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FRENCHRAPUS 🇺🇸 15h

FRENCHRAPUS claimed that OpenAI had discovered a hidden spy microphone behind a television in the meeting room of its executives, where very confidential information was being discussed. According to him, the device could listen to live conversations, encrypt data, and transmit it outside. It was reportedly installed around September 28 and spotted two days later during a security check. The author added that ChatGPT then analyzed the device's memory with OpenAI's AI models and identified an engineer from the company as responsible. He also claimed that the FBI arrested the engineer that day and that he faced up to five years in prison if convicted. #OpenAI #CyberSécurité #IntelligenceArtificielle (translated)

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Alex, Public Speaking Trainer 2d

6) forced face-to-face #talks. The most honest #conversations happen in the car, on a walk, or while cooking. When eye #contact isn't required, talking about #tough #topics is easier. Want a heart-to-heart? Don't ask to "#talk #seriously". Go for a walk. #publicspeaking #trainer

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Bartosz Fiałek 6d

The author described turning doctor-patient conversations into structured medical documentation as one of AI’s most promising healthcare applications, saying it could reduce administrative work and give physicians more time to focus on what matters.

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We Don't Have Time 7d

The author announced that the Climate Change Summit, which they described as Central and Eastern Europe’s leading event on climate action, would return on October 14 from Bucharest. They said discussions would cover biodiversity, the circular economy, agriculture, ESG and other topics, and invited readers to register. https://t.co/m0eVtaG1rK https://t.co/52g1ZQmuex #ClimateAction #Biodiversity #Sustainability #RO

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BFMTV 1w

The article raises the question of whether AI companies such as Anthropic and OpenAI read all user conversations, following an incident where a chatbot reported a potential threat to the police, while specifying that only problematic content is monitored for security and model improvement reasons. #IntelligenceArtificielle #Chatbots #Confidentialité (translated)

www.bfmtv.com
ChatGPT, Claude... Les entreprises d'IA lisent-elles toutes les conversations des utilisateurs?
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Franceinfo 1w

Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally, firmly denies the allegations of anti-Semitic messages made by Mediapart and states that he does not have a Facebook account to request the extraction of conversations related to the allegations. #JordanBardella #antisemitisme #Mediapart (translated)

www.franceinfo.fr
"Vous auriez adoré me voir poser le genou à terre" : Jordan Bardella, accusé de messages antisémites, s'en prend de nouveau à Mediapart
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Gio CR7 1w

Cristiano Ronaldo claimed that the Portuguese coach had proposed a plan for him to participate in international matches, which he accepted. According to him, the plan stipulated that he would play in the first and last match and would not go to Norway or Denmark. However, he had agreed to play 30 minutes in Norway at the coach's request. Ronaldo then reproached the coach for breaking his word. He said they had agreed that the coach would acknowledge in a press conference that he had proposed the plan, that Ronaldo had never asked to play, and that it was wrong of him to make him warm up without putting him in the game. Simão Coutinho, a manager at Al Nassr, had witnessed their exchanges, he specified. Ronaldo felt that the tone of the coach during the press conference was different from that of their private conversation. The Portuguese captain acknowledged that he had been wrong not to greet the supporters after the match and for leaving the gathering. He apologized to them, as well as to his teammates, while explaining that the breach of trust had led him to leave. He also stated that he accepted the Federation's sanction and indicated that he would remain available for the national team after his suspension, provided he was fit and playing for his club. #CristianoRonaldo #ÉquipeNationale #Football (translated)

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Le Parisien 1w

Jordan Bardella, the president of the National Rally, declared that he no longer has a Facebook account and that he cannot request Meta to extract his conversations. #Politique #Bardella #RN (translated)

www.leparisien.fr
Affaire Bardella : le président du RN assure ne plus avoir Facebook et ne pas pouvoir « demander l’extraction de conversations » à Meta
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LPR Amel 🦦 1w

LPR WikiAmel 🦦 wrote that he preferred the "gota" who leaked private conversations to the one in a suit, whom he accused of pretending to monitor his words. #Gota #Révélation #ConversationsPrivées (translated)

