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The article addresses the weakening of physical education and physical preparation among Estonian reservists, which threatens the country's defense capability, as only one third of them can pass the NATO physical preparation test. #эстонскиерезервисты #физическаяподготовка #обороноспособность (translated)

Little Think Tank indicated, relaying Valdiguie, that the Paris police headquarters had urgently recalled all of its reservists for October 24 and November 4. According to the message, an email mentioning "current events" asked them to respond before October 22. #France #Police #Urgent (translated)

Prince Joachim, who has been a reservist for a long time, has participated in all his recalls and has never been compensated for this. The bill being examined aims to rectify this situation. Indeed, he is a reserve officer in the Navy, and as Théo Francken specifies in a parliamentary report, he has never received anything: "Prince Joachim, who has been a reservist for a long time, has participated in all his recalls and has never been compensated for this. The bill being examined aims to rectify this situation." #FamilleRoyale #Belgique #Lois (translated)

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Here we will take a close look at the parliamentary process and make adjustments if necessary. The CDU politician Diana Herbstreuth, a career soldier and member of the Defense Committee, wants the needs of those affected to be taken into account in the future. #Reservestärkungsgesetz #Bundeswehr #Reservisten (translated)

The main problem is being released by the employer. Things have changed because of the Ukraine war, but it must be stated clearly that many employers still do not release people for military training. This is also happening, describes reservist and corporal Alexander during the training in Saxony-Anhalt. #Reservestärkungsgesetz #Bundeswehr #Reservisten (translated)

Today, the Bundestag will discuss the Reserve Strengthening Act, which aims to make reserve duty mandatory in order to increase the number of reservists to 200,000 by 2033, a move that is criticized by the business community and the Left Party. #Reservestärkungsgesetz #Bundeswehr #Reservisten (translated)

Cerfia reported, citing The Times, that the British army had trained for six days to retake the Falkland Islands, claimed by Argentina. About 150 British paratroopers and 100 local reservists reportedly simulated operations from 1982, with support from Typhoon fighter jets. The exercises also took into account modern threats, including drone attacks. According to Cerfia, while Argentina reiterated its territorial claims, British military officials believed that it did not have the necessary capabilities to attempt an invasion. #Malouines #RoyaumeUni #Argentine (translated)

Sofie Löwenmark wrote that the comparison with ISIS was misleading and that Kenan Habul had misunderstood the IDF statistics. According to her, the 150 individuals referred to a compilation of people with Israeli citizenship and at least one additional citizenship, including Swedish. The group could include individuals who served in the military or were reservists, and the statistics did not specify what type of service they had. Löwenmark also pointed out that some could be born and raised in Israel and have Swedish citizenship; according to her, several thousand Swedish citizens lived in Israel, many with dual citizenship. She wrote that the news did not claim that 150 Swedes had traveled from Sweden to fight in Gaza, even though Habul's comments, according to her, gave that impression. #Israel #svenskpolitik #medborgarskap (translated)

The Ministry of Defense has called for 500 positions for voluntary reservists in the Armed Forces, establishing age, nationality, and training requirements, with an application deadline that ends on October 25, 2026. #ReservistasVoluntarios #FuerzasArmadas #ConvocatoriaDefensa (translated)

Part 3 of the very serious incident on the FlyDubai flight between Dubai and Tel Aviv. 🇦🇪🇮🇱🇸🇦 | Part 3 #Israel - What we see in the image is one of the Israeli passengers who intervened in the struggle between the pilot and the co-pilot who attempted to crash the plane. - Keep in mind that on a flight with over a hundred Israeli passengers, it is likely that dozens of them will be active soldiers on vacation or reservist citizens, and they will not remain passive in their seats when noticing that the plane is descending strangely sharply and much earlier than arriving in Israel. - For context, open the post I am quoting below (part 1 and part 2). #FlyDubai #IncidenteAéreo #Israel (translated)

‘Zeg Raphaël, je bent nu een astronaut voor ESA en vertrekt binnenkort op ruimtevaartmissie, maar een briljant wetenschapper als jou kunnen we ook goed gebruiken hoor. Zou je geen reservist binnen Defensie willen worden?’ ‘Zeker, Sir. Met plezier. Wat moet ik daarvoor doen?’ 1 https://t.co/6cWTuSuyWH #astronaut #ESA #Defensie #NL

