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Dorota Wysocka-Sznepf definitely deserves her title of high priestess of propaganda. She knows perfectly well that the electoral procedure was a classic trap set for @NawrockiKn. The backers of Onet hoped that he would fall into it, and then it would be possible to heat up the narrative that "the court confirmed the allegations of Harłukowicz and Stankiewicz." Why? 1) The court in the 24-hour electoral procedure does not conduct an investigation. It only examines whether there were obvious lies or just "assumptions" and opinions. 2) Texts written based on anonymous sources, hypotheses, and questions are constructed in such a way that the lawsuit in the electoral procedure would be dismissed on formal grounds. 3) If Nawrocki had filed a lawsuit, he would most likely have lost it procedurally. The entire pro-Platform machinery - with such "journalists" at the helm - would immediately declare success: "The court dismissed Nawrocki's lawsuit!" suggesting to the audience that since the lawsuit was dismissed, the allegations were true. The salon's misfortune was that Nawrocki's team saw through this game. That’s why there was no lawsuit then, and instead today we have an ordinary civil trial, in which the journalists of Onet are slowly finding the ground burning beneath their feet. (translated)

What irony. Once a rebel, a journalist fighting against the arrogant establishment. Today he dances on a yacht, mocking investments in public services. He laughs at investments that allowed young working parents in small towns to send their child to daycare. At public transport, which allows for cheaper and faster commutes to work. At social housing, support for people with disabilities, vocational training in small towns, connecting sewer systems and the internet to places in Poland that would never be reached commercially. Mr. Stanowski reduces it to... "Haha, yachts." Mr. Stanowski, not everyone has a limousine, a chauffeur, money for private schools, and a villa near Warsaw. There are people who do not have all of this and need daycare, good public schools, trains, and buses for a dignified life. (translated)

Life in Germany is getting more and more expensive. In September, inflation rose to over three percent. In terms of energy, the increase is even at 14.9 percent. The biggest price driver is fuel. Consumers had to pay almost 50 percent more for fuel in September compared to a year earlier. And what is the federal government doing? They are giving citizens a measly 17 cents, which doesn't even fully reach the consumer. The fuel discount, which comes into effect on October 1 after months of inaction by the Merz government, is a bad joke considering the enormous inflation! Not 17 cents, one euro would be appropriate! A price cap of 1.50 euros for fuel in Germany is urgently needed. This is possible if the CO2 price is abolished, the energy tax is halved, and the value-added tax on fuel and energy is reduced to 7 percent. (translated)

"You handle things hands-free, and for the visually impaired, such glasses are a great solution: an extra pair of eyes that reads aloud and describes what is in front of you." The glasses from Meta are a 'textbook example of a product that is legally available but ethically undesirable,' says well-known AI speaker Jarno Duursma. (translated)

Seven instead of eight years. This is not a correction, this is leniency. Simeon Trux, born as such, later called Maja T., attacked with other patriots on the "Day of Honor." Contusions, bruises, broken bones. For this, there is now a one-year discount in Budapest. The public prosecutor wanted to impose a harsher sentence. The court reduced it. Those who beat others often face a debate in Germany and at least a punishment in Hungary. However, even that is being downplayed again. Arrest in Berlin, extradition, the Federal Constitutional Court finds the procedure inadmissible, the family speaks of isolation and vermin. All important, as soon as the perpetrator suffers. The bones of the beaten do not feature in this sympathy. Seven years for a serious crime is not a scandal of harshness. It is the scandal that even this is considered too much. (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

So here it is: I'm heading to Active Reserves. Given my specialization, I will—who would have thought—become a doctor. The equipment of these units has seen quite a lot. As the 🇺🇦 battlefield shows, for example, the resilience of ambulances is very significant for the survival of the wounded. They've been waiting for them for quite some time... In short: the absurdity of the ruling treacherous populists will jeopardize the lives of our boys and girls who, despite all the disgusting, harassment, and humiliation, are willing to defend this country. I learned from the more experienced not to complain. We will improvise as we saw in 🇺🇦. Modifying civilian cars, buying equipment ourselves, setting up clinics in basements. We'll manage. But know in advance: to the marrow of my bones, I despise those who waste time and effort on defense at a time when we need to prepare for it... (translated)

It was great to speak to students at the #FuckTheFees protest. Students have to continue to get organised against this government. Students need: ➡️ Publicly-funded Student Accommodation, ➡️ Properly funded education ➡️ An abolition of the 'Student Contribution Charge' https://t.co/pLMny5UBUx #Students #Education #Protest #Thetweetdoesnotmentionanyspecificcountries.Therefore #therearenocountrycodestoreturn.

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the annual Valdai Club forum that Russia did not start the war, but was forced to defend itself due to obvious aggression, while emphasizing the importance of strengthening defensive capabilities and cooperation for a peaceful future. (translated)