BETA nonprofit public democratic european moderated

Search

#audiences

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 / Anthropic

Russia continues to escalate its official rhetoric, openly threatening European countries with war. Zakharova’s delusional claims about a possible European attack are nothing more than an attempt to mobilise domestic audiences and lay the groundwork for potential aggression #Russia #War #Europe #RU #EU

Mitico Magazine - The Teatro Edicola of San Severo: A Model of Cultural Revolution for Stanford University as Well Source: https://www.miticomagazine.com/territorio-e-sociale/teatro-edicola-di-san-severo-un-modello-di-rivoluzione-culturale-anche-per-la-stanford-university/ The Teatro Edicola in Via Tondi In San Severo, a singular metamorphosis has taken place: a newsstand abandoned for at least six years has found a new function and a new identity, transforming into one of the smallest and most unusual theatre stages in the world. An experiment born in the heart of the town which, in just a few months, has moved beyond local boundaries, attracting attention even overseas. It is called Teatro Edicola and it is a project conceived by the company Foyer '97, artistically directed by Francesco Gravino, which has brought the old newsstand in Via Tondi back to life through a formula that is both essential and surprising. Foyer '97 Foyer '97 APS was established as a formally constituted association active in the cultural sector in San Severo in 1997, born from the vocation of a group of actors, directors and theatre enthusiasts, with the aim of building a "living" and accessible theatre in the town. Over the years the company has developed a repertoire that includes texts from the classical tradition, contemporary dramaturgy, comedy and experimental projects, not limiting itself to the mere production of theatre shows, but also organising theatre courses and workshops and educational and cultural projects characterised by a strong inclusive ethos, particularly in schools. Foyer '97 does not always have a fixed artistic ensemble, but works with different performers and collaborators depending on the project; the only indispensable presence is that of Francesco Guido Gravino himself, actor, director and artistic director of the theatre company. The distinctive feature of Foyer '97 is certainly the value of social and cultural promotion attributed to theatre, the extremely close relationship with the audience and the search for a type of theatre outside conventional spaces, with cemeteries, trains, bell towers, and now a newsstand, as its backdrop. Six spectators, a few minutes and a minimal distance between stage and audience The project was launched on 27 March 2026, on the occasion of World Theatre Day, offering a theatrical experience built around a radical reduction of the conventional spaces and times of performance. The idea was born not only from the search for unconventional spaces, but also from "Edicola Fiore", the morning press review with a strongly ironic tone presented by Rosario Fiorello and Stefano Meloccaro, which was broadcast first only on Fiorello's social channels between 2011 and 2014, and then also on radio and television between 2016 and 2018. The review took its name from the diminutive of its founder, Fiore, and from the newsstand of a friend of Fiorello's in Via Flaminia Nuova in Rome, where the showman would meet early in the morning with a group of friends to read the newspapers. The San Severo newsstand was granted free of charge by its owner Pino Frau to the theatre group which, after obtaining temporary authorisation and institutional support from the Municipality of San Severo, refurbished it within two weeks at a cost of less than €3,000. Just six seats, a total surface area of 4 sq m, of which only 2 are for the stage area, less than a metre between actors and audience, a curtain, a lectern, two lights, performances lasting between 5 and 15 minutes, audience rotation every quarter of an hour: apparently minimal elements that end up subverting the usual relationship between stage and auditorium. Spectators, in fact, find themselves immersed in the stage action, in such proximity to the actors that every gesture, expression and word becomes immediately perceptible. In this way, theatre abandons its traditional spaces and insinuates itself into the everyday life of the street, becoming an intimate, concentrated and almost participatory experience. During the inaugural period admission was free with a subsequent voluntary donation from spectators; in the event of a more stable and longer-term concession, which could lead to seasonal theatre performances, the proposed ticket price would be €5. Audiences reward the experiment Foyer '97's gamble met with public interest right from the start: over 60 people attended the shows in a single afternoon, while the three days that inaugurated the season sold out. From a singular local experiment, the Teatro Edicola thus began to arouse curiosity even outside the province of Foggia, gradually transforming into a case of cultural and social interest, until it reached the American continent. From the province of Foggia to the "Stanford Social Innovation Review" The San Severo experience has now come under the international spotlight: in September 2026, the Stanford Social Innovation Review, an international journal and platform dedicated to social innovation published by the Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society at Stanford University in California, published on its website and in the Fall 2026 print edition the reportage "The Six-Seat Revolution", written by Dr Luciano Magaldi Sardella, independent journalist and researcher affiliated with the European Open University, and editorially supervised by deputy editor David V. Johnson. In the article, it is argued that the Teatro Edicola attracted attention overseas because the project concentrates cultural innovation, urban regeneration and proximity theatre into just a few square metres: starting from a real urban problem, it recovers an abandoned place with a modest investment, brings performance directly into public space and experiments with a much closer relationship between actors and spectators. From the point of view of theatrical representation, it also highlights how the format, based on micro-stories of five to twelve minutes, taken from great classics such as Goldoni, Chekhov, Ibsen, Euripides and Benni, and on audience rotation every fifteen minutes, transforms the physical limitations of the space into a precise dramaturgical choice, proving to be extremely innovative. All of this makes it possible to address some of the main critical issues in the sector: falling audience numbers, an exclusively elderly audience, reduced resources and distance from traditional cultural venues. The journal also highlights, however, the potential problems: economic sustainability, the need for stable institutional support and the difficulty of replicating the model, which is closely linked to the community and territory of San Severo. A model looking beyond San Severo Despite the difficulties, initial requests for information have already arrived from Lucca and Rome, where there is curiosity about the possibility of getting to know the model more closely and the steps needed to replicate it. The replicability formula, in fact, does not seem to require particularly costly infrastructure: an unused space, a targeted intervention, a cultural idea, in-depth knowledge of the surrounding area and a willingness to return that place to the community can be enough to trigger a new urban function. It is precisely in the disproportion between the modesty of the resources employed and the resonance generated by the initiative that perhaps the most original feature of the Teatro Edicola lies, certainly unique of its kind; there are, however, other examples in Italy of newsstands reused for other purposes: "Edicola 518", a twentieth-century kiosk abandoned in the centre of Perugia, now dedicated to independent publishing, art and cultural production; and in Rome itself, the abandoned newsstand in Piazza Testaccio used temporarily as a stage for a show by Fabio Morgan and the Erno newsstand in the Prati district, which almost every month offers a calendar of events, exhibitions, pop-ups and collaborations with artists and creative enterprises. Small revolutions, therefore, that tell stories of the reappropriation of urban spaces, of creativity and social innovation. And which, it is hoped, will take root in order to look ever further afield.

