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Ci sono persone che fanno apparizioni televisive solo da quando si è riaperto il caso #garlasco, mentre il vostro odiato Galassi andava a Superquark, sul Guardian e su Forbes in anni in cui il massimo share altri lo avevano coi parenti per il cenone della vigilia di Natale. #Garlasco #tv #opinioni

A Crown Instead of the Barracks: An Idea From Outside the Box Could Egypt’s exiled opposition use constitutional monarchy to dismantle the legitimacy of the 1952 coup? By Adham Hasanin Egyptian journalist and political writer, based in the Netherlands To understand what follows, a reader unfamiliar with Egypt needs one basic fact: since 1952, Egypt has never been governed by anyone who did not first wear a military uniform. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and today Abdel Fattah el-Sisi four men, four eras, one common origin. All rose through the armed forces. All inherited a state built by a coup that year, when a group of officers calling themselves the "Free Officers" overthrew King Farouk I and, within a year, abolished the monarchy altogether and declared a republic. For seventy-three years, the underlying equation has not changed: the army rules, power passes from one officer to the next, and legitimacy is drawn from the barrel of a gun rather than the ballot box. Every conceivable form of opposition has been tried legal parties and banned ones, Islamist movements, liberal and leftist coalitions, the 2011 popular uprising, and the 2013 elections whose result was overturned by force within a year. All of them hit the same wall: a military institution that reproduces itself under different names, while the core of the system remains untouched. So what if the problem, all along, has not simply been who rules, but the constitutional framework that makes military rule possible in the first place? And what if the answer lies not in swapping one president for another, but in dismantling the underlying equation itself, through a framework Egyptian opposition movements have never seriously tried: a purely ceremonial constitutional monarchy, on the model of Belgium, the Netherlands, or Spain where the head of state becomes a symbol above the political fray, while the army is permanently expelled from politics and returned to its barracks. This is not a call to revive a particular family, nor nostalgia for a golden age that never quite existed. It is a proposal for a political and strategic tool that has not yet been used in the intellectual arsenal of Egypt’s opposition in exile a tool that deserves serious discussion, regardless of whether it is ever literally realised or simply serves to expand the boundaries of what is politically thinkable. I. Why 1952, Not 2013 or 2011, Is the Root The strategic error made by most Egyptian opposition movements from the Muslim Brotherhood to the April 6 Youth Movement to the various civil opposition parties has been treating each political crisis as an isolated case: Mubarak was corrupt and had to be toppled; Sisi staged a coup that must be condemned; the interim military council was a transitional phase to be endured. This piecemeal approach treats the symptoms while leaving the original illness untouched. That original illness is the very structure of legitimacy established by the coup of 23 July 1952. The Egyptian republican system, from Nasser to today, has never built its legitimacy on a genuine democratic social contract. Instead, it has rested on a fixed trinity: the rhetoric of "revolution against feudalism and colonialism," charismatic individual leadership, and military protection of the regime framed as the guarantor of stability. This trinity has repeated itself from Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak to Sisi, with only cosmetic variations. Each new president was never a break from the system he was its continuation. When the opposition says "let us return to the constitutional framework that preceded the coup," it is not criticising a particular policy. It is declaring that the legal foundation of everything that came after 1952 was illegitimate from the start. Here lies the rhetorical power of "returning to the pre-1952 order": it does not merely demand swapping one ruler for another. It withdraws historical legitimacy from the entire republican military system including today’s regime, which draws its own declared legitimacy from that same "1952 legacy." II. Why a "Ceremonial Crown," Not "the Return of a Ruling Family" Here is the most important distinction anyone advocating this