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Vláďa Foltán wrote that Volodymyr Zelenskyy "was fact-checking Trump" and pointed out that prices are rising due to the war in the Middle East and the blockade of Hormuz. According to Foltán, almost everyone understands this, and people should hear what the reality is. He called for fair and open communication with the public and for the "playing" with them to stop. https://t.co/d64ZuWGuqx #Zelenskyj #válka #politika (translated)

We'll see each other tomorrow - Shmoo wrote that former Prime Minister Leszek Miller has shared the profile of the Legal Services Center. The author claimed that the account is directly linked to the Lega Artis service, which fact-checking organizations have repeatedly described as a part of a network spreading Russian propaganda coming from Sputnik and RIA Novosti. #propaganda #faktczekowanie #LegArtis (translated)

The author claimed that Arcom now wanted to regulate political podcasts that were outside its control. He also accused the government of launching its own X account dedicated to fact-checking to silence critics, believing that its policy was leading to a budgetary disaster accompanied by austerity. https://t.co/vgCzoxGcUB #podcast #politique #factchecking #FR (translated)

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)

Cerfia indicated that the government had launched a fact-checking account on X called "Let's Be Precise." According to the media, it was meant to address information deemed false or misleading, particularly regarding the 2027 budget, relying on facts, figures, and official sources, and to promote a debate based on verifiable data. #FactChecking #Budget2027 #Vérité (translated)

The post said high blood pressure often caused no symptoms but could increase the risk of heart attack and stroke. During EU Screening Week, it said it was encouraging people, alongside the European Society of Cardiology, to know their blood pressure figures, noting that a check took less than a minute.

Luiz Fux faz uma espécie de ‘fact checking’ da decisão de Flávio Dino: “Nenhuma decisão do TSE proibiu a defesa de Nossa Senhora Aparecida ou de sua condição de Padroeira. A ordem eleitoral proibiu o contrário: a afirmação inverídica, como fato, de que o candidato pretende retirar-lhe o título. A decisão (de Dino) cassou, assim, uma proibição que não existe, e restabeleceu a circulação de uma afirmação cuja falsidade ninguém, nem mesmo o peticionário, sustentou nos autos.” #Justiça #FactChecking #Eleições

“You could be a billionaire and get Obamacare.” Dr. Oz says a Soros-funded group is using the courts to block CMS from stopping fraud in Obamacare. “We believe Soros funded a lawfare group… It’s an aligned group with the Democratic Party who has sued us 150 times on these issues.” “They just won a suit… that blocks us from checking the tax returns of people on Obamacare.” “That’s how you destroy a system.” https://x.com/MAHA_Action/status/2104194351760892164

The Ghosts of Zaolzie – how a cyberattack tried to manufacture a conflict between Poland and Czechia At around 5pm on 16 August 2026, an alarming article appeared on the website of Radio PiK, a genuine Polish regional broadcaster. Its headline claimed that Poland was preparing to seize Czech territory and that the Czech Foreign Ministry had received a document outlining Warsaw's demands. Radio PiK had published no such story. An attacker had compromised an employee's credentials, gained access to the station's content management system and replaced a legitimate article with fabricated material. The newsroom quickly removed it and informed the authorities. But the intrusion was only one element of a much larger operation. Investigators subsequently uncovered forged diplomatic documents, accounts impersonating Polish and Czech officials, a cloned Czech news site, AI-generated material, a fictitious local activist and advertising for a demonstration that apparently did not exist. Together, these elements attempted to manufacture the appearance of a new territorial conflict between Poland and Czechia over Zaolzie. A false crisis built around a real territorial issue The operation worked because it did not start entirely with fiction. Poland and Czechia do have an unresolved technical