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Vladimir Putin's party won the legislative elections in Russia, increasing tensions in Europe where debates about easing sanctions against certain Russian oligarchs are emerging, while Ukraine and its allies express concerns about the legitimacy of this vote in the occupied territories. (translated)

The Ghosts of Zaolzie – how a cyberattack tried to manufacture a conflict between Poland and Czechia At around 5pm on 16 August 2026, an alarming article appeared on the website of Radio PiK, a genuine Polish regional broadcaster. Its headline claimed that Poland was preparing to seize Czech territory and that the Czech Foreign Ministry had received a document outlining Warsaw's demands. Radio PiK had published no such story. An attacker had compromised an employee's credentials, gained access to the station's content management system and replaced a legitimate article with fabricated material. The newsroom quickly removed it and informed the authorities. But the intrusion was only one element of a much larger operation. Investigators subsequently uncovered forged diplomatic documents, accounts impersonating Polish and Czech officials, a cloned Czech news site, AI-generated material, a fictitious local activist and advertising for a demonstration that apparently did not exist. Together, these elements attempted to manufacture the appearance of a new territorial conflict between Poland and Czechia over Zaolzie. A false crisis built around a real territorial issue The operation worked because it did not start entirely with fiction. Poland and Czechia do have an unresolved technical issue concerning approximately 368.44 hectares of territory, originating in post-war changes to the Polish-Czechoslovak border. It is commonly described as the Czech “territorial debt” to Poland. But this is not a Polish claim to Zaolzie and there is no evidence that Warsaw is seeking to annex Czech territory. The operation fused this real issue with a much more powerful historical memory. Zaolzie – the part of Cieszyn Silesia west of the Olza River – was disputed by Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War. In 1938, during the crisis created by the Munich Agreement, Poland seized the territory from Czechoslovakia. The manipulation therefore followed a simple logic: a real territorial debt became an alleged Polish territorial demand, which was then transformed into a supposed attempt to reclaim Zaolzie. Fake accounts impersonating Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister Artur Harazim and Czech ambassador Břetislav Dančák helped reinforce the story. Fabricated diplomatic documents circulated alongside them. One early version referred incorrectly to 638.44 hectares; the fake Harazim account then “corrected” the number to the genuine figure of 368.44 hectares. It was an effective form of reverse fact-checking: correcting one false detail could make the larger fabrication appear authentic. Fake media – and one real newsroom The operators also created a website designed to resemble Czech public broadcaster iRozhlas. It published material supporting the same narrative, including claims that Czech residents near the border were becoming concerned about Polish intentions. The result was a manufactured information loop. Forged documents could support fake media reports; impersonated officials could comment on those reports; social-media accounts could then cite both as confirmation. But the Radio PiK hack added something much more valuable: the credibility of a real media organisation. Instead of merely cloning a newsroom, the attackers briefly inserted their fabrication into an authentic one. A familiar domain, logo and established broadcaster could therefore appear to confirm a story manufactured elsewhere. The cyberattack was not simply an accompanying technical incident. It was part of the information operation itself – a way of manufacturing credibility for false information. From a synthetic activist to a real demonstration The operation then attempted to move from the digital world into the physical one. A Facebook account under the name “Adam Sikora” promoted a demonstration in the Czech border city of Třinec under slogans including “Cieszyn Silesia is Czech” and “Here we live, here we stay”. Paid Facebook advertising was reportedly used to promote the event. Yet Třinec authorities said no demonstration had been properly notified. Promotional material used the logo of the Czech KOVO trade union, which denied any involvement. Investigators also identified indications that Sikora's profile photograph and other imagery were AI-generated. The persona even advertised a supposed house for sale in the border region, reinforcing the impression that frightened residents wanted to leave because of Polish territorial ambitions. The property could not be verified and its images also showed signs of artificial generation. This reveals the architecture of the operation: forged document → fake official → cloned media → compromised real media → synthetic local activist → advertised protest → appearance of