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Sir Ken McCallum head of MI5 - Russia remains "aggressor number one" and is fighting a hybrid war against the UK that is not being taken seriously enough. This "war" did not start last week. It's been going on for a decade+ and those denying it should be challenged. www.bbc.co.uk/news/article...

The BBC is making a lot of cuts (including to some things only the BBC would do or could do). The BBC could cut some things where it is simply replicating what private media businesses will do - as it wants a share of audience. This issue could be covered seriously by its news channels.

The author condemned what they described as a Houthi attack on King Khalid Airport the previous day, saying it had killed at least 12 people and seriously injured scores more. They said Ireland stood in solidarity with Saudi Arabia and offered condolences to the victims’ families. #Solidarity #Condolences #SaudiArabia #IE #SA

The author said data from EIA and Kpler was badly out of alignment and that more datasets would be released soon, including Asian oil import figures they said could not be manipulated. They added that the new data would eventually show whether seriously questionable figures had been circulating. #EIA #OilMarket #DataIntegrity #AS

I endorse Ulf Kristersson. For me, the decisive issues are clear: Sweden must remain a strong supporter of Ukraine and move seriously toward joining the Eurozone. Sweden has already taken the historic step into NATO. The next strategic European step should be a serious national https://t.co/xt8hj4dxrS #UlfKristersson #Sweden #Eurozone #SE #UA #EU

Only resignation will do. The mistake is unforgivable for someone in your function. One cannot seriously be the judge of any genocide when one has displayed this deep level of profound ignorance about the worst genocide in history. #ResignationNow #UnforgivableMistake #GenocideAwareness #Thetweetdoesnotmentionanyspecificcountries #sotherearenocountrycodestoreturn.

🇺🇲 🛢️ Trump Says He’s ‘Very Seriously’ Thinking of Diesel Export Ban - Bloomberg - “We’re thinking about it very seriously,” President Donald Trump says after being asked about a possible export ban on diesel. - “We’re looking at it very seriously. We may do it,” he tells an #Trump #DieselExport #Oil政策 #US

Thea Gilmore (born 25 November 1979), is an English singer-songwriter. She has released more than twenty albums since her 1998 debut Burning Dorothy. She has had three Top 40 entries on the UK Albums Chart and one on the UK Singles Chart. She became interested in music as a result of her father's record collection, which included work by Bob Dylan, Joni Mitchell, and The Beatles. Later, she listened to Elvis Costello, Tom Waits, and The Replacements, among others. Having always written poetry and stories, she began seriously writing songs at the age of 15. https://hvdommelen.nl/g/GilmoreT.html

But what will Germany do if Russia does *not* seriously engage in negotiations, and continues to attack Germany and our allies? That is the critical question Germany fails to answer — and that failure emboldens Moscow and guarantees they will continue to escalate their attacks. #Germany #Russia #Negotiations #DE #RU

In the volatile context of the Middle East, @UNRWA remains a critical, stabilizing presence. But its capacity to act is seriously imperilled. Member States must take immediate action. I‘m counting on their unwavering political & financial support to protect UNRWA’s mandate and #MiddleEast #UNRWA #SupportForUNRWA #IL #PS #JO #SY #LB

