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On me demande souvent si les lunettes QATSFE, (disponibles avec « Mon Dieu, comme je les hais » sur https://t.co/kweHFpSmpt) sont conçues pour regarder l’éclipse. Alors non. Deconnez pas. Elles servent à vous reconnaître entre vous, dans un mélange de connivence et d’élégance. 😉 https://t.co/WlEenjKbYY #mode #style #accessoires

Psal mi dnes známý, který cestoval do Ománu (viz screenshot níže). Přesně takto začínají ty příhody, kdy někoho odmítnou vpustit třeba do USA nebo ho přinejmenším pošlou na secondary inspection na „výslech“. Připomnělo mi to Čecháčky, které jsem bohužel potkal na imigračce na letišti v Marakéši, dylina neuměla anglicky a s křikem se tam rozčilovala, že jí pohraničník nerozumí :D Došel jsem k závěru, že my jako Češi máme jednu nehezkou vlastnost – většina z nás se neumí chovat a to nás dost odlišuje od Anglosasů (mám samozřejmě na mysli ty bílé, kolegové z Afriky a Asie jsou s výjimkou Jižní Koreje, Japonska a Singapuru ještě úplně jiná liga, co se týče nevychovanosti). My Češi jako slovanský národ jsme zvyklí řešit vše napřímo, od srdíčka, někdy s verbální agresivitou, což ale vlastně nikde nefunguje, dokonce ani na našem území. Člověk tím nic nezíská kromě falešného pocitu vítězství v „konfliktu“. Protože celý život hodně cestuju, tak jsem se naučil ten anglosaský model jednání, při cestování je to samozřejmost, už proto, že jsem v zahraničí host, funguje to bezvadně, ale ne vždy tomu tak bylo. Mám krásný příklad. V roce 2022 jsme byli s facility managerem na výletě v USA. Zarezervovali jsme si oba pokoj (každý svůj) v hotelu v Queens, NYC přes Booking, který vždy uvádí konečnou cenu, resp. explicitně zmíní položky, které v ceně nejsou (např. městské taxy). Já v poznámce u rezervace uvedl, že bych rád poprosil o tichý pokoj, ideálně s výhledem. V noci jsme přijeli z letiště na hotel a začal indický Apu takovým tím jejich pasivně-agresivním stylem zkoušet naúčtovat $5 denně za tzv. resort fee (taková americká mrdkovina, hodně používají na Floridě a ve Vegas, a je to jakože za možnost využívat posilovnu, bazén...). V našem hotelu ale nebyla ani posilovna, ani bazén, kromě pokojů a malinkého lobby prostě nic. Tak jsem se ho (ještě v klidu) ptal, za co ten resort fee je. A on přidrzle, že za mikrovlnku na pokoji. Tak mu říkám, ať si mikrovlnku odnese, že ji nepotřebuju a nebudu to platit, protože pokoj jsem zarezervoval dříve, než ten resort fee zavedli (prý to byla novinka a rezervaci jsem měl několik měsíců). Čávo zase něco mlel, to už mi bouchly saze a začal jsem na něj řvát, že je scammer 🤣 To ho dost nasralo, nakonec jsem musel ten resort fee zaplatit (šlo asi o $60), jinak by mě neubytoval a k tomu mi dal špinavej pokoj v prvním patře do ulice přímo nad vstup do hotelu. Facility manager dostal pokoj v 9. patře s krásným výhledem :D Další den jsem to řešil na recepci s kolegyní od Apu, ta uznala, že jsem v právu a lováky mi vrátila, šajze cimra mi ale zůstala. No a letos jsem byl opět v Queens v NYC, totožný scénář – měl jsem pokoj zarezervovaný snad půl roku dopředu za super peníze. Přijel jsem na hotel, na recepci Apu, udělal jsem check-in, ptám se během check-inu, jestli je pokoj tichý, Apu že jasně. Pokoj opět nad vchodem do hotelu, do rušné ulice, naproti vjezd na parkoviště. Tentokrát, poučen po minulém nezdaru, jsem zašel v klidu zpět na recepci a velmi klidně, slušně, tzv. „na Anglosasa“ jsem mu vysvětloval, že pokoj úplně tichý není, že rezervaci mám půl roku, tak by na ní mohl být brán zřetel a jestli by s tím nešlo něco udělat, že budu v hotelu 7 dní a že by mi to dost pomohlo. Čárymáryfuk, najednou se objevil pokoj ve 4. patře, orientovaný na druhou, klidnou stranu a jako bonus hezký výhled na Manhattan. Takže buďte v zahraničí slušní a klidní, vyplatí se to. Slušní (nerovná se vulgární, za to už je pokutička) nemusíte být na české policajty a měšťáky a na slovenské celníky. Proč? Protože se to nevyplatí, slušnost se v těchto případech často obrátí proti vám... #Cestování #Imigrace #Slušnost