idea seriously must grasp: the project does not rest on restoring any particular individual from the Muhammad Ali dynasty, nor on nostalgia for King Farouk or his ancestors. The real power of the idea lies in the constitutional form, not in the person who happens to sit on the throne. Three successful European democracies illustrate the model clearly. Belgium, where King Philippe is a purely constitutional symbol with no real executive power, while the state is run through an elected parliament and a complex coalition government reflecting the country’s linguistic and political diversity. The Netherlands, where King Willem-Alexander formally opens the parliamentary year and signs laws, but where actual decision-making rests with the prime minister and the elected parliament. And Spain, where the king represents symbolic continuity of the state above party politics, while the military and security services answer entirely to civilian authority a transition achieved after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, when King Juan Carlos I voluntarily relinquished the extensive executive powers he had inherited and backed free elections, most dramatically in February 1981, when he personally ordered the armed forces to remain loyal to the constitution during an attempted military coup, causing it to collapse within hours. The common thread across these three models is not "the presence of an ancient royal family." It is the principle of separating symbol from power. The monarch in these countries does not rule; he represents. He issues no political decisions; he provides the continuity and symbolic stability that allows party political competition to revolve beneath him, without every transfer of power becoming an existential crisis of legitimacy. This is precisely what Egypt’s military republican system lacks: a neutral mechanism for guaranteeing state continuity that does not depend on the person of the ruler or his security apparatus. When Egypt’s military-republican president is absent, it is always the army that fills the vacuum, because it is the only institution built to be the "guarantor of stability." Under a ceremonial monarchical model, by contrast, it is the king not the army who represents that symbolic guarantee, genuinely opening the door to removing the military institution from the political equation altogether. III. Egypt’s Standing Under the Monarchy: An Honest Reckoning, Not Blind Nostalgia For a Western reader with little prior knowledge of Egypt’s monarchical period (1922–1952), it helps to know this: Egypt was nominally independent under its own king from 1922, but Britain retained enormous informal control over the country’s foreign policy, military bases, and the Suez Canal throughout the period a reality that shaped everything that follows. Any honest invocation of "Egypt’s standing under the monarchy" must avoid the trap of mythologised nostalgia that many advocates of this idea fall into. Egypt in that era was no lost paradise, and any honest article must say so plainly. The Egyptian pound, for instance, often invoked as a symbol of "national currency strength" in that period, was not strong because of independent Egyptian monetary policy. It was pegged to the British pound sterling as part of Egypt’s complete colonial financial dependency until 1947, with Egypt exercising no independent oversight of its own currency whatsoever. The pound’s strength, in other words, was not a sovereign Egyptian achievement it was a reflection of British imperial power ruling Egypt from behind the throne. But this does not mean Egypt lacked a genuine regional standing worth studying. Cairo, in the 1930s and 1940s, was the undisputed cultural capital of the entire Arab world: the Egyptian film industry produced more than half of all Arabic-language cinema; its theatre scene, led by figures like Youssef Wahbi and Naguib al-Rihani, and its music, with Umm Kulthum and Mohammed Abdel Wahab, set the standard across the region; Cairo University was the first modern university in the Arab world; and the Egyptian press was the reference point for Arab public opinion from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Cairo was, quite simply, to the Arab world what Paris was to Francophone Europe: an unrivalled centre of cultural and intellectual gravity. This standing was not necessarily a product of monarchy itself, so much as a product of a relative space of political and press pluralism that allowed Egyptian civil society to flourish, despite all the flaws of the political system and the interference