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FRENCHRAPUS 🇺🇸 1w

FRENCHRAPUS stated that the French magazine LOVE had published exclusive information about GTA 6, with its release expected the following month. According to him, Rockstar wanted to make Lucia a character as impactful and beloved as Arthur Morgan in Red Dead Redemption 2. He also wrote that non-playable characters would have coherent conversations and would be designed with their own lives and histories. The exchanges heard by players would thus make sense, he added. FRENCHRAPUS described the map as a world where players could spend hundreds of hours and become attached to. Finally, he indicated that Rockstar had met with police officers and gang members in Florida to enhance the game's realism. The studio would also seek to maintain the relevance of its satire over several years by avoiding too much reliance on the fleeting trends of the internet, he wrote. #GTA6 #RockstarGames #JeuxVidéo (translated)

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Amine Snoussi 2w

Amine Snoussi, a journalist who revealed a video of Raphaël Glucksmann for Le Média TV, criticized franceinfo for discussing the context of his remarks without consulting the media. He specified that the video, in his opinion, stemmed from a meeting of Boris Vallaud's faction held on September 17 in front of about thirty socialist executives, with a Zoom link open remotely. Snoussi contested that the broadcast constituted an invasion of privacy, arguing that it was a political meeting. He defended the public interest in remarks made by a presidential candidate about his rivals and emphasized that, according to the editorialist of franceinfo, the leader of the socialist deputies present next to him did not react. The journalist added that no one on set disputed the authenticity of the remarks and criticized the comparison to the tabloid press of the 1930s. He defended the media's role in revealing off-camera political discussions, recalling that the exchanges of the factions of the Socialist Party were regularly reported by franceinfo and other media. He finally expressed regret that franceinfo dedicated a show to this revelation without inviting Le Média TV and stated that he was available for a future invitation. #Journalisme #PresseIndépendante #Politique (translated)

