Henri Vanhanen

Henri Vanhanen demanded the publication of Tiitinen's list. He stated that he had supported its release before and assessed that the secrecy maintained for over 30 years had generated mystique around the list that was no longer beneficial. Vanhanen pointed out that the names on the list would not prove anyone guilty, in his opinion. He believed that publishing it would help distinguish known facts from the speculation that had arisen over the decades. Vanhanen also connected the issue to the open handling of Finland's Cold War history. He wrote that transparency was important in the current discussion on security policy, influence, and the actions of foreign powers. https://t.co/j8CXiiVumh #TiitisenLista #Avoimuus #Historia (translated)

Henri Vanhanen wrote that the head of Germany's foreign intelligence had warned that Russia was waging a shadow war against Germany. According to him, the head of Germany's domestic intelligence had said that Russia was preparing sabotage and even assassinations on German territory. Vanhanen assessed that in Finland, it was sometimes assumed that Russian intelligence activities had some sort of invisible boundary of politeness that would prevent actions at people's doorsteps or overly brazen acts. He wrote that, in his opinion, Russian intelligence services did not operate according to the boundaries that Finns consider acceptable, but rather based on what works and where they are given space. According to Vanhanen, naivety was not a strong security policy. https://t.co/gjetkWxfTV #Venäjä #tiedustelu #turvallisuuspolitiikka (translated)

Henri Vanhanen wrote that he had been calling for a clearer situational picture of Russia's intelligence and influence activities towards Finland for some time. He viewed positively that, according to him, the message from the Security Police and the Defense Forces about the situation was now serious: Russian intelligence operations against Finland had intensified, cyber intelligence was active, and the interest was particularly focused on the defense industry. Vanhanen noted that the chief of the intelligence department of the General Staff had assessed that the intelligence operations targeting society and critical systems could be preparation for sabotage. According to him, Finland could thus become a target of Russian sabotage activities. He also wrote that, according to the Security Police, at least one small Finnish technology company had already been subject to verifiably increased intelligence activities. Vanhanen assessed that Russia aimed to weaken Ukraine's ability to continue the war by also influencing countries, businesses, and supply chains related to Western support. He warned that problems arising for companies supporting Ukraine could raise questions in Finland about the risks of support and serve Russia's objectives. Vanhanen suggested that the security of defense and technology companies should be proactively strengthened. He urged companies to check, among other things, their cybersecurity, the protection of their facilities, approaches to personnel, data access rights, supply chains, and unusual cooperation, recruitment, and investor contacts. He stated that especially small companies should be provided with easily accessible government support for identifying threats and improving security. According to Vanhanen, Russia's goal was to get Western countries to reduce their support for Ukraine. He believed that Finland should respond to possible pressure by better protecting the people and companies enabling support rather than changing its policies. https://t.co/f0INfDq1Zf #Venäjä #Suomi #Kyberturvallisuus (translated)

The author stated that he had spoken on Yle's morning show about Ukraine's new weapon systems and robotization. According to him, humanoid robots would hardly solve the war in Ukraine, but robots and autonomous systems would already be commonplace in the next war. He added that it was easy to laugh at the current clumsy robots. https://t.co/EVRBr71spg #Ukraina #robotit #teknologia #FI #UA (translated)

Henri Vanhanen wrote that Finland's security leadership should clearly tell Finns how the threat posed by Russia may have changed. According to him, in Europe, sabotage linked to Russia had become more dangerous, while in Finland there had been warnings about new threats and the self-reinforcing effects of public debate. Vanhanen considered an updated overall assessment of changes in Russian actions and their significance for Finland to be timely. He asked how likely it was that sabotage seen elsewhere in Europe and the recruitment of local actors were considered in Finland, as well as what aspects of the security situation had not changed. He wrote that Finns did not need more reasons to fear Russia but a clearer picture of what was known, what was considered possible, and what had no evidence. https://t.co/pVVdY68NoX #Suomi #Venäjä #turvallisuus (translated)

Henri Vanhanen wrote that Ukraine had announced the use of its own FP-7 ballistic missile in battle for the first time. According to him, President Volodymyr Zelensky had reported on the first combat use and stated that the next phase would be production. Vanhanen noted that the missile manufacturer, Fire Point, claimed the FP-7 had a range of about 200 kilometers, a warhead weight of 150 kilograms, and a speed of up to 1,500 meters per second. He stated that the missile could target command posts, air defense systems, air bases, and ammunition depots, for example. Vanhanen pointed out that there had been no information on the first launch about what it struck or whether the missile hit its target. He wrote that the military significance of the system would depend on whether the missiles could be produced sufficiently, affordably, and accurately. According to him, approximately seven months had passed since the first known test launch. Vanhanen mentioned that Fire Point was also developing the FP-9 missile, which aimed for a range of over 800 kilometers and a warhead of up to 800 kilograms. He emphasized that the FP-9 was not yet an operational weapon. According to Vanhanen, the significance of the FP-7 would ultimately depend on whether it could be put into production. https://t.co/MWd1JlMbu8 #Ukraina #ohjukset #sota (translated)