Teatro Edicola di San Severo: un modello di rivoluzione culturale anche per la Stanford University

Mitico Magazine - The Teatro Edicola of San Severo: A Model of Cultural Revolution for Stanford University as Well Source: https://www.miticomagazine.com/territorio-e-sociale/teatro-edicola-di-san-severo-un-modello-di-rivoluzione-culturale-anche-per-la-stanford-university/ The Teatro Edicola in Via Tondi In San Severo, a singular metamorphosis has taken place: a newsstand abandoned for at least six years has found a new function and a new identity, transforming into one of the smallest and most unusual theatre stages in the world. An experiment born in the heart of the town which, in just a few months, has moved beyond local boundaries, attracting attention even overseas. It is called Teatro Edicola and it is a project conceived by the company Foyer '97, artistically directed by Francesco Gravino, which has brought the old newsstand in Via Tondi back to life through a formula that is both essential and surprising. Foyer '97 Foyer '97 APS was established as a formally constituted association active in the cultural sector in San Severo in 1997, born from the vocation of a group of actors, directors and theatre enthusiasts, with the aim of building a "living" and accessible theatre in the town. Over the years the company has developed a repertoire that includes texts from the classical tradition, contemporary dramaturgy, comedy and experimental projects, not limiting itself to the mere production of theatre shows, but also organising theatre courses and workshops and educational and cultural projects characterised by a strong inclusive ethos, particularly in schools. Foyer '97 does not always have a fixed artistic ensemble, but works with different performers and collaborators depending on the project; the only indispensable presence is that of Francesco Guido Gravino himself, actor, director and artistic director of the theatre company. The distinctive feature of Foyer '97 is certainly the value of social and cultural promotion attributed to theatre, the extremely close relationship with the audience and the search for a type of theatre outside conventional spaces, with cemeteries, trains, bell towers, and now a newsstand, as its backdrop. Six spectators, a few minutes and a minimal distance between stage and audience The project was launched on 27 March 2026, on the occasion of World Theatre Day, offering a theatrical experience built around a radical reduction of the conventional spaces and times of performance. The idea was born not only from the search for unconventional spaces, but also from "Edicola Fiore", the morning press review with a strongly ironic tone presented by Rosario Fiorello and Stefano Meloccaro, which was broadcast first only on Fiorello's social channels between 2011 and 2014, and then also on radio and television between 2016 and 2018. The review took its name from the diminutive of its founder, Fiore, and from the newsstand of a friend of Fiorello's in Via Flaminia Nuova in Rome, where the showman would meet early in the morning with a group of friends to read the newspapers. The San Severo newsstand was granted free of charge by its owner Pino Frau to the theatre group which, after obtaining temporary authorisation and institutional support from the Municipality of San Severo, refurbished it within two weeks at a cost of less than €3,000. Just six seats, a total surface area of 4 sq m, of which only 2 are for the stage area, less than a metre between actors and audience, a curtain, a lectern, two lights, performances lasting between 5 and 15 minutes, audience rotation every quarter of an hour: apparently minimal elements that end up subverting the usual relationship between stage and auditorium. Spectators, in fact, find themselves immersed in the stage action, in such proximity to the actors that every gesture, expression and word becomes immediately perceptible. In this way, theatre abandons its traditional spaces and insinuates itself into the everyday life of the street, becoming an intimate, concentrated and almost participatory experience. During the inaugural period admission was free with a subsequent voluntary donation from spectators; in the event of a more stable and longer-term concession, which could lead to seasonal theatre performances, the proposed ticket price would be €5. Audiences reward the experiment Foyer '97's gamble met with public interest right from the start: over 60 people attended the shows in a single afternoon, while the three days that inaugurated the season sold out. From a singular local experiment, the Teatro Edicola thus began to arouse curiosity even outside the province of Foggia, gradually transforming into a case of cultural and social interest, until it reached the American continent. From the province of Foggia to the "Stanford Social Innovation Review" The San Severo experience has now come under the international spotlight: in September 2026, the Stanford Social Innovation Review, an international journal and platform dedicated to social innovation published by the Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society at Stanford University in California, published on its website and in the Fall 2026 print edition the reportage "The Six-Seat Revolution", written by Dr Luciano Magaldi Sardella, independent journalist and researcher affiliated with the European Open University, and editorially supervised by deputy editor David V. Johnson. In the article, it is argued that the Teatro Edicola attracted attention overseas because the project concentrates cultural innovation, urban regeneration and proximity theatre into just a few square metres: starting from a real urban problem, it recovers an abandoned place with a modest investment, brings performance directly into public space and experiments with a much closer relationship between actors and spectators. From the point of view of theatrical representation, it also highlights how the format, based on micro-stories of five to twelve minutes, taken from great classics such as Goldoni, Chekhov, Ibsen, Euripides and Benni, and on audience rotation every fifteen minutes, transforms the physical limitations of the space into a precise dramaturgical choice, proving to be extremely innovative. All of this makes it possible to address some of the main critical issues in the sector: falling audience numbers, an exclusively elderly audience, reduced resources and distance from traditional cultural venues. The journal also highlights, however, the potential problems: economic sustainability, the need for stable institutional support and the difficulty of replicating the model, which is closely linked to the community and territory of San Severo. A model looking beyond San Severo Despite the difficulties, initial requests for information have already arrived from Lucca and Rome, where there is curiosity about the possibility of getting to know the model more closely and the steps needed to replicate it. The replicability formula, in fact, does not seem to require particularly costly infrastructure: an unused space, a targeted intervention, a cultural idea, in-depth knowledge of the surrounding area and a willingness to return that place to the community can be enough to trigger a new urban function. It is precisely in the disproportion between the modesty of the resources employed and the resonance generated by the initiative that perhaps the most original feature of the Teatro Edicola lies, certainly unique of its kind; there are, however, other examples in Italy of newsstands reused for other purposes: "Edicola 518", a twentieth-century kiosk abandoned in the centre of Perugia, now dedicated to independent publishing, art and cultural production; and in Rome itself, the abandoned newsstand in Piazza Testaccio used temporarily as a stage for a show by Fabio Morgan and the Erno newsstand in the Prati district, which almost every month offers a calendar of events, exhibitions, pop-ups and collaborations with artists and creative enterprises. Small revolutions, therefore, that tell stories of the reappropriation of urban spaces, of creativity and social innovation. And which, it is hoped, will take root in order to look ever further afield.

