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Retired Colonel Maciej Korowaj assessed that the 17.1 trillion rubles earmarked for defense in the Russian budget for 2027 does not constitute a barrier to mobilization, but it does not signal it either. He pointed out that the overt mobilization stance remains marginal, and the contract model is exhausting its social base. In his opinion, part of the increase in defense spending may stem from transferring payments for the wounded and the families of the deceased to this sector, which were previously included in a classified section called "Social Policy." This would mean that part of the growth finances the costs of losses, rather than new capabilities. Korowaj wrote that, regardless of the budget, Russia's legal-administrative capacity to mobilize people is increasing. He noted that a decree from December 30, 2025, directed contract reservists to protect critical facilities in 2026, and a decree from July 27, 2026, increased the armed forces' personnel by 25,000, to 1,535,000 soldiers. According to him, this was the third such increase in the year, formally tied to the creation of military-construction units. He also referenced an assessment by the Ukrainian HUR that Russia aims to recruit about 600,000 people in 2026–2027, utilizing the electronic register and digital summonses, which would enable mobilization without public announcement. Korowaj identified the system's capacity as the main limitation. He wrote that Russian losses currently amount to 30,000–35,000 killed or wounded per month, and according to NATO estimates, most recruits still end up on the front lines as reinforcements. With an intake of about 30,000 people per month, the army, in his opinion, is essentially restoring its personnel rather than creating surpluses for new formations. Citing OSINT, he noted that 4,799 out of 7,342 pre-war tanks stored in depots had been used, leaving about 19% remaining. Korowaj assessed that in the short term, it would be possible to draft several hundred thousand people as reinforcements and rear echelon personnel, but not quickly create a second army capable of maneuver warfare. He emphasized that mass mobilization would require the identification, selection, training, and equipping of hundreds of thousands of individuals, while the military apparatus is busy sustaining the front. He also referred to a report by Andrei Belousov for Vladimir Putin from December 2025: in 2025, five divisions, 13 brigades, and 30 regiments were to be formed, while four divisions, 14 brigades, and 39 regiments were planned for 2026. He pointed to the establishment of the 44th Army Corps in Karelia, the elevation of brigades to the rank of divisions, including the 71st Guards Mechanized Division on the Kola Peninsula, and a rocket brigade with Iskanders. In his view, these formations mainly consisted of conscripts and trained reinforcements. He added that according to Finnish sources, the expansion of bases in Petrozavodsk, Pechenga, and Baltiysk would enable the support of 80,000–115,000 soldiers only after the war in Ukraine concludes. Korowaj agreed with the ISW assessment that, in the short term, ground operations against NATO are unlikely, as the majority of Russia's potential is engaged in Ukraine. He also cited a report from a closed NATO briefing in Ankara, during which an Alliance representative purportedly spoke about the re-establishment of the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts, at least one new corps, and three divisions, but also mentioned a lack of signs of an intention to conduct a rapid attack. He concluded that the budget finances a long war with Ukraine and creates opportunities for the period after it is frozen, but it does not indicate preparations for an attack on NATO or a withdrawal of the Kremlin from such an option. #Rosja #wojna #defensywa (translated)

"Every additional billion dollars that Russia manages to earn from exports will be spent on acquiring and importing critical components and equipment for weapon production, modernizing drones, producing missiles, and recruiting more soldiers," said Zelensky. #Rusko #Ukrajina #Válka (translated)

We will likely have to expand the pool of prisoners for exchange with European and American idiots to get our people back. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also hinted that Moscow may detain European and American citizens to use them in prisoner exchanges and thus secure the release of Zvinchuk. #Zvinčuk #Rusija #ČrnaGora (translated)

The European Commission is changing its approach to subsidies for Ukraine, ensuring that there will be no obligation to spend EU money on the Ukrainian defense industry, which puts Poland in a dilemma about whether to apply for funding from the second round of SAFE, considering the short time for project implementation. #Ukraina #Bezpieczeństwo #PrzemysłObronny (translated)

At the end of 2024, two-thirds of Ukrainian refugees were working in the Czech Republic, raising concerns about a potential shortage of employees after their possible return to their homeland, while recruiting new workers from Ukraine faces obstacles and quotas, as companies strive to adapt and secure a stable workforce. #zaměstnanost #českýtrhpráce (translated)

