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The author claimed there was documented evidence of electoral or pre-electoral manipulation in Spain, and said citizenship laws were not being applied in good faith. They also accused the Sanchista government of acting against legislators’ will by applying political asylum criteria. #España #Elecciones #ManipulaciónElectoral #ES

The Patria Prima Association announced that it had sent 85 emails that morning to the parliamentarians of Bucharest and the city councilors of the Capital, to find out whether they supported or opposed plans to eliminate some traffic lanes and parking spaces in favor of bike lanes and areas with restricted auto access. The Association argued that traffic in Bucharest was already choked and that millions of people depended on cars for work, family, shopping, and commutes between Bucharest and Ilfov. It also criticized the possibility of introducing fees for car access, questioning how those who could not afford them would get around and invoking the financial situation of STB, which it said was in insolvency. Patria Prima demanded explanations regarding the circulation of ambulances and fire trucks, evacuations in the event of earthquakes or disasters, and the existence of studies or simulations about the effects of the measures on emergency interventions. The Association stated that it would publish the responses from the elected officials and that it had placed the email addresses of Bucharest parliamentarians and city councilors on its website. In the post, the organization stated that small groups of activists could influence the decisions of authorities through debates, petitions, and pressure, while the majority of citizens did not make their voices heard. It urged people to write to their local elected officials and parliamentarians about issues such as traffic, parking, fees, and infrastructure, and to ask for explanations, documents, and written responses. #București #Trafic #DrepturiCivile (translated)

Destination Télé reported the remarks of Pascal Praud, who believed that the events that occurred on Saturday in France and the day before in Paris were predictable and that only naive or stupid people could be surprised by them. He stated that the situation had been announced, planned, and documented for years, and that the confrontation had now begun, adding that this was only the beginning. https://t.co/X1rdQY80Sv #France #Paris #actualités (translated)

The author indicated that an American photojournalist, whom he described as one of the most famous and active in covering the most tense situations in the United States for several years, was conducting a live broadcast this Sunday dedicated to a demonstration that he described as "wild," just beginning in Paris. #journalisme #manifestation #livestream #US #FR (translated)

🫀🧭 Maladies cardio-neurovasculaires : la feuille de route 2026-2030 fixe 36 actions, du repérage en soins primaires à l’aller-vers, avec des cibles chiffrées pour 2030 et 15 repères santé 📊🩺 📒 Prévenir les maladies cardio-neurovasculaires : feuille de route nationale pour la santé cardiovasculaire 2026-2030 ✍️ Direction générale de la santé (DGS) - Ministère de la Santé, des Familles, de l’Autonomie et des Personnes handicapées Capsules Audio de Pratiques en Santé 🎙️🎥 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61MoC89c-AI Analyse de Pratiques en Santé et lien vers la source ℹ️➕ https://www.pratiquesensante.com/blog/pratiques-15/prevenir-les-maladies-cardio-neurovasculaires-feuille-de-route-nationale-pour-la-sante-cardiovasculaire-2026-2030-6267 📌 Environ 140 000 décès par an : les maladies cardio-neurovasculaires restent la deuxième cause de mortalité en France (p. 7), alors que plus de 70 % d’entre elles sont associées, dans le monde, à des facteurs évitables (p. 3). Ce document fixe le cadre national de prévention jusqu’en 2030 : des cibles chiffrées (p. 12) et 36 actions qui mobilisent notamment le premier recours, l’exercice coordonné, la santé au travail et l’école (p. 15-24). Il documente les inégalités sociales, territoriales et entre femmes et hommes (p. 6-10), le situe par rapport à la loi du 27 juillet 2026 et aux plans sur les déterminants (p. 11) et propose 15 repères pour les usagers et les professionnels (p. 25-26). 🇬🇧: Preventing cardio-neurovascular diseases: national roadmap for cardiovascular health 2026-2030 - https://www.pratiquesensante.com/en/blog/practices-15/preventing-cardio-neurovascular-diseases-national-roadmap-for-cardiovascular-health-2026-2030-6267 #️⃣ #pratiquesensante #SantéCardiovasculaire #Prévention #HypertensionArtérielle #MonBilanPrévention #GestesQuiSauvent #InégalitésDeSanté #SoinsPrimaires

Didier Maïsto contested the presentation of events in Paris. He claimed that a festive and calm procession had filled Boulevard Magenta without incident, while thousands of young masked individuals dressed in black had confronted law enforcement at Place de la République. According to him, the police had very little retaliated despite the throwing of urban furniture, large stones, and relentless mortar fire. Maïsto added that by late afternoon, the neighborhood and other areas had been looted, set on fire, and vandalized, and that no police officers were present. He stated that he had been documenting police violence for nearly ten years, but argued that this time, law enforcement had been used by Emmanuel Macron and his associates to provoke chaos. He estimated that police officers, high school students, protesters, and citizens had been deceived, and called on his counterpart to take issue with Macron rather than the police, reminding that he had had him re-elected. He finally asserted that the journalists and citizens present could confirm his account. #France #Manifestation #Vérité (translated)