Teatro Edicola di San Severo: un modello di rivoluzione culturale anche per la Stanford University

💥Triomphe pour Pascal Praud hier à 20h ! CNEWS : 994 000 Jusqu’à 1 200 000 téléspectateurs à 19h45 BFMTV : 294 000 LCI : 208 000 FRANCE INFO : 84 000 Evidemment large leader sur les cibles publicitaires 25/49 : 3,2% vs 1,5% BFMTV et 0,6% LCI CSP+ : 4,6% vs 1,6% BFMTV et 1% LCI https://t.co/f8Xri6GCsY #Audiences #Télévision #CNEWS

Fake NV – how a cloned newsroom turned an AI video into a $140 million corruption scandal For two days in September, a website that looked almost indistinguishable from one of Ukraine’s best-known news organisations carried an extraordinary corruption story. It claimed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau had raided former defence procurement chief Arsen Zhumadilov and discovered more than $140 million in cash packed inside refrigerator boxes. One box supposedly carried the words “For the Servant of the People” – an apparent reference to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political party. The raid never happened. The photographs and video presented as evidence were fabricated, and the news organisation reporting the story was not the New Voice of Ukraine but a cloned version of it. The episode is a compact example of an increasingly effective disinformation technique. Rather than inventing a new propaganda outlet and trying to build its credibility from scratch, an operator can simply steal the identity of an established newsroom and place fabricated material inside an otherwise convincing copy of its editorial environment. A newsroom copied almost in full The counterfeit site appeared at nvukraine.com, while the authentic New Voice of Ukraine operates at nv.ua and english.nv.ua. Registration records examined by fact-checkers show that the false domain was created on 21 September 2026, two days before the fabricated article appeared. According to NV’s own investigation, the imitation went much further than copying a logo: the operators reproduced the site’s visual design, sections, branding, contact information and genuine editorial material. A snapshot of legitimate NV content from 23 September appears to have been copied onto the counterfeit site, into which the operators inserted a single false article. That article claimed that NABU had searched premises connected to Zhumadilov, who had headed Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency until August, and seized $140 million in cash. The story was published in several languages, including Ukrainian and English, suggesting that the operation was intended not only for Ukraine’s domestic information space but also for foreign audiences following the war and Western support for Kyiv. AI supplied the supposed evidence The false article was supported by a video purportedly showing the money discovered during the raid. NABU said no such search or procedural action had taken place and identified the footage as fabricated using artificial intelligence. Independent fact-checker Lead Stories found no credible Ukrainian or international reporting confirming either the raid or the alleged seizure, while searches of NABU’s own published material produced no evidence supporting the claim. The operation therefore combined two separate forms of synthetic credibility. The AI-generated footage supplied what looked like visual proof, while the cloned NV website supplied institutional proof: an apparently reputable Ukrainian newsroom supposedly confirming that the event had happened. Neither element needed to withstand close scrutiny for long. Together, they only needed to appear credible enough to be copied, quoted and redistributed before the deception was exposed. From a fake Ukrainian source into the Russian information ecosystem On 24 September, the story began moving through large pro-Russian Telegram channels. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications traced early amplification to Golos Mordora, with roughly 149,000 subscribers, and Militarist, with around 277,000. Within less than an hour, other channels including VOBLA, Rossiya Seychas and Ostashko! Vazhnoye were circulating versions of the same claim. It subsequently appeared on X and on Russian-language websites including e-news.su and pressa24.ru. Babel calculated that posts carrying the fabrication had accumulated approximately 370,000 views by the morning of 25 September. The story also moved beyond the Russian-language ecosystem. English-language versions appeared in online communities including Lemmy and Hexbear, while accounts on X shared direct links to the counterfeit NV article. NV later reported that larger Russian media and propaganda outlets, including RIA Novosti, Life, Vesti, Ukraina.ru and Mail.ru, had reproduced or discussed the claim. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a Kremlin representative involved in contacts with the United States, also shared it on 25 September. This amplification is significant, but it should not be confused with proof of authorship. Publicly available evidence shows how the false story entered and spread through a Russian and pro-Russian information ecosystem. It does not establish which organisation registered the cloned domain, generated the video or directed the operation from the outset. Why copy NV? The operation relied on source laundering. A claim originating directly from a Russian Telegram channel that Ukraine’s defence procurement system had concealed $140 million would immediately carry an obvious political context. A claim apparently uncovered by an established Ukrainian newsroom looks very different. Once the fabricated NV article existed, subsequent accounts could cite what appeared to be an independent Ukrainian source rather than present the allegation as their own. Each repost moved the story another step away from its manufactured origin. The use of an English-language version strengthened that mechanism for audiences outside Ukraine. The underlying narrative was also carefully chosen. Corruption in Ukrainian defence procurement is a genuine subject of public scrutiny and investigative reporting, so the fabricated story did not require audiences to accept an entirely unfamiliar premise. It inserted a false event into a real area of political concern. That mixture of authentic context and fabricated evidence can be more persuasive than a completely invented story because much of the surrounding information feels recognisable. What can – and cannot – be attributed Ukrainian authorities and NV describe the episode as a Russian information operation, and its distribution can be documented extensively across pro-Russian and Russian media channels. The available public evidence, however, does not identify the organisation that created the counterfeit website, nor does it link the operation forensically to a named Russian intelligence service, military unit or state contractor. The most precise description is therefore a Russian-aligned disinformation operation whose fabricated material was systematically amplified through the Russian information ecosystem. That distinction matters. Distribution can be observed directly; command-and-control is harder to establish and should not be inferred without evidence. The newsroom itself becomes the deepfake The most important feature of the operation was not the $140 million figure or even the AI-generated video. It was the counterfeit newsroom surrounding them. The operators copied a real publication, populated it largely with genuine material and inserted a single false story, allowing the fabrication to borrow the accumulated credibility of journalists who had nothing to do with it. This points to a broader evolution in synthetic media. AI can fabricate an image, a voice or a video, but an influence operation can now fabricate something larger: the source that supposedly verified the evidence. In the Fake NV operation, the article, the video and the website reinforced one another, creating not simply a false story but a manufactured chain of credibility. Sources The New Voice of Ukraine — investigation into the cloned website https://english.nv.ua/nation/nv-discovers-fake-copy-of-website-with-planted-story-cites-russian-links-50644601.html The New Voice of Ukraine — Russian amplification of the $140 million fabrication https://english.nv.ua/russia-spreads-fake-140-million-ukraine-corruption-story-during-dmitriev-u-s-talks-50644647.html Lead Stories — independent fact-check https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-story-claims-140-million-found-at-home-of-ukraines-zhumadilov-marked-servant-of-the-people-nv-website-originated-it.html Babel — AI video and distribution analysis https://babel.ua/en/news/130469-a-video-is-sharing-online-about-140-million-found-in-the-possession-of-the-ex-head-of-the-defense-procurement-agency-this-is-an-ai-video-distributed-by-a-clone-of-ukrainian-media Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — initial debunk https://spravdi.org/en/ai-fake-about-140-million-amid-us-talks-how-russians-impose-the-image-of-corrupt-ukraine-on-the-west/ Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — NABU confirmation https://spravdi.org/u-merezhi-poshyryuyut-shi-fejk-pro-nibyto-obshuky-nabu-v-eksgolovy-agencziyi-oboronnyh-zakupivel/ Detector Media — distribution and NABU response https://detector.media/infospace/article/252806/2026-09-25-u-merezhi-pidrobyly-sayt-nv-dlya-poshyrennya-feyku-pro-obshuky-v-eksochilnyka-agentsii-oboronnykh-zakupivel/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode10 #FakeNV #NewVoiceOfUkraine #Ukraine #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #ClonedMedia #FakeMedia #FakeNews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #AIVideo #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #CorruptionNarrative #UkraineCorruption #DefenceProcurement #NABU #ArsenZhumadilov #Telegram #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

