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the operation is scheduled for the first days of this week and the estimated post-operative recovery time will be about one weekWhen pressed by journalists, the Director of the Holy See Press Office, Matteo Bruni, clarified that "the operation is scheduled for the first days of this week and the estimated post-operative recovery time will be about one week". #PopeLeoXIV #lunghealth #VaticanNews

The post said Brazil was holding the first round of its presidential election, with President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, 80, seeking another term. It said a second round, if needed, was scheduled for Oct. 25, and linked to a Kalshi market asking who would win. https://t.co/I6mZWwhMOD https://t.co/S2urmNptJc #Eleições2023 #Brasil #Política #BR (translated)

IRAN: MEK/NCRI – when AI impersonated a real activist in live conversations For years, synthetic media has largely meant fabricated images, cloned voices and manipulated video. A case uncovered by Anthropic in September 2026 suggests a more consequential development: artificial intelligence being used not merely to imitate how a person looks or sounds, but to behave as that person in an ongoing conversation. Anthropic says it dismantled a distributed influence operation targeting Iranians inside the country and abroad that it linked to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or PMOI/MEK, and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The operators used a shared AI-agent platform to support impersonation, audience profiling, coordinated social-media activity, synthetic personas and the laundering of organisational content through apparently independent accounts. At least four people involved in the operation worked for official NCRI media outlets, according to Anthropic. The company also found references to committee approval processes and MEK leadership, but said it could not independently determine the precise level of central control. Cloning a person from 8,400 Telegram posts The most striking part of the operation involved a real activist whose Telegram identity was copied. According to Anthropic, the operators instructed Claude in Persian that it was now that person, then provided approximately 8,400 of the activist’s Telegram posts so the system could learn and reproduce his writing style. The AI-assisted account was subsequently used to conduct live political conversations with the activist’s existing contacts. Anthropic says that, to its knowledge, the people receiving those messages did not know they were interacting with an account being operated with AI assistance. This is materially different from a conventional chatbot or a static deepfake. The system was not simply producing a forged statement attributed to someone else. It was using a large archive of that person’s authentic language as behavioural training material, then applying the resulting imitation interactively. In practical terms, the deception moved from synthetic content to synthetic identity. Anthropic did not publish the identity of the impersonated activist, nor details of his contacts, and the public report does not establish what specific information the conversations produced. What it does establish is that the impersonation was operational rather than experimental: the cloned account was used in real exchanges with real people. From social-media monitoring to psychographic dossiers The impersonation sat inside a much broader targeting system. Anthropic says the network scraped more than 500 social-media channels and categorised individuals by location, age, profession, political orientation and arrest history. It then analysed approximately 51,944 archived messages from conversations to construct detailed psychographic dossiers on dozens of people inside Iran. The system was therefore not limited to broadcasting propaganda. It was also designed to understand specific audiences and individuals. Profiles could be used to decide what kind of message was most likely to resonate with a particular person, which political identity they appeared closest to and how they should be approached. Anthropic describes this as a structured targeting funnel rather than ad hoc social-media activity. That distinction is important in the Iranian context. Political activists, dissidents and opposition contacts inside Iran can face arrest and severe punishment. The report does not show that the dossiers directly led to arrests or other harm, but collecting and organising information such as arrest history and political affiliation adds a surveillance dimension to what would otherwise be described as an influence operation. A shared AI system for an influence network Anthropic found that the actors used a shared Claude-based platform named “Viktor”, with separate workspaces and persistent memory. Those memory files contained approved sources, prohibited words, account-management instructions and methods intended to reduce the risk of detection. One operator loaded MEK founding doctrine into the system as what the report called “strategic base data”, allowing others to reuse it across their work. This persistent-memory structure meant the AI did not have to be briefed from scratch for every task. Once doctrine, stylistic rules and operational constraints had been stored, the system could repeatedly produce material consistent with the network’s objectives. Anthropic says the same general playbook appeared across different workspaces despite the operators not sharing obvious account infrastructure. The network also used automated pipelines to