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Susanne wrote that NU.nl proposed Laura Faber as an ordinary citizen in an article about people taking in status holders, without mentioning her work in the reception and integration of newcomers, according to her. Susanne called Faber the director of Bureau de Werkvloer, a teacher at PONT | Zorg & Sociaal, project leader for the Development of Municipal Reception at the municipality of Hengelo, and founder of the integration school and language school Iedereen aan Boord in Deventer. According to Susanne, Faber's income came 100% from projects and assignments that were directly related to refugee reception and the integration of newcomers and status holders. Susanne called the portrayal misleading and wrote that she had submitted a community note. According to her, it was ready for review and would only become visible to everyone after enough reviews. She thanked Hilda Spruit for her response under the article and provided two sources. https://t.co/htqtVhSm1c https://t.co/4GI1TXQwZR #journalistiek #vluchtelingen #integratie (translated)

Peter Jančič estimated that due to the referendum, not only Golob but the entire opposition has scored a political own goal. He wrote that controlling the government will be more difficult as a result, even though it should primarily be in the interest of the opposition. He believed that the opposition deserved this, as, in his words, during the time it was in power, it openly used investigative commissions for political settling of scores with the opposition and those who thought differently, rather than for oversight of the government. https://t.co/1BtAbaxEAu #referendum #politika #Slovenija (translated)

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Juliana Könning, vice-chairman of the National Student Union, argued in an opinion piece that claiming that young people are being sacrificed to 'war lust' is pure deception, and advocates for a realistic approach to the discussion surrounding defense spending and the possible introduction of the Defense Readiness Act. #Oorlogskoorts #Jongeren #Defensie (translated)

This week he changed his stance, saying that the majority of Brazilian workers support the introduction of shorter working hours. In May, Bolsonaro said that shortening the work week to 40 hours could cause "mass unemployment," an argument made by employer associations. And after voting for the amendment, Bolsonaro stated that he "supports something even better," referring to an alternative proposal whereby wages would be based on actual hours worked. #Lula #Bolsonaro #radniTjedan (translated)

- We will be brave but also smart, and we do not plan to significantly change our philosophy. We will play to win - Leko said and assured his players that Inter is not a monster, meaning they are good enough to compete with them equally. - Some may think our style of play is naive and risky, but I was guided by instinct. It's not easy to visit Inter and play "man-to-man," and it's easy to end up losing to Inter and admitting they are better. Still, I hoped for a positive outcome because the players insisted that they really like this tactical approach - said Ivan Leko after what is probably the greatest or at least the most notable victory in his coaching career. - Inter had many chances, but we did too. Luck must be earned, and I am incredibly proud of my guys. This is truly a big deal for Belgian football, and we must enjoy this. And this is not accidental, but the product of good work in the club over the past years, which we want to continue in the upcoming matches - concluded Leko. #LigaPrvaka #ClubBrugge #IvanLeko (translated)

Eight American states, including Iowa, Kansas, and Arizona, have filed a lawsuit against OpenAI, accusing the technology company of misleading claims about the safety of the ChatGPT chatbot and demanding that the company make adjustments to its AI models. #OpenAI #ChatGPT #rechtszaak (translated)

Badenoch tells PMQs "all of the gas" from Jackdaw "goes into the British grid". This is misleading - the grid is connected to Europe, so once gas goes into the "British grid" it's often sold abroad And anyway, it would only produce 2-6% of UK gas output at peak. Bald men fighting over a dirty comb.

Monique X- Fluencer wrote that people were not misled, but were deliberately lied to. According to her, everyone could have seen on the streets over the past few years how much migration had taken place. She accused Marianne Zw of participating in a political game and now pretending to have discovered something. https://t.co/87dG7GPQ6l #migratie #politiek #bewustwording (translated)

🧵 I want to make one point about the federal permitting bill. Before I do, I'd just encourage everyone who's interested in the details to listen to this podcast, which covers them ... extensively. There's a lot of complicated stuff in there & the cartoonish portrayals you see online are misleading.

Marianne Zwagerman wrote that people had been misled for years with reassuring percentages about the impact of migration on the housing shortage. She said that the reality was less rosy and announced that she would discuss it live at 7:00 PM with Demo Demo on NPO Radio 1. She also invited people to watch and talk along. https://t.co/6YTJYtA4ou #Migratie #Woningnood #Discussie (translated)

"I would have to study it and see because there have been violations on both sides." In response to a journalist's question about Russian attacks on energy facilities despite the ceasefire he announced himself, Trump said, "I would have to study it and see because there have been violations on both sides." He thinks that he actually wants to reach an agreement, while we need to convince Zelensky that he also wants an agreement. When asked how he intends to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to adhere to the ceasefire, Trump stated, "I think he actually wants to reach an agreement, while we need to convince Zelensky that he also wants an agreement," referring to the Ukrainian president. "I think the sides will come to an agreement. In fact, I think Putin wants an agreement more than Zelensky does." When asked why he believes Putin is interested in an agreement despite still attacking Ukraine, Trump once again refrained from criticizing the Kremlin. "I think the sides will come to an agreement. In fact, I think Putin wants an agreement more than Zelensky does," he said. #Trump #Zelenski #Rusija (translated)

I think the sides will reach an agreement. In fact, I believe that Putin wants the agreement more than Zelensky. When asked how he intends to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to adhere to the ceasefire, Trump stated that "he thinks he actually wants to reach an agreement, while we need to make Zelensky want an agreement too," referring to the Ukrainian president. #Trump #Ukrajina #Rusija (translated)

"I have to study and see because there were violations on both sides. When asked by a journalist about the Russian attacks on energy facilities despite the ceasefire that he himself announced, Trump responded that he would 'have to study and see because there were violations on both sides.' He thinks that he actually wants to reach an agreement, while we have to make Zelensky want an agreement too. When asked how he intends to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to adhere to the ceasefire, Trump stated that 'he thinks that he actually wants to reach an agreement, while we have to make Zelensky want an agreement too,' referring to the Ukrainian president. I think the sides will reach an agreement. I actually think that Putin wants an agreement more than Zelensky does." #Putin #Trump #Ukrajina (translated)

In this opinion piece, Rutger van Bergem and Sander Renes argue that the comparison between grid congestion and traffic congestion is misleading, as there is often enough electricity capacity available outside peak times, and that flexible connections can offer more effective solutions than simply expanding the electricity grid. #Netcongestie #Elektriciteitsnet #DuurzameEnergie (translated)