BFMTV 6d

Le verdict du procès de l'affaire Federico Martin Aramburu a condamné Loïk Le Priol à 26 ans de réclusion criminelle pour meurtre, tandis que Romain Bouvier a été condamné à 19 ans pour tentative de meurtre, lors d'audiences marquées par des témoignages poignants sur la vie de la victime et les circonstances tragiques de sa mort. #Justice #Procès #Criminalité

Affaire Federico Martin Aramburu: les temps forts de ces trois semaines d'audience

Je remercie SEM le Président Bassirou Diomaye Faye et SEM le Président Évariste Ndayishimiye du Burundi pour leur soutien renouvelé à ma candidature au poste de secrétaire général des Nations unies. Je me réjouis des audiences tenues à ce sujet avec le Président Bassirou Diomaye Faye, en marge de la 81e session de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU à New York, dans la perspective des prochaines échéances. #ONU #Diplomatie #Election

URGENT - Quelle audience hier soir pour Emmanuel Macron qui est intervenu sur TF1 et France 2 pour... ne rien annoncer malgré les fortes attentes des Français face à la crise mondiale ? #audiences #tf1 #france2 #france3 #m6 https://t.co/qDcWkRouwt #audiences #tf1 #france2 #FR

UAE / Sudan – when an influence operation tried to enter the United Nations A network of roughly 300 apparently independent social-media influencers. A human-rights organisation borrowing the identity of a real NGO. Personal dossiers on European politicians and journalists. And testimony prepared for delivery at the United Nations without revealing the state interest behind it. These were elements of an influence operation uncovered by Anthropic and disclosed in September 2026. The company says it linked the activity with high confidence to UAE government officials. Tracked as GTG-84002, the operation targeted several overlapping issues: the Muslim Brotherhood, perceptions of the war in Sudan and international mechanisms examining the United Arab Emirates' role in the conflict. What distinguishes the case is not simply its use of artificial intelligence. It is the attempt to make state-aligned messaging appear to originate from independent influencers, human-rights organisations and potentially witnesses addressing an international institution. An influence network built around 300 fake voices Anthropic identified a single actor using Claude to support a sustained influence campaign. At its centre was an AI persona called “Deadshot”, running on the operator's own platform. A master doctrine file repeatedly instructed the system to support what it described as a coordinated international effort to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood. The operator simultaneously managed several components of the campaign, including approximately 300 inauthentic influencer accounts across social-media platforms. Internal material examined by Anthropic described the apparent independence of this network as its greatest strategic advantage. That phrase captures the central method. The objective was not simply to broadcast a political position but to conceal where that position originated. One visible example appeared on 4 June 2026, when accounts participated in a coordinated campaign using #SudanIslamists and near-identical graphics connecting Sudanese Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood with regional instability. Anthropic says the amplification network was centrally funded and coordinated. Its investigation also found that the operator financing the social-media network was connected to the wider influence operation. A human-rights organisation that was not what it appeared to be Social media was only one layer. The operator also created a front NGO that copied the identity of a genuine Swiss organisation and used that borrowed legitimacy to publish human-rights material produced for the campaign. Anthropic's description elsewhere also refers to the identity of a real Sudanese human-rights organisation being used in connection with the preparation of testimony. The public report does not fully clarify whether these references describe the same front or separate elements of the operation, so they should not be treated as definitively identical. The underlying technique, however, is clear: political material was designed to appear as if it originated from independent civil society rather than from actors linked to a government. This is particularly significant in the human-rights environment, where the perceived independence of an organisation or witness can determine how seriously evidence is received by journalists, diplomats and international institutions. The attempt to reach the UN The most consequential part of the operation concerned the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. According to Anthropic, the operator used Claude to ghost-write complete testimony intended to be delivered by two individuals during the session. The texts were prepared under explicit constraints ensuring that neither statement would mention the UAE. This did not amount to a conventional government submission. The intention, according to Anthropic's reconstruction, was for material serving the interests of a party connected to the Sudan conflict to reach an international forum through apparently independent voices. But an important limitation remains: Anthropic could not confirm that the testimony was ultimately delivered. The company similarly could not establish whether other dossiers produced by the operation reached their intended recipients or influenced policy. It therefore assessed the campaign as Category Three on the Brookings Breakout Scale – activity distributed across several platforms, but without evidence of broad public impact sufficient for a higher classification. The distinction matters. The evidence demonstrates a sophisticated attempt to influence international debate; it does not demonstrate that the attempt succeeded. Politicians, journalists and UN investigators became targets The operation was not limited to generating public content. Anthropic found that the operator researched and compiled detailed profiles of 18 members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists. Some material was prepared for direct delivery to senior UAE officials. The network also assembled what Anthropic describes as “counter-accountability dossiers” on UN