social tension. The final stage is particularly significant. Had real people attended the demonstration, photographs of an authentic crowd could potentially have been presented as evidence that Czech citizens genuinely feared Polish territorial ambitions. A fabricated online conflict could therefore have begun generating real-world evidence of its own existence. Why Zaolzie? Historical grievances are valuable material for influence operations because the underlying facts are real. Poland and Czechoslovakia genuinely disputed Cieszyn Silesia. Poland genuinely occupied Zaolzie in 1938. A Polish minority genuinely lives in Czechia. And the 368.44-hectare territorial issue genuinely exists. The operator did not need to invent that history. It only needed to suggest that the history was repeating itself. PISM assessed that the operation sought to revive the image of Poland as a revisionist state willing to challenge European borders. Such a narrative could serve a broader purpose: damaging Polish-Czech relations, weakening confidence between NATO and EU allies and portraying Central Europe as a region where historical territorial conflicts remain unresolved. Russia is the leading attribution – but not a proven one The attribution requires more caution than the mechanics of the operation. PISM assessed Russia as the most likely perpetrator, while NASK identified similarities between the campaign and previously observed Russian influence methods. Russian-linked information infrastructure had also shown earlier interest in the Polish-Czech territorial issue. The techniques are familiar: cloned media, forged documents, impersonated officials, synthetic identities, historical grievances and the combination of cyber intrusion with information manipulation. But these indicators are not the same as definitive attribution. As of mid-September 2026, no publicly disclosed forensic evidence had conclusively connected the Radio PiK compromise, fake domains, accounts and financing to a specific Russian intelligence service, government organisation or contractor. Russia can therefore reasonably be described as the leading analytical attribution, but claims that the operation was definitively conducted by the GRU or another named Russian structure go beyond the publicly available evidence. The operation failed. The model remains important The campaign did not create a Polish-Czech diplomatic crisis. Both governments rejected the narrative, the fictitious protest was exposed, journalists reconstructed much of the operation and Radio PiK detected the intrusion quickly. Its observable impact appears to have been limited. But Zaolzie illustrates a broader evolution in information warfare. Modern operations do not have to rely on a single viral fake. They can construct an entire artificial information environment in which different elements appear to confirm one another. A forged document creates the claim. A fake diplomat authenticates it. A cloned newsroom reports it. A hacked real newsroom lends it credibility. An AI-generated citizen reacts to it. Advertising creates the appearance of a grassroots movement. And if real people eventually respond, fiction begins producing genuine events. The objective is no longer simply to persuade people that something happened. It is to create the conditions in which something real starts happening because enough people believed that it did. Sources: Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) https://pism.pl/publikacje/dezinformacja-o-relacjach-polsko-czeskich Euronews Polska — Radio PiK cyberattack https://pl.euronews.com/2026/08/20/polska-planuje-zajecie-terytorium-czech-wlamali-sie-na-strone-radia-i-opublikowali-falszyw Demagog https://demagog.org.pl/na-biezaco/skoordynowana-operacja-uderza-w-polsko-czeskie-relacje-czy-stoi-za-nia-rosja/ Robert Lansing Institute https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/08/27/zaolzie-as-an-instrument-of-influence-an-attempt-to-revive-a-polish-czech-territorial-conflict/ Institute for European Security Studies (IESS) https://www.iess.org.ua/analytics/ghosts-of-zaolzie iDNES.cz https://www.idnes.cz/ostrava/zpravy/tesinsko-kampan-lzi-demonstrace-trinec-primatorka-palkovska.A260826_963356_ostrava-zpravy_jog Radio Zachód / PAP https://zachod.pl/1539751/niedzielny-atak-hakerski-na-radio-pik-redaktor-naczelny-podjelismy-niezwloczne-dzialania/ Euronews — territorial debt / NASK assessment https://de.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/21/polen-plant-besetzung-tschechischen-gebiets-fake-news TVP World https://tvpworld.com/95036191/-warsaw-warns-against-division-amid-czech-border-disinformation Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode5 #GhostsOfZaolzie #Zaolzie #Poland #Czechia #CieszynSilesia #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Cyberattack #CyberSecurity #HybridWarfare #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #ForgedDocuments #DigitalImpersonation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Astroturfing #RussianInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #NATO #CentralEurope #MediaManipulation #WRLD