issue concerning approximately 368.44 hectares of territory, originating in post-war changes to the Polish-Czechoslovak border. It is commonly described as the Czech “territorial debt” to Poland. But this is not a Polish claim to Zaolzie and there is no evidence that Warsaw is seeking to annex Czech territory. The operation fused this real issue with a much more powerful historical memory. Zaolzie – the part of Cieszyn Silesia west of the Olza River – was disputed by Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War. In 1938, during the crisis created by the Munich Agreement, Poland seized the territory from Czechoslovakia. The manipulation therefore followed a simple logic: a real territorial debt became an alleged Polish territorial demand, which was then transformed into a supposed attempt to reclaim Zaolzie. Fake accounts impersonating Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister Artur Harazim and Czech ambassador Břetislav Dančák helped reinforce the story. Fabricated diplomatic documents circulated alongside them. One early version referred incorrectly to 638.44 hectares; the fake Harazim account then “corrected” the number to the genuine figure of 368.44 hectares. It was an effective form of reverse fact-checking: correcting one false detail could make the larger fabrication appear authentic. Fake media – and one real newsroom The operators also created a website designed to resemble Czech public broadcaster iRozhlas. It published material supporting the same narrative, including claims that Czech residents near the border were becoming concerned about Polish intentions. The result was a manufactured information loop. Forged documents could support fake media reports; impersonated officials could comment on those reports; social-media accounts could then cite both as confirmation. But the Radio PiK hack added something much more valuable: the credibility of a real media organisation. Instead of merely cloning a newsroom, the attackers briefly inserted their fabrication into an authentic one. A familiar domain, logo and established broadcaster could therefore appear to confirm a story manufactured elsewhere. The cyberattack was not simply an accompanying technical incident. It was part of the information operation itself – a way of manufacturing credibility for false information. From a synthetic activist to a real demonstration The operation then attempted to move from the digital world into the physical one. A Facebook account under the name “Adam Sikora” promoted a demonstration in the Czech border city of Třinec under slogans including “Cieszyn Silesia is Czech” and “Here we live, here we stay”. Paid Facebook advertising was reportedly used to promote the event. Yet Třinec authorities said no demonstration had been properly notified. Promotional material used the logo of the Czech KOVO trade union, which denied any involvement. Investigators also identified indications that Sikora's profile photograph and other imagery were AI-generated. The persona even advertised a supposed house for sale in the border region, reinforcing the impression that frightened residents wanted to leave because of Polish territorial ambitions. The property could not be verified and its images also showed signs of artificial generation. This reveals the architecture of the operation: forged document → fake official → cloned media → compromised real media → synthetic local activist → advertised protest → appearance of social tension. The final stage is particularly significant. Had real people attended the demonstration, photographs of an authentic crowd could potentially have been presented as evidence that Czech citizens genuinely feared Polish territorial ambitions. A fabricated online conflict could therefore have begun generating real-world evidence of its own existence. Why Zaolzie? Historical grievances are valuable material for influence operations because the underlying facts are real. Poland and Czechoslovakia genuinely disputed Cieszyn Silesia. Poland genuinely occupied Zaolzie in 1938. A Polish minority genuinely lives in Czechia. And the 368.44-hectare territorial issue genuinely exists. The operator did not need to invent that history. It only needed to suggest that the history was repeating itself. PISM