Eduardo Camavinga (véritable couteau suisse depuis le Mondial 2022), le match d'anthologie de Lassana Diarra face à l'Italie en 2007, ou encore Christian Karembeu. ✅ Les galères : Le replacement d'Adrien Rabiot face à la Suisse à l'Euro 2021 ou encore l'expérience écourtée de Luis Fernandez à l'Euro 84, qui manquait de discipline défensive. ❌ Aimé Jacquet avait tenté ce même pari avec Alain Boghossian avant la Coupe du Monde. Son débriefing de l'époque résume cependant le piège qui guette un milieu replacé derrière : 🗣️ « Tactiquement, il a été excellent. C'est dans la relance qu'il a pêché. Comme il est milieu, il cherche toujours la passe décisive au lieu d'assurer une relance plus propre et plus simple. » 🗞️ @lequipe #EquipeDeFrance #Zidane #Football

« APRÈS L’EUPHORIE, LES DIABLES ONT ÉTÉ REMIS À LEUR PLACE PAR L’ÉQUIPE B DE LA FRANCE 🇫🇷. » 😭 « DÉGRADÉS PAR LES COIFFEURS FRANÇAIS. » 💇‍♂️ La presse belge 🇧🇪 est FRUSTRÉE ce mardi après Belgique-France 👇 🗞️ RTBF : « Une bataille des voisins frustrante : QUE C’EST CRUEL ! Franchement, il fait mal le but d'Olise. Parce que jusque-là, les Diables Rouges avaient vaillamment tenu tête à cette équipe de France. Mais le talent brut a fini par faire la différence. Au pire moment…. » 🗞️ La DH : « Les Diables rouges ont vu tout le chemin qu'il reste encore à parcourir… » 🗞️ Le Soir : « Le nouveau sélectionneur français a pu se permettre d’aligner une équipe de coiffeurs… Tout ce que touche Zizou se transforme en or, tout ce qu’il dit et prédit est parole d’Évangile et, convenons-en, l’homme le plus populaire de France a le luxe de ses choix. C’est tout de même une brochette de sacrés joueurs qui est partie à l’assaut du but de Lammens. » 🗞️ Sporza : « Encore une déception cette décennie face à cette France maudite. (…) L'heure de la revanche a sonné pour le choc de la semaine prochaine à Paris, Zizou ? » via @RMCsport #Belgique #France #DiablesRouges

🚨 300 000 € BRUT PAR MOIS POUR ZIDANE À LA TÊTE DES BLEUS ! 💸🇫🇷 Il s'aligne sur la rémunération fixe de Didier Deschamps. Il abandonne en revanche les primes de droit à l'image par match pour protéger ses contrats personnels. En contrepartie, ses bonus seront bien plus importants en cas de succès lors des grands tournois. (@lequipe) #Zidane #Bleus #Football

AFRICA DAILY REPORT — 29 SEPTEMBER 2026 Major developments reported during the previous 24 hours. 1. ETHIOPIA — Renewed Tigray conflict intensifies around strategic Alamata Federal-aligned forces claimed the capture of Alamata, an important supply hub south of Mekelle, after a TPLF-led offensive widened fighting into Afar and Amhara. Diplomatic sources cited by Reuters said the town had fallen or federal-aligned forces had entered it, while communications remained disrupted across Tigray. The renewed conflict is raising serious concerns about the survival of the 2022 Pretoria peace settlement. Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-pro-government-forces-claim-capture-strategic-tigray-town-2026-09-28/ 2. DR CONGO — Ebola outbreak passes 8,000 confirmed cases Importance: 10/10 — Critical Government data showed 8,067 confirmed Ebola cases and 3,901 deaths as of September 26. The Bundibugyo-virus outbreak is now the largest and deadliest Ebola epidemic recorded in the DRC and has spread across 63 health zones in seven provinces; shortages of health workers and weaknesses in contact tracing continue to impede containment. Source: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2026-09-28-drc-ebola-infections-cross-8000-confirms-government/ 3. SOUTH AFRICA — Death toll from Wedela tavern shooting rises to 18 Importance: 9/10 — Very High Police said another victim died in hospital, raising the death toll from the weekend attack in Wedela, southwest of Johannesburg, to 18. Authorities are searching for the attackers and examining a possible connection to turf wars in illegal gold mining; a separate weekend shooting near Cape Town killed another 10 people. Source: https://currently.att.yahoo.com/att/south-african-police-death-toll-062225459.html 4. ZAMBIA — Government targets average 7% economic growth Importance: 8/10 — High Zambia's finance ministry says the government aims to raise average economic growth to 7% over the next three years. The target follows progress in restructuring the country's external debt and represents an attempt to translate improving macroeconomic stability into stronger sustained growth. Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambia-aims-lift-economic-growth-7-over-next-three-years-2026-09-28/ 5. MALI — Barrick and unions reach agreement, averting gold-mine strike Importance: 8/10 — High Barrick Mining signed a new collective bargaining agreement with unions at the Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex, and planned strike action was withdrawn. The agreement reduces immediate operational risk at one of Mali's most important gold-producing assets following a prolonged period of tension involving the miner, workers and the Malian authorities. Source: https://www.brecorder.com/news/40441512/mali-gold-mine-barrick-mining-reaches-deal-with-unions 6. KENYA — Court of Appeal upholds Affordable Housing Levy Kenya's Court of Appeal dismissed challenges to the Affordable Housing Act and levy, upholding the legal framework underpinning one of President William Ruto's major domestic programmes. The judges also upheld the Kenya Revenue Authority Commissioner's role in collecting the levy, although they found that the Commission on Revenue Allocation should have been consulted before parliamentary debate. Source: https://allafrica.com/stories/202609280027.html 7. ETHIOPIA–SUDAN — Accusations over support for armed groups deepen regional tensions Ethiopia's army chief accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of supporting forces fighting federal troops amid renewed warfare in northern Ethiopia. Sudan rejected the allegations as baseless and counter-accused Ethiopia of facilitating support for Sudan's paramilitary RSF, adding another interstate dimension to the conflicts destabilising the Horn of Africa. Source: https://apnews.com/article/6b3208122a4221f3c2e8dcbe21630016 8. UGANDA — Police confirm detention of activist Praise Aloikin Ugandan police confirmed that activist Praise Aloikin Opoloje is in custody after activists and associates had reported her missing. Police said she had been arrested and would be brought before a court; Aloikin participated in the 2024 anti-corruption protests and has publicly criticised political and security figures. Source: https://allafrica.com/stories/202609280365.html 9. SOUTH AFRICA — Rand weakens as high oil prices increase economic pressure Importance: 7.5/10 — High The rand weakened about 0.5% against the dollar in early Monday trade as Middle East tensions pushed Brent crude above $107 per barrel. Because South Africa imports most of its fuel, sustained high oil prices pose risks through higher import costs and inflationary pressure. Source: https://www.channelafrica.co.za/channelafrica/news/rand-slips-as-us-iran-stalemate-pushes-oil-prices-higher/ 10. AFRICA — AFCON 2027 qualification moves into Matchday 2 Importance: 6/10 — Moderate The latest qualifying round opened with Burkina Faso beating Central African Republic 1–0, Equatorial Guinea defeating Sierra Leone 1–0, DR Congo beating Zimbabwe 2–1 and Tunisia drawing 2–2 with Botswana. September 29 brings a large slate including Ethiopia–Senegal, South Sudan–Egypt, Ghana–Gambia, Guinea-Bissau–Nigeria and Zambia–Togo. Source: https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/6/577635/Sports/Africa-Cup-of-Nations-qualifiers-results-amp%3B-fixt.aspx #Africa #AfricaNews #TopNewsOfAfrica #SouthAfrica #Wedela #Johannesburg #TavernShooting #MassShooting #ViolentCrime #IllegalMining #PublicSafety #Zambia #ZambianEconomy #EconomicGrowth #GDPGrowth #DebtRestructuring #Macroeconomics #AfricanEconomy #Ethiopia #Tigray #Alamata #TigrayConflict #PretoriaPeaceAgreement #HornOfAfrica #ArmedConflict #RegionalSecurity #AfricanSecurity #Geopolitics #AfricaToday #wrldorg

DEUXIÈME MATCH DE ZINEDINE ZIDANE 🇫🇷 À LA TÊTE DES BLEUS CE SOIR 🤩 L’Équipe de France affronte la Belgique 🇧🇪 en Ligue des Nations ce lundi soir. Zizou devrait aligner une attaque INÉDITE : 🇫🇷 Bradley Barcola 🇫🇷 Esteban Lepaul 🇫🇷 Désiré Doué Qui portera les Bleus ce soir face aux Belges ? 🤔 Les cartes du mode HYPERGLITCH de @sorare sont maintenant disponibles. 🆕 🤝 En collaboration avec Sorare #Football #ÉquipeDeFrance #ZinedineZidane

A lot of people who ideologically align with my work are skeptical of crypto. Fair, given who some of the biggest personalities are. But my work is tied to Ethereum because both are uncompromisable for censorship resistance, freedom to transact and tech to improve human agency. https://t.co/DHjWIsm0Fh #Ethereum #CensorshipResistance #CryptoSkepticism #Thetweetdoesnotmentionanyspecificcountries.Therefore #therearenocountrycodestoreturn.