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Krzysztof Graj 2w

IRAN: MEK/NCRI – when AI impersonated a real activist in live conversations For years, synthetic media has largely meant fabricated images, cloned voices and manipulated video. A case uncovered by Anthropic in September 2026 suggests a more consequential development: artificial intelligence being used not merely to imitate how a person looks or sounds, but to behave as that person in an ongoing conversation. Anthropic says it dismantled a distributed influence operation targeting Iranians inside the country and abroad that it linked to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or PMOI/MEK, and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The operators used a shared AI-agent platform to support impersonation, audience profiling, coordinated social-media activity, synthetic personas and the laundering of organisational content through apparently independent accounts. At least four people involved in the operation worked for official NCRI media outlets, according to Anthropic. The company also found references to committee approval processes and MEK leadership, but said it could not independently determine the precise level of central control. Cloning a person from 8,400 Telegram posts The most striking part of the operation involved a real activist whose Telegram identity was copied. According to Anthropic, the operators instructed Claude in Persian that it was now that person, then provided approximately 8,400 of the activist’s Telegram posts so the system could learn and reproduce his writing style. The AI-assisted account was subsequently used to conduct live political conversations with the activist’s existing contacts. Anthropic says that, to its knowledge, the people receiving those messages did not know they were interacting with an account being operated with AI assistance. This is materially different from a conventional chatbot or a static deepfake. The system was not simply producing a forged statement attributed to someone else. It was using a large archive of that person’s authentic language as behavioural training material, then applying the resulting imitation interactively. In practical terms, the deception moved from synthetic content to synthetic identity. Anthropic did not publish the identity of the impersonated activist, nor details of his contacts, and the public report does not establish what specific information the conversations produced. What it does establish is that the impersonation was operational rather than experimental: the cloned account was used in real exchanges with real people. From social-media monitoring to psychographic dossiers The impersonation sat inside a much broader targeting system. Anthropic says the network scraped more than 500 social-media channels and categorised individuals by location, age, profession, political orientation and arrest history. It then analysed approximately 51,944 archived messages from conversations to construct detailed psychographic dossiers on dozens of people inside Iran. The system was therefore not limited to broadcasting propaganda. It was also designed to understand specific audiences and individuals. Profiles could be used to decide what kind of message was most likely to resonate with a particular person, which political identity they appeared closest to and how they should be approached. Anthropic describes this as a structured targeting funnel rather than ad hoc social-media activity. That distinction is important in the Iranian context. Political activists, dissidents and opposition contacts inside Iran can face arrest and severe punishment. The report does not show that the dossiers directly led to arrests or other harm, but collecting and organising information such as arrest history and political affiliation adds a surveillance dimension to what would otherwise be described as an influence operation. A shared AI system for an influence network Anthropic found that the actors used a shared Claude-based platform named “Viktor”, with separate workspaces and persistent memory. Those memory files contained approved sources, prohibited words, account-management instructions and methods intended to reduce the risk of detection. One operator loaded MEK founding doctrine into the system as what the report called “strategic base data”, allowing others to reuse it across their work. This persistent-memory structure meant the AI did not have to be briefed from scratch for every task. Once doctrine, stylistic rules and operational constraints had been stored, the system could repeatedly produce material consistent with the network’s objectives. Anthropic says the same general playbook appeared across different workspaces despite the operators not sharing obvious account infrastructure. The network also used automated pipelines to coordinate Instagram posting schedules and tailor messages to different audiences. Some accounts initially avoided mentioning the Mojahedin at all, allowing material aligned with MEK/NCRI narratives to appear as neutral or independent political commentary. Content was distributed through the organisation’s own media ecosystem as well as accounts presented as ordinary news or activist profiles. Anthropic assessed the campaign as Category Two on its Breakout Scale: active on multiple platforms with distribution through NCRI-linked media properties and amplifier accounts, but without evidence of broad authentic penetration. Synthetic citizens and disguised organisational media The same infrastructure generated AI avatars presented as ordinary Iranians, complete with Persian audio, to promote Maryam Rajavi’s political programme. Anthropic says the synthetic nature of these personas was intentionally concealed. Operators also rewrote and redistributed content originating from MEK-affiliated media while stripping identifying features or presenting it through apparently independent accounts. The network’s political messaging targeted the Iranian government but also rival opposition currents, including monarchists and supporters of the Pahlavi camp. Anthropic documented fabricated video material attacking a member of the Pahlavi family and the use of the slogan “Neither Shah Nor Sheikh”, consistent with the NCRI’s broader competition with other opposition movements. That rivalry provides relevant context. Reuters describes the MEK as one of Iran’s principal organised opposition movements in exile and the dominant force behind the NCRI, led by Maryam Rajavi. Its relationship with other opposition currents is often contentious, while the extent of its support inside Iran remains uncertain. What can be attributed – and what cannot Anthropic’s attribution is unusually specific but still needs to be stated carefully. The company says its investigation linked the operation to MEK/NCRI and established that at least four participants worked for official NCRI media organisations. It also found a common operational playbook, committee review structures and repeated references to MEK leadership. On that basis, Anthropic said central tasking was likely. It nevertheless stopped short of saying it had proven that NCRI’s senior leadership directly ordered or managed every component of the operation. That caveat matters. The strongest public evidence supports describing GTG-84006 as a MEK/NCRI-aligned influence operation involving personnel from official NCRI media, rather than asserting that every action was directly commanded by the organisation’s top leadership. The broader significance of the case lies elsewhere. Earlier generations of synthetic media attempted to fabricate evidence: a photograph, a voice recording or a video. Here, AI was used to maintain an identity over time, remember doctrine, analyse targets and speak directly to real people while appearing to be someone they already trusted. The deepfake was no longer merely an artefact. It had become a participant in the conversation. Sources Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 AI Misuse Case Library — GTG-84006 activist impersonation case https://www.misuseofai.com/en/cases/gtg-84006-activist-impersonation/ Reuters — Who makes up Iran’s fragmented opposition? https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/who-makes-up-irans-fragmented-opposition-2025-06-18/ Reuters — Iran’s divided opposition senses its moment https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-divided-opposition-senses-its-moment-activists-remain-wary-protests-2025-06-19/ Reuters — NCRI and Maryam Rajavi https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dissident-leader-abroad-urges-iranians-bring-down-khamenei-2025-06-24/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode12 #Iran #MEK #PMOI #NCRI #IranianOpposition #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #AIDeception #AIImpersonation #IdentityImpersonation #SyntheticIdentity #InteractiveDeepfake #DigitalImpersonation #PersonaCloning #BehaviouralCloning #Telegram #PsychographicProfiling #TargetProfiling #AudienceTargeting #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #SyntheticPersonas #NarrativeLaundering #CoordinatedInfluence #PoliticalInfluence #DigitalInfluence #OppositionPolitics #IranPolitics #OSINT #WRLD