assessed that the operation sought to revive the image of Poland as a revisionist state willing to challenge European borders. Such a narrative could serve a broader purpose: damaging Polish-Czech relations, weakening confidence between NATO and EU allies and portraying Central Europe as a region where historical territorial conflicts remain unresolved. Russia is the leading attribution – but not a proven one The attribution requires more caution than the mechanics of the operation. PISM assessed Russia as the most likely perpetrator, while NASK identified similarities between the campaign and previously observed Russian influence methods. Russian-linked information infrastructure had also shown earlier interest in the Polish-Czech territorial issue. The techniques are familiar: cloned media, forged documents, impersonated officials, synthetic identities, historical grievances and the combination of cyber intrusion with information manipulation. But these indicators are not the same as definitive attribution. As of mid-September 2026, no publicly disclosed forensic evidence had conclusively connected the Radio PiK compromise, fake domains, accounts and financing to a specific Russian intelligence service, government organisation or contractor. Russia can therefore reasonably be described as the leading analytical attribution, but claims that the operation was definitively conducted by the GRU or another named Russian structure go beyond the publicly available evidence. The operation failed. The model remains important The campaign did not create a Polish-Czech diplomatic crisis. Both governments rejected the narrative, the fictitious protest was exposed, journalists reconstructed much of the operation and Radio PiK detected the intrusion quickly. Its observable impact appears to have been limited. But Zaolzie illustrates a broader evolution in information warfare. Modern operations do not have to rely on a single viral fake. They can construct an entire artificial information environment in which different elements appear to confirm one another. A forged document creates the claim. A fake diplomat authenticates it. A cloned newsroom reports it. A hacked real newsroom lends it credibility. An AI-generated citizen reacts to it. Advertising creates the appearance of a grassroots movement. And if real people eventually respond, fiction begins producing genuine events. The objective is no longer simply to persuade people that something happened. It is to create the conditions in which something real starts happening because enough people believed that it did. Sources: Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) https://pism.pl/publikacje/dezinformacja-o-relacjach-polsko-czeskich Euronews Polska — Radio PiK cyberattack https://pl.euronews.com/2026/08/20/polska-planuje-zajecie-terytorium-czech-wlamali-sie-na-strone-radia-i-opublikowali-falszyw Demagog https://demagog.org.pl/na-biezaco/skoordynowana-operacja-uderza-w-polsko-czeskie-relacje-czy-stoi-za-nia-rosja/ Robert Lansing Institute https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/08/27/zaolzie-as-an-instrument-of-influence-an-attempt-to-revive-a-polish-czech-territorial-conflict/ Institute for European Security Studies (IESS) https://www.iess.org.ua/analytics/ghosts-of-zaolzie iDNES.cz https://www.idnes.cz/ostrava/zpravy/tesinsko-kampan-lzi-demonstrace-trinec-primatorka-palkovska.A260826_963356_ostrava-zpravy_jog Radio Zachód / PAP https://zachod.pl/1539751/niedzielny-atak-hakerski-na-radio-pik-redaktor-naczelny-podjelismy-niezwloczne-dzialania/ Euronews — territorial debt / NASK assessment https://de.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/21/polen-plant-besetzung-tschechischen-gebiets-fake-news TVP World https://tvpworld.com/95036191/-warsaw-warns-against-division-amid-czech-border-disinformation Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode5 #GhostsOfZaolzie #Zaolzie #Poland #Czechia #CieszynSilesia #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Cyberattack #CyberSecurity #HybridWarfare #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #ForgedDocuments #DigitalImpersonation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Astroturfing #RussianInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #NATO #CentralEurope #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Tady končí legrace. Sezname, Marie, budíček! Dnešní rozhovor Marie Bastlové s Petrem Hladíkem vstoupí do historie politického marketingu z dílny Seznam Zpráv. Rozhovor je zde - https://t.co/krjpwhB4Td V části od 15:20 se Marie Bastlová Petra Hladíka ptá, "Co dalšího se na Vás snaží Vaší nástupci najít? Najdou něco, definitivně zavážného? Ha, ha, ha," (Bastlová se otevřeně směje). Petr Hladík odpovídá, "Nenajdou nic, v žádném případě, řídil jsem ministerstvo s veškerou odpovědností." Moderátorka pak zmiňuje oblasti, které se prý "zpochybňují", například oblast větrných elektráren, solárních dotací a kauza Výzkumného ústavu pro krajinu. Hladík odpovídá, že o tom nic neví. Bastlová se opět usměje a "hardtalk" končí. Stačí Hladíkovo rezolutní "ne, jsem čistý jak lilie" a Marie Bastlová se s úsměvem přesune k dalšímu tématu, aniž by šla do detailu. Jenže je tu realita, od které se Seznam Zprávy prostřednictvím Bastlové snaží odvést pozornost jinam. „Po přezkoumání obsahu podání a samotného článku z médií státní zástupce zjistil, že se ve věci může jednat o neoprávněné nakládání s dotačními prostředky pocházejícími z rozpočtu Evropské unie, a to v řádů milionů Kč,“ uvedl státní zástupce Michal Hanych. https://t.co/BGIsc9Cpou Desítky projektů solárních projektů byly rozděleny na menší, aby získaly 2,2 krát vyšší dotaci a holding Solar Global, jehož majitel podpořil Petra Pavla 1 milionem korun, je dnes vyšetřován evropskou prokuraturou. Hladík dotace podepsal. Finančním ředitelem holdingu je Tomáš Buzrla, ředitel Svazu moderní energetiky. Ano, toho svazu, odkud měl Hladík dva poradce - bývalé zaměstnance Hnutí DUHA, Martina Sedláka a Martina Andera. Solární tunel, zdroj - https://t.co/qfCa2tlQVQ Hladík, poradci - https://t.co/wjIy0UC7N6 Ne, Bastlové stačí Hladíkovo rezolutní ne, jsem čistý jako lilie. Na provázanost poradců s holdingem se neptá, na stamilionové škody šetřené evropskou prokuraturou - násobně vyšší než objem investičních dotací Agrofertu - také nepřijde řeč. Zpochybňování větrných elektráren? A že je co zpochybňovat. "Jedním z bodů jednání bude i vztah dosavadních výstupů k „nezbytným oblastem“ a k existujícím studiím rozmístění OZE, resp. probíhajícím změnám ZÚR k OZE v části krajů. " To píše Petr Holub v e-mailu ze dne 20. 11., který má redakce Deníku P k dispozici. Proč je nutné zahrnout existující studie do akceleračních zón? Chce to "M", tedy Martin Sedlák, zástupce investorů do větrné energetiky. Ten stejný Martin Sedlák, který na tvorbu akceleračních zón dohlíží, jak dokládá jiný zápis z porady Výzkumného ústavu pro krajinu. Výřez mail, foto v příspěvku Výřez zápis - foto v příspěvku Ten samý Martin Sedlák, který za ministerstvo koordinuje kampaň k propagaci akceleračních zón, které vytváří na míru svým chlebodárcům, členům Svazu moderní energetiky. Sedlák má na starost fact-checking, tedy určení, které informace o zónách jsou za stát (!!!) komunikovány a které jsou označeny za dezinformace. Důkaz, foto v příspěvku (Ondra je Ondřej Novák z PR agentury https://t.co/XkNszoDegy) Ten samý Sedlák, poradce ministra, který v letech 2024 a 2025 inkasuje od Hladíka 12 milionů do svých vlastních firem (!!!). Organizuje předvolební setkání v krajích, kde jsou propagovány akcelerační zóny. Smlouva 1 - https://t.co/yTDtdIqSCG Smlouva 2 - https://t.co/oyHp8iFemJ Ministerstvo platí penězi daňových poplatníků lobbistu, který lobbuje za zájmy svých klientů jménem státu (!!!). Ten samý lobbista koordinuje státní informační kampaň (!!!) a určuje, co stát (!!!) komunikovat bude, a co již ne. Důkaz, foto v příspěvku Ten samý Sedlák, podle zdrojů redakce Deníku P, řídil úřednické porady a na ministerstvo nasadil zaměstnance vlastní PR agentury https://t.co/XkNszoDegy, aby vytvářeli redakční výstupy jménem státu (!!!!!) a distribuovali je do médií. Důkaz - task-list MŽP, foto v příspěvku A nyní přijde ta pointa. Ten samý Sedlák si "koupil" i Marii Bastlovou. Byla to právě Bastlová, která moderovala státem placená předvolební setkání po boku Hladíka i Sedláka, a nemoderovala je zdarma. Platil jí Sedlákův Svaz moderní energetiky. Důkaz - úvodní foto, Marie Bastlová je po boku Petra Hladíka na akci lobbistů ve velmi dobré náladě https://t.co/0qxWRixjZj Nešlo o ojedinělý případ. Bastlová