of both palace and occupier. The lesson here is not "bring back the king and the standing will return." It is: when even a limited margin of civic freedom exists, Egypt flourishes culturally and intellectually almost by its own nature. And that margin is precisely what has been entirely absent across the past seven decades of unchallenged military rule. IV. What Reform Would Actually Require Not Repeating the Old Mistakes Any serious advocacy of this model must include, even briefly, a clear vision for avoiding the flaws of the old monarchical system itself otherwise the proposal collapses into simply replacing one form of authoritarianism with another wearing a different crown. First, the armed forces would need to be placed fully under a civilian ministry of defence, with its budget subject to transparent parliamentary oversight the exact opposite of its current status as a state-within-a-state, and equally opposed to its role under the monarchy, when it often served as an instrument of British influence. Second, a judiciary fully independent of both palace and government alike, unlike the old model, which saw direct royal interference in political life as when King Fuad I dismissed the elected government of Prime Minister Saad Zaghloul’s successor, Mustafa al-Nahhas, in 1928, in one of the clearest "constitutional coups" in modern Egyptian history. Third, a parliament that genuinely represents the people rather than landowners and the aristocracy, as was the case before 1952, when membership in the Senate was effectively conditional on the ability to pay land taxes meaning political representation was, by law, restricted to the wealthy. Fourth, genuine economic sovereignty, with a truly independent national currency rather than one pegged to a foreign power’s currency, unlike the historical dependency of the Egyptian pound on sterling. These four principles are enough to clarify that the project on offer is not a literal "return to the past," but a borrowing of the constitutional form (symbolic monarchy) combined with an explicit rejection of its old substance (colonial dependency, palace interference, parliamentary feudalism). V. The Role of Egyptian Movements in Exile: Between Goal and Instrument This raises the most practical question of all: how might Egypt’s opposition abroad actually adopt this idea, and in what capacity? The honest answer is that the power of this proposal does not necessarily lie in its literal fulfilment, but in its dual strategic function. On one hand, it can be advanced as a genuine political goal adopted by broad coalitions of Egyptian movements coalitions that might include Islamists, liberals, leftists, and traditional monarchists, united around a single shared premise: rejecting the legitimacy of the 1952 order and everything that followed from it, even if they later disagree over the precise final shape of the state. On the other hand and this matters more in practice the idea can be deployed as a rhetorical instrument of pressure to widen a Egyptian political debate currently trapped between two false choices: "continued military rule" or "no alternative, chaos awaits." When the opposition puts forward a clearly defined third model a European-style constitutional monarchy it breaks this false binary and opens new intellectual space in Egyptian public discourse, even if the project is never realised in its literal form. This kind of "leverage idea" is common in the history of political movements worldwide: it is not necessarily proposed to be fulfilled immediately in full, but to redraw the boundaries of the politically possible, and to force the existing regime to defend its legitimacy rather than simply assume it. Conclusion: An Invitation to Debate, Not a Ready-Made Prescription This article does not claim that restoring a monarchical form would magically resolve Egypt’s chronic crisis of legitimacy, nor does it ignore the immense difficulties facing any transformative project under a military institution as economically and securitywise entrenched as Egypt’s is today. But it raises a question that deserves serious debate among Egypt’s opposition in exile, rather than automatic dismissal simply for being unfamiliar: Has the Egyptian opposition exhausted every available tool for dismantling the legitimacy of 1952, or has it remained trapped in the same old binary swapping one ruler for another while the framework that makes military rule possible remains untouched? The idea is on the table now, not as a finished solution, but as an overdue invitation to think outside the box.