Sie wollen Krieg Maßnahmen, die noch vor wenigen Jahren undenkbar gewirkt hätten, sind inzwischen in ganz Europa Gesetz Vor allem der Norden Europas wird in wahnwitzigem Tempo als die Nachfolger der Ukraine auf Krieg getrimmt ! 🇫🇮 FINNLAND • Anhebung des Reservistenalters auf 65 • Aufbau einer Reserve von nahezu einer Million Menschen • Aufhebung der gesetzlichen Hürde, die alliierten Atomwaffen den Zugang zu finnischem Territorium verwehrte • Austritt aus dem Vertrag zum Verbot von Antipersonenminen 🇪🇪 ESTLAND • Bereitschaft erklärt, nötigenfalls NATO-Atomwaffen aufzunehmen • Bau von Bunkern, Schützengräben und Panzersperren an der russischen Grenze • Beteiligung an der neuen Baltischen Verteidigungslinie 🇱🇻 LETTLAND • Bau von Grenzbefestigungen, Barrieren und militärischen Stellungen • Austritt aus dem Vertrag zum Verbot von Antipersonenminen • Ausbau von Zivilschutz und nationaler Resilienz 🇱🇹 LITAUEN • Bau befestigter Verteidigungsstellungen nahe Russland und Belarus • Anhäufung von Panzersperren und Minenfähigkeiten • Austritt aus dem Antipersonenminen-Vertrag 🇵🇱 POLEN • Angebot, NATO-Atomwaffen zu stationieren • Aufbau einer Armee und Reserve von insgesamt rund 500.000 Personen • Planung, jährlich bis zu 100.000 Reservisten auszubilden • Prüfung einer militärischen Vorbereitung aller erwachsenen Männer • Bau des „Östlichen Schildes“ aus Befestigungen, Überwachung, Drohnenabwehr und möglichen Minenfeldern • Austritt aus dem Antipersonenminen-Vertrag Und erst gestern hat der völlig durchgeknallte Aussenminister Polens die Menschen aufgefordert sich Notfallrationen zuzulegen und für jederzeitige Evakuierungen bereit zu sein !! 🇩🇪 DEUTSCHLAND • Erfassung von U-Bahn-Stationen, Tunneln, Garagen und Kellern als mögliche Schutzräume • Streben nach Schutzplätzen für etwa eine Million Menschen • Erfassung und Prüfung junger Männer für einen möglichen Wehrdienst • Vorbereitung, Hunderttausende NATO-Soldaten und Fahrzeuge im Ernstfall nach Osten zu verlegen 🇸🇪 SCHWEDEN • Versand eines Handbuchs „Im Falle von Krise oder Krieg“ an die Bürger • Anleitung für Familien zum Überstehen von Stromausfällen, Luftangriffen, Kommunikationsausfällen und möglicher Besatzung 🇩🇰 DÄNEMARK • Ausweitung der Wehrpflicht auf Frauen • Verlängerung des Wehrdienstes von vier auf elf Monate 🇫🇷 FRANKREICH • Öffentliche Überlebenshinweise zu Notvorräten, Funkkommunikation und Strahlenschutz • Förderung der Teilnahme an Reservisten- und Zivilschutzorganisationen 🇬🇧 GROSSBRITANNIEN • Wiederbelebung staatlicher „Kriegsbücher“ • Verzahnung von Militär-, Zivil-, Industrie- und Versorgungsplanung • Vorbereitung einer nationalen Heimatschutzübung • Stärkung des Schutzes von Energie, Wasser, Kommunikation und Seekabeln • Planung für Cyberangriffe, Treibstoffknappheit und Lieferkettenbrüche • Erleichterte Rückberufung ehemaliger Soldaten – potenziell bis zum Alter von 65 • Steigerung der Produktion von Waffen, Drohnen und Munition Im Kalifat England kann man mittlerweile im Fernsehen sitzen und folgendes sagen - ohne dass Mann danach mit nassen Fetzen aus dem Studio geprügelt wird : „Die Briten würden im Krieg gegen Russland zu Größe aufsteigen. Wir müssten natürlich ein paar Leute einsperren, prorussische Stimmen, die ‚geht nicht in den Krieg für Burnham‘ rufen (!) 🇪🇺 EUROPÄISCHE UNION • Empfehlung an alle Bürger Lebensmittel, Wasser, Medikamente, Bargeld und Notvorräte für mindestens 72 Stunden bereitzuhalten • Aufbau strategischer Reserven für chemische, biologische, radiologische und nukleare Notfälle De selbsternannte Feudalklasse organisiert in ganz Europa - speziell im Norden Europas- den Großen Krieg gegen Russland während die überwältigende Mehrheit der Menschen die Warnungen nicht Ernst nahmen oder denken "es wird niemand mitmachen" Dabei sind wir alle nur noch einen False Flag Zwischenfall von der nächsten Apokalypse in Europa entfernt ! Wenn Sie Krieg sagen dann meinen Sie Krieg GM #Krieg #Europa #Sicherheit