🇫🇷🇷🇺 ALERTE - La France RIPOSTE déjà militairement, dans le champ conventionnel, à des attaques hybrides russes, sans nécessairement le rendre public, reconnaît une source militaire française au Monde : "C’est déjà le cas". Plusieurs sources militaires jugent désormais crédible l’hypothèse d’un "véritable test militaire russe" contre les alliés de l’OTAN à brève échéance. (Le Monde) #France #Russie #OTAN

In recent days, there has been considerable speculation about the security of NATO's eastern flank. Estonia's security assessment remains unchanged. We are calm, vigilant, and prepared. Together with our NATO Allies, we have spent years strengthening deterrence and collective #NATO #EasternFlank #Security #EE #NATO

The American Congress has enacted the Graham law, imposing new economic sanctions against Russia and its allies, giving Donald Trump the power to impose tariffs of up to 100% on major countries importing Russian gas and oil, including China and India, in response to the invasion of Ukraine. (translated)

ACCORD HISTOIRE CONCERNANT LE GROENLAND DERNIÈRE HEURE : J'ai le plaisir d'annoncer que les États-Unis d'Amérique ont conclu un accord avec le Royaume du Danemark et le Groenland, accordant aux États-Unis un contrôle permanent sur la sécurité et l'ensemble des autres besoins au Groenland, répondant ainsi pleinement à TOUTES nos nombreuses préoccupations américaines. Cela ne coûtera RIEN aux États-Unis ! Sous ma direction, nous avons travaillé avec les représentants du Danemark et du Groenland pour garantir que les États-Unis auront À JAMAIS la capacité totale de faire le nécessaire au Groenland afin de sécuriser et défendre la sécurité du Groenland ainsi que celle des États-Unis d'Amérique.  De plus, à compter d'aujourd'hui, aucun adversaire des États-Unis ne pourra JAMAIS établir de base au Groenland, y maintenir une présence militaire ou y effectuer des investissements sensibles sans notre approbation écrite expresse. Depuis plus de 100 ans, les présidents connaissent l'importance stratégique du Groenland, mais AUCUN d'entre eux n'a été en mesure d'agir à ce sujet. Je suis fier d'être le président qui a réglé de façon permanente et définitive cette situation très importante.  Il s'agit d'un accord à « durée infinie », sans aucune fin ! Nous sommes très honorés et fiers de ce qui vient de se produire, et tout ce qui a été convenu aujourd'hui sera chéri par le peuple américain. Nous allons immédiatement entamer le processus de développement d'une importante présence militaire dans les zones appropriées du Groenland, lesquelles sont nombreuses. Nous travaillerons avec la population du Groenland pour son développement et sa construction.  Cette solution est excellente pour les États-Unis d'Amérique, le Danemark, le Groenland et l'ensemble de nos alliés. Nous nous réjouissons à l'idée de collaborer avec le formidable peuple du Danemark et du Groenland vers un avenir magnifique concernant cette vaste parcelle de terre hautement stratégique. Nous en prendrons grand soin ! C'est un rêve qui se réalise pour les États-Unis d'Amérique, un événement très important, historique et spécial. Merci de votre attention sur ce sujet !  Président DONALD J. TRUMP #Groenland #ÉtatsUnis #Danemark

❗️ [ 🇷🇺 RUSSIE | 🇺🇦 UKRAINE ] 🔸 Vladimir Poutine préparerait une intensification de la guerre contre l’Ukraine, qui pourrait également viser les alliés de Kiev en Europe, selon le Telegraph. Des responsables du renseignement occidental estiment que Moscou préparerait une « mobilisation discrète » après les élections prévues ce week-end en Russie, qui pourraient permettre l’enrôlement de milliers de nouveaux soldats. #Russie #Ukraine #Guerre

This US administration has no real strategy to deal with Russia. Result is chaos. Concrete evidence of Moscow's hostile operations against US and Allies (vide FBI report, help to Iran etc.) is ignored, while irresponsible ideas of mythical trade deals with Russia get a hearing.👇 #Russia #USForeignPolicy #Chaos #US #RU #IR

We must not believe that we are powerless. Europe is strong and even stronger with allies. We will not surrender to bullies. Against tech oligarchs, dictators, and those tearing down the rules-based order, we unite and stand up to give hope. 🇪🇺 https://t.co/n9NyHW5VEa #Unity #StandUp #FutureOfEurope #EU

Dans un article paru dans Le Point hier, Christelle Morançais attaque Lisnard et Knafo. Elle déclare ne pas vouloir d’une image d’ultralibérale à la tronçonneuse, ne veut pas être comparée à David Lisnard car « elle au moins, elle fait » et encore moins à Sarah Knafo et à ses recettes « gros rouge qui tache ». Non mais franchement, vous êtes moins d’une dizaine d’élus à vous revendiquer libéraux en France, ne vous tirez pas dans les pattes ! La présidente des Pays de la Loire est connue pour avoir résisté aux pressions des gaspilleurs d’argent public en tous genres et mis un coup de rabot de 100 millions d’euros dans le budget de sa région. C’est bien. Mais elle utilise cette aura libérale pour rassurer le milieu des affaires sur la ligne économique de son candidat à la présidentielle… Édouard Philippe. Ah c’est sûr que ton Édouard avec zéro baisse des dépenses, zéro effort, zéro norme supprimée, il ne va tacher personne ! Oui, Milei a des allures de bourrin. Le rocker gueulard, le fou à la tronçonneuse. Mais vous savez quoi ? Ça marche ! Non seulement il gagne des élections mais en plus il redresse un pays ruiné par le socialisme ! La pauvreté chute, la croissance explose, les citoyens respirent. Ce n’est pas en étant timorée, encore moins en tapant sur ses rares potentiels alliés, que Morançais et son candidat ramollo ont la moindre chance de sauver ce pays. Tu es libérale pourquoi ? Parce que tu sais que tu as raison et qu’il faut trancher dans les dépenses le plus possible et le plus rapidement possible. Il est temps d'assumer. #Libéralisme #Politique #Économie

🇲🇽🇪🇺🛡️ MEXICO INTO NATO, THE EU & THE EURO! 💶 Yes, the poster is satire — Trump is literally exploding at the idea. 😂💥 But the geopolitical proposal behind it is serious: I want a much wider Euro-Atlantic community of democracies, free trade partners and security allies. https://t.co/QE4XWGuSH3 #MexicoInNATO #EuroAtlantic #Geopolitics #MX #EU

I am calling for a serious European debate on whether the European Union itself should become part of NATO’s institutional security architecture. @vonderleyen Today, 23 of the EU’s 27 member states are already NATO Allies, and NATO officially describes the EU as a unique and https://t.co/gZmnzhLRYE #NATO #EU #SecurityArchitecture #EU #NATO