Henri Vanhanen wrote that he wanted to correct the interpretations of an article by Helsingin Sanomat that dealt with nuclear weapons and said he remained uncertain about what the article ultimately claimed regarding Finland's security. According to him, Finland did not join the NATO nuclear deterrent with little discussion or unnoticed, but rather joined an alliance whose deterrence and defense had been based on nuclear weapons for decades. He described the strategic nuclear forces of the United States as a key basis for NATO's nuclear deterrent. Vanhanen considered that the bombing of Nagasaki was not an example of the current type of nuclear deterrent because Japan did not have a nuclear weapon nor the ability to respond to a U.S. strike. In his view, Nagasaki demonstrated the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the human risks of their use, whereas the current deterrent was based on the assumption that an attacker had to consider the possibility of retaliation and uncontrolled escalation. Vanhanen assessed that Trump had increased uncertainty regarding the United States' commitment to the conventional defense of Europe and believed Europe would have to bear more responsibility for it. However, he distinguished this from the claim that the U.S. nuclear deterrent had weakened. According to him, the U.S. ability to use nuclear weapons had not diminished, NATO was not dismantling its nuclear plans or arrangements, systems were being modernized, and F-35 aircraft were being introduced into NATO's nuclear missions. Vanhanen stated that the NATO Nuclear Planning Group had confirmed in June that strategic nuclear forces, particularly U.S. forces, remained the ultimate guarantee of the allies' security and had decided to continue strengthening and modernizing the nuclear deterrent. Vanhanen considered it a central uncertainty whether Moscow would believe that the U.S. president would be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend an ally in an extreme situation. He reminded that the question of the U.S. willingness to endanger its own cities for the sake of Europe had been a concern throughout the history of the extended nuclear deterrent and there had been no complete certainty during the Cold War or at the present time. According to him, Finland's option was not a nuclear deterrent or a nuclear-free security environment, as Russia would have its nuclear weapons in any case. Vanhanen wrote that the crucial issue for the deterrent was that the Russian leadership could not be certain that the United States would defend Finland. https://t.co/3C8aAkuMwj #ydinaseet #Nato #Suomi (translated)

The press conference today clarified the suspicions related to parliamentarians' homes. According to Speaker Halla-aho, there is a significant number of cases. It is suspected that residences have been entered in the absence of the representatives. No signs of forced entry have been found, and nothing has been stolen, but traces have been left in the homes. The suspicions involve members of different parties, and the first case may go back as far as a year. There is currently no confirmed information about the perpetrator or motive. The background may involve criminal activity, harassment or stalking targeted at individual politicians, domestic extremist groups, or the actions of a foreign state. Not all reported cases may necessarily be related to each other. Now, it is the police's task to distinguish real intrusions from other observations and investigate possible connections between them. The possibility of a state actor must still be taken seriously. An especially interesting detail is the marks left in the homes. If the intention were solely to obtain information secretly, a successful intrusion would fundamentally be attempted to be concealed. If, instead, traces are deliberately left behind, being noticed may itself be part of the operation. In that case, intelligence is combined with psychological influence. Such methods are known in the history of Russian security services. There have been intrusions into the homes of diplomats, officials, and other individuals deemed interesting, with deliberate traces left behind. This does not prove anything about the perpetrators of these cases. It indicates why the possibility of a foreign state’s action must be thoroughly investigated. If it ultimately turns out to be state influence, the selection of targets would in itself be significant. Parliamentarians decide on Finland's defense policy, NATO cooperation, support for Ukraine, relations with Russia, and numerous other decisions in which foreign states may have strong interests. Coercion does not have to mean an attempt to change one vote in a single ballot. The aim could also be to gather information, map networks and vulnerabilities, or generate uncertainty about whether the consequences of political decisions extend to an individual's own home and loved ones. That is why Finland now needs a more open discussion about the kind of foreign intelligence, influence, and pressure directed at it. Confidential information should not be disclosed, but Finns should have a realistic understanding of the security environment in which we live and whether its change requires anything from decision-makers, companies, or ordinary people. And above all, keep a cool head. If the purpose of such acts turns out to be to generate fear and uncertainty in Finland, that is precisely the effect that should not be allowed. Serious suspicions will be investigated, efforts will be made to identify the perpetrators, and appropriate action will be taken if necessary. Finland's decisions will continue to be made in Finland, without fear and pressure. #turvallisuus #politiikka #tiedustelu (translated)