🔴 OPINIÓN SPORT | El Barça debe aclarar ya el tema Julián Álvarez 💬"No hay más margen. El club ha estado al lado del jugador, pero el delantero debe definir su salida o finiquitar el tema porque el Barça no puede esperar más" ✍️ L. Miguelsanz https://t.co/swF8QxFA1t #FCBarcelona #JuliánÁlvarez #Futbol

Det vanligaste misstaget när Muslimska brödraskapet diskuteras är att leta efter maktövertagandet. Den klassiska strategin är mer sofistikerad än så. Makten är inte början på processen. Den är resultatet av den. Hos grundaren Hassan al-Banna börjar förändringen med individen. Genom tarbiya, religiös och ideologisk fostran, formas människan som ska bära projektet vidare. Därefter kommer familjen. Övertygelsen ska inte bara överleva individen utan reproduceras mellan generationerna. Det tredje steget är samhället. Genom daʿwa, utbildning, social verksamhet, föreningar, moskéer, studentmiljöer och professionella nätverk byggs den sociala bas från vilken större förändringar kan genomföras. Först därefter blir institutionerna centrala. Civilsamhälle, opinionsbildning, organisationer och, där förutsättningarna finns, partier, parlament och val blir verktyg för att omsätta social förankring i politiskt inflytande. Det femte steget är regeringsmakten. Men inte heller den är nödvändigtvis slutmålet. Att vinna ett val är en sak. Att förändra samhällets institutioner och normer är något annat. Därför är det sjätte begreppet avgörande: tamkīn, befästandet. Det beskriver tillståndet där rörelsen har uppnått sådan social, organisatorisk och politisk styrka att den eftersträvade ordningen inte bara kan införas utan också bestå. I al-Bannas historiska vision återstod sedan ett sjunde steg: att röra sig bortom nationalstaten, mot muslimsk enhet, ummah, och ytterst ett återupprättat kalifat. Kedjan är därför enkel: Individen->Familjen->Samhället->Institutionerna->Regeringen->Tamkīn->Den islamiska ordningen. Det innebär inte att varje organisation med historiska eller ideologiska band till MB följer en hemlig sjupunktsplan. Sådana påståenden måste beläggas organisation för organisation. Men det innebär att den som enbart letar efter revolutionärer riskerar att missa själva idén. I MBs klassiska strategi behöver makten inte stormas. Den kan byggas. #MuslimskaBrödraskapet #Samhällsförändring #Tamkīn

Mythe n°5 : "La France manque d'eau : il faut réduire l'irrigation." Vraiment ? Comparons les chiffres européens. • La France est le 2ᵉ pays d'Europe par l'abondance de ses ressources hydriques (après la Norvège). Ce n'est pas une opinion – c'est la géographie. • Taux de mobilisation de l'eau en Europe : 🇫🇷 France : 20% 🇩🇪 Allemagne : 25% 🇪🇸 Espagne : 29% 🇮🇹 Italie : 32% L'Italie utilise 60% de plus que la France. Personne ne dit que l'Italie "vole l'eau". • L'eau que la France ne stocke pas en hiver part dans la mer. Ce n'est pas vertueux, c'est inefficace. • La solution : stocker en hiver, recycler, dessaler là où c'est pertinent. Pas restreindre. Gérer. #Eau #Agriculture #Irrigation • Et côté pratique, même constat. Part de la SAU irriguée en 2016 : Grèce 23,6%, Italie 20,2%, France 6,8%. Moyenne UE : 5,9%. Surfaces équipées : Espagne 3,6 M ha, Italie 4,1 M ha, France 2,8 M ha. (Eurostat) • Nos voisins irriguent 3 à 4 fois plus intensément que nous, sur des territoires plus secs et plus petits. Et ils prennent les marchés que nous abandonnons. ➡️ Et la comparaison la plus parlante, ce sont les ouvrages. En 25 ans : France 5 à 10 M de m³ de nouvelles réserves. Maroc : environ 2 Mds de m³. Espagne : environ 22 Mds d m³ de stockage. ➡️ Rapportée aux 500 Mds de m³ de pluie que reçoit la France chaque année, notre capacité de stockage agricole équivaut à quelques heures de précipitations. Ce ne sont pas nos ressources qui nous distinguent. Ce sont nos ouvrages. #Eau #Irrigation @AnnieGenevard @Agri_Gouv @Ecologie_Gouv @Irrigants_Fr #Eau #Agriculture #Irrigation

Esta película claramente es para dejar a Moisés como una víctima.. las señoras y la gente que no ven el 24/7 lo van a empezar a tomar como una víctima porque lo dejaron como si toda la casa estuviera en contra de él. #LaCasaDeLosFamososMx https://t.co/sNIJLQbXr9 #Cine #Opinión #LaCasaDeLosFamosos

Ay no. Creo que es NECESARIO que hablen con todos y les digan la verdad. Que todos están de hueva y el público se está quejando. Porque no reaccionan a nada. El cine fue bueno y aún así no reaccionan. @ronogueron haz algo YAAAAAAA #LaCasaDeLosFamososMéxico #LaCasaDeLosFamososMx #Cine #Realidad #Opiniones

