Henri Vanhanen wrote that NATO's commander for European forces, Alexus Grynkewich, had described the alliance's strategic thinking in preparation for a possible Russian attack without revealing classified operational plans. According to Vanhanen, the speech aimed to convey that an attack on NATO territory would fail, and to reassure Europeans. He noted that the speech did not indicate, in his view, that NATO was anticipating an immediate attack. Vanhanen mentioned that Grynkewich summarized the theory of victory in three phases: the attack would be halted, its advance would be paralyzed, and if necessary, the military system supporting the attack would be broken. According to Vanhanen, this could mean strikes not only against the attacking troops but also against their logistics, command, and other support systems, if necessary, within Russian territory. The goal, in his interpretation, would not be to defeat Russia as a state, but to prevent it from seizing even part of NATO territory and pressuring the alliance to accept the situation. Vanhanen also highlighted from the speech that the plan took into account a situation where U.S. forces would be tied up in another war. He considered this a crucial issue for Europe and referred to the limited military resources of the United States and Trump's Russia policy, which he believed had made Washington's decisions difficult to predict. Vanhanen proposed that alongside NATO's plan, Europe needs its own plan for victory. Its goal would be for European NATO countries to be able to repel and defeat a large-scale conventional Russian attack over the next ten years even without U.S. combat troops. He believed this would require a joint assessment of the shortcomings in European defense, regular exercises without the assumption of U.S. participation, and binding decisions to correct the deficiencies. Vanhanen wrote that the purpose of a credible deterrent would be to make the initiation of war unprofitable for Russia. #Nato #Venäjä #turvallisuus (translated)