A Crown Instead of the Barracks: An Idea From Outside the Box Could Egypt’s exiled opposition use constitutional monarchy to dismantle the legitimacy of the 1952 coup? By Adham Hasanin Egyptian journalist and political writer, based in the Netherlands To understand what follows, a reader unfamiliar with Egypt needs one basic fact: since 1952, Egypt has never been governed by anyone who did not first wear a military uniform. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and today Abdel Fattah el-Sisi four men, four eras, one common origin. All rose through the armed forces. All inherited a state built by a coup that year, when a group of officers calling themselves the "Free Officers" overthrew King Farouk I and, within a year, abolished the monarchy altogether and declared a republic. For seventy-three years, the underlying equation has not changed: the army rules, power passes from one officer to the next, and legitimacy is drawn from the barrel of a gun rather than the ballot box. Every conceivable form of opposition has been tried legal parties and banned ones, Islamist movements, liberal and leftist coalitions, the 2011 popular uprising, and the 2013 elections whose result was overturned by force within a year. All of them hit the same wall: a military institution that reproduces itself under different names, while the core of the system remains untouched. So what if the problem, all along, has not simply been who rules, but the constitutional framework that makes military rule possible in the first place? And what if the answer lies not in swapping one president for another, but in dismantling the underlying equation itself, through a framework Egyptian opposition movements have never seriously tried: a purely ceremonial constitutional monarchy, on the model of Belgium, the Netherlands, or Spain where the head of state becomes a symbol above the political fray, while the army is permanently expelled from politics and returned to its barracks. This is not a call to revive a particular family, nor nostalgia for a golden age that never quite existed. It is a proposal for a political and strategic tool that has not yet been used in the intellectual arsenal of Egypt’s opposition in exile a tool that deserves serious discussion, regardless of whether it is ever literally realised or simply serves to expand the boundaries of what is politically thinkable. I. Why 1952, Not 2013 or 2011, Is the Root The strategic error made by most Egyptian opposition movements from the Muslim Brotherhood to the April 6 Youth Movement to the various civil opposition parties has been treating each political crisis as an isolated case: Mubarak was corrupt and had to be toppled; Sisi staged a coup that must be condemned; the interim military council was a transitional phase to be endured. This piecemeal approach treats the symptoms while leaving the original illness untouched. That original illness is the very structure of legitimacy established by the coup of 23 July 1952. The Egyptian republican system, from Nasser to today, has never built its legitimacy on a genuine democratic social contract. Instead, it has rested on a fixed trinity: the rhetoric of "revolution against feudalism and colonialism," charismatic individual leadership, and military protection of the regime framed as the guarantor of stability. This trinity has repeated itself from Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak to Sisi, with only cosmetic variations. Each new president was never a break from the system he was its continuation. When the opposition says "let us return to the constitutional framework that preceded the coup," it is not criticising a particular policy. It is declaring that the legal foundation of everything that came after 1952 was illegitimate from the start. Here lies the rhetorical power of "returning to the pre-1952 order": it does not merely demand swapping one ruler for another. It withdraws historical legitimacy from the entire republican military system including today’s regime, which draws its own declared legitimacy from that same "1952 legacy." II. Why a "Ceremonial Crown," Not "the Return of a Ruling Family" Here is the most important distinction anyone advocating this idea seriously must grasp: the project does not rest on restoring any particular individual from the Muhammad Ali dynasty, nor on nostalgia for King Farouk or his ancestors. The real power of the idea lies in the constitutional form, not in the person who happens to sit on the throne. Three successful European democracies illustrate the model clearly. Belgium, where King Philippe is a purely constitutional symbol with no real executive power, while the state is run through an elected parliament and a complex coalition government reflecting the country’s linguistic and political diversity. The Netherlands, where King Willem-Alexander formally opens the parliamentary year and signs laws, but where actual decision-making rests with the prime minister and the elected parliament. And Spain, where the king represents symbolic continuity of the state above party politics, while the military and security services answer entirely to civilian authority a transition achieved after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, when King Juan Carlos I voluntarily relinquished the extensive executive powers he had inherited and backed free elections, most dramatically in February 1981, when he personally ordered the armed forces to remain loyal to the constitution during an attempted military coup, causing it to collapse within hours. The common thread across these three models is not "the presence of an ancient royal family." It is the principle of separating symbol from power. The monarch in these countries does not rule; he represents. He issues no political decisions; he provides the continuity and symbolic stability that allows party political competition to revolve beneath him, without every transfer of power becoming an existential crisis of legitimacy. This is precisely what Egypt’s military republican system lacks: a neutral mechanism for guaranteeing state continuity that does not depend on the person of the ruler or his security apparatus. When Egypt’s military-republican president is absent, it is always the army that fills the vacuum, because it is the only institution built to be the "guarantor of stability." Under a ceremonial monarchical model, by contrast, it is the king not the army who represents that symbolic guarantee, genuinely opening the door to removing the military institution from the political equation altogether. III. Egypt’s Standing Under the Monarchy: An Honest Reckoning, Not Blind Nostalgia For a Western