✊🏾 SOUTIEN À AMINATA POUYE : FACE AU RACISME, NOUS NE NOUS TAIRONS PAS J’apporte tout mon soutien à Aminata Pouye, tête de liste de La France insoumise aux élections sénatoriales en Gironde, victime d’une violente attaque raciste près de Bordeaux. Des injures racistes, des violences, de l’intimidation : voilà ce qu’elle a subi. Et nous devons le dire avec force. Le racisme n’est pas une opinion. C’est une violence. En tant que maire de Saint-Denis / Pierrefitte, je refuse que celles et ceux qui s’engagent pour l’égalité, la justice sociale et la dignité de toutes et tous soient réduits au silence par la haine raciste. À Aminata Pouye, je veux dire toute ma solidarité et mon soutien. Tu n’es pas seule. Derrière toi, il y a toutes celles et ceux qui refusent une société où la couleur de peau, l’origine ou le nom deviennent des prétextes à la violence et à l’exclusion. Notre réponse doit être politique, collective et démocratique. À la haine raciste, répondons par la mobilisation. À l’intimidation, répondons par les urnes. Au racisme, répondons par l’égalité et la fraternité. Aminata Pouye porte ce combat. Faites d’elle votre future sénatrice. Nous ne reculerons pas. Nous ne nous tairons pas. Et nous continuerons à faire de l’antiracisme un combat politique majeur. #AminataPouye #Senatoriales2026 #Gironde #Antiracisme #LutteContreLeRacisme #Egalite #JusticeSociale #LaFranceInsoumise #LFI #SaintDenis #Pierrefitte #Gauche #Solidarite #Antiracisme #LutteContreLeRacisme #Egalite

La Marichocho hace mucho ruido con sus patochadas, su inabarcable subnormalidad, su maldad sin límites, su gestión turbia, sus viajes, sus áticos, sus oscuros negocios... PERO A LA MARICHOCHO EN REALIDAD, HAY QUE ECHARLA POR ESTO: https://t.co/Kg97MxsAHf #Política #Corrupción #Opinión

Scusate ma trovo ridicolo anche solo dire la volevano a casa a fare la calzetta era un sondaggio ed ogni uni ha scelto quello che voleva ma attaccare chi ha votato casa per svariati motivi dicendo la volevano a casa per vedere il suo compagno era scontato per chi ⤵️ #Opinioni #Sondaggio #Discussione

El 3x08 de #HouseOfTheDragon debuta con un 9,1 de nota media en IMDb. En mi opinión, ha sido el mejor cierre de temporada de toda la serie. Un episodio con un ritmo perfecto, una tensión brutal y que consigue cerrar muchas de sus tramas de una forma tremendamente satisfactoria, algo pocas veces visto. La Batalla de la Ladera me ha parecido espectacular. Creo que no somos conscientes todavía de la calidad de lo que acabamos de presenciar a nivel de producción. Desde La Batalla de los Bastardos no se veía nada igual en este universo. Y el desarrollo de Rhaenyra a nivel narrativo ha sido una delicia. Puede que en otros episodios haya dejado mucho que desear, pero en este lo ha bordado. Cada decisión suya demuestra perfectamente que ya estamos ante Rhaenyra la Cruel. Personalmente, esta tercera temporada me ha parecido muy superior a la segunda. No creo que llegue al nivel de la primera, que para mí sigue siendo casi perfecta, pero a nivel de producción y espectacularidad está a otro nivel. ¿Con qué puntuación valoraríais vosotros la tercera temporada y en qué posición la pondríais? #HouseOfTheDragon #GameOfThrones #TVShows

Acabo de leer que el Gobierno va a regalar 2 millones de gafas para ver el eclipse. Yo aprendí con el COVID a alejarme de todo lo que recomienda esta gente. Así que el eclipse lo va a ver tu puta madre. 🤪 #Eclipse #Opinión #COVID19

Coucou @QuotaClimat Alors vous aussi, comme ça vous voulez participer à la mise sous tutelle de la pensée en France. C’est fou tous les petits dictateurs en herbe qu’il y a dans ce pays. Je vais vous décevoir : le discours climatique est une gigantesque arnaque. Je vous hais ! https://t.co/0KJZ3qibZO #Climat #Liberté #Opinion