se Sedlákem spolupracovala na komerční bázi pravidelně. Moderovala podcast Pod Proudem Sedlákovy PR agentury Obnovitelně, který taktéž získal od daňových poplatníků bezmála 2 miliony korun. Video, Bastlová+Sedlák - https://t.co/FMEOD5On1T Jeden z dílů, který Bastlová moderovala, se jmenuje "Skupina JRD oslavila 20 let. Chce postavit další větrný park." Skupina JRD byla přitom jednou z firem, kterým měl Sedlák "na míru" připravovat akcelerační zóny v oblastech jejich plánovaných projektů. Téma brzy v detailu rozvedu i s doprovodnými dokumenty. Státem placené angažmá Marie Bastlové u lobbistů za OZE nekompromituje jen moderátorku, ale i jejího zaměstnavatele. Stamilionové solární dotace tedy vyšetřuje Evropský úřad veřejného žalobce pro možný podvod - Bastlová se u kauzy nezastaví. Akcelerační zóny prokazatelně, podle dokumentů samotného ministerstva, vytvářeli lobbisté, lobbisté také určovali jejich rozsah a lobbisté tento projekt komunikovali jménem státu. Marie Bastlová se u těchto kauz ale zastavit nemůže. Sama se totožnými lobbisty nechala "koupit" a nebylo jí divné moderovat podcast financovaný poradcem ministra nebo akci za peníze daňových poplatníků, kde vystupuje po boku poradce ministra a samotného ministra. Kdyby šlo o Michala Půra, byl by oheň na střeše. Bastlová nemůže zabřednout ani do kauzy Výzkumného ústavu pro krajinu. Ta je přitom jasná jako facka. Účastníci porady ze dne 22. listopadu si předem rozdělili peníze a zakázky, politička hnutí STAN si dokonce od vítězného dodavatele "zajistila" 80 % majetkového podílu pro sebe a manžela ve firmě, která následně získala 1,52 milionu korun. Eva Volfová přitom nad rámec tohoto "kusu koláče" získala smlouvu od Výzkumného ústavu pro krajinu za další 2 miliony. Znovu by se objevilo Sedlákovo jméno. A s ním i faktury, redakční výstupy a další detaily týkající se Seznam Zpráv. Do detailu je kauza popsaná zde - https://t.co/2hS0o9UQ6r Věc popsal i server iDNES, kdyby bylo citování Pauknera zločinem - https://t.co/t8F7CKEqTV I proto moderátorka "hardtalku" absolutně pomíjí detaily zveřejněné na tiskové konferenci MŽP, které publikoval server iDNES. Jinak by se Hladíka zeptala, zda je normální, že si hodnotitelka tendru za 9 milionů a aktivní politička hnutí STAN před vypsáním zakázky zajistí v jedné z vítězných firem 80 % vlastnický podíl, zatímco je sama odpovědná za výběr dodavatele. Volfová STAN, manžel, přepis podílu před tendrem VÚKOZ - https://t.co/5QnZVip5SE Nešlo přitom o nic menšího, než o podobu krajiny České republiky. Ale to podle Bastlové zřejmě není důležité - ha, ha, ha. A je toho daleko více. Hlavní tvář média s rozpočtem 180 milionů, od které občané čekají nepříjemné otázky a připravenost, se nechala "koupit", tudíž se usmívá nad kauzami Petra Hladíka a odbyde otázky po prostém "ne, jsem čistý jako lilie" ministra, jehož resort je vyšetřován v několika zásadních a závažných pochybeních. Další kauzy začnou vyplouvat na povrch již brzy. Bohužel nemám rozpočet přes 350 milionů ročně jako Seznam Zprávy a Novinky, nebo 90 milionů ročně jako Deník N. Kdyby tato média dělala svou práci, Petr Hladík je i s Martinem Sedlákem již dávno diskvalifikován pro jakoukoli politickou funkci. Důvodů jsou desítky. Obstarávání neveřejných dokumentů a jejich následné ověřování je týdny trvající řehole. Dává-li vám tedy práce projektu Paukner Media smysl, můžete jej podpořit předplatným ve výši poplatku za Českou televizi. Na rozdíl od Seznam Zpráv nerozlišuji "hodnotové" a "zavrženíhodné" dotační i jiné podvody. https://t.co/EbnFIdwXFO Nyní pro vás například dokumentuji případ 14 Čapích hnízd, které nechal Hladíkův resort vyrůst po České republice. I kvůli tomu vychází textů méně, neboť objíždíme republiku a projekty, kde mohla vzniknout škoda způsobená dotačním podvodem za 700 milionů, natáčíme, navštěvujeme a dokumentujeme. Opět za nimi stojí Martin Sedlák s Petrem Hladíkem. Ten Hladík, který je čistý jako lilie a obávané Marii Bastlové stačí jeho prosté ne, aby veškeré kauzy přešla a s nadšením se vrhla do tématu, jak jsou Hladíkovi nástupci hrozní, příšerní a hrůzostrašní. O to přeci v celém rozhovoru jde, nebo ne? Šalom. Foto Bastlová, Hladík - Svaz moderní energetiky Foto dokumenty: Deník P #politika #českárepublika #mediálnídiskuze