reader with little prior knowledge of Egypt’s monarchical period (1922–1952), it helps to know this: Egypt was nominally independent under its own king from 1922, but Britain retained enormous informal control over the country’s foreign policy, military bases, and the Suez Canal throughout the period a reality that shaped everything that follows. Any honest invocation of "Egypt’s standing under the monarchy" must avoid the trap of mythologised nostalgia that many advocates of this idea fall into. Egypt in that era was no lost paradise, and any honest article must say so plainly. The Egyptian pound, for instance, often invoked as a symbol of "national currency strength" in that period, was not strong because of independent Egyptian monetary policy. It was pegged to the British pound sterling as part of Egypt’s complete colonial financial dependency until 1947, with Egypt exercising no independent oversight of its own currency whatsoever. The pound’s strength, in other words, was not a sovereign Egyptian achievement it was a reflection of British imperial power ruling Egypt from behind the throne. But this does not mean Egypt lacked a genuine regional standing worth studying. Cairo, in the 1930s and 1940s, was the undisputed cultural capital of the entire Arab world: the Egyptian film industry produced more than half of all Arabic-language cinema; its theatre scene, led by figures like Youssef Wahbi and Naguib al-Rihani, and its music, with Umm Kulthum and Mohammed Abdel Wahab, set the standard across the region; Cairo University was the first modern university in the Arab world; and the Egyptian press was the reference point for Arab public opinion from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Cairo was, quite simply, to the Arab world what Paris was to Francophone Europe: an unrivalled centre of cultural and intellectual gravity. This standing was not necessarily a product of monarchy itself, so much as a product of a relative space of political and press pluralism that allowed Egyptian civil society to flourish, despite all the flaws of the political system and the interference of both palace and occupier. The lesson here is not "bring back the king and the standing will return." It is: when even a limited margin of civic freedom exists, Egypt flourishes culturally and intellectually almost by its own nature. And that margin is precisely what has been entirely absent across the past seven decades of unchallenged military rule. IV. What Reform Would Actually Require Not Repeating the Old Mistakes Any serious advocacy of this model must include, even briefly, a clear vision for avoiding the flaws of the old monarchical system itself otherwise the proposal collapses into simply replacing one form of authoritarianism with another wearing a different crown. First, the armed forces would need to be placed fully under a civilian ministry of defence, with its budget subject to transparent parliamentary oversight the exact opposite of its current status as a state-within-a-state, and equally opposed to its role under the monarchy, when it often served as an instrument of British influence. Second, a judiciary fully independent of both palace and government alike, unlike the old model, which saw direct royal interference in political life as when King Fuad I dismissed the elected government of Prime Minister Saad Zaghloul’s successor, Mustafa al-Nahhas, in 1928, in one of the clearest "constitutional coups" in modern Egyptian history. Third, a parliament that genuinely represents the people rather than landowners and the aristocracy, as was the case before 1952, when membership in the Senate was effectively conditional on the ability to pay land taxes meaning political representation was, by law, restricted to the wealthy. Fourth, genuine economic sovereignty, with a truly independent national currency rather than one pegged to a foreign power’s currency, unlike the historical dependency of the Egyptian pound on sterling. These four principles are enough to clarify that the project on offer is not a literal "return to the past," but a borrowing of the constitutional form (symbolic monarchy) combined with an explicit rejection of its old substance (colonial dependency, palace interference, parliamentary feudalism). V. The Role of Egyptian Movements in Exile: Between Goal and Instrument This raises the most practical question of all: how might Egypt’s opposition abroad actually adopt this idea, and in what capacity? The honest answer is that the power of this proposal does not necessarily lie in its literal fulfilment, but in its dual strategic function. On one hand, it can be advanced as a genuine political goal adopted by broad coalitions of Egyptian movements coalitions that might include Islamists, liberals, leftists, and traditional monarchists, united around a single shared premise: rejecting the legitimacy of the 1952 order and everything that followed from it, even if they later disagree over the precise final shape of the state. On the other hand and this matters more in practice the idea can be deployed as a rhetorical instrument of pressure to widen a Egyptian political debate currently trapped between two false choices: "continued military rule" or "no alternative, chaos awaits." When the opposition puts forward a clearly defined third model a European-style constitutional monarchy it breaks this false binary and opens new intellectual space in Egyptian public discourse, even if the project is never realised in its literal form. This kind of "leverage idea" is common in the history of political movements worldwide: it is not necessarily proposed to be fulfilled immediately in full, but to redraw the boundaries of the politically possible, and to force the existing regime to defend its legitimacy rather than simply assume it. Conclusion: An Invitation to Debate, Not a Ready-Made Prescription This article does not claim that restoring a monarchical form would magically resolve Egypt’s chronic crisis of legitimacy, nor does it ignore the immense difficulties facing any transformative project under a military institution as economically and securitywise entrenched as Egypt’s is today. But it raises a question that deserves serious debate among Egypt’s opposition in exile, rather than automatic dismissal simply for being unfamiliar: Has the Egyptian opposition exhausted every available tool for dismantling the legitimacy of 1952, or has it remained trapped in the same old binary swapping one ruler for another while the framework that makes military rule possible remains untouched? The idea is on the table now, not as a finished solution, but as an overdue invitation to think outside the box.