“You could be a billionaire and get Obamacare.” Dr. Oz says a Soros-funded group is using the courts to block CMS from stopping fraud in Obamacare. “We believe Soros funded a lawfare group… It’s an aligned group with the Democratic Party who has sued us 150 times on these issues.” “They just won a suit… that blocks us from checking the tax returns of people on Obamacare.” “That’s how you destroy a system.” https://x.com/MAHA_Action/status/2104194351760892164

The end of #UNGA has a tradition, the conversation with @ForeignAffairs. UN has a strong legacy, is relevant still today but needs to regain the power to align decisions. Dialogue remains the path, but action must be the destination of that dialogue. https://t.co/pS0klBpxiD #UNGA #Dialogue #GlobalLeadership #Therearenospecificcountriesmentionedinthetweetprovided.Thus #therearenocountrycodestoreturn.

My proposal for Lebanon is clear: align with the EU sanctions regime against Russia and stand openly with Ukraine. 🇱🇧🇪🇺🇺🇦 Lebanon’s European path should mean foreign-policy alignment with Europe, serious enforcement against sanctions evasion, humanitarian and political support https://t.co/HmnkDOm4SJ #Lebanon #EU #Ukraine #LB #EU #UA

Fake NV – how a cloned newsroom turned an AI video into a $140 million corruption scandal For two days in September, a website that looked almost indistinguishable from one of Ukraine’s best-known news organisations carried an extraordinary corruption story. It claimed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau had raided former defence procurement chief Arsen Zhumadilov and discovered more than $140 million in cash packed inside refrigerator boxes. One box supposedly carried the words “For the Servant of the People” – an apparent reference to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political party. The raid never happened. The photographs and video presented as evidence were fabricated, and the news organisation reporting the story was not the New Voice of Ukraine but a cloned version of it. The episode is a compact example of an increasingly effective disinformation technique. Rather than inventing a new propaganda outlet and trying to build its credibility from scratch, an operator can simply steal the identity of an established newsroom and place fabricated material inside an otherwise convincing copy of its editorial environment. A newsroom copied almost in full The counterfeit site appeared at nvukraine.com, while the authentic New Voice of Ukraine operates at nv.ua and english.nv.ua. Registration records examined by fact-checkers show that the false domain was created on 21 September 2026, two days before the fabricated article appeared. According to NV’s own investigation, the imitation went much further than copying a logo: the operators reproduced the site’s visual design, sections, branding, contact information and genuine editorial material. A snapshot of legitimate NV content from 23 September appears to have been copied onto the counterfeit site, into which the operators inserted a single false article. That article claimed that NABU had searched premises connected to Zhumadilov, who had headed Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency until August, and seized $140 million in cash. The story was published in several languages, including Ukrainian and English, suggesting that the operation was intended not only for Ukraine’s domestic information space but also for foreign audiences following the war and Western support for Kyiv. AI supplied the supposed evidence The false article was supported by a video purportedly showing the money discovered during the raid. NABU said no such search or procedural action had taken place and identified the footage as fabricated using artificial intelligence. Independent fact-checker Lead Stories found no credible Ukrainian or international reporting confirming either the raid or the alleged seizure, while searches of NABU’s own published material produced no evidence supporting the claim. The operation therefore combined two separate forms of synthetic credibility. The AI-generated footage supplied what looked like visual proof, while the cloned NV website supplied institutional proof: an apparently reputable Ukrainian newsroom supposedly confirming that the event had happened. Neither element needed to withstand close scrutiny for long. Together, they only needed to appear credible enough to be copied, quoted and redistributed before the deception was exposed. From a fake Ukrainian source into the Russian information ecosystem On 24 September, the story began moving through large pro-Russian Telegram channels. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications traced early amplification to Golos Mordora, with roughly 149,000 subscribers, and Militarist, with around 277,000. Within less than an hour, other channels including VOBLA, Rossiya Seychas and Ostashko! Vazhnoye were circulating versions of the same claim. It subsequently appeared on X and on Russian-language websites including e-news.su and pressa24.ru. Babel calculated that posts carrying the fabrication had accumulated approximately 370,000 views by the morning of 25 September. The story also moved beyond the Russian-language ecosystem. English-language versions appeared in online communities including Lemmy and Hexbear, while accounts on X shared direct links to the counterfeit NV article. NV later reported that larger Russian media and propaganda outlets, including RIA Novosti, Life, Vesti, Ukraina.ru and Mail.ru, had reproduced or discussed the claim. