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Jura Háček asked Jindřich if the president should also take a photo of the train ticket to Košice and the receipt from Penny. He wrote that since Jindřich checks all of the president's vacations, nothing should be missing for him, and ended the post with an insult. https://t.co/Q120J62klg #humor #politika #Czechia (translated)

The author called for Czechia to adopt the euro, saying it would attract more investment, boost growth and wages, and help close the prosperity gap with Austria. They also proposed honoring Václav Havel on a Czech €2 coin. https://t.co/KbcGkiahTb #Czechia #Eurozone #Economy #CZ #EU #AT (translated)

The author said they had visited Czechia and Poland in March, where think tank staff, journalists and politicians seemed very enthusiastic about the war in Iran. They wrote that those people now appeared unhappy over what the author described as a major boost to Russia’s economy and war machine, and asked how to explain the change. #Czechia #Poland #IranWar #CZ #PL #IR #RU

The author claimed that the United States was buying diesel directly from Russia while sanctioning India for doing the same. They added that Estonia, Poland, Finland and Czechia appeared to support the policy in the name of transatlantic values. https://t.co/bCMrXWXnJv #Diesel #Sanctions #TransatlanticValues #US #RU #IN #EE #PL #FN #CZ

Czech literature is presented in Frankfurt as the honorary guest of the 78th International Book Fair, aiming to open doors to English and American markets, as emphasized by the head of the Czechia 2026 project Martin Krafle. #CzechLiterature #FrankfurtskýVeletrh #Cultura (translated)

The author proposed a new partnership between Austria and Czechia, describing it as a historic deal. The proposal included Austria joining NATO, major cross-border infrastructure investment and nuclear cooperation with ČEZ, as well as ending what the author called anti-Temelín populism. https://t.co/e6BfEjjPAj #Österreich #Tschechien #Partnerschaft #AT #CZ (translated)

PUTIN’S 12 ELECTION TARGETS? EUROPE MUST WATCH 2027 CLOSELY. 🇱🇻 Latvia 🇨🇿 Czechia 🇧🇬 Bulgaria 🇪🇪 Estonia 🇫🇮 Finland 🇫🇷 France 🇵🇱 Poland 🇸🇰 Slovakia 🇸🇮 Slovenia 🇮🇹 Italy 🇪🇸 Spain 🇬🇷 Greece Europe is entering a dense 2026–2027 election cycle while Russia’s war against Ukraine https://t.co/ka1OyJBjqY #Putin2027 #EuropeanElections #UkraineWar #LV #CZ #BG #EE #FN #FR #PL #SK #SI #IT #ES #GR