Special Rapporteurs who had criticised the UAE's conduct in relation to Sudan. This places the campaign in a broader context. Since Sudan's civil war began in April 2023, the role of external powers has become an increasingly important part of international scrutiny. Sudan has accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, allegations Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. In 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE before the International Court of Justice, accusing it of complicity in genocide against the Masalit through alleged support for the RSF. The UAE rejected the allegations. The ICJ subsequently removed the case from its list after finding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the UAE's reservation to the relevant provision of the Genocide Convention. The ruling therefore did not determine whether Sudan's substantive allegations were true or false. That contested international environment helps explain why narratives about Sudan, human rights and accountability were valuable targets for an influence operation. AI as an operating system for influence The role played by Claude is also important to understand accurately. Anthropic did not find that artificial intelligence independently conceived or directed the campaign. Human operators established the objectives, political doctrine and targets. AI instead helped operationalise them. Across hundreds of sessions, Claude was used to transform predetermined political objectives into social-media narratives, human-rights reports, testimony, intelligence-style briefs and detailed profiles of individuals. The same system could support narrative production, target research and preparation of material for different audiences. That represents a more significant development than simply using generative AI to produce propaganda faster. Traditional influence operations require different teams to research targets, write content, manage personas, adapt messages and prepare briefing material. Generative AI can compress several of those functions into a single operational workflow. The result is not necessarily more convincing propaganda. It is potentially cheaper, faster and more scalable influence infrastructure. From fake influencers to institutional influence Anthropic says it linked the operation to UAE government officials with high confidence. Its assessment was based partly on internal material naming senior Emirati officials as intended recipients of the work, alongside other evidence available to its investigators. That remains an attribution by Anthropic rather than a judicial finding or publicly released forensic attribution by a government agency. The distinction should be retained. The larger significance of GTG-84002 lies in the architecture of the campaign. A network of fake influencers could create the appearance of public opinion. A cloned human-rights organisation could provide institutional credibility. AI-generated reports could give political narratives the appearance of research. Profiles of journalists and politicians could support more precise targeting. And ghost-written testimony could potentially carry the same message into an international institution without revealing the political interest behind it. This is a different model from the familiar troll farm. The objective is no longer simply to make propaganda look popular. It is to make state-aligned messaging look independent – and, if possible, to move it from social media into the institutions where international policy and accountability are debated. SOURCES: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 International Court of Justice — Sudan v. United Arab Emirates https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197 International Court of Justice — press releases and case documents https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197/press-releases United Nations Geneva — Sudan v UAE proceedings at the ICJ https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/04/105241/world-court-begins-hearing-sudans-complicity-genocide-case-against UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs — UAE response to Sudan's allegations https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/4/10/10-4-2025-UAE-UAE UN Digital Library — Sudan's letter concerning alleged UAE support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?ln=en UN Digital Library — UAE response concerning allegations of support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4046224?ln=en Ultra Sudan — reporting on Anthropic's UAE-linked influence-operation findings https://ultrasudan.usawtiq.com/أنثروبيك-أحبطنا-عملية-تأثير-إماراتية-استخدمت-الذكاء-الاصطناعي-لاستهداف-السودان/عامر-صالح/أخبار KEYWORDS #DISINFORMED #Episode8 #UAE #Sudan #UnitedArabEmirates #UnitedNations #UNHumanRightsCouncil #HumanRights #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeInfluencers #FakeNGO #NGOImpersonation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #NarrativeManipulation #InstitutionalInfluence #SudanConflict #SudanWar #MuslimBrotherhood #InternationalRelations #Geopolitics #Anthropic #ClaudeAI #OSINT #WRLD

Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 / Anthropic

🇬🇧 Short Press Release (English) FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE “Wet Heels Symphony” introduces a bold new performance concept featuring three actresses and one actor who step into water wearing high, glossy heels. Blending choreography, rain‑based sound design, and fashion‑driven aesthetics, the production transforms each heel impact into a precise rhythmic gesture. The performance highlights how wet heels, droplets, and shimmering reflections create a unified visual and acoustic language — theatrical, daring, and unexpectedly poetic. As Wet Heels Symphony expands with new ensemble studies, audiences are invited to experience water as a fully expressive stage medium. For media inquiries or collaboration proposals, please contact the project team.

💥BOUM ! Nouveau record hier à 20h de Pascal Praud qui dès le mois de septembre explose les compteurs : 855 000 téléspectateurs !!! Et jusqu’à 1 024 000 à 20h50 Toute la concurrence réunie fait à peine la moitié de Pascal Praud BFMTV : 208 000 LCI : 185 000 FRANCE INFO : 87 000 https://t.co/Q0qqaKNlLp #audiences #télévision #record