IS reports today that some members of parliament's homes have already been breached. This new information makes the situation significantly more serious. It is no longer just a potential threat. As I mentioned earlier, this method of operation inevitably raises the issue of Russia. The Russian security services have a long history of similar actions. Breaching homes can gather information, but it can also demonstrate to the target that even their most private space can be accessed. If the incidents now revealed involve the actions of a foreign state, we are talking about very serious interference in Finnish democracy. At the same time, Finland now needs a much more open discussion about how foreign states operate here. What is really happening in Finland, what kinds of methods of influence and pressure are being directed at us, and what does the changed situation require from authorities, society, and possibly also ordinary Finns? Of course, not all information from authorities can be made public. However, that does not mean that we should remain silent about the phenomenon itself. People find it difficult to recognize foreign influence or prepare for it if we cannot talk about it openly. In this situation, whispering does not increase security. An open society defends itself best by understanding what is being done against it, keeping a cool head, and making it clear that Finnish democracy is not being pressured by fear. https://t.co/zaymNSpIRt #Suomi #demokratia #turvallisuus (translated)

As a result of the opposition's vote of no confidence regarding Israeli policy, Minister of Defense Häkkänen has to miss the meeting of defense ministers of JEF countries. The topic of the meeting is strengthening the defense of Northern Europe. What was ultimately achieved with all this remained somewhat unclear to me. https://t.co/tzF9jzZsad #Puolustuspolitiikka #PohjoisEurooppa #Israel (translated)

I must say that the scale of the discussion surrounding Häkämies' visit to Israel is starting to frustrate me. The task of security policy is not to make decision-makers look good, but to keep the country safe. We have a neighboring country to the east that is at war, the security of Europe is in its most serious situation in decades, and Finland must at the same time strengthen its defense, preparedness, and alliance relations. In this world situation, I would prefer politics to focus less on proving its own moral purity and more on taking responsibility for how Finland's security is actually ensured. We do not have to like all our partners, nor do we have to approve of all their actions. Nevertheless, defense policy must be able to be conducted in a world as it is. Right now, we have more important matters to attend to than gathering political points from our supporters. Virtue signaling does not deter a single ballistic missile. https://t.co/6ME2hwb1Nd #turvallisuuspolitiikka #Suomi #puolustus (translated)

There may be something much larger happening in Russia than it appears outwardly. We are used to thinking of mobilization as an event. Putin gives a speech, a decision is announced, and reservists are called to service. The next mobilization may look completely different. Russia may gradually call men to service, decentralizing actions across the country, pressuring people to sign contracts, and sparing politically sensitive cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. There may never be a single day when we could state that a new mobilization has begun. If this does not produce enough soldiers, the situation could become even bleaker. Russia could even stage an attack on its own soil and blame it on Ukraine or NATO. The goal would not be to convince us, but rather the Russians, that the country is under attack and needs more men for the war. This is also significant for Finland. If Russia manages to mobilize hundreds of thousands of new soldiers, the issue is not just about the front in Ukraine. At the same time, it is worth watching whether Russia begins to build a new strategic reserve and fill its new units in the Leningrad military district near Finland. There is no immediate threat of attack against Finland, but right now decisions can be made that determine Russia's military power at our borders for years to come. https://t.co/zWneprVedN #Venäjä #SotilaallinenVoima #Ukraina (translated)