20 důvodů, proč je nový ratingový posudek S&P vysvědčením současné Babišovy vlády 1) Posudek vznikl až po nástupu Babišovy vlády. S&P nerozhodovala před volbami ani při sestavování kabinetu, ale 25. září 2026, tedy s několikaměsíční zkušeností s novou vládou a její politikou. 2) Agentura Babišovu vládu v textu jmenuje přímo, a to celkem 15krát (Fialova vláda je zmíněna jednou, další vlády ani jednou). Nejde tedy jen o anonymní hodnocení „České republiky“. S&P píše o vládě vedené ANO a o návratu Andreje Babiše do premiérské funkce. 3) S&P přímo posuzuje hospodářskou politiku nové vlády. Doslova očekává, že „economic management will remain prudent under the ANO-led government“. Agentura tedy předpokládá rozvážné hospodářské řízení právě za současného kabinetu. 4) Pozitivní výhled přichází navzdory tomu, že S&P dobře ví o fiskálním uvolnění. Agentura nepřehlédla vyšší výdaje ani rozvolnění rozpočtového rámce; naopak je výslovně zapracovává do prognózy. Přesto výhled zlepšila. 5) S&P zná vládní návrh deficitu na rok 2027. Výslovně uvádí, že vláda projektuje deficit sektoru vládních institucí 3,5 % HDP. Pozitivní rozhodnutí tedy nebylo učiněno bez znalosti vládního rozpočtového kurzu. 6) Agentura počítá s realizací vládního programu. Vyšší sociální výdaje, investice a uvolněnější fiskální politika nejsou pro S&P hypotetickým rizikem; jsou součástí jejího základního scénáře. Přesto neočekává rozpad české úvěrové kvality. 7) S&P předpokládá, že Babišův kabinet nepřekročí dlouhodobě fiskální mez. Agentura očekává, že schodky po roce 2027 opět klesnou pod 3 % HDP. To znamená, že nevychází ze scénáře nekontrolované fiskální expanze. 8) S&P je v jednom bodě dokonce optimističtější než vláda. Pro rok 2027 počítá s nižším deficitem, než jaký projektuje samotná vláda, protože očekává, že tradice fiskální obezřetnosti bude dál působit. 9) Agentura neočekává odklon od podnikatelsky orientované politiky. Přímo píše, že neočekává „break from Czechia's traditional pro-business policies“. To už je výrok velmi konkrétně vztahovaný k nové politické reprezentaci. 10) S&P neočekává roztržku s EU. Přestože zmiňuje suverénnější, na Česko zaměřenou, orientaci koalice, základní scénář počítá s „broadly constructive continuity“ ve vztazích s evropskými partnery. To je hodnocení politického rizika současné vlády. 11) Pozitivní výhled znamená důvěru v následujících 12 až 24 měsíců – tedy hlavně v období mandátu této vlády. S&P píše, že očekává zachování silných veřejných a vnějších bilancí právě v tomto horizontu. 12) Možné zlepšení ratingu má nastat rovněž během této vlády. Agentura výslovně připouští zvýšení ratingu během jednoho až dvou let. Pokud se tedy naplní její základní scénář, rozhodující období připadá na působení Babišova kabinetu. 13) S&P nevidí změnu vlády jako institucionální zlom. Ratingové agentury jsou citlivé na změny institucí a pravidel; S&P sice upozorňuje na rozvolnění fiskálního rámce, ale nevyvozuje z něj zásadní pokles kvality českých institucí. 14) Agentura považuje existující fiskální polštář za dostatečný i pro politiku nové vlády. Píše, že dosavadní rezervy a předchozí historie obezřetnosti poskytují „cushion for this policy shift“. Tedy: nový kurz je volnější, ale podle S&P ho české finance zatím unesou. 15) Vládní investiční politika je součástí pozitivního makro scénáře. S&P očekává průměrný růst 2,3 % v letech 2026–2029, přičemž domácí poptávku má podporovat i fiskální expanze. Fiskální uvolnění tedy agentura započítává je jako jeden z faktorů růstu. 16) Není to jen hodnocení zděděného roku 2025. S&P modeluje dluh, deficity, investice i hospodářskou politiku až do roku 2029. Velká část tohoto období tedy leží před současnou vládou, nikoli za ní. 17) Do prognózy je započten i jeden z největších projektů Babišovy nynější éry – Dukovany. S&P počítá s financováním dvou nových jaderných bloků a přesto hodnotí český dluh jako umírněný i na konci horizontu. 18) Agentura testuje současnou vládu i proti nepříznivému scénáři. Upozorňuje na drahé energie, geopolitiku, slabší zahraniční poptávku a problémy autoprůmyslu. Pozitivní výhled tedy nevychází z bezrizikového prostředí. 19) Kdyby S&P považovala politický obrat po nástupu Babiše za zásadní kreditní riziko, logičtější by bylo výhled nezlepšovat. Agentura sama uvádí, že výhled by mohla zhoršit, pokud by fiskální expanze signalizovala méně obezřetný institucionální rámec. Právě to nyní neudělala. Naopak. 20) S&P neříká pouze „v Česku je nač navazovat“, ale „očekáváme, že politika zůstane obezřetná pod vládou vedenou ANO“. Zároveň však agentura samozřejmě připisuje část síly Česka dlouhodobě nízkému zadlužení, ČNB, devizovým rezervám, bankám a předchozímu vývoji už od 90. let. #BabišovaVláda #S&P #Ekonomika

Evropský soud pro lidská práva rozhodl, že Česká republika porušila právo na život Stanislava Tomáše, který zemřel po policejním zásahu v Teplicích v roce 2021, a nařídil vyplatit jeho rodině odškodné ve výši 30 660 eur kvůli nedostatečnému dohledu policie nad jeho zdravotním stavem. #Czechia #lidskáPráva #policejníbrutalita

TRUMP PRESSURES EUROPE. PUTIN ATTACKS EUROPE. EUROPE ANSWERS WITH UNITY. 🇪🇺 My proposal is EURO ENLARGEMENT 2027–2029: Poland 🇵🇱 Romania 🇷🇴 Hungary 🇭🇺 Czechia 🇨🇿 Sweden 🇸🇪 and Denmark 🇩🇰 into a larger, stronger euro area. From Central and Eastern Europe to Scandinavia, Europe https://t.co/qPZhD2e7Ks #EuropeUnited #EuroEnlargement #StrongerTogether #PL #RO #HU #CZ #SE #DK

