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The author reported on severe scenes in Gorkha, Nepal. The Budhi-Gandaki River had swelled so strongly that the Soti-Khola bridge near Arughat was washed away today. He wrote that even solid infrastructure cannot withstand such a flood and expressed his sympathy to those affected. #Nepal #Naturkatastrophe #Gorkha #NP (translated)

Mari Rantanen wrote to Niilo Heinonen and Otto Juote that, in her opinion, the publication of the list was not a political decision but a decision by the Supo that the KHO had upheld. She criticized the National Coalition Party for being erratic and urged it to stop the "nonsense." #politiikka #Suponpäätös #Suomi (translated)

Jakub Balcerzak summarized the last Saturday before the start of the 2026/2027 league season. He assessed that the slogan "Beat the champion" will motivate the rivals of Michał Winiarski's team, and each of them will approach the matches with full commitment. He cited the match between Trefl and Sordyl as an example and wondered how many weaker teams would manage to play in a similar way. According to Balcerzak, Lublin was in better shape at this stage of preparations than a year earlier. He praised the creativity of Ran and Ogawa as well as the play of the latter, and positively evaluated the start of preparations for Mikołaj Sawicki, whom he considered well physically prepared. The author was pleased with Roberto Piazza's presence in the Polish club, but noted that there is a lot of work ahead for PGE Project Warszawa, as the Italian coach had only started working with the team a few days earlier. He assessed that Romano could help Warsaw achieve a major trophy this season. After the match against Lublana, he pointed out that the average age of Project's players on the court was almost 33 years. He also wrote that Śliwka's injury means at least a month off, and noted that the captain of the Polish national team has played only 31 percent of league matches in almost three years. Balcerzak called Tymoteusz Lenik one of the best Polish middle blockers from the 2005 age group and younger. He believed that Gheorghe Crețu is guiding the player well and predicted that Lenik would make it to the senior national team next season. He pointed to 22-year-old Mateusz Nowak as a possible successor to Bartłomiej Lemański in Bełchatów and as the best player of Skra during the preparation period. He described Szymon Jakubiszak as one of the leading Polish middle blockers and wrote that he should join a club competing for the Polish championship. Regarding the Italian league, Balcerzak praised Basil Dermaux's performance in Milan, where he scored 27 points, including seven aces. He indicated Hryhoriia Khotsevycha as a potential discovery of the new season of LegaVolley, and described Pardo Matia as an increasingly important player in Modena's offense. He added that his collaboration with Tizi-Oualou was going very well. Assessing the teams from Japan, Balcerzak stated that there is a lot of work ahead for Suntory Sunbirds Osaka and that the team no longer commands the same respect as in previous years. He positively evaluated the new Nagoya and the performance of Norbert Huber, while considering Osaka Bluteon the best team currently in the country, with a significant advantage over rivals. The photograph was signed with the name K. Łukawski. #podsiatka #siatkówka #sezonligowy #Polska (translated)

Tere Sammallahti wrote that according to the interpretation of the Tax Administration, taxes of up to 170,000 euros should have been paid on an income of 41,000 euros, but the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the interpretation. He contemplated what kind of social media story the Tax Administration would create about the legal dispute and thanked for the work victory as well as for the precedent he considers important. https://t.co/x1NDdIyEbr #verotus #oikeus #ennakkopäätös (translated)

Tijjani Reijnders opened the scoring for Al-Qadsiah with a free kick in the away match against Al-Kholood, while Cristiano Ronaldo is back in the starting lineup for Al Nassr after his controversy with the Portuguese national team. #AlQadsiah #SaudiProLeague #TijjaniReijnders (translated)

Mona Juul wrote that she rarely gave space to political opponents and colleagues on her side, but this time she thought it was important to highlight their warnings about misinformation. She mentioned, among other things, that Stinus Lindgreen from the Radical Left had written about daily Russian misinformation on social media and his concern that parts of the population had lost trust in the authorities. According to Juul, Karsten Hønge from SF had described lies and manipulations from the Kremlin, while Troels Lund Poulsen from the Liberal party had talked about anonymous profiles, conspiracy theories, and accusations directed at him. Alex Vanopslagh from the Liberal Alliance had written that Russia spread propaganda, and Ida Auken had warned that actors from St. Petersburg influenced who won Danish elections. Juul wrote that she herself saw conspiracy theories, deliberate misinformation, AI-generated lies, and Russian bot accounts on social media. She called the development a challenge for Danish democracy and believed that politicians must stand together because the truth was under pressure. She highlighted Danish news media and journalists as important for democratic information because the media had accountable editors-in-chief and were responsible to the Danish people and the Press Council. At the same time, she warned against videos on X, whose authenticity could not be established. Juul thanked her political colleagues for addressing coordinated misinformation and said that Russia wanted to create distrust among people. In response, she called for solidarity. #Misinformation #Demokrati #Sammenhold (translated)

