Search

"Any measure aimed at banning diesel exports would be unexpected for Europeans and would have very serious consequences for the performance of our economy." On Thursday, on the sidelines of the G20 in the United States, European Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic emphasized the "close contact" between the European Union and the American administration. (translated)

"According to United Nations figures, a child is abused every 30 minutes in Congo. It has been nearly twenty months since I left Panzi Hospital. Today, with the closure of the airports in Goma and Bukavu (two cities under the administration of the AFC/M23 rebellion, Ed.), one has to go through the Rwandan capital, Kigali, to access them, which is not an alternative for me," explains Denis Mukwege, Nobel Peace Prize winner 2018. (translated)

🚨 VASCO CONTESTS TECHNICAL CRITERIA OF FLA-FLU, POINTS OUT VIOLATION OF CONCESSION RULES AND CITES DECISION FROM TJRJ IN ACTION FOR MARACANÃ Vasco filed an obligation lawsuit on Wednesday (1st) with a request for urgent protective measures to try to secure the Maracanã against Boca Juniors on October 20, for the semifinal of the South American Cup. In the action, the club directly questions the technical criteria used by Fla-Flu to deny the stadium, points out unequal treatment, supports violations of concession rules, and also explores a contradiction involving the Memorandum of Understanding. 📌 WHAT FLA-FLU ALLEGED In response to Vasco, the concessionaire pointed to the accumulated wear of the lawn, the climatic conditions of July and August, and the need to preserve the intervals designated for field maintenance. For 10/20, Fla-Flu specifically mentioned games of Fluminense on 10/18 and Flamengo on 10/22. With Vasco x Boca between these matches, there would be three games in five days. According to the concessionaire, this sequence would prevent procedures such as helical mowing, targeted fertilization, supplemental lighting, and repair of damage to the lawn. 📌 VASCO QUESTIONS THE TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION The first counterpoint is the lawn itself. Vasco highlights that, three days after the denial, it was announced that the existing field would be removed and new Bermuda Celebration rolls would be placed, with the return of football scheduled for 10/08. Vasco x Boca will be on 10/20. The club's thesis is that it would not be possible to use the accumulated wear of the old lawn as justification for a match that will take place 12 days after the return of football to the renewed field. 📌 GREENLEAF DOCUMENT IS USED BY VASCO Vasco also retrieves the technical planning prepared by Greenleaf, the company responsible for lawn maintenance, in August. According to the action, the document shows that the same procedures cited by Fla-Flu to deny Vasco x Boca have already been carried out in a concentrated manner between matches. The petition states that helical mowing, targeted fertilization, supplemental lighting, and damage repair have even been grouped in a single day after a match, even in a winter scenario and lawn wear. The question posed by Vasco is direct: if this work could be done in August to accommodate the sequence of games from Flamengo and Fluminense, why couldn't it be repeated in October, after the complete lawn replacement? 📌 INTERVAL BETWEEN GAMES Vasco also contests the argument of three games in five days by comparing the situation with the recent calendar of the Maracanã. The action argues that sequences with reduced intervals for Flamengo and Fluminense matches have already been admitted. For Vasco, if the necessary interval for lawn recovery is decisive for denying a match, that criterion must be applied equally to all clubs. 📌 SHOWS AND OTHER EVENTS The action also points out that the Maracanã hosts shows, religious gatherings, and events from other sports, including the installation of structures and occupancy of the field area. Vasco questions how the administration can reconcile these events with lawn preservation, yet considers it technically unfeasible to host a semifinal of CONMEBOL. According to the data presented in the action, at least seven extraordinary events unrelated to official football were held between 2025 and 09/30/2026. 📌 CONCESSION NOTICE Vasco cites item 3.4 of the Terms of Reference, which gives priority to football events from the official calendars of FIFA, CONMEBOL, CBF, and FERJ over other events. Vasco x Boca is an official semifinal of CONMEBOL. The action argues that there would be an "inversion of this priority" by accommodating shows and other events and denying the stadium for a match that, under the concession rules cited by the club, should have priority. The petition mentions "distortion of the concessionaire's obligations" and "violation of the equal treatment required by the Concession Notice." 