“Fue un verdadero placer recibir a un artista de talla internacional como tú, Harry Styles. Gracias por visitarnos y por darte la oportunidad de descubrir y disfrutar los sabores de la cocina de Hidalgo. Siempre será un honor recibirte en El Hidalguense!” ©️elhidalguense_restaurante #HarryStyles #CocinaMexicana #ElHidalguense

L’agent du joueur confirme l’info au @telegraaf : « Son absence n'a rien à voir avec la situation impliquant le Paris Saint-Germain. Ce n'est pas le style de Mika. Il s'agissait simplement d'un cas de surcharge. C'était une mesure de précaution pour éviter de prendre le moindre risque. » 🎯 #PSG #Football #Transferts

Chaque président a envie de laisser sa trace avec des constructions. Macron, fidèle au style « Néo-Tuche » utilisé pour re-décorer l’Élysée, nous laissera les vitraux de Notre Dame et l’immonde verrue qu’il va faire bâtir à l’entrée de @AssembleeNat Ce mec aura TOUT enlaidi… https://t.co/wcMGWUtOZ3 #France #Politique #Architecture

Flick : « Concernant Fermín, nous devons gérer sa participation avec soin. Raphinha s'entraîne avec nous depuis environ dix ou douze jours, tandis que Fermín a commencé les entraînements quelques jours plus tôt. Les choses se sont bien passées, et il était clair qu'il jouerait quarante-cinq minutes, après quoi nous l'avons remplacé. Quant à Raphinha, comme je l'ai dit à plusieurs reprises, c'est pour moi l'un des joueurs les plus importants, car il apporte beaucoup de dynamisme et d'intensité à notre style de jeu, et c'est exactement ce dont nous avons besoin de sa part. C'est l'un des leaders de l'équipe, et j'ai besoin qu'il soit engagé à cent pour cent avec l'équipe et avec nos objectifs ici. Et c'est ce que je veux voir de lui. » #Football #Sport #Teamwork

Gianni Infantino, the president of FIFA, remains at the head of the organization despite the scandals and controversies surrounding his leadership methods and political style, which resemble the behavior of some current politicians, while the article's author criticizes how Infantino avoids responsibility and ignores pressure from UEFA and football personalities. (translated)