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a Kremlin representative involved in contacts with the United States, also shared it on 25 September. This amplification is significant, but it should not be confused with proof of authorship. Publicly available evidence shows how the false story entered and spread through a Russian and pro-Russian information ecosystem. It does not establish which organisation registered the cloned domain, generated the video or directed the operation from the outset. Why copy NV? The operation relied on source laundering. A claim originating directly from a Russian Telegram channel that Ukraine’s defence procurement system had concealed $140 million would immediately carry an obvious political context. A claim apparently uncovered by an established Ukrainian newsroom looks very different. Once the fabricated NV article existed, subsequent accounts could cite what appeared to be an independent Ukrainian source rather than present the allegation as their own. Each repost moved the story another step away from its manufactured origin. The use of an English-language version strengthened that mechanism for audiences outside Ukraine. The underlying narrative was also carefully chosen. Corruption in Ukrainian defence procurement is a genuine subject of public scrutiny and investigative reporting, so the fabricated story did not require audiences to accept an entirely unfamiliar premise. It inserted a false event into a real area of political concern. That mixture of authentic context and fabricated evidence can be more persuasive than a completely invented story because much of the surrounding information feels recognisable. What can – and cannot – be attributed Ukrainian authorities and NV describe the episode as a Russian information operation, and its distribution can be documented extensively across pro-Russian and Russian media channels. The available public evidence, however, does not identify the organisation that created the counterfeit website, nor does it link the operation forensically to a named Russian intelligence service, military unit or state contractor. The most precise description is therefore a Russian-aligned disinformation operation whose fabricated material was systematically amplified through the Russian information ecosystem. That distinction matters. Distribution can be observed directly; command-and-control is harder to establish and should not be inferred without evidence. The newsroom itself becomes the deepfake The most important feature of the operation was not the $140 million figure or even the AI-generated video. It was the counterfeit newsroom surrounding them. The operators copied a real publication, populated it largely with genuine material and inserted a single false story, allowing the fabrication to borrow the accumulated credibility of journalists who had nothing to do with it. This points to a broader evolution in synthetic media. AI can fabricate an image, a voice or a video, but an influence operation can now fabricate something larger: the source that supposedly verified the evidence. In the Fake NV operation, the article, the video and the website reinforced one another, creating not simply a false story but a manufactured chain of credibility. Sources The New Voice of Ukraine — investigation into the cloned website https://english.nv.ua/nation/nv-discovers-fake-copy-of-website-with-planted-story-cites-russian-links-50644601.html The New Voice of Ukraine — Russian amplification of the $140 million fabrication https://english.nv.ua/russia-spreads-fake-140-million-ukraine-corruption-story-during-dmitriev-u-s-talks-50644647.html Lead Stories — independent fact-check https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-story-claims-140-million-found-at-home-of-ukraines-zhumadilov-marked-servant-of-the-people-nv-website-originated-it.html Babel — AI video and distribution analysis https://babel.ua/en/news/130469-a-video-is-sharing-online-about-140-million-found-in-the-possession-of-the-ex-head-of-the-defense-procurement-agency-this-is-an-ai-video-distributed-by-a-clone-of-ukrainian-media Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — initial debunk https://spravdi.org/en/ai-fake-about-140-million-amid-us-talks-how-russians-impose-the-image-of-corrupt-ukraine-on-the-west/ Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — NABU confirmation https://spravdi.org/u-merezhi-poshyryuyut-shi-fejk-pro-nibyto-obshuky-nabu-v-eksgolovy-agencziyi-oboronnyh-zakupivel/ Detector Media — distribution and NABU response https://detector.media/infospace/article/252806/2026-09-25-u-merezhi-pidrobyly-sayt-nv-dlya-poshyrennya-feyku-pro-obshuky-v-eksochilnyka-agentsii-oboronnykh-zakupivel/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode10 #FakeNV #NewVoiceOfUkraine #Ukraine #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #ClonedMedia #FakeMedia #FakeNews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #AIVideo #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #CorruptionNarrative #UkraineCorruption #DefenceProcurement #NABU #ArsenZhumadilov #Telegram #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Russia’s influence operation arrives ahead of the US midterms With weeks remaining before America's November midterm elections, a familiar type of content has begun appearing online. Videos resembling reports from CNN, the BBC and The New York Times accuse candidates of corruption, antisemitism and misconduct. Hollywood actors