📌 UNEQUAL TREATMENT Vasco summarizes its challenge in four points: • the lawn replacement would change the premise of accumulated wear; • Greenleaf's own planning would demonstrate that maintenance could be carried out between matches; • the calendar would show reduced intervals that have already been admitted for Flamengo and Fluminense; • other events are reconciled with the necessary care for field preservation. As a result, Vasco asserts that restrictions are being applied selectively. The action further cites clause 13.2 of the Concession Contract, which prohibits favoritism and unjustifiably different, discriminatory treatment, or "without technical criteria" that results in restricted access to the Complex. 📌 THE CONTRADICTION POINTED OUT BY VASCO Fla-Flu claims not to recognize the validity of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2025. At the same time, according to Vasco, it uses the document itself—especially the provision for four matches conditioned on availability and operational conditions—to justify the denial. Vasco points out contradictory behavior and invokes the principle of good faith. 📌 PREVIOUS DECISION OF TJRJ The action also cites the Instrument Appeal No. 3023517-70.2026.8.19.0000. On that occasion, Justice Alexandre Freitas Câmara analyzed the discussion regarding the absence of Fla-Flu's signature on the Memorandum. The magistrate stated that Flamengo and Fluminense, members of the concessionaire, had signed the document and pointed out that disregarding it later could represent contradictory behavior contrary to good faith. 📌 RECOMMENDATION FROM BEPE The issue of public safety also appears as an argument for the use of the Maracanã. According to the action, BEPE (Specialized Battalion for Policing in Stadiums) recommended holding the match at the Maracanã due to the magnitude of the confrontation and the expected public turnout. Vasco uses this recommendation to argue that the Maracanã is not just a preference of the club. The petition points to the stadium as the option that best meets capacity, location, structure, security, and operational conditions to host the match against Boca. 📌 SÃO JANUÁRIO IS NOT AN OPTION Vasco also differentiates the situation from the previous process involving Vasco x Vitória, when it did not obtain a preliminary injunction to use the Maracanã. This time, according to the action, São Januário cannot host the semifinal. The South American Manual requires a minimum capacity of 30,000 spectators starting from the semifinals, while the petition indicates São Januário has approximately 21,880 seats. Vasco acknowledges the Nilton Santos Stadium as an alternative but argues that having another stadium does not resolve the issue brought to Justice: is there legitimate technical and contractual basis for Fla-Flu to deny Maracanã? 📌 WHAT VASCO SEEKS Vasco is seeking a preliminary injunction requiring Fla-Flu to make the Maracanã available for Vasco x Boca on 10/20 at 9:30 PM. The request includes the maximum ticket allocation corresponding to the authorized capacity, the use of necessary facilities for organizing the match, the implementation of a mosaic, and temporary installation of banners in the same manner allowed for the clubs that are members of the concessionaire. In case of non-compliance, Vasco requests a daily fine of R$ 1 million. Vasco must inform CONMEBOL by October 5 where it will hold the return match of the semifinal. (translated)

The family of Renee Good, who was killed by an agent of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), has filed lawsuits against the U.S. and top officials of the Trump administration over the death of the mother of three children, which has sparked widespread protests and discussions about the conduct of federal agents. (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

You will hear announcements from our friends in Europe regarding new diesel fuel deliveries that will come to the market and significantly lower the prices of this fuel. Wright, who accompanied Trump in the Oval Office on Wednesday, said that the administration will soon announce measures aimed at lowering diesel fuel prices. (translated)

This is a question that we ponder and discuss every day. However, it seems that it would negatively impact gasoline prices, which would increase somewhat, while diesel prices would decrease somewhat. Meanwhile, President Trump confirmed on Wednesday that the ban on diesel fuel exports imposed by his administration is still under consideration. (translated)

Rodina Renee Good, a woman shot in January 2026 by federal immigration agents in Minneapolis, filed a lawsuit against the Trump administration and several immigration officials for violating her civil rights and negligence, which sparked significant opposition to deportation raids. (translated)