UAE / Sudan – when an influence operation tried to enter the United Nations A network of roughly 300 apparently independent social-media influencers. A human-rights organisation borrowing the identity of a real NGO. Personal dossiers on European politicians and journalists. And testimony prepared for delivery at the United Nations without revealing the state interest behind it. These were elements of an influence operation uncovered by Anthropic and disclosed in September 2026. The company says it linked the activity with high confidence to UAE government officials. Tracked as GTG-84002, the operation targeted several overlapping issues: the Muslim Brotherhood, perceptions of the war in Sudan and international mechanisms examining the United Arab Emirates' role in the conflict. What distinguishes the case is not simply its use of artificial intelligence. It is the attempt to make state-aligned messaging appear to originate from independent influencers, human-rights organisations and potentially witnesses addressing an international institution. An influence network built around 300 fake voices Anthropic identified a single actor using Claude to support a sustained influence campaign. At its centre was an AI persona called “Deadshot”, running on the operator's own platform. A master doctrine file repeatedly instructed the system to support what it described as a coordinated international effort to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood. The operator simultaneously managed several components of the campaign, including approximately 300 inauthentic influencer accounts across social-media platforms. Internal material examined by Anthropic described the apparent independence of this network as its greatest strategic advantage. That phrase captures the central method. The objective was not simply to broadcast a political position but to conceal where that position originated. One visible example appeared on 4 June 2026, when accounts participated in a coordinated campaign using #SudanIslamists and near-identical graphics connecting Sudanese Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood with regional instability. Anthropic says the amplification network was centrally funded and coordinated. Its investigation also found that the operator financing the social-media network was connected to the wider influence operation. A human-rights organisation that was not what it appeared to be Social media was only one layer. The operator also created a front NGO that copied the identity of a genuine Swiss organisation and used that borrowed legitimacy to publish human-rights material produced for the campaign. Anthropic's description elsewhere also refers to the identity of a real Sudanese human-rights organisation being used in connection with the preparation of testimony. The public report does not fully clarify whether these references describe the same front or separate elements of the operation, so they should not be treated as definitively identical. The underlying technique, however, is clear: political material was designed to appear as if it originated from independent civil society rather than from actors linked to a government. This is particularly significant in the human-rights environment, where the perceived independence of an organisation or witness can determine how seriously evidence is received by journalists, diplomats and international institutions. The attempt to reach the UN The most consequential part of the operation concerned the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. According to Anthropic, the operator used Claude to ghost-write complete testimony intended to be delivered by two individuals during the session. The texts were prepared under explicit constraints ensuring that neither statement would mention the UAE. This did not amount to a conventional government submission. The intention, according to Anthropic's reconstruction, was for material serving the interests of a party connected to the Sudan conflict to reach an international forum through apparently independent voices. But an important limitation remains: Anthropic could not confirm that the testimony was ultimately delivered. The company similarly could not establish whether other dossiers produced by the operation reached their intended recipients or influenced policy. It therefore assessed the campaign as Category Three on the Brookings Breakout Scale – activity distributed across several platforms, but without evidence of broad public impact sufficient for a higher classification. The distinction matters. The evidence demonstrates a sophisticated attempt to influence international debate; it does not demonstrate that the attempt succeeded. Politicians, journalists and UN investigators became targets The operation was not limited to generating public content. Anthropic found that the operator researched and compiled detailed profiles of 18 members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists. Some material was prepared for direct delivery to senior UAE officials. The network also assembled what Anthropic describes as “counter-accountability dossiers” on UN Special Rapporteurs who had criticised the UAE's conduct in relation to Sudan. This places the campaign in a broader context. Since Sudan's civil war began in April 2023, the role of external powers has become an increasingly important part of international scrutiny. Sudan has accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, allegations Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. In 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE before the International Court of Justice, accusing it of complicity in genocide against the Masalit through alleged support for the RSF. The UAE rejected the allegations. The ICJ subsequently removed the case from its list after finding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the UAE's reservation to the relevant provision of the Genocide Convention. The ruling therefore did not determine whether Sudan's substantive allegations were true or false. That contested international environment helps explain why narratives about Sudan, human rights and accountability were valuable targets for an influence operation. AI as an operating system for influence The role played by Claude is also important to understand accurately. Anthropic did not find that artificial intelligence independently conceived or directed the campaign. Human operators established the objectives, political doctrine and targets. AI instead helped operationalise them. Across hundreds of sessions, Claude was used to transform predetermined political objectives into social-media narratives, human-rights reports, testimony, intelligence-style briefs and detailed profiles of individuals. The same system could support narrative production, target research and preparation of material for different audiences. That represents a more significant development than simply using generative AI to produce propaganda faster. Traditional influence operations require different teams to research targets, write content, manage personas, adapt messages and prepare briefing material. Generative AI can compress several of those functions into a single operational workflow. The result is not necessarily more convincing propaganda. It is potentially cheaper, faster and more scalable influence infrastructure. From fake influencers to institutional influence Anthropic says it linked the operation to UAE government officials with high confidence. Its assessment was based partly on internal material naming senior Emirati officials as intended recipients of the work, alongside other evidence available to its investigators. That remains an attribution by Anthropic rather than a judicial finding or publicly released forensic attribution by a government agency. The distinction should be retained. The larger significance of GTG-84002 lies in the architecture of the campaign. A network of fake influencers could create the appearance of public opinion. A cloned human-rights organisation could provide institutional credibility. AI-generated reports could give political narratives the appearance of research. Profiles of journalists and politicians could support more precise targeting. And ghost-written testimony could potentially carry the same message into an international institution without revealing the political interest behind it. This is a different model from the familiar troll farm. The objective is no longer simply to make propaganda look popular. It is to make state-aligned messaging look independent – and, if possible, to move it from social media into the institutions where international policy and accountability are debated. SOURCES: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 International Court of Justice — Sudan v. United Arab Emirates https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197 International Court of Justice — press releases and case documents https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197/press-releases United Nations Geneva — Sudan v UAE proceedings at the ICJ https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/04/105241/world-court-begins-hearing-sudans-complicity-genocide-case-against UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs — UAE response to Sudan's allegations https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/4/10/10-4-2025-UAE-UAE UN Digital Library — Sudan's letter concerning alleged UAE support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?ln=en UN Digital Library — UAE response concerning allegations of support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4046224?ln=en Ultra Sudan — reporting on Anthropic's UAE-linked influence-operation findings https://ultrasudan.usawtiq.com/أنثروبيك-أحبطنا-عملية-تأثير-إماراتية-استخدمت-الذكاء-الاصطناعي-لاستهداف-السودان/عامر-صالح/أخبار KEYWORDS #DISINFORMED #Episode8 #UAE #Sudan #UnitedArabEmirates #UnitedNations #UNHumanRightsCouncil #HumanRights #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeInfluencers #FakeNGO #NGOImpersonation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #NarrativeManipulation #InstitutionalInfluence #SudanConflict #SudanWar #MuslimBrotherhood #InternationalRelations #Geopolitics #Anthropic #ClaudeAI #OSINT #WRLD