Marcin Józefaciuk criticized Barbara Nowacka for allegedly lecturing the president on TVN24 and mocking his office staff. In response, he pointed out delays attributed to the Ministry of Education. Józefaciuk stated that regulations regarding pedagogical supervision were published on August 31, 2026, a day before they went into effect and the school year began. In the case of the "Digital Student" program, he noted that the regulations were published on September 18, 2025, and the deadline for submissions by preschool and institution directors expired on September 19. He also mentioned that a letter regarding the correction of funding under Standard A for 2025 was sent over a month after the school year had started, when commitments had already been incurred. He wrote that the signature for the curriculum basis of new professions was announced for June 8, submitted on June 22, and published on July 28, while recruitment was already ongoing. Józefaciuk also noted that he waited 217 days for a response to his interpellation regarding the protection of education workers. According to him, he learned at that time, among other things, that the Ministry of Education had not worked on appointing an ombudsman for their rights. He also wrote that some teachers were losing pay for extra hours, the prime minister intervened, and the law was later amended, partially retroactively. He linked the issue of working over 40 hours a week to about 19 months passing since the Supreme Court's resolution. Józefaciuk accused Nowacka of a double standard: ridiculing others' delays while explaining her own. He added that in the recording he discussed each of the cited examples. #polityka #edukacja #nauczyciele (translated)

Chyba już ostateczne potwierdzenie. Niewykorzystane 10 - 20 mld euro 🇪🇺 SAFE - zamiast drugiego naboru dla naszej zbrojeniówki - na projekty z Ukrainą. Potwierdza się też moja intuicja sprzed 2 dni. Priorytetowym kierunkiem - ukraiński projekt tarczy antybalistycznej FREYJA. Dzisiejsza wizyta Tuska w Kijowie i trochę paniczne przystąpienie do "koalicji antybalistycznej" ma pewno przykryć fakt, że nikt z nim w Brukseli tego nie konsultował. #Ukraina #bezpieczeństwo #zbrojeniówka

České podniky čelí paradoxu: zatímco považují své zaměstnance za nejcennější aktivum a klíč k růstu, současně se snaží vyřešit dlouhodobé problémy s náborem a udržením talentů, což komplikuje jejich konkurenceschopnost a zvyšuje náklady na pracovní sílu. #zaměstnanci #nábor #talenty

"Wykorzystując środki pozostałe z SAFE uruchomimy wspólne projekty z firmami ukraińskimi." A to bardzo ciekawe... Do tej pory nasz rząd przekonywał, że będzie drugi nabór SAFE i polski przemysł będzie mógł wnioskować o kolejne fundusze. Fundusze - przypomnijmy - z pożyczek zaciąganych przez państwa członkowskie, które później trzeba spłacić. Uzupełniam, bo rząd ma tendencje do przedstawienia tego jako darmowego prezentu. Jak wynika jednak ze słów UvL - KE wydaje się traktować pozostałe środki z SAFE jako potencjalną pulę ekstra wsparcia dla Kijowa, który skarży się znów na dziurę w wydatkach obronnych. Jako główny przykład wymienia przy tym ukraiński projekt tarczy antybalistycznej FREYJA. Projekt - przypominam - w którym Polska nie bierze udziału. (ergo - polski przemysł żadnych wniosków o fundusze składać nie będzie). Przypominam też, że trzonem programu FREYJA jest pocisk przechwytujący FP-7.X firmy Fire Point. Tak - tej samej firmy Fire Point, która zamieszana jest w gigantyczną aferę korupcyjną i której główny udziałowiec, właściciel legendarnego złotego klozetu, opala się po udanej ucieczce z Kijowa na plażach Izraela. Zresztą, pomijając wątek FP - jak powszechnie wiadomo, zaplecze administracji Zełeńskiego kasuje ekstra 20 do 30% bakszyszu na większości projektów zbrojeniowych. Mam w związku z tym pewne wątpliwości. Czy takie przeznaczenie tych pieniędzy - raz jeszcze przypominam: pożyczek, które będziemy spłacać - jest rzeczywiście zgodne z oryginalnie deklarowanymi celami SAFE? Czy to się spina z oryginalną narracją naszego rządu na temat tego programu? Czy Polska ma zaciągać pożyczki na rzecz projektu, w którym nie bierze udziału i który - jak można się spodziewać - służył będzie jako kolejny syfon korupcyjny dla ukraińskiej oligarchii? Ciekawe jest też - kto i gdzie podjął taką decyzję? Czy ktoś w ogóle konsultował tę sprawę z rządem w Warszawie? #SAFE #Ukraina #projektyzbrojeniowe

Proč musí MMR sedět na Staroměstském náměstí? Stát tam drží přes 11 000 m² na jedné z nejdražších adres v Česku. Zároveň v Praze soutěží o úředníky s trhem, kde VŠ bere v mediánu 76 tisíc, zatímco v MS kraji 56 tisíc. Přesun institucí do regionů není charita. Je to racionalizace státu: levnější provoz, lepší pozice při náboru a stovky kvalitních pracovních míst mimo Prahu. Plus ta symbolika :) #MMR #Praha #zaměstnanost