coordinate Instagram posting schedules and tailor messages to different audiences. Some accounts initially avoided mentioning the Mojahedin at all, allowing material aligned with MEK/NCRI narratives to appear as neutral or independent political commentary. Content was distributed through the organisation’s own media ecosystem as well as accounts presented as ordinary news or activist profiles. Anthropic assessed the campaign as Category Two on its Breakout Scale: active on multiple platforms with distribution through NCRI-linked media properties and amplifier accounts, but without evidence of broad authentic penetration. Synthetic citizens and disguised organisational media The same infrastructure generated AI avatars presented as ordinary Iranians, complete with Persian audio, to promote Maryam Rajavi’s political programme. Anthropic says the synthetic nature of these personas was intentionally concealed. Operators also rewrote and redistributed content originating from MEK-affiliated media while stripping identifying features or presenting it through apparently independent accounts. The network’s political messaging targeted the Iranian government but also rival opposition currents, including monarchists and supporters of the Pahlavi camp. Anthropic documented fabricated video material attacking a member of the Pahlavi family and the use of the slogan “Neither Shah Nor Sheikh”, consistent with the NCRI’s broader competition with other opposition movements. That rivalry provides relevant context. Reuters describes the MEK as one of Iran’s principal organised opposition movements in exile and the dominant force behind the NCRI, led by Maryam Rajavi. Its relationship with other opposition currents is often contentious, while the extent of its support inside Iran remains uncertain. What can be attributed – and what cannot Anthropic’s attribution is unusually specific but still needs to be stated carefully. The company says its investigation linked the operation to MEK/NCRI and established that at least four participants worked for official NCRI media organisations. It also found a common operational playbook, committee review structures and repeated references to MEK leadership. On that basis, Anthropic said central tasking was likely. It nevertheless stopped short of saying it had proven that NCRI’s senior leadership directly ordered or managed every component of the operation. That caveat matters. The strongest public evidence supports describing GTG-84006 as a MEK/NCRI-aligned influence operation involving personnel from official NCRI media, rather than asserting that every action was directly commanded by the organisation’s top leadership. The broader significance of the case lies elsewhere. Earlier generations of synthetic media attempted to fabricate evidence: a photograph, a voice recording or a video. Here, AI was used to maintain an identity over time, remember doctrine, analyse targets and speak directly to real people while appearing to be someone they already trusted. The deepfake was no longer merely an artefact. It had become a participant in the conversation. Sources Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 AI Misuse Case Library — GTG-84006 activist impersonation case https://www.misuseofai.com/en/cases/gtg-84006-activist-impersonation/ Reuters — Who makes up Iran’s fragmented opposition? https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/who-makes-up-irans-fragmented-opposition-2025-06-18/ Reuters — Iran’s divided opposition senses its moment https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-divided-opposition-senses-its-moment-activists-remain-wary-protests-2025-06-19/ Reuters — NCRI and Maryam Rajavi https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dissident-leader-abroad-urges-iranians-bring-down-khamenei-2025-06-24/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode12 #Iran #MEK #PMOI #NCRI #IranianOpposition #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #AIDeception #AIImpersonation #IdentityImpersonation #SyntheticIdentity #InteractiveDeepfake #DigitalImpersonation #PersonaCloning #BehaviouralCloning #Telegram #PsychographicProfiling #TargetProfiling #AudienceTargeting #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #SyntheticPersonas #NarrativeLaundering #CoordinatedInfluence #PoliticalInfluence #DigitalInfluence #OppositionPolitics #IranPolitics #OSINT #WRLD

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Africa Daily Report — 1 October 2026 Major developments reported during the previous 24 hours 1. Kenya / East Africa — $16 billion Dangote refinery breaks ground in Lamu. Five African heads of state joined the groundbreaking of Dangote Group's planned $16 billion refinery in Lamu. The plant is designed to process 700,000 barrels per day and is expected to take about 40 months to complete. It is intended to reduce East Africa's dependence on imported refined petroleum, but the project still faces land-rights litigation and environmental concerns. Importance: VERY HIGH — the project could materially reshape East African fuel supply, trade flows, infrastructure investment and regional industrialisation. Direct source: https://apnews.com/article/a0ae7108ae4f4144222aea101baed3a5 2. South Africa — Ramaphosa announces response to gender-based violence. President Cyril Ramaphosa announced additional measures after the discovery of multiple murdered women in Ekurhuleni. Measures include a 60-day local-government safety audit and reviews of unresolved murder, rape and other gender-based-violence cases. Police have not established that the recent killings were committed by a