The Moondoggies is an American rock band from Everett, Washington, United States. Formed in 2005 by Kevin Murphy (guitar, vocals), Caleb Quick (keyboards, vocals), Carl Dahlen (drums, vocals), and Robert Terreberry (bass, vocals). They have been described as "seriously kick-ass" by Austin Scaggs of Rolling Stone. The band has released four albums and one EP on Hardly Art, an imprint of Sub Pop Records. https://hvdommelen.nl/m/Moondoggies.html

CANADA + EU = “HOSTILE”? Seriously? 🇨🇦🇪🇺 Trump has threatened Europe with “very heavy tariffs” if he judges Canada’s proposed EU associate membership to be a hostile move. The proposal itself is about deeper EU–Canada cooperation, and its details are still being defined. My https://t.co/GIFLMjLZT4 #Canada #EU #Tariffs #CA #EU

Seriously President, why list these events, all of which happened today and then conclude with: "Russia will find our resolve only growing stronger. We are reinforcing our collective deterrence and defence, together with NATO. And we are stepping up the pressure on Russia." #NATO #Russia #Deterrence #RU #NATO

Seriously President, why list these events, all of which happened today and then conclude with: "Russia will find our resolve only growing stronger. We are reinforcing our collective deterrence and defence, together with NATO. And we are stepping up the pressure on Russia." #Russia #NATO #Defence #RU #NATO

This is a very thoughtful essay from somebody close to the actual frontier, seeing firsthand the growing problems we have in making AI safe. Very worth reading. Also, it might help outsiders understand that uncontrolled superintelligence is something insiders take seriously. #AI #Superintelligence #Safety #Therearenospecificcountriesmentionedinthetweet.Therefore #theresponseis:

10s nachgedacht 🔥 ANOTHER EXPLOSION AT EMCO IN BULGARIA — HOW MANY “ACCIDENTS” BEFORE EUROPE TAKES SABOTAGE SERIOUSLY? Europe must wake up. On 12 September another fire and explosion struck an EMCO weapons-storage facility near Tsareva Livada in Bulgaria — the second incident https://t.co/EqqHgPAiIr #Bulgaria #EMCO #Sabotage #BG #EU