Tänään kerrottu JEF-uutinen on paljon suurempi asia Suomen turvallisuudelle kuin ehkä vielä ymmärretään. Kyse ei ole vain uusista taistelujoukoista tai Britannian ydinaseista. Pohjois-Eurooppaan rakennetaan parhaillaan järjestelyä, jonka avulla Britannia ja joukko Suomen lähimpiä kumppaneita voivat pahassa paikassa ryhtyä sotilaallisesti toimeen nopeasti myös ilman Natoa. Tämä on iso muutos. Jos Venäjä joskus haluaisi testata länttä, sille olisi edullista synnyttää mahdollisimman epäselvä tilanne. Sellainen, jossa 32 Nato-maata joutuvat pohtimaan, mitä oikein tapahtuu, onko kyse hyökkäyksestä ja miten siihen vastataan. JEF vaikeuttaa tällaista peliä. Se ei tarvitse edes kaikkien kymmenen JEF-maan yhteistä päätöstä. Britannia voi lähteä toimimaan esimerkiksi Suomen, Ruotsin ja muiden halukkaiden maiden kanssa. Jokainen maa päättää itse joukkojensa käytöstä. Nyt tämän taakse rakennetaan myös enemmän sotilaallista voimaa. JEF-maat perustavat uusia taistelujoukkoja, ja erityisesti merellä tarkoitus on pystyä kokoamaan eri maiden voimat nopeasti yhteen ja tarvittaessa myös taistelemaan yhdessä. Suomelle tämä on valtava asia. Olemme riippuvaisia Itämerestä ja yhteyksistä länteen. Britannia puolestaan on Euroopan vahvimpia merivaltoja, ydinasevaltio ja maa, joka pystyy tuomaan tänne oikeasti merkittävää sotilaallista voimaa. Britannia ei siis vain lupaa tukea Pohjois-Eurooppaa. Se rakentaa jo rauhan aikana järjestelmää, jonka kautta se voisi tarvittaessa tulla tänne taistelemaan. Mitä valmiimmaksi tämä tehdään etukäteen, sitä vähemmän kriisin hetkellä jää arvailtavaksi. Nato on Suomen puolustuksen perusta, mutta kaikkea ei kannata jättää yhden kortin varaan. JEF tarkoittaa, että tarvittaessa Britannia ja muut halukkaat maat voivat toimia nopeasti myös keskenään. Venäjä ei voi siis laskea sen varaan, että epäröinti Natossa ostaisi sille aikaa. Siksi pidän JEF:n vahvistumista yhtenä Suomen puolustuksen tärkeimmistä kivijaloista juuri nyt. #SuomenPuolustus #JEF #Nato

Tämä on todella iso ja tärkeä uutinen Suomen puolustukselle. Britannia, Suomi ja muut JEF-maat perustavat uudet taistelujoukot, joiden tarkoitus on pystyä toimimaan nopeasti, jos jokin jäsenmaista joutuu uhatuksi. Olennaista on, ettei kaikkea tarvitse odottaa Naton kautta. JEF-maat voivat toimia myös itse. Juuri näin Suomen puolustusta pitää mielestäni rakentaa. Nato on puolustuksemme tärkein perusta, mutta meidän ei kannata laittaa kaikkia munia samaan koriin. Mitä enemmän Suomella on ympärillään vahvoja maita, jotka ovat harjoitelleet kanssamme, tehneet yhteisiä suunnitelmia ja ovat tarvittaessa valmiita toimimaan nopeasti, sitä vaikeampi Venäjän on kuvitella voivansa testata meitä. Britannia on Euroopan vahvimpia sotilasmahteja, ydinasevaltio ja maa, jolla on kyky tuoda Pohjois-Euroopan puolustukseen kaikkea F-35-hävittäjistä laivastoon ja sukellusveneisiin. Nyt näitä kykyjä kytketään entistä tiiviimmin Suomen ja muun Pohjois-Euroopan puolustukseen. Tällaisessa maailmassa turvallisuutta kannattaa rakentaa useamman lukon taakse. Nato on niistä tärkei, mutta JEF, Britannia ja muut läheiset puolustuskumppanit tekevät kynnyksestä hyökätä Suomeen vielä korkeamman. https://t.co/K7GZVIzQSF #SuomenPuolustus #Nato #JEF

Venäjän jatkuvalle häiriköinnille ja uhkailulle Euroopassa pitäisi asettaa nykyistä selvempi hinta. Minulla olisi tähän konkreettinen ehdotus. Euroopan pitäisi sopia etukäteen periaatteesta, jonka mukaan Venäjän meihin kohdistaman painostuksen lisääminen johtaa Ukrainan sotilaallisen tuen kasvattamiseen. Ei siis joka kerta viikkojen keskustelua siitä, miten vastaamme. Venäjä tietäisi jo etukäteen, mitä sen toiminnasta seuraa. Tämä pitäisi rakentaa portaittain. Ensimmäisenä kasvattaisin Ukrainan pitkän kantaman iskukykyä. Lisää Storm Shadow/SCALP-ohjuksia ja niiden tuotantoa Ukrainassa. Taurus-ohjukset mukaan. Eurooppalaista ATACMS-tuotantoa pitäisi vauhdittaa ja Britannian kehittämien uusien yli 500 kilometrin kantaman aseiden tuotanto saada nopeasti suureen mittakaavaan. Toiseksi, laittaisin huomattavasti enemmän eurooppalaista rahaa Ukrainan omaan pitkän kantaman ase- ja droonituotantoon. Ukrainalla on jo paljon osaamista ja toimivia järjestelmiä. Euroopan tehtävä olisi mahdollistaa niiden valmistaminen aivan toisessa mittakaavassa. Kolmanneksi poistaisin tarpeettomat rajoitukset sille, miten Ukraina voi käyttää lännestä saamiaan pitkän kantaman aseita Venäjän sotilaallista hyökkäyskykyä vastaan. Tämän lisäksi Ukraina tarvitsee jatkuvasti lisää ilmatorjuntaa. Patriot-, NASAMS- ja IRIS-T-järjestelmien ohjuksia tarvitaan paljon, jotta Venäjä ei pysty samalla kasvattamaan omaa ohjus- ja droonipainettaan Ukrainaa vastaan. Periaate olisi lopulta hyvin helppo ymmärtää: Jos Venäjä lisää painostusta Eurooppaa vastaan, me lisäämme Ukrainan kykyä käydä sotaa Venäjää vastaan. Jos painostus jatkuu, seuraava porras otetaan käyttöön. Tämä olisi samalla tukea Ukrainalle, Euroopan oman turvallisuuden vahvistamista ja konkreettista pelotetta. Venäjän pitäisi joutua laskemaan jo ennen seuraavaa operaatiotaan, kuinka paljon vahvemman Ukrainan se on valmis sillä ostamaan. #Ukraina #Venäjä #Eurooppa