single perpetrator. Importance: VERY HIGH — gender-based violence remains a major public-safety and criminal-justice challenge in South Africa. Direct source: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violence-against-women-south-africa-is-national-shame-president-says-2026-09-30/ 3. DR Congo — Mistrust complicates Ebola response after politician killed. Congolese politician Marie-Célestin Karondwa was killed after publicly supporting the government's Ebola response, according to AP. The killing illustrates the severe community mistrust confronting health authorities as the Bundibugyo-virus outbreak continues. Congo has recorded more than 8,000 confirmed infections and nearly 4,000 deaths in the current outbreak. Importance: CRITICAL — the combination of rapid transmission, very high mortality, insecurity and resistance to health measures poses a major regional public-health risk. Direct source: https://apnews.com/article/1ff629474298a62db44438c6eb178270 4. Zambia — Government opens talks with IMF on a new programme. Zambia began discussions with a visiting IMF mission on a successor lending programme. The country's previous $1.7 billion IMF arrangement expired in January, and Lusaka wants a new agreement before year-end. The IMF mission is scheduled to remain through October 10. Importance: HIGH — a new IMF programme could affect Zambia's fiscal policy, investment environment and economic strategy after its sovereign-debt restructuring. Direct source: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambia-starts-talks-with-visiting-imf-mission-new-loan-programme-2026-09-30/ 5. South Africa / United States — Pretoria summons US ambassador. South Africa's foreign ministry summoned US Ambassador Leo Brent Bozell III over what it described as “undiplomatic conduct.” It was the third such summons in nine months, reflecting continuing strain in bilateral relations. Both governments have nevertheless indicated that dialogue is continuing. Direct source: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-summons-us-ambassador-again-over-undiplomatic-conduct-official-says-2026-09-30/ 6. South Africa — Anti-immigration protests held in Durban. Hundreds of demonstrators marched in Durban calling for more deportations of undocumented migrants and tighter border controls. The demonstration comes amid heightened tensions over migration and previous violence against foreign nationals. Authorities did not recognise an ultimatum previously issued by organisers demanding that undocumented migrants leave the country. Direct source: https://apnews.com/article/c086e617b555643510541f9c9906ca4b 7. Africa — WHO data show sharp increase in cholera deaths. New WHO surveillance data show that reported cholera deaths globally rose by about 30% in 2025 despite fewer reported cases. The African Region experienced a particularly sharp deterioration: reported cases increased by 34% and deaths by 58%. Angola, DR Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan were among seven countries accounting for roughly 90% of reported global cases and deaths. Importance: VERY HIGH — the figures highlight persistent weaknesses in water, sanitation, surveillance and access to timely treatment across several African states. Direct source: https://allafrica.com/stories/202609300113.html 8. Zambia — New cholera outbreak reaches 304 cases and 11 deaths. Zambian health authorities reported 304 cholera cases across seven districts in five provinces as of September 29, with 11 deaths. Lusaka was among the affected areas. The government said eight deaths occurred in communities, pointing to delays in patients reaching treatment. Importance: HIGH — Zambia only recently ended its previous outbreak, making renewed transmission a significant public-health concern. Direct source: https://www.mwebantu.com/11-die-as-cholera-hits-seven-districts-in-five-provinces-says-ministry-of-health/ 9. Burkina Faso — Country opens its first gold refinery. Burkina Faso inaugurated its first domestic gold refinery, RAFFINOR-BF, in Ouagadougou. The facility cost more than 11 billion CFA francs and has an initial annual refining capacity of about 164 tonnes, with plans for substantial expansion. The project is intended to retain more value from the country's gold production through domestic refining, certification and processing. Importance: HIGH — the refinery is part of a wider African trend toward local mineral beneficiation and greater domestic control of commodity value chains. Direct source: https://apnews.com/article/f39f714232e1784bb5051cdf44f0b992 10. Zimbabwe — Helicopter crash reported with six people aboard. A helicopter carrying four passengers and two crew members crashed in Zimbabwe's Marondera district southeast of Harare. Government and police officials said initial information indicated there were no survivors. Authorities had not immediately released all identities or a cause for the crash. Importance: MODERATE — a significant domestic aviation accident, with investigation and identification of those aboard still pending. Direct source: https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/helicopter-6-aboard-crashes-zimbabwe-survivors-officials-136898678 #Africa #AfricaNews #TopNewsOfAfrica #DRCongo #Ebola #EbolaOutbreak #PublicHealth #HealthSecurity #CommunityTrust #DiseaseResponse #Zambia #IMF #InternationalMonetaryFund #EconomicReform #DebtRestructuring #FiscalPolicy #AfricanEconomy #SouthAfrica #CyrilRamaphosa #GenderBasedViolence #Femicide #PublicSafety #CriminalJustice #Ekurhuleni #ViolenceAgainstWomen #AfricanSecurity #RegionalStability #Geopolitics #AfricaToday #wrldorg