Mise au point de PASTEF-Les Patriotes Face aux déclarations fantaisistes et mensongères tenues récemment par le ministre Abdoulahad Ndiaye, PASTEF-Les Patriotes tient à apporter une clarification ferme afin de rassurer l'ensemble des militants et sympathisants. Le nom de domaine https://t.co/OYCd0jUP38 est la propriété exclusive et inaliénable du parti. Il est entièrement sous le contrôle des instances officielles habilitées, et les prétentions du sieur Ndiaye selon lesquelles ce nom de domaine lui appartiendrait relèvent de la pure fabulation. Par ailleurs, le sieur Ndiaye n’a jamais été associé, ni de près ni de loin, à aucune étape du processus de conception, de mise en place ou de gestion de la plateforme de vente des cartes de membres. Il ne dispose d'aucun accès, ni d'aucun levier sur nos systèmes. Nous tenons à rassurer l'ensemble des patriotes : les opérations d'adhésion et de vente de cartes de membres se poursuivent en toute sécurité. Abdoulahad Ndiaye n’a qu’à mettre ses menaces à exécution, comme il prétend en avoir la capacité ou se taire à jamais. Ses gesticulations témoignent d’une peur de la vague Pastef et ne sont que de la manipulation. *Dans le contexte actuel, un ministre devrait avoir d’autres préoccupations que de faire le tour des plateaux pour fabuler.* PASTEF - Les Patriotes ne sera jamais perturbé par ces quêtes d'attention. Nous vous donnons rendez-vous dans notre émission Màj, pour notre rubrique Fact-checking. Restez focus! #PASTEF #Politique #Sénégal

📌Mise au point de PASTEF-Les Patriotes Face aux déclarations fantaisistes et mensongères tenues récemment par le ministre Abdoulahad Ndiaye, PASTEF-Les Patriotes tient à apporter une clarification ferme afin de rassurer l'ensemble des militants et sympathisants. Le nom de domaine https://t.co/yc4TExPNUi est la propriété exclusive et inaliénable du parti. Il est entièrement sous le contrôle des instances officielles habilitées, et les prétentions du sieur Ndiaye selon lesquelles ce nom de domaine lui appartiendrait relèvent de la pure fabulation. Par ailleurs, le sieur Ndiaye n’a jamais été associé, ni de près ni de loin, à aucune étape du processus de conception, de mise en place ou de gestion de la plateforme de vente des cartes de membres. Il ne dispose d'aucun accès, ni d'aucun levier sur nos systèmes. Nous tenons à rassurer l'ensemble des patriotes : les opérations d'adhésion et de vente de cartes de membres se poursuivent en toute sécurité. Abdoulahad Ndiaye n’a qu’à mettre ses menaces à exécution, comme il prétend en avoir la capacité ou se taire à jamais. Ses gesticulations témoignent d’une peur de la vague Pastef et ne sont que de la manipulation. Dans le contexte actuel, un ministre devrait avoir d’autres préoccupations que de faire le tour des plateaux pour fabuler. PASTEF - Les Patriotes ne sera jamais perturbé par ces quêtes d'attention. Nous vous donnons rendez-vous dans notre émission Màj, pour notre rubrique Fact-checking. Restez focus! #PASTEF #PolitiqueSénégal #DéclarationOfficielle

Questo post, ha al suo interno il contributo AI, tempo di lettura 10min: Questo contenuto fa parte di una strategia di disinformazione russa molto specifica. Il video in questione, che mostra un soldato apparentemente ammanettato all'interno di un autobus con scritte in italiano che attaccano il "regime di Zelensky", è in realtà un falso clamoroso architettato dalla propaganda del Cremlino. [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...), [2] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336)Le verifiche indipendenti condotte dalle agenzie di intelligence e di fact-checking mettono in luce la vera natura del filmato: [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...), [2] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336)1. Chi c'è davvero nel video?Il Centro per il contrasto alla disinformazione ucraino (CCI) e diverse testate giornalistiche internazionali hanno analizzato il filmato originale. È emerso che: [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...), [2] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336)Gli uomini ammanettati sul mezzo sono soldati russi, nello specifico appartenenti alla 15ª Brigata Fucilieri Motorizzati delle Guardie della Federazione Russa. [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...), [2] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336)Nel