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Le président argentin Javier Milei a décrit l'ONU comme une organisation inutile qui ne sert qu'à nourrir une caste de parasites lors de son discours à l'Assemblée générale, tout en critiquant son inaction sur les revendications de souveraineté sur les îles Malouines et les craintes liées à l'intelligence artificielle. #JavierMilei #ONU #IntelligenceArtificielle

On est déjà dans la crise pétrolière. Beaucoup de gens ne peuvent plus faire le plein. Certains en sont à choisir entre se nourrir ou faire le plein. Il faut bloquer les prix. Et vite ! https://t.co/doLrrRSTc2 #CrisePétrolière #PrixDesCarburants #SoutienAuxConsommateurs

Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

Est-ce que notre objectif c'est d'être compétitif avec la nourriture brésilienne, ou est-ce que c'est de bien nourrir les Français ? Nous devons changer de cap pour l'agriculture française, pour s'assurer que les paysans et les agriculteurs aient des revenus qui soient liés à https://t.co/lsnoEwqpZd #AgricultureFrançaise #Nourriture #Compétitivité #BR #FR

Mme von der Leyen, le XXIe siècle nous rappelle une vérité que l’Europe avait oubliée : les peuples qui ne savent plus défendre leurs frontières, faire tourner leurs usines, produire leur énergie ou nourrir leurs enfants remettent leur destin entre les mains des autres. Depuis https://t.co/RTM0qWKU3v #Europe #Souveraineté #Énergie #L'Europe #donclepaysassociéestl'UnionEuropéenne.Cependant #letweetnementionnepasdepaysspécifiqueparsoncode. Iln'yapasdecodedepaysàextraire. Sivousrecherchezl'UE #soncodeestEU #maisaucunautrecodedepaysspécifiquen'estmentionnédansletexte.

Le plein d'essence dépasse 100€. Des millions de gens choisissent entre se nourrir, se loger, se déplacer. Pendant ce temps les pétroliers ont multiplié leurs marges par 4. Mme @vonderleyen, qu'attendez-vous pour bloquer les prix et taxer les superprofits ? Que l'essence https://t.co/yihJJztEsX #Essence #Superprofits #CriseÉconomique #FR

Comme l’Espagne et le Portugal du 16e siècle, qui pensaient avoir une abondance éternelle garantie par l’or des Amériques, la France pense depuis longtemps que rien ne peut lui arriver parce qu’elle aurait les moyens de se nourrir. Cet aveuglement a conduit et conduira à la https://t.co/kxdPzQl8Lp #Histoire #France #IllusionÉconomique #ES #PT #FR

Plus d'un quart des Français se déclarent en situation de précarité énergétique, une tendance qui s'accentue, selon le baromètre du Secours populaire, avec des conséquences graves sur leur capacité à se nourrir et à couvrir leurs dépenses essentielles. #PrécaritéÉnergétique #CriseÉnergétique #SecoursPopulaire

Nous avons encore une fois fait une très belle annonce ce matin. C’est clair que le PCQ, c’est le parti qui défend les travailleurs et le monde ordinaire. Les Québécois qui se lèvent tôt, qui ne comptent pas leurs heures et qui donnent le meilleur d’eux-mêmes pour avoir assez d’argent pour nourrir leur famille et vivre dignement. Les syndicats peuvent jouer un rôle positif pour les travailleurs. Mais pour que les syndicats restent dans l’intérêt de celles et ceux qui travaillent tous les jours pour le Québec, ça prend plus de démocratie syndicale et de transparence. Oser, pour vrai. #Travailleurs #Québec #Syndicats

Dans notre pays, avant des chiffres et des abstractions, il y a des êtres humains qui ont droit à leur part de bonheur. Voilà de quoi un gouvernement insoumis s'occupera. Nous rétablirons l'ordre ! L'ordre de la dignité, du droit au logement, de se nourrir, d'être soignés. https://t.co/2g3dG73wMv #Dignité #DroitAuLogement #Bonheur #FR

⚡️🇫🇷FLASH - Devant une foule compacte à la braderie de #Lille, Jean-Luc #Mélenchon a déclaré que « la France n’est plus un pays souverain » sur le plan #alimentaire, incapable selon lui de nourrir sa population avec ses propres productions. Il appelle à produire davantage de « carottes » et de « tomates » plutôt que « du maïs pour nourrir les poulets chinois », et promet le #bio gratuit à la cantine pour tous les enfants : « Cela fera des économies de santé (…) le cancer et le diabète sont des maladies politiques », a-t-il ajouté. #Lille #Mélenchon #Agriculture

Quand on est dans un pays où il y a 10 millions de pauvres qui ont déjà des difficultés pour se nourrir correctement, on ne peut pas laisser les consommateurs supporter le coût de l’inflation alimentaire. Il faut donc encadrer les marges de la grande distribution et des https://t.co/Nol6GRL3bP #InflationAlimentaire #Pauvreté #GrandeDistribution #FR

🚨 La santé des femmes en situation de précarité : un enjeu réel, mais éclaté entre santé, social, hébergement et droits. Par où commencer ? 📒 Promotion de la santé des femmes en situation de précarité : repères pour la pratique et mises en œuvre inspirantes ✍️ Émilie Bec — CREAI-ORS Occitanie · DRAPPS Occitanie (ARS Occitanie) Sur ce sujet, l'information utile est dispersée dans des dizaines de rapports. Ce document réunit une sélection de ressources récentes — du frottis-truck aux dispositifs « aller vers » — et précise, pour chacune, ce qu'elle apporte et où la trouver. Sa force n'est pas d'être un mode d'emploi clé en main, mais un point d'entrée pour repérer, orienter et agir : monter une action, argumenter un projet, nourrir une formation. Un vrai gain de temps de veille pour les équipes de terrain. 👉 Mon analyse et le document source sont à retrouver ici : https://www.pratiquesensante.com/blog/pratiques-15/promotion-de-la-sante-des-femmes-en-situation-de-precarite-reperes-pour-la-pratique-et-mises-en-%C5%93uvre-inspirantes-6155 🎙️ À écouter également : la capsule audio/vidéo de Pratiques en Santé. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-05kLyJIFE&t=4s #PratiquesEnSanté #PromotionSanté #SantéDesFemmes #InégalitésDeSanté #AllerVers #Précarité #SantéCommunautaire

La sécurité sociale, la protection des travailleuses et travailleurs, la capacité de loger et de nourrir son peuple et notamment les plus fragiles, voilà ce qui nous rend fiers d’être françaises et français. 🇫🇷 #Melenchon2027 https://t.co/o3CKd207sc #Solidarité #France #DroitsDesTravailleurs