Antoine Léaument wrote that the problem arose when the police stepped outside the republican framework, stating that the cases were frequent, numerous, and documented. He criticized those who said they loved the police without condemning its serious faults, believing that they were not doing the institution any favors. https://t.co/I2eeHdaPMC #Police #République #Justice (translated)

AlertesInfos warned that it would take action against individuals fraudulently using its name, logo, or identity to spread false information by impersonating the media. It stated that it has a direct communication channel with X to quickly report the relevant accounts and request their suspension. The media clarified that a suspension would not preclude possible legal action and that creating new accounts after a suspension could result in a formal notice, a complaint, or legal action, subject to legal conditions. AlertesInfos added that it retains screenshots, links, public account identifiers, and other elements documenting the impersonations, even if the posts or accounts are deleted. It has expressed the desire to hold those responsible for their actions accountable before the relevant authorities. #Avertissement #Usurpation #ProtectionDesDonnées (translated)

Ilan Gabet wrote that after years of participating in and documenting protests, he had never seen a situation like this. He described the streets of Paris as plunged into chaos, estimated that the police were overwhelmed, and claimed to have never observed so much anger. #Paris #manif #colère (translated)

Eric.k, known as The Irradiated Radish, had supported the people who were protesting and called for them to act peacefully and watch over each other. He advised them to charge their phones, bring water, snacks, their medications and papers, notify a loved one, and set up a meeting point as well as several exit routes, due to transport disruptions and station closures he had announced. He also recommended filming important events from a distance, keeping the original files, and noting the time and place of the events. According to him, filming law enforcement officers on duty in public was legal in France. He advised saving the videos, protecting their accounts, and not posting images that would unnecessarily expose the identity of other protesters. He finally urged to film the RIO to the maximum. #Manifestation #DroitDeManifester #Soutien (translated)

Oana Eftimie stated in a clip that the reports from DGPI and SRI, declassified on December 4, 2024, two days before the annulment of the elections, indicated the involvement of PNL, through the communication agency Kensington, in coordinating a TikTok campaign associated with Călin Georgescu's candidacy. Eftimie said that authorities presented the #EchilibrușiVerticalitate campaign as evidence of Russian interference and that the DGPI report considered it identical to a campaign called "Brother Next to Brother," conducted by the Russian Federation in Ukraine before the invasion in February 2022. According to the author, the campaign had been run by Kensington and paid for by PNL, according to an ANAF report. She compared this lead to the criminal prosecution for the continued bribery of voters against Bogdan Peșchir and the influencers who had voluntarily supported Georgescu’s candidacy. Eftimie claimed that for almost two years, she had not seen a similar interest in investigating the campaign she attributed to PNL. The author further asserted that the authorities had initially anonymized the names of the agencies involved, but had not protected the identities of the influencers targeted by actions. She also reported that Peșchir had been forced by a police officer to remove his cap, mask, and glasses when he arrived escorted at the IGPR headquarters. Eftimie questioned why the lead on the paid campaign was not being investigated. #PNL #InterferențăRusească #Alegeri2024 (translated)

The author claimed that Israeli settlers had brutally attacked Heidi Levine, a journalist for The Washington Post. He also described them as fascist gangs that, as he wrote, acted with total impunity and under the protection of the army against Palestinians and those who denounced or documented their crimes. https://t.co/9sAr3MTjEU #Palestina #LibertadDePrensa #DerechosHumanos #IL #PS (translated)

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Internal documents obtained by The Washington Post reveal the identities of donors who contributed approximately 333 million dollars to Trump's ballroom, highlighting the controversial connections between them and government contracts, as well as potential political influences. #DonaldTrump #finanțare #investigație (translated)

Oana Eftimie asked why the communication agency Kensington was not being investigated after Bogdan Peșchir had been indicted for the continued corruption of voters. She mentioned that Peșchir had voluntarily been involved in supporting Călin Georgescu's candidacy and questioned where the Russians were that the authorities had spoken about concerning the elections. Eftimie wrote that the reference to foreign interference had appeared in a note from the General Directorate for Internal Protection within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, addressed to the Presidential Administration and declassified on December 4, 2024. According to her, the note linked the #echilibrusiverticalitate campaign to the "Brother Next to Brother" campaign conducted by the Russian Federation in Ukraine before the invasion in February 2022. She also claimed that a December 2024 ANAF report showed that the Kensington agency had run the #echilibrusiverticalitate campaign, hiring the FameUp platform, with the payment coming from PNL. Eftimie asked why this lead was not being investigated if it was the only one identified by the authorities regarding a paid campaign. https://t.co/TkrNzoh470 #corupție #interferențăstrăină #alegeri (translated)

Nine fired FBI agents involved in the investigation into Donald Trump's secret documents have filed a complaint against FBI Director Kash Patel and are demanding their jobs back, after they were previously fired on the spot earlier this year. #FBI #KashPatel #DonaldTrump (translated)