appear to denounce Democrats. Other clips claim that warnings about Russian interference are themselves a Democratic disinformation campaign. The reports are fabricated. Graphika, which tracks online influence operations, says it has identified a coordinated campaign targeting candidates in competitive US Senate races. It assesses with high confidence that the material was produced by Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka – a long-running Russia-aligned influence operation previously active against elections and political debates in Europe and the United States. The activity coincides with a broader warning from American intelligence officials. Classified assessments reported by The New York Times conclude that the Kremlin has authorised another digital influence campaign ahead of the 2026 midterms, aimed primarily at exploiting existing divisions and undermining confidence in American democracy. There is an important distinction. US officials have not reported evidence that Russia is attempting to manipulate voting machines or alter the counting of votes. The operation is about influencing the information environment surrounding the election. Fake scandals for competitive Senate races Graphika traced a concentrated wave of activity between 10 and 14 September. Likely inauthentic or repurposed accounts distributed videos accusing Democratic politicians of corruption, antisemitism and other misconduct. The targets included Senator Jon Ossoff in Georgia, Representative Chris Pappas in New Hampshire and Texas state representative James Talarico, as well as Senate candidates Sherrod Brown in Ohio, Roy Cooper in North Carolina, Mary Peltola in Alaska, Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, Joshua Turek in Iowa and Troy Jackson in Maine. The selection was not random. These were politicians involved in Senate contests where the result could matter to control of the chamber. The campaign did not rely on a single political narrative. Instead, it attached different accusations to different candidates – corruption, social issues, antisemitism or personal misconduct – while maintaining a consistent production and distribution model. That model is characteristic of Matryoshka: create apparently independent pieces of evidence, disguise them as journalism and distribute them through networks of disposable accounts. Hollywood celebrities who never said what the videos claimed One of the campaign's more distinctive techniques involved genuine footage of American actors. Videos featuring celebrities including Sarah Jessica Parker and Julia Roberts were altered with captions and other material to suggest they were promoting the slogan #AllDemocratsAreCriminals. The technique continued in subsequent material. Fact-checkers identified fabricated New York Times-branded videos using footage of Alyssa Milano, Sean Astin, Rachael Harris, Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden, Annie Potts and Patrick Fabian. Some of the original footage came from Cameo, where actors record personalised video messages. Their authentic images were retained while fabricated audio, captions or surrounding material changed the meaning entirely. Lead Stories compared several of the clips with the originals and found that the supposed political statements did not appear in the genuine recordings. Eric Braeden's representative separately confirmed that the claim he had joined the anti-Democratic campaign was false. The advantage of the technique is straightforward. Generative AI does not need to create a convincing celebrity from nothing. The operator can begin with authentic footage of a recognisable person and manipulate only the elements necessary to manufacture a political statement. Stealing the authority of real newsrooms Celebrity impersonation was only one layer. The operation repeatedly borrowed the visual identity of established media organisations. Graphika identified material impersonating or falsely citing the BBC, CNN and Politico, alongside references to France's VIGINUM foreign-interference agency and journalist Brandy Zadrozny. Other material reproduced New York Times-style branding. Some fabricated reports made an unusual claim: that Democrats themselves were organising disinformation or “false-flag operations” and then blaming Russia. This creates a defensive layer around the influence operation. Instead of merely distributing false political allegations, the campaign also attempts to discredit future reporting about the manipulation itself. If successful, evidence exposing foreign interference can be reframed as part of the conspiracy. Graphika says it assesses with high confidence that Operation Overload produced these videos. The technique is well established. Earlier investigations by CheckFirst and Reset Tech documented hundreds of falsified pieces of content produced by Operation Overload, often impersonating journalists, institutions and major media brands. AI-generated or manipulated material has increasingly become part of that production system. What US intelligence says Russia is trying to achieve The broader strategic picture comes from American intelligence assessments reported on 18 September. According to US officials familiar with classified findings, the Kremlin has authorised a covert digital influence campaign aimed at Americans during the 2026 election season. Its apparent objective is to seed or amplify domestic divisions and weaken confidence in the political process. Some officials described the principal aim as