British Conservatives: "Russia has disgracefully interfered in politics in France, Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Moldova, Romania and invaded Ukraine. They even meddled in the US elections." Also British Conservatives: "What? Russia! Interfere in Brexit? Ridiculous! Just a tired old conspiracy theory."
The author argued that anti-immigration policies were effective at mobilising voters because they offered a sense of identity, whether based on race, language, Christianity or other factors. They said this appeal was stronger than that of other culturally conservative causes.
The conservative commentator currently works as a communications adviser at Trump Media & Technology Group. #WhiteHouse #PressSecretary #USPolitics
The author wrote that, according to polls, Spanish conservative parties were significantly ahead of the Socialists led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez before the November election. He referred to Sánchez as politically finished. https://t.co/MgndcvNwsH #Spanien #Wahlen #Politik #ES (translated)
Jannik Sinner has announced that he will return to play in 2027 due to an injury to his right knee, the exact diagnosis of which is still unknown, and his doctors have suggested conservative therapies without proposing surgery. #JannikSinner #tennis #infortuni (translated)
Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD
Göktaş's arrest was the latest in a widening crackdown on anyone seen as critical of Turkey's conservative government or its values, which has netted hundreds of politicians, artists, musicians, journalists and LGBTQ+ activists. #Turkey #Comedy #FreeSpeech
Steve Deace is sounding a major alarm for Republicans ahead of the 2026 midterms. In his September 25 column, the conservative Iowa commentator says polling relayed to Iowa House Republicans suggests even districts Donald Trump previously carried by around 10–15 points could now https://t.co/O66mRGJlEV #Midterms2026 #Republicans #Election2024 #US
Big tech cannot apply a different set of rules to users in the US and in Europe! Yet, this is exactly what is happening! In 2025 major platforms stopped censoring conservative opinion in the US, but the European Commission still empowers NGOs to tell social media services to https://t.co/fijHMvFTFJ #BigTech #Censorship #FreeSpeech #US #EU
Nearly 200 Indigenous candidates—a record—are running in Brazil’s October general elections, many campaigning on environmental protection amid an increasingly conservative political landscape in which agribusiness interests wield significant influence https://t.co/VtT6fL7GLc #IndigenousCandidates #BrazilElections #EnvironmentalProtection #BR
The center isn’t holding. For the first time, the German conservatives failed to enter a state parliament. https://t.co/ZrUuiy5DAP #GermanPolitics #Conservatives #Elections2023 #DE
To the American followers. Vincent Bolloré a French billionaire and conservative media mogul, often described as France’s Rupert Murdoch is announcing a deal with Nigeria. #VincentBolloré #Nigeria #MediaMogul #US #FR #NG
This is pure gold. What to make of Russia pretending to protect conservative values—and how to counter its aggression. The brilliant Avi Sahar at the European Parliament on why words like “hybrid,” “resilience,” and “below threshold” just hide our cowardice. https://t.co/FPcqsg2ZVp #Russia #ConservativeValues #HybridWarfare #RU #EU
The conservative activist was speaking to a crowd of thousands on the university campus when he was shot and killed by a gunman positioned on a roof. #GunViolence #Utah #CharlieKirk
The conservative activist was speaking to a crowd of thousands on the university campus when he was shot and killed by a gunman positioned on a roof. #CharlieKirk #GunViolence #Utah