CZECHIA & THE EURO — THE 2027 PROPOSAL 🇨🇿🇪🇺💶 A proposed Czech euro strategy could set 2027 as the political turning point: enter ERM II immediately and complete euro adoption as soon as the EU treaty criteria permit. Czechia is not currently in ERM II, and EU rules require at https://t.co/sblBwswwpN #Czechia #Euro2027 #EUTreaty #CZ #EU

The Ghosts of Zaolzie – how a cyberattack tried to manufacture a conflict between Poland and Czechia At around 5pm on 16 August 2026, an alarming article appeared on the website of Radio PiK, a genuine Polish regional broadcaster. Its headline claimed that Poland was preparing to seize Czech territory and that the Czech Foreign Ministry had received a document outlining Warsaw's demands. Radio PiK had published no such story. An attacker had compromised an employee's credentials, gained access to the station's content management system and replaced a legitimate article with fabricated material. The newsroom quickly removed it and informed the authorities. But the intrusion was only one element of a much larger operation. Investigators subsequently uncovered forged diplomatic documents, accounts impersonating Polish and Czech officials, a cloned Czech news site, AI-generated material, a fictitious local activist and advertising for a demonstration that apparently did not exist. Together, these elements attempted to manufacture the appearance of a new territorial conflict between Poland and Czechia over Zaolzie. A false crisis built around a real territorial issue The operation worked because it did not start entirely with fiction. Poland and Czechia do have an unresolved technical issue concerning approximately 368.44 hectares of territory, originating in post-war changes to the Polish-Czechoslovak border. It is commonly described as the Czech “territorial debt” to Poland. But this is not a Polish claim to Zaolzie and there is no evidence that Warsaw is seeking to annex Czech territory. The operation fused this real issue with a much more powerful historical memory. Zaolzie – the part of Cieszyn Silesia west of the Olza River – was disputed by Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War. In 1938, during the crisis created by the Munich Agreement, Poland seized the territory from Czechoslovakia. The manipulation therefore followed a simple logic: a real territorial debt became an alleged Polish territorial demand, which was then transformed into a supposed attempt to reclaim Zaolzie. Fake accounts impersonating Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister Artur Harazim and Czech ambassador Břetislav Dančák helped reinforce the story. Fabricated diplomatic documents circulated alongside them. One early version referred incorrectly to 638.44 hectares; the fake Harazim account then “corrected” the number to the genuine figure of 368.44 hectares. It was an effective form of reverse fact-checking: correcting one false detail could make the larger fabrication appear authentic. Fake media – and one real newsroom The operators also created a website designed to resemble Czech public broadcaster iRozhlas. It published material supporting the same narrative, including claims that Czech residents near the border were becoming concerned about Polish intentions. The result was a manufactured information loop. Forged documents could support fake media reports; impersonated officials could comment on those reports; social-media accounts could then cite both as confirmation. But the Radio PiK hack added something much more valuable: the credibility of a real media organisation. Instead of merely cloning a newsroom, the attackers briefly inserted their fabrication into an authentic one. A familiar domain, logo and established broadcaster could therefore appear to confirm a story manufactured elsewhere. The cyberattack was not simply an accompanying technical incident. It was part of the information operation itself – a way of manufacturing credibility for false information. From a synthetic activist to a real demonstration The operation then attempted to move from the digital world into the physical one. A Facebook account under the name “Adam Sikora” promoted a demonstration in the Czech border city of Třinec under slogans including “Cieszyn Silesia is Czech” and “Here we live, here we stay”. Paid Facebook advertising was reportedly used to promote the event. Yet Třinec authorities said no demonstration had been properly notified. Promotional material used the logo of the Czech KOVO trade union, which denied any involvement. Investigators also identified indications that Sikora's profile photograph and other imagery were AI-generated. The persona even advertised a supposed house for sale in the border region, reinforcing the impression that frightened residents wanted to leave because of Polish territorial ambitions. The property could not be verified and its images also showed signs of artificial generation. This reveals the architecture of the operation: forged document → fake official → cloned media → compromised real media → synthetic local activist → advertised protest → appearance of social tension. The final stage is particularly significant. Had real people attended the demonstration, photographs of an authentic crowd could potentially have been presented as evidence that Czech citizens genuinely feared Polish territorial ambitions. A fabricated online conflict could therefore have begun generating real-world evidence of its own existence. Why Zaolzie? Historical grievances are valuable material for influence operations because the underlying