Pour l'𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒓 du maillot 🤍❤️💛 ⚪️ Base blanche emblématique 🔴🟡 Iconiques couleurs sang et or 🔙 Hommage aux années 90 🛍️ https://t.co/7cGWUmwwon #RCAlliance https://t.co/mReOiZXjEL #Maillot #Football #Style

🚨 LE BARÇA PRÉPARE UNE OFFRE DE 60 M€ POUR RODRI : 45 M€ FIXES + 15 M€ DE BONUS 🗣️ @Nilsola10 : « L’intention du Barça aujourd’hui est de présenter cette offre le plus rapidement possible, d’après les informations dont nous disposons ici à la Cadena SER. Il s’agirait d’une offre qui pourrait atteindre 60 millions d’euros, bonus compris : environ 45 millions d’euros fixes, auxquels s’ajouteraient 10 à 15 millions d’euros de variables, afin d’atteindre les 60 millions que souhaite Manchester City. Le Barça est convaincu qu’après tout ce que Rodri a apporté à Manchester City et maintenant que le joueur a demandé à rejoindre le Barça, le club anglais pourrait accepter. Évidemment, il faudra négocier, mais, pour l’instant, ce sont les montants envisagés par le Barça : environ 40-45 M€ fixes + 10-15 M€ de variables. À noter également que ces 50 millions d’euros sont les sommes que le Barça avait préparées, entre 50 et 60 millions, pour recruter un défenseur central. Une position qui serait évidemment également couverte avec l’arrivée de Rodri. Ces 50-60 millions, au lieu d’être consacrés au défenseur central dont on a tant parlé, seraient donc désormais destinés à Rodri. » 🎤 : Si je comprends bien, c’est aujourd’hui que le Barça a appris que Rodri acceptait de leur donner le feu vert pour négocier avec Manchester City ? 🗣️ @Nilsola10 : « Oui, exactement. Lorsque nous en parlions dimanche dans El Larguero, ce qui manquait au Barça pour se lancer définitivement, c’était la décision du joueur, qui n’était pas encore claire. Évidemment, Rodri ne l’avait communiqué ni au Barça ni au Real Madrid jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il l’a communiqué au Barça. Le club lui-même nous l’a confirmé cet après-midi aux médias et, à partir de là, le Barça s’est immédiatement mis au travail avec Manchester City. Le Barça est optimiste et pense que l’opération peut être bouclée. Je le répète, la première proposition que le Barça souhaite présenter très rapidement devrait tourner autour de 60 millions d’euros, fixes et variables compris. Un élément clé dans la décision de Rodri serait notamment les appels qu’il a reçus de Deco, mais aussi l’insistance d’Eric García, Pedri, Dani Olmo et Pau Cubarsí, ses coéquipiers en sélection espagnole. Ils lui ont transmis quelque chose qui a beaucoup plu à Rodri : l’enthousiasme qui règne dans le vestiaire du Barça, sa jeunesse et, évidemment, le style de jeu du club catalan. » #Barça #Rodri #Mercato

La préférence de Rodri est de rejoindre le FC Barcelone plutôt que le Real Madrid, les deux clubs Manchester City et Real Madrid étant au courant de la position du joueur. Le FC Barcelone nourrit un intérêt de longue date pour ce milieu de terrain, intérêt qui s’est intensifié à la suite de la blessure de Frenkie de Jong. Le club estime que Rodri serait un choix idéal pour le système de Hansi Flick, tandis que le joueur est réputé penser qu’il s’épanouirait dans le style de jeu du FC Barcelone. Le FC Barcelone doit désormais trouver les ressources financières pour rendre un transfert possible. Une offre de l’ordre de 60–70 M€ pourrait suffire à satisfaire Manchester City. @FabriceHawkins #FCBarcelona #Rodri #TransferNews

J'ai pas prévu de voter en 2027, vu que je ne crois pas un instant à "la démocratie républicaine française", mais il se peut que je me bouge pour mettre un bulletin en faveur du candidat qui s'engagera à dégager toute la décoration en style "Néo-Tuche" de Brigitte à l'Elysée... https://t.co/QESyD2VKkd #Politique #Élections2027 #Démocratie

🚨🚨 Une source très fiable à Madrid confirme que le Barça est bien entré dans la course pour Rodri, qui est désormais séduit par le projet et le style de jeu du club. Regardez le dernier RT de Fabrizio Romano 🔥🔥🔥 https://t.co/qQwEI4vtaj #FCBarcelona #Rodri #Transferts