Russia’s fake African newsrooms – propaganda designed to look local A Facebook user in Nairobi, Accra, Johannesburg or Luanda encounters what appears to be a local news page. It publishes stories about African politics, Western influence and relations with Russia. The language is tailored to an African audience and the page presents itself not as a foreign broadcaster, but as part of the local information landscape. Behind some of these outlets, however, Meta found operators based in Russia. In its 2026 threat research, the company disclosed a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour network targeting audiences in Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the operation. Around 30,000 users followed at least one of the Pages, while the operators spent approximately $7,000 on Facebook and Instagram advertising, mostly in euros and US dollars. The numbers are relatively modest. The method is considerably more important. Rather than openly distributing Russian state messaging, the network posed as local African news sources and grassroots organisations, promoting narratives about Western colonialism and political interference while presenting Russia as a credible economic and political alternative. It was an old geopolitical message delivered through a much more effective identity: not Moscow speaking to Africa, but Africans apparently speaking to one another. A news outlet that was actually an influence operation Meta's investigation found that the network attempted to conceal its Russian origin while creating media brands that appeared indigenous to the countries they targeted. Its content amplified historical grievances against former colonial powers, criticised Western involvement in Africa and promoted closer relations with Russia. One example helps illustrate how the infrastructure was assembled. A Facebook Page targeting Kenya was called Kenya Watchtower. According to OpenAI's subsequent investigation, Facebook transparency records showed that the Page had previously been named “Farmtown5”. It appears to have been acquired or repurposed rather than built from scratch as a Kenyan news organisation. Some Pages also exposed administrator locations in Russia and Ukraine. Other elements of the network had previously targeted audiences in Zambia and Namibia. This use of apparently local identities is particularly important in the African information environment. A story published by RT or another identifiable Russian outlet arrives with an obvious geopolitical provenance. The same narrative presented by something resembling an independent Kenyan, Ghanaian or South African newsroom carries a different kind of credibility. The source appears closer to the reader, and the geopolitical interest behind the message becomes less visible. Then investigators found Dr Manuel Godsin The Facebook operation was only one part of a broader information ecosystem. OpenAI investigated related activity after receiving information from Meta and subsequently banned a ChatGPT account it assessed as likely originating in Russia. OpenAI called the campaign Operation No Bell. The account was being used to generate long-form articles and social-media posts about African geopolitics. Prompts were primarily written in English, but OpenAI also observed Russian-language instructions that the user described as coming from a manager. The operator sometimes explicitly asked the model to make the material appear less AI-generated – including requests to avoid stylistic features associated with machine-generated text and to write more like a human journalist. Many articles appeared under the name “Dr Manuel Godsin”, presented as an academic with a PhD from the University of Bergen and an affiliation with an organisation called the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. OpenAI could find no credible evidence that Godsin existed. Searches of Norway's National Research Information Repository and the University of Bergen library produced no record of him. Investigators subsequently discovered that a photograph used to represent Godsin had appeared years earlier on a Russian professional networking site and apparently belonged to a law student in St Petersburg. The fabricated academic identity was nevertheless remarkably productive. OpenAI identified 53 online articles carrying the Godsin byline. The fiction had moved beyond fake social-media pages and into the real media ecosystem. When propaganda enters genuine newsrooms This is the most consequential aspect of the operation. The articles were not confined to websites controlled by the influence network. Some were published by genuine African news organisations, including established South African outlets. The content mixed local political issues with broader geopolitical narratives. Some pieces criticised the United States and Britain or defended Russia's role in Africa. One accused the British NGO Crisis Action of fomenting protests in South Africa. Another praised Russia's presence in the Central African Republic. Other material addressed Kenya, Angola and relations between African governments and Washington. The mechanism represents a significant evolution from the classic troll-farm model. Instead of building an audience entirely on its own platforms, an influence operator can manufacture an apparently credible expert, generate articles in his name and persuade genuine news organisations to publish them. Once this happens, the propaganda acquires something a fake Facebook Page cannot provide: the institutional credibility of a real newsroom. OpenAI assessed No Bell's social-media impact as limited. One Facebook Page had around 3,000 followers before Meta removed it, while several others had very small audiences. But the operation was more successful in placing material in established media. In OpenAI's impact framework, it approached the level at which an influence operation breaks into mainstream media. For information operators, a single article published by a recognised outlet can potentially be more valuable than thousands of impressions generated by an obviously artificial account. A much larger network of ghost journalists Subsequent research suggests that Manuel Godsin was not an isolated experiment. In August 2026, Graphika, working with Code for Africa and with support from Meta, published a much broader investigation into Russian ghostwriting operations across African media. Researchers identified 44 ghost writers and fake experts, 38 of them assessed as high-confidence fabricated personas, operating between 2021 and 2026. Their material appeared or was quoted across 138 websites and was subsequently republished through at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages, including authentic users, coordinated inauthentic networks and official Russian communication channels. The narratives were strikingly consistent. They included criticism of France, Ukraine and the United States; attacks on organisations such as ECOWAS and the International Criminal Court; positive portrayals of Russian involvement in Africa; praise for Russian paramilitary forces; and support for sovereignty-oriented political projects such as the Alliance of Sahel States. The operation therefore extends beyond creating fake news websites. It attempts to insert Russian-aligned narratives into the legitimate African media ecosystem using identities that appear African, independent or academically authoritative. This also explains why measuring reach through the original Facebook network alone is misleading. A fabricated article may begin with an influence operator, appear in a genuine African publication, be republished elsewhere and eventually circulate without any visible connection to Russia. At that point, the provenance of the narrative has effectively been laundered. An old Russian strategy with increasingly local faces Russia's use of local intermediaries in Africa is not new. Meta documented Russian networks using African nationals as early as 2019. In 2020 it dismantled another operation involving people in Ghana and Nigeria working on behalf of individuals in Russia, with links to previous activity associated with the Internet Research Agency. More recent Meta investigations suggest that this model has continued to evolve. Networks have increasingly relied on local freelancers, social-media managers and authentic media outlets rather than exclusively operating armies of obviously fake Russian-controlled accounts. This decentralisation offers several advantages. Local operators understand language, political sensitivities and cultural references. Authentic accounts are harder to identify than newly created synthetic personas. Local media brands can also deliver narratives without immediately triggering the scepticism associated with Russian state outlets. There is no evidence that every African journalist, freelancer or publication carrying such material knowingly participates in Russian influence activity. Meta explicitly notes in its investigations that some local contractors may not know who ultimately commissioned their work. That distinction is essential. The operation's effectiveness partly depends on precisely this ambiguity between deliberate participation, commercial content placement and unwitting amplification. The objective is to make Russian narratives look African The significance of this network is therefore not its 30,000 Facebook followers or its $7,000 advertising budget. Those figures are small compared with the audiences of major African media organisations. What matters is the distribution model. Traditional foreign propaganda asks an audience to trust a foreign source. These operations attempt to remove the foreign source from the equation altogether. A Russian geopolitical narrative can be generated with AI, attributed to an expert who does not exist, published by a media organisation that does, amplified through a Facebook Page presenting itself as local, and then rediscovered elsewhere as apparently independent African analysis. By the time the reader encounters it, Moscow may have disappeared completely from the chain of attribution. The resulting information operation is therefore less about making Russian propaganda more persuasive than about making it look as though it is no longer Russian propaganda at all. In an increasingly fragmented African media environment, that may be the more important evolution to watch. SOURCES: Meta Threat Research https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h1-2026-russia-based-cib-network-1/ OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina News24 https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2019 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/removing-more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2020 https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta Threat Research — Russian Use of Authentic Operators in Sub-Saharan Africa https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h2-2025-russia-based-cib-network-2/ KEYWORDS: #DISINFORMED #Episode7 #Russia #Africa #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeNews #FakeMedia #FakeNewsrooms #MediaImpersonation #GrassrootsManipulation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SyntheticMedia #FakeInfluencers #SocialMediaManipulation #Facebook #Meta #OperationNoBell #AfricanMedia #MediaManipulation #Propaganda #DigitalInfluence #Angola #Ghana #Kenya #SouthAfrica #OSINT #WRLD