video originale non censurato (nato sui canali russi per denunciare i problemi interni al loro stesso esercito), i militari parlano con un marcato accento russo e non indossano in alcun modo le divise ufficiali delle Forze di Difesa ucraine. [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...), [2] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336)La didascalia originaria del video, rintracciata su canali Telegram russi di protesta, recitava originariamente: "I disertori del 108° Reggimento d'Assalto Aereo vengono portati a una missione di combattimento in manette". [1] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336)2. Come opera il ribaltamento della propaganda pro-Putin?I canali di propaganda russa e i profili complottisti occidentali (inclusi quelli italiani come l'account "Cronos" nello screenshot) hanno preso questo video, lo hanno decontestualizzato e ne hanno ribaltato la narrazione. [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...)Hanno aggiunto scritte ad effetto come "Il reclutamento forzato del regime Zelensky" per far credere che l'esercito ucraino sia alla disperazione, ridotto a legare i propri cittadini pur di mandarli al fronte. [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...), [2] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336)Il contesto reale (perché la fake news attecchisce)Questa narrazione funziona tra i complottisti perché fa leva su un briciolo di dibattito reale. È vero che in Ucraina la mobilitazione militare è un tema teso e divisivo, e che la nuova legge sulla leva ha generato forti discussioni interne nel paese. Tuttavia, la propaganda russa cavalca sistematicamente questo argomento creando falsi totali (attori che recitano la parte di reclutatori violenti, o video russi riciclati come questo) con tre scopi precisi: [1] (https://www.avvenire.it/.../ucraina-ribellioni-contro-la...), [2] (https://www.rsi.ch/.../L%E2%80%99Ucraina-e-i-reclutamenti...), [3] (https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/.../kremlin-claims-1-7-million...), [4] (https://cpd.gov.ua/.../fake-video-about-mobilization-in.../)Demoralizzare la popolazione ucraina e i suoi sostenitori.Creare l'illusione che la Russia stia vincendo facilmente e che l'Ucraina non abbia più uomini.Convincere l'opinione pubblica occidentale che sostenere Kyiv sia inutile perché "il popolo non vuole combattere". [1] (https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/.../kremlin-claims-1-7-million...), [2] (https://time.com/.../russia-disinformation-ukraine.../)In conclusione, siamo davanti a un classico esempio di specchio riflesso: la propaganda mostra i metodi coercitivi usati dall'esercito russo sui propri soldati ribelli e li attribuisce al nemico per infangarlo. [1] (https://unn.ua/.../propagandists-spread-a-fake-video-of...), [2] (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46336) A ri-propagare queste fake, i componenti delle così dette "camere di compensazione": All'interno di queste comunità chiuse si attivano dei meccanismi psicologici e digitali precisi: Il bias di conferma: Le persone che frequentano questi spazi non cercano la verità dei fatti, ma la conferma di ciò in cui credono già (ad esempio: "Zelensky è un dittatore", "I media ci nascondono tutto"). Se un video supporta questa tesi, viene accettato immediatamente senza alcuna verifica. La polarizzazione e l'isolamento: Chiunque provi a portare prove reali o a fare fact-checking viene bollato come "troll", "pagato dal sistema" o "addormentato". In questo modo l'echo chamber espelle il pensiero critico e si protegge da qualsiasi smentita. Gli algoritmi dei social: Le piattaforme tendono a mostrare agli utenti contenuti simili a quelli con cui hanno già interagito. Se un utente inizia a guardare video complottisti, l'algoritmo continuerà a proporgliene, creando una bolla in cui quella fake news sembra l'unica realtà esistente e condivisa da tutti. Chi crea questa propaganda (spesso fabbriche di troll o agenzie statali strutturate) sa benissimo come sfruttare queste dinamiche: non ha bisogno di creare un falso perfetto, gli basta che sia emotivamente impattante per fare in modo che le echo chamber lo amplifichino da sole, gratuitamente e in modo virale.