Jurgen Vluijmans wrote that his first opinion piece in De Morgen was about companies, and more specifically about management companies, which he believes do not exist as often thought. He mentioned that he explained with four arguments why, according to him, VDB and Vooruit were wrong. The piece was readable without a paywall; Vluijmans thanked Bart Eeckhout for that. https://t.co/kHOul97dJD #opinie #vennootschappen #journalistiek (translated)

Hasnain Kazim remembered the third anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. At that time, he arrived by bicycle in Heidelberg and heard discussions about the attack in the marketplace. The terror had strengthened his resolve to stand against extremism. He described the attack as the largest mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust. Kazim wrote that religiously justified restrictions and violence had occupied him since childhood. He had experienced, among other things, the outrage over a joke by Rudi Carrell about Khomeini, the persecution of Salman Rushdie, and the deaths of more than a dozen acquaintances, friends, and colleagues at the hands of Islamist extremists. He had also found statements that praised Hitler or Osama bin Laden to be profoundly unbearable. Since October 7, 2023, he has observed that Hamas terrorists are celebrated in Germany as well. In Berlin-Neukölln, people distributed candies after the massacre. Kazim also criticized the fact that some young people appeared with keffiyehs and pro-Palestinian slogans without understanding their political and historical significance. He wrote that Hamas fighters and bin Laden are portrayed on TikTok as representatives of the oppressed or as opponents of capitalism. At the same time, Kazim warned of extremists demanding mass "remigration" and threatening people who appeared foreign or Muslim to them. He accused the political center of not rejecting Islamism and the glorification of terror decisively enough and of ceding the political space to others. He did not want to live in a society where extremists set the tone, nor in one where Sharia law prevailed and religious authorities dictated people's lives. Kazim also referred to the vulnerability of people who could be identified as Jewish, as well as the need for protection for restaurants, kindergartens, schools, places of worship, and diplomatic missions. This was neither resistance nor criticism of the Israeli government, he wrote. In conclusion, he commemorated the victims of October 7, wished healing and peace for the injured, and called for the defeat of the terrorists. #Terrorismus #Extremismus #Frieden (translated)

After the purchase of the Seattle Seahawks for $9.61 billion, owner Vinod Khosla is causing unrest among fans after he made vague remarks about the team's future in Seattle in an interview and is now trying to dispel fears of a possible move. #Seahawks #NFL #VinodKhosla (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Verokarhu has been shot down! I won in the Supreme Administrative Court 100–0. Every single issue. Big thanks to Miika Härkönen & Taxpayers' Association! The matter concerned personal income taxation and resolved the tax treatment of professional gamblers in Finland – now and in the future. https://t.co/dnZZPSkNDV #verotus #tuomio #voitto (translated)

O canal de notícias Khodorkovsky LIVE, fundado pelo opositor exilado Mikhail Khodorkovsky, foi incluido na lista russa de agentes estrangeiros após ser acusado pelo Ministério da Justiça de divulgar informações falsas sobre o Exército russo. #Rússia #Khodorkovsky #LiberdadeDeImprensa

Death toll: 662 million innocent, unarmed civilian non-combatants murdered in islamic genocides. Islamic terrororganizations Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, Indian Mujahideen, Students Islamic Movement of India, Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan, Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e- Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Al-Badr, Al-Umar Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen, Ansar Ghazwat ul-Hind, Islamic State Jammu and Kashmir, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Ansarullah Bangla Team, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh, Neo-Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Islamic State: Al- Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, Islamic State Khorasan Province: Islamic State Sinai Province, Islamic State Central Africa Province, Islamic State East Asia, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, Ansar Dine, Katibat Macina, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar Bayt al- Maqdis, Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunna, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; Khorasan Group, Jund al-Aqsa, Abdullah Azzam Brigades: Fatah al-Islam, Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Turkistan Islamic Party, Caucasus Emirate, Riyad-us- Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs, Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, Ajnad al-Kavkaz, Armed Islamic Group, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Takfir wal-Hijra, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Maute Group, Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansaru, Jundallah; Hamas. What could possibly go wrong?

Just because there's a few terrorist organizations like: Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, Indian Mujahideen, Students Islamic Movement of India, Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan, Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e- Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Al-Badr, Al-Umar Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen, Ansar Ghazwat ul-Hind, Islamic State Jammu and Kashmir, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Ansarullah Bangla Team, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh, Neo-Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Islamic State: Al- Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, Islamic State Khorasan Province: Islamic State Sinai Province, Islamic State Central Africa Province, Islamic State East Asia, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, Ansar Dine, Katibat Macina, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar Bayt al- Maqdis, Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunna, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; Khorasan Group, Jund al-Aqsa, Abdullah Azzam Brigades: Fatah al-Islam, Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Turkistan Islamic Party, Caucasus Emirate, Riyad-us- Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs, Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, Ajnad al-Kavkaz, Armed Islamic Group, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Takfir wal-Hijra, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Maute Group, Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansaru, Jundallah; Hamas Doesn't Mean that Islam is a violent Death Cult.