Euroopasta tulee nyt toinen toisensa perään vakavia varoituksia Venäjän toiminnasta. Minusta Suomen tulee päivittää julkinen uhka-arvio, jos viranomaisilla on perusteita arvioida uhkaympäristön muuttuneen. Supon, sotilastiedustelun ja valtiojohdon pitäisi silloin kertoa suomalaisille mahdollisimman selvästi, mistä muutoksessa on kyse, mihin meidän kannattaa varautua ja tarvitaanko uusia varautumisohjeita. Epämääräisten varoitusten sijaan tarvitsemme mahdollisimman selkeän tilannekuvan. https://t.co/tz9hTMbf9N #Venäjä #uhkaympäristö #Suomi

Iso uutinen 👇 Zelenskyin mukaan Trump on tehnyt lopullisen päätöksen sallia Patriot-torjuntaohjusten valmistamisen Ukrainassa. Jos päätös materialisoituu sopimukseksi ja tuotannoksi, kyse olisi Ukrainalle erittäin merkittävästä asiasta. Ballistiset ohjukset ovat tällä hetkellä Ukrainan ilmapuolustuksen pahimpia ongelmia. Niiden torjuntaprosentti on tänä vuonna painunut ajoittain alle 20 prosenttiin samalla, kun Venäjä on lisännyt niiden käyttöä. Patriot on käytännössä Ukrainan tärkein järjestelmä ballististen ohjusten torjumiseen. Oma Patriot-ohjusten tuotanto vähentäisi Ukrainan riippuvuutta rajallisista länsimaisista varastoista. Tälle talvelle siitä ei kuitenkaan vielä ole ratkaisuksi. Zelenskyi itse arvioi aiemmin, että tuotannon käynnistäminen voisi viedä noin 1–1,5 vuotta. Siksi Ukraina tarvitsee nyt lisää valmiita torjuntaohjuksia. Pidemmällä aikavälillä tämä voisi kuitenkin ratkaista yhden Ukrainan ilmapuolustuksen keskeisistä pullonkauloista. #Ukraina #Patriot #Ilmapuolustus

Siinä on MiG venäläinen MiG-31-hävittäjä Suomenlahdella 24.9.2026. Suomen ja Ruotsin hävittäjät tekivät eilen ensimmäisen yhteisen operatiivisen tunnistuslentonsa, kun useita venäläisiä sotilaskoneita liikkui Suomenlahden yllä kansainvälisessä ilmatilassa. Hyvä, että uusi yhteistyö on nyt testattu myös tositilanteessa. Valvonta toimii, koneet nousevat ilmaan ja Suomen sekä Ruotsin ilmavoimat kykenevät toimimaan yhdessä. Juuri tältä pohjoismaisen puolustusyhteistyön pitää näyttää käytännössä. #ilmavoimat #puolustusyhteistyö #SuomiRuotsi

1. Venäjän toiminnasta Euroopassa olisi minusta syytä puhua nyt tavallista suoremmin. Sabotaasi, kriittiseen infrastruktuuriin kohdistuva toiminta ja ihmishenkiä vaarantavat operaatiot eivät ole enää teoreettisia uhkakuvia. Samalla eri puolilta Eurooppaa varoitetaan Venäjän voivan olla valmis menemään vielä pidemmälle. Kaipaisin valtiojohdolta Suomessa nyt lisää avoimuutta tilanteeseen 👇 #Venäjä #Eurooppa #kriisi