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Crocodyle wrote that obtaining cards was smooth at the beginning of the game, but after 15 to 20 hours and with 50 cards, he felt a rise in difficulty that he did not like in free-to-play. He said he was considering improving conditions for free-to-play players, which would also have an indirect effect on the premium experience. He added that his progress in free-to-play allowed him to adjust rewards according to his impressions. #FreeToPlay #Gaming #JeuxVidéo (translated)

Pueden enojarse y pelear todo lo que quieran, pero a la primera que vea comentarios xenófobos, desatinados o directamente estúpidos sobre mi país, para mí es bloqueo automático, así sean moots de hace años. Ningún pixel de internet va a estar nunca por encima de mi país #Xenofobia #Respeto #País

Hoy, en @EnBocaDe_Todos, vuelven a utilizar imágenes mías pixelando mi marca de agua. Ayer estuve siguiendo esta manifestación en directo, hablando con numerosos vecinos de Ceuta y trabajando durante horas para poder ofrecer contenido en primicia. Yo también utilizo en ocasiones contenido de este programa, pero jamás se me ocurriría borrar o tapar su marca de agua. No entiendo por qué este programa insiste en invisibilizar mi trabajo de esta manera, especialmente cuando presume de pluralidad y de dar voz a todo el mundo. El respeto al trabajo de los demás debería ser recíproco. #Respeto #Contenido #Periodismo

Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

Juan le hizo raid a Ash💜 "JUAAAN, bienvenidos a todos, hola chicos y chicas, gracias por el raid, espero hayan tenido un buen stream. Estamos jugando "no pixel" que es un server de gta roleplay [...] mi personaje es un influencer molesto, basicamente estoy interpretando a juan" https://t.co/J2MCjzNAFa #GTA #Roleplay #Streaming

Apple a dévoilé son iPhone Duo, son premier smartphone pliable, qui pourrait redéfinir le marché malgré l'existence déjà établie de concurrents comme le Samsung Galaxy Z Fold 8, le Google Pixel 11 Pro Fold, l'Honor Magic V6 et le Motorola Razr 70 Ultra. #iPhoneDuo #SmartphonePliable #Apple

For artists and music industry professionals, managing digital presence shouldn't mean using a dozen different tools. SXR Connect by SXR Music Group is a comprehensive platform designed to streamline your workflow: 🔹 Link Management: One link for every stream, store, and purchase option. 🔹 Campaigns: Lock in listeners before release day with Pre-Save Campaigns and Pixel tracking (Meta, TikTok, Google Analytics). 🔹 Operations: Sign contracts directly inside the platform with E-Signature support. 🔹 Analytics: Gain insights into geo, device, browser, and referrer data for every interaction. 🔹 Branding: Choose from visual presets like Punk, Neon, Glass, or Sunset for your / @username bio page. If you're looking to professionalize your music distribution and marketing, it's time to connect. 🔗 Learn more: subexile.com/connect #MusicIndustry #MusicMarketing #ArtistDevelopment #SXR #Subexile #MusicTech #DigitalDistribution #MusicBusiness

«El espacio está lleno de partículas de muy alta energía que se desplazan a gran velocidad. Y, en ocasiones, esas partículas chocan contra distintos objetos -continúa-. Si un rayo cósmico golpea la cámara con el ángulo adecuado, puede crear una enorme cantidad de electrones en varios píxeles de la imagen (...) Así que, cuando la cámara lee la imagen, aparece una gran franja blanca y brillante que puede adoptar muchas formas, tamaños y configuraciones diferentes y que, básicamente, puede aparecer en cualquier lugar de la fotografía»

⏹️ Spielende im GAZi-Stadion. Wir gewinnen unser erstes Heimspiel in der Google Pixel Frauen-Bundesliga mit 2:1 gegen den Hamburger SV. Den Siegtreffer in der 84. Spielminute erzielt Nicole Billa. JAAAAA – stark Mädels! ⚪🔴🔥 #VfBFrauen | #VfB | #VfBHSV 2:1 | #GPFBL | [Anzeige] HELU #FrauenBundesliga #VfB #Fußball

Hablando muy seriamente Sabéis lo que va a ser jugar a GTA 6 en tercera persona con Lucía? Esta tía no es una Skin de fortnite Esta tia es una morenaza, un quesito histórico, un helado de chocolate, un bomboncito nestle, una chocolatinita kinder Esa nalga izquierda bajando mientras la nalga derecha sube, leonidas de fondo Tu dedo decidiendo cuando para ese gluteo de moverse o continua Yo no voy a acabar bien de verdad Estoy enamorado de ese pixel. #GTA6 #Gaming #Videojuegos

Ale żenada. System 3 wypuściło trailer Jamesa Ponda, gdzie każdy asset "remasteru" został wygenerowany przez AI. Ludzie zauważyli w 0,1s. Kilka najnowszych okładek studia to obrazki generowane modelami. Studio idzie w zaparte, że ani jeden asset nie jest AI. Na dowód publikuje artykuł napisany przez AI, gdzie pokazane jest jak pixel art z gry przerobiono w AI na rysunki i fejkowe modele. Nie dość, że wygląda jak każdy generyczny pożółkły slop to nie zgadza się nic. Metaliczna krowa dostała skórę, kanka na mleko stała się działem a monokl dr Maybe szarym okiem. Każdy sutek "modelu 3D" ma inny kształt. Nadal twierdzą, że to nie AI. Sorry, ale za takie kłamanie w żywe oczy upadłe moralnie studia powinno dostawać takie kary finansowe, które by je zamykały. Podstawowym obowiązkiem powinno być zero tolerancji dla okłamywania klienta z premedytacją. Wstyd widzieć co się stało z brytyjską legendą branży. Trailer: https://t.co/HVi4ulioZg #JamesBond #AI #gaming

Esta Temporada trae una selección de nuevas armas, objetos y habilidades inspiradas en algunos de los mayores iconos de la historia de los videojuegos. Esto es lo que puedes conseguir: Zapatillas Sonic Power: Carga un Spin Dash en tierra o realiza un Ataque Spin en el aire Mega Buster: El legendario cañón de brazo dispara balas de energía individuales, disparos rápidos o proyectiles explosivos de carga larga, incluso mientras corres o acelera el deslizamiento Escopeta de 8 bits: Una escopeta automática diseñada como una consola retro de 8 bits. Incluye recargas de cartuchos de juego, efectos de píxeles y un sistema integrado de marcadores en tiempo real que rastrea los multiplicadores de combos La obra maestra de Midas: Una pistola dorada de un solo disparo que inflige un alto daño, capaz de eliminar enemigos de un solo disparo a la cabeza. Si eres el jugador afortunado que lo coge cuando aparece, úsalo sabiamente: la munición es limitada Grieta de Tetris: Grieta en piezas de Tetris, que culmina en el icónico clear de 4 líneas de Tetris, hace una gran curación en área Ficha 1-Up: Reaparece con tu inventario completo después de haber sido eliminado Llama en modo Dios: Aprovecha el verdadero poder de la llama para convertirte en una bola de demolición imparable ¡y más colaboraciones emocionantes que llegarán más adelante esta temporada! #Videojuegos #NuevasArmas #Gaming