Russia-Based Influence Operation Network Targeting Sub-Saharan Africa

⚠️❗️Russian special services responsible for information warfare against the West are conducting a campaign aimed at intimidating audiences in France. To that end, they invoke Russian activity and presence in Africa. The Russian narrative suggests that French territory is within https://t.co/WxSy586T8J #Russia #InformationWarfare #France #FR #RU #AF

Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

Analyse du mode opératoire informationnel russe Storm-1516 | SGDSN

"RTL 102.5": THE KIOSK-THEATRE FEATURED IN STANFORD UNIVERSITY'S REVIEW SOURCE: https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.instagram.com%2Fp%2FDdeEUnXiKMT%2F%3Ffbclid%3DIwcGRvZgFleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETB1OU02c2NZUzNkeWVpb2ZJc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHhWTgrXrSOqSpbqd0NlmkWW4gNxVEDa-2BmQGWsVUhQQoqC4_J55glcV6Fzu_aem_zWbIIMpp66X9FxYrdVcTmg&h=AUDX8FniZvleWSVlN4ngwxrSLu1IeEzRJGb1DHFgsznthttLc9QR-ahTowPSBcj7rf_yYePu1vaPUXc34NqwzN3m-FtFuy-KM33ftfPsEeZaaYwWOXktve-A-NW0TY9CLHcritIH__2rbzUD5w&__tn__=-UK-R&c[0]=AUCpozNMTPma15kUqGpGsKv6GwFtuWcQmfK3Oj0VtFFsM0cj9rhdH6l9Y-6SLIz8vG2VBro_6pSGTiplv6br8YJx7ZZQnAPeuivIBI0eX8NPUol4JadoLFkhbxd949RZixQc7l2aWhHEkWT6kEVC92069Lsd2AymBya1pXHVw4UabsmzYz1s SAN SEVERO (FG) - The concept of the kiosk-theatre of San Severo, in the province of Foggia, dubbed the smallest theatre in the world, has become a case study for Stanford University. The article The "Six-Seat Revolution", by the Foggia-born researcher Luciano Magaldi Sardella, supervised by Deputy Editor David V. Johnson, has been published in "Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)" - the multi-award-winning publication covering cross-sector solutions to global problems. The article appears in the "Dispatches" section of the "Stanford Social Innovation Review". "This is an achievement that rewards our work," emphasizes Francesco Gravino, Artistic Director of the theatre company Foyer 97. "Requests to replicate the model have come from other parts of Italy, such as Lucca and Rome. We thought of creating a cultural activity from a place that was disused and in a state of abandonment. There ought to be a regional law that makes it possible to convert these disused premises into places where numerous activities can be brought to life. Genuine cultural outposts." Gravino and the company's actors are preparing the new programme. "Next year our company will be 30 years old," he said, "an important milestone that we shall celebrate with a number of new developments." Six chairs, less than two square metres, performances repeated every 15 minutes, and sold-out audiences of young people and adults. An experiment that has aroused curiosity and interest in the world of entertainment as well. Between late July and early August, during his tour in Lucera (Foggia), Biagio Antonacci made a surprise stop at the kiosk-theatre and sang his Iris. "It was truly a wonderful encounter that attracted the attention of passers-by," Gravino concludes.

"RAINEWS - TGR PUGLIA": THE NEWSSTAND THEATRE FROM FOGGIA FEATURED IN STANFORD UNIVERSITY'S REVIEW ACTIVITY OF THE WORLD'S SMALLEST THEATRE TO RESUME IN OCTOBER SOURCE: https://www.rainews.it/tgr/puglia/articoli/2026/09/il-teatro-edicola-del-foggiano-finisce-sulla-rivista-della-stanford-university-1fa44018-e792-4bbe-b469-8ceb4dde825f.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawUcvbdwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMHU5TTZzY1lTM2R5ZWlvZklzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeJu765F3ygz0yxQ1zf6z27DM21yeKjBzL3eUBCVg0fk0ULdT4tnicXACUltw_aem_RkZlY9URH16w3f7zdL3AOQ SAN SEVERO (FG) - The idea of the newsstand theatre in San Severo, in the province of Foggia, dubbed the smallest theatre in the world, has become a case study for Stanford University. The article "The Six-Seat Revolution", by the researcher from Orta Nova in the Province of Foggia, Luciano Magaldi Sardella, supervised by editor David V. Johnson, has been published in "Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)" - an award-winning publication covering cross-sectoral solutions to global problems. The piece appears in the "Dispatches" section of the "Stanford Social Innovation Review". The article describes how a rusted newsstand in San Severo was transformed into a radically new theatrical experience. "It is an achievement that rewards our work," emphasizes Francesco Gravino, artistic director of the theatre company Foyer 97. "Requests to replicate the model have come from other parts of Italy, such as Lucca and Rome. We thought of creating a cultural activity from a place that had long been disused and abandoned." "What we need is a regional law that makes it possible to repurpose these disused spaces where numerous activities could be organized. Genuine cultural outposts." Gravino and the actors of the company are preparing the new programme. "Next year our company will be 30 years old," he said, "an important milestone which we shall celebrate with some new initiatives." Six chairs, less than two square metres, performances repeated every 15 minutes, and sold-out audiences of young people and adults. An experiment that has aroused curiosity and interest in the world of entertainment as well. Between late July and early August, during the tour in Lucera (Foggia), Biagio Antonacci made a surprise stop at the newsstand theatre and sang his Iris. "It was truly a wonderful encounter that captured the attention of passers-by," Gravino concludes.