www.anthropic.com
Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 / Anthropic
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Antton Rouget 2w

"We have proof that these conversations have not been altered," says Antton Rouget, co-author of the Mediapart investigation. #Antisémitisme #JordanBardella #Mediapart (translated)

Écrits antisémites attribués à Jordan Bardella par Mediapart: le média d'investigation révèle ses preuves
www.bfmtv.com
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Antton Rouget 2w

"We have proof that these conversations have not been altered," asserts Antton Rouget, co-author of the Mediapart investigation. #Lycéens #Mobilisation #Éducation (translated)

Colère des lycéens: Prisca Thevenot, députée Renaissance, accuse LFI de "souffler sur les braises"
www.bfmtv.com
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Jordan Bardella 2w

Mediapart published on Thursday, October 1, screenshots of several conversations with Jordan Bardella to support their investigation revealing anti-Semitic messages from 2013 attributed to the president of the National Rally, which he denies being the author of. #Antisémitisme #JordanBardella #Mediapart (translated)

Écrits antisémites attribués à Jordan Bardella: "Nous avons la preuve que ces conversations n'ont pas été altérées", affirme Antton Rouget, co-auteur de l'enquête de Mediapart
www.bfmtv.com
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Antton Rouget 2w

"We have proof that these conversations have not been altered," claims Antton Rouget, co-author of the Mediapart investigation. #Antisémitisme #JordanBardella #Mediapart (translated)

Écrits antisémites attribués à Jordan Bardella: "Nous avons la preuve que ces conversations n'ont pas été altérées", affirme Antton Rouget, co-auteur de l'enquête de Mediapart
www.bfmtv.com
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BFMTV 2w

Mediapart published screenshots of conversations attributed to Jordan Bardella, where anti-Semitic messages from 2013 are revealed, although he denies being the author, while Antton Rouget, co-author of the investigation, claims that these exchanges have not been altered. #Antisémitisme #JordanBardella #Mediapart (translated)

www.bfmtv.com
Écrits antisémites attribués à Jordan Bardella: "Nous avons la preuve que ces conversations n'ont pas été altérées", affirme Antton Rouget, co-auteur de l'enquête de Mediapart
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jean-michel aphatie 2w

I am shocked by @J_Bardella's reaction after the second publication from @Mediapart concerning him. It is not a matter of "gross montages" but a restitution of conversations in which he participated and during which he made anti-Semitic comments. Who then #antisemitisme #libertédepression #médiapart #FR (translated)

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Impact 2w

🚨 FLASH JORDAN BARDELLA TRAPPED BY… JORDAN BARDELLA HIMSELF 😭😭😭 While he claims not to be behind the Meta account that Mediapart revealed to have openly antisemitic messages, the media claims to have authenticated these exchanges thanks to… his autobiography. He recounts the same personal anecdotes that only he could have known and that he would have shared in these conversations eleven years earlier… #JordanBardella #Antisémitisme #Média (translated)

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Kunta van den Kinté  2w

The anti-Semite Jordan Bardella thought that by deleting his Facebook account, his messages would disappear. But we learned this evening that the source from Mediapart retrieved the conversation history from Facebook, which was verified by a bailiff. You're finished, Jordy. 😏🍿 https://t.co/OL6ZBkgpkP #Antisémitisme #Mediapart #Justice (translated)

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