facts are real. Poland and Czechoslovakia genuinely disputed Cieszyn Silesia. Poland genuinely occupied Zaolzie in 1938. A Polish minority genuinely lives in Czechia. And the 368.44-hectare territorial issue genuinely exists. The operator did not need to invent that history. It only needed to suggest that the history was repeating itself. PISM assessed that the operation sought to revive the image of Poland as a revisionist state willing to challenge European borders. Such a narrative could serve a broader purpose: damaging Polish-Czech relations, weakening confidence between NATO and EU allies and portraying Central Europe as a region where historical territorial conflicts remain unresolved. Russia is the leading attribution – but not a proven one The attribution requires more caution than the mechanics of the operation. PISM assessed Russia as the most likely perpetrator, while NASK identified similarities between the campaign and previously observed Russian influence methods. Russian-linked information infrastructure had also shown earlier interest in the Polish-Czech territorial issue. The techniques are familiar: cloned media, forged documents, impersonated officials, synthetic identities, historical grievances and the combination of cyber intrusion with information manipulation. But these indicators are not the same as definitive attribution. As of mid-September 2026, no publicly disclosed forensic evidence had conclusively connected the Radio PiK compromise, fake domains, accounts and financing to a specific Russian intelligence service, government organisation or contractor. Russia can therefore reasonably be described as the leading analytical attribution, but claims that the operation was definitively conducted by the GRU or another named Russian structure go beyond the publicly available evidence. The operation failed. The model remains important The campaign did not create a Polish-Czech diplomatic crisis. Both governments rejected the narrative, the fictitious protest was exposed, journalists reconstructed much of the operation and Radio PiK detected the intrusion quickly. Its observable impact appears to have been limited. But Zaolzie illustrates a broader evolution in information warfare. Modern operations do not have to rely on a single viral fake. They can construct an entire artificial information environment in which different elements appear to confirm one another. A forged document creates the claim. A fake diplomat authenticates it. A cloned newsroom reports it. A hacked real newsroom lends it credibility. An AI-generated citizen reacts to it. Advertising creates the appearance of a grassroots movement. And if real people eventually respond, fiction begins producing genuine events. The objective is no longer simply to persuade people that something happened. It is to create the conditions in which something real starts happening because enough people believed that it did. Sources: Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) https://pism.pl/publikacje/dezinformacja-o-relacjach-polsko-czeskich Euronews Polska — Radio PiK cyberattack https://pl.euronews.com/2026/08/20/polska-planuje-zajecie-terytorium-czech-wlamali-sie-na-strone-radia-i-opublikowali-falszyw Demagog https://demagog.org.pl/na-biezaco/skoordynowana-operacja-uderza-w-polsko-czeskie-relacje-czy-stoi-za-nia-rosja/ Robert Lansing Institute https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/08/27/zaolzie-as-an-instrument-of-influence-an-attempt-to-revive-a-polish-czech-territorial-conflict/ Institute for European Security Studies (IESS) https://www.iess.org.ua/analytics/ghosts-of-zaolzie iDNES.cz https://www.idnes.cz/ostrava/zpravy/tesinsko-kampan-lzi-demonstrace-trinec-primatorka-palkovska.A260826_963356_ostrava-zpravy_jog Radio Zachód / PAP https://zachod.pl/1539751/niedzielny-atak-hakerski-na-radio-pik-redaktor-naczelny-podjelismy-niezwloczne-dzialania/ Euronews — territorial debt / NASK assessment https://de.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/21/polen-plant-besetzung-tschechischen-gebiets-fake-news TVP World https://tvpworld.com/95036191/-warsaw-warns-against-division-amid-czech-border-disinformation Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode5 #GhostsOfZaolzie #Zaolzie #Poland #Czechia #CieszynSilesia #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Cyberattack #CyberSecurity #HybridWarfare #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #ForgedDocuments #DigitalImpersonation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Astroturfing #RussianInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #NATO #CentralEurope #MediaManipulation #WRLD

1 in 6 jobs in Czechia depends on trade beyond the EU - the potential is only growing. The new trade landscape is accelerating our negotiations. Glad to be in Prague for discussions with government and business about our fast-moving trade, economic security agenda. #EUExportDay https://t.co/lMu3itnrX9 #CzechTrade #EconomicSecurity #EUExportDay #CZ

Wild story from Czechia: a prankster posing as the operator of an anonymous conspiracy account contacted Foreign Minister Petr Macinka. Within hours, Macinka agreed to meet him secretly, without police protection, at a site staged with fake weapons and explosives. https://t.co/xIPVe43wWT #Czechia #prank #conspiracy #CZ

What a day for 🇨🇿 Czechia... First 🇨🇿 Jablonec eliminated 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 Rangers. Then 🇨🇿 Viktoria Plzen overturned a 3-0 deficit v 🇷🇸 Crvena zvezda! https://t.co/g1RhIYMFyw #Czechia #Football #UEFA