Il Teatro-edicola sbarca sulla rivista della Stanford University

"ANSA NAZIONALE CULTURA": THE NEWSSTAND THEATRE FROM FOGGIA FEATURED IN STANFORD UNIVERSITY'S REVIEW ACTIVITY OF THE WORLD'S SMALLEST THEATRE TO RESUME IN OCTOBER SOURCE: https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cultura/teatro/2026/09/19/il-teatro-edicola-del-foggiano-finisce-sulla-rivista-della-stanford-university_7b986fd6-267e-41ed-9c7b-a0c74aad9dea.html SAN SEVERO (FG) - The idea of the newsstand theatre in San Severo, in the province of Foggia, dubbed the smallest theatre in the world, has become a case study for Stanford University. The article "The Six-Seat Revolution", by the researcher from Orta Nova in the Province of Foggia, Luciano Magaldi Sardella, supervised by editor David V. Johnson, has been published in "Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)" - an award-winning publication covering cross-sectoral solutions to global problems. The piece appears in the "Dispatches" section of the "Stanford Social Innovation Review". The article describes how a rusted newsstand in San Severo was transformed into a radically new theatrical experience. "It is an achievement that rewards our work," emphasizes Francesco Gravino, artistic director of the theatre company Foyer 97. "Requests to replicate the model have come from other parts of Italy, such as Lucca and Rome. We thought of creating a cultural activity from a place that had long been disused and abandoned." "What we need is a regional law that makes it possible to repurpose these disused spaces where numerous activities could be organized. Genuine cultural outposts." Gravino and the actors of the company are preparing the new programme. "Next year our company will be 30 years old," he said, "an important milestone which we shall celebrate with some new initiatives." Six chairs, less than two square metres, performances repeated every 15 minutes, and sold-out audiences of young people and adults. An experiment that has aroused curiosity and interest in the world of entertainment as well. Between late July and early August, during the tour in Lucera (Foggia), Biagio Antonacci made a surprise stop at the newsstand theatre and sang his Iris. "It was truly a wonderful encounter that captured the attention of passers-by," Gravino concludes.

Il Teatro-edicola del Foggiano finisce sulla rivista della Stanford University - Teatro - Ansa.it

"BLASTING NEWS ITALIA": SIX-SEAT REVOLUTION: FOGGIA'S NEWSSTAND THEATRE BECOMES A CASE STUDY AT STANFORD SOURCE: https://it.blastingnews.com/cultura-spettacoli/2026/09/rivoluzione-a-sei-posti-il-teatro-edicola-di-foggia-caso-studio-a-stanford-004141773.html SAN SEVERO (FG) - The Newsstand Theatre of San Severo, created from a disused news-stand, is a case study for Stanford University by Chiara Valentini The Newsstand Theatre of San Severo, in the province of Foggia, known as the smallest theatre in the world, has become a prestigious case study for Stanford University. The news, released on 19 September 2026, concerns the publication in the Stanford Social Innovation Review of the reportage entitled "The Six-Seat Revolution". The feature is entirely devoted to the innovative cultural project of the theatre company Foyer 97 and its artistic director, Francesco Gravino. The article, authored by the Foggia-born researcher Luciano Magaldi and supervised by editor David V. Johnson, appears in the magazine's Dispatches section. The Stanford Social Innovation Review is a publication that focuses on cross-sectoral solutions to global problems. The Apulian project, at the heart of this international recognition, was born from the transformation of a disused and abandoned site into a vibrant space dedicated to very small-scale theatrical performances. A six-seat stage for a unique experience The Newsstand Theatre is distinguished by its extremely small dimensions: it has just six chairs and occupies less than two square metres. Its innovative format provides for performances every 15 minutes, ensuring a high turnover of audiences. Attendance has been sold out, attracting a heterogeneous audience of young people and adults. This particular configuration drastically reduces the distance between actors and spectators, concentrating the theatrical experience in an intimate and original space created from a former news-stand. Francesco Gravino expressed his pride, linking this important recognition to the journey undertaken by the Foyer 97 company. The artistic director also mentioned the numerous requests to replicate the model received from other Italian cities, including Lucca and Rome. Gravino emphasised the urgent need to introduce specific regional regulations to facilitate the reconversion of disused sites into cultural activities, describing them as genuine "cultural outposts" for the community. Currently, Gravino and the company's actors are engaged in preparing the new programme. Foyer 97: thirty years of activity and new challenges The theatre company Foyer 97 is about to celebrate a significant anniversary. Francesco Gravino announced that "next year our company will be 30 years old", a milestone that will be celebrated with the introduction of some important innovations. This anniversary is closely linked to the resumption of activities scheduled for October and to the presentation of the new programme for the Newsstand Theatre. The "Stanford Social Innovation Review" reportage recalled that the Newsstand Theatre was inaugurated on the morning of 27 March 2026, coinciding with World Theatre Day. This event marked the beginning of a project that continues to generate interest and to demonstrate the potential of urban regeneration through culture.

Rivoluzione a sei posti: il Teatro-edicola di Foggia caso studio a Stanford

"BLOG QC24": THE FOGGIAN NEWSSTAND THEATRE FEATURES IN STANFORD UNIVERSITY'S REVIEW SOURCE: https://blogcq24.com/italia/puglia/il-teatro-edicola-del-foggiano-finisce-sulla-rivista-della-stanford-university/100188322/ SAN SEVERO (FG) - The idea of the newsstand theatre in San Severo, in the province of Foggia, dubbed the smallest theatre in the world, has become a case study for Stanford University. The article "The Six-Seat Revolution" by Foggian researcher Luciano Magaldi Sardella, supervised by editor David V. Johnson, has been published in Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR), an award-winning publication covering cross-sector solutions to global problems. The article appears in the Dispatches section of the Stanford Social Innovation Review. "It is a result that rewards our work," emphasizes Francesco Gravino, artistic director of the theatre company Foyer 97. "Requests to replicate the model have come from other areas of Italy, such as Lucca and Rome. We thought of creating a cultural activity out of a place that was by then disused and in a state of abandonment. What is needed is a regional law that provides for the possibility of reconverting these disused premises into places where numerous activities can be brought to life. Real cultural strongholds." Gravino and the actors of the company are preparing the new programme. "Next year our company will be 30 years old," he said, "an important milestone that we will celebrate with some new initiatives." Six chairs, less than two square metres, performances repeated every 15 minutes and sold-out audiences of both young people and adults. An experiment that has aroused curiosity and interest in the world of entertainment as well. Between late July and early August, during the tour in Lucera (Foggia), Biagio Antonacci made a surprise stop at the newsstand theatre and sang his Iris. "It was truly a wonderful encounter that captured the attention of passers-by," Gravino concludes.

Il Teatro-edicola del Foggiano finisce sulla rivista della Stanford University - Blog CQ24