creating disorder rather than helping a single political party. The publicly identified Matryoshka material examined so far, however, has targeted Democratic candidates. Those two findings should not be treated as contradictory. An operation can exploit partisan divisions while serving the broader objective of making the electoral system appear corrupt, chaotic or illegitimate. US officials also reportedly assess the current Russian campaign as less extensive or coordinated than some previous election operations. Moscow is considered less focused on congressional elections than presidential contests and remains heavily occupied by its war against Ukraine. Russia has denied previous US accusations of election interference. An operation with limited reach – so far There is another reason for caution: producing large quantities of disinformation is not the same as successfully influencing voters. Matryoshka has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to manufacture content at industrial speed, but much of its material receives little genuine engagement. Researchers monitoring the network have previously warned against confusing automated distribution and platform view counts with authentic audience penetration. There are exceptions. A fabricated New York Times-style video featuring Jamie Lee Curtis had accumulated nearly 200,000 views on X by the end of 17 September, according to reporting by The New York Times. Other pieces attracted considerably less attention. There is currently no public evidence demonstrating that the campaign has changed voting intentions or will affect election results. What the September activity demonstrates is something narrower but important: a Russia-aligned influence infrastructure previously used against European elections has now turned significant attention towards the American midterms. The basic method has changed little – impersonate trusted media, manufacture scandals and use networks of inauthentic accounts to distribute them. What has changed is the production technology. Authentic celebrity footage, synthetic voices, manipulated video and rapidly generated fake journalism allow the same operation to produce more tailored material for more candidates at lower cost. The objective does not require Americans to believe every fabrication. Creating uncertainty over which videos, news reports and public statements are authentic can itself degrade trust in the information environment surrounding an election. Sources - Graphika — Russia-Aligned Influence Operation Targets US Midterm Candidates, German State Elections https://www.graphika.com/insights/russia-aligned-influence-operation-targets-us-midterm-candidates-german-state-elections - The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections, U.S. Intelligence Finds https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/us/politics/russia-election-disinformation-us-intelligence.html - Kathimerini / The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections https://www.ekathimerini.com/nytimes/1315792/russia-aims-to-inject-chaos-into-elections-us-intelligence-finds/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload: An AI-fuelled escalation of the Kremlin-linked propaganda effort https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-an-ai-fuelled-escalation-of-the-kremlin-linked-propaganda-effort/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload targeting the US election https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-a-growing-disinformation-threat-now-targeting-the-u-s-presidential-election/ - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Alyssa Milano, Rachael Harris and Sean Astin https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-alyssa-milano-rachael-harris-sean-astin-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden and other celebrities https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-leonardo-dicaprio-eric-braeden-other-celebs-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Brennan Center for Justice — AI Is Changing Foreign Election Influence https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/ai-changing-foreign-election-influence - ODNI — previous US intelligence assessment of foreign election information operations https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024.pdf - FBI / ODNI / CISA — previous joint assessment of Russian election influence operations https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-110424 #DISINFORMED #Episode9 #Russia #UnitedStates #USMidterms #Midterms2026 #USElections #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #OperationOverload #Matryoshka #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #FakeNews #PoliticalDisinformation #CelebrityDeepfakes #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #ElectionSecurity #CognitiveWarfare #Graphika #OSINT #Democracy #WRLD

« CHERKI RELAYEUR PROMETTEUR » 🇫🇷💎 Testé dans un milieu à 3 et aligné plus bas qu’à son habitude, RAYAN CHERKI A SU CONVAINCRE POUR SA PREMIÈRE sous Zidane. Pour @lequipe 🗞️, "le milieu offensif de Manchester City a su montrer ses qualités habituelles dans un registre qui expose davantage ses faiblesses." "Quoi qu’il fasse, quelle que soit sa position ou le contexte, Rayan Cherki attire toujours une lumière particulière." 🌟 Il a touché 88 ballons, record parmi les milieux et attaquants français hier, "et deux fois ses gestes auraient pu valoir une passe décisive" si Rabiot et Koundé avaient mis le ballon au fond. #Cherki #Zidane #Football