Matryoshka – rosyjska operacja wpływu przed wyborami w Niemczech „Rosja nie musi przekonać Niemców do jednej historii. Wystarczy, że przekona ich, że żadnej historii nie można już ufać.” Matryoshka to rosyjska operacja informacyjna aktywna co najmniej od 2023 roku, znana również jako Operation Overload lub Storm-1679. Jej operatorzy produkują spreparowane materiały podszywające się pod prawdziwe media i osoby publiczne, a następnie próbują sztucznie zwiększać ich widoczność w mediach społecznościowych. Latem 2026 roku jednym z głównych celów operacji stały się wybory regionalne i lokalne w Niemczech. Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) zidentyfikował 269 postów opublikowanych w ciągu 21 dni aktywności między 24 czerwca a 1 września. Kampania dotyczyła m.in. wyborów w Saksonii-Anhalt i Meklemburgii-Pomorzu Przednim oraz głosowań lokalnych w Dolnej Saksonii i Berlinie. Atakowano przede wszystkim CDU, SPD, Zielonych, Die Linke i FDP oraz rząd kanclerza Friedricha Merza. Zwraca uwagę niemal całkowity brak podobnych ataków na AfD i BSW – partie znacznie bardziej krytyczne wobec sankcji na Rosję i niemieckiego wsparcia dla Ukrainy. Fabryka politycznych skandali Matryoshka nie próbowała przekonać odbiorców do jednej konkretnej historii. Operatorzy produkowali wiele różnych oskarżeń dotyczących tych samych polityków. Dobrym przykładem był Eric Stehr, kandydat Die Linke w Saksonii-Anhalt. W spreparowanych materiałach oskarżano go m.in. o zamordowanie własnej babci dla mieszkania, zabójstwo internetowej modelki, antysemityzm, przemoc polityczną czy organizowanie tajnych imprez seksualnych. Fałszywe informacje przedstawiano jako materiały takich mediów jak FAZ, ARD, „Stern” czy „Der Spiegel”. Niemieccy dziennikarze sprawdzili część tych historii w policji i na uczelni – zarzuty okazały się bezpodstawne. Podobny schemat stosowano wobec innych kandydatów. Najczęściej pojawiały się historie dotyczące korupcji, narkotyków, przemocy seksualnej, zabójstw, manipulowania wyborami i przestępstw z nienawiści. Wspólny przekaz był prosty: politycy demokratycznego establishmentu są skorumpowani, niebezpieczni i niegodni zaufania. Operacja wykorzystywała również istniejące podziały między wschodnimi i zachodnimi Niemcami. W fałszywych materiałach pojawiały się hasła sugerujące, że „Zachód nienawidzi Wschodu”, a nawet wezwania do ponownego zbudowania muru dzielącego Niemcy. To charakterystyczny mechanizm operacji wpływu: zamiast tworzyć konflikt od podstaw, wykorzystuje się prawdziwe społeczne frustracje i próbuje je pogłębiać. Fałszywe media i sztuczna inteligencja Jedną z najważniejszych technik Matryoshki było podszywanie się pod wiarygodne media. ISD zidentyfikował wykorzystanie identyfikacji wizualnej 31 redakcji, w tym 20 niemieckich. Operatorzy kopiowali logotypy, układ grafik i wygląd materiałów telewizyjnych, zmieniając ich treść tak, aby wyglądały jak prawdziwe publikacje. Coraz większą rolę odgrywa przy tym generatywna sztuczna inteligencja. Według ISD około 40 proc. analizowanych filmów dotyczących niemieckich wyborów zawierało głosy wygenerowane przez AI. Wykorzystywano również prawdziwe nagrania celebrytów, które następnie przerabiano. W kampanii #StopMerzToday użyto wizerunków m.in. Sarah Jessiki Parker i Mike'a Tysona. Spreparowane nagrania przedstawiały także aktora Daniela Brühla jako osobę grożącą zabiciem Merza, a Heidi Klum przypisywano życzenie śmierci czołowym niemieckim politykom. Treści były często absurdalne i ekstremalne, ale właśnie to zwiększało ich potencjał do przyciągania uwagi. Operatorzy nie potrzebowali, aby wszystkie materiały były wiarygodne. Wystarczyło, że jeden z nich został podchwycony przez popularne konto, dziennikarza lub polityka. Operacja działająca jak firma Analiza czasu publikacji wskazuje, że za Matryoshką stoi zorganizowana infrastruktura, a nie spontaniczna aktywność internautów. Posty pojawiały się przede wszystkim od poniedziałku do piątku między 9:00 a 21:00 czasu środkowoeuropejskiego. Ponad 60 proc. publikowano między 15:00 a 19:00, często seriami w regularnych odstępach. Następnie do działania wchodziły konta wzmacniające. Udostępniały spreparowane materiały, generowały reakcje i oznaczały dziennikarzy oraz redakcje. To istotny element Operation Overload: przeciążanie mediów i organizacji fact-checkingowych ogromną liczbą materiałów wymagających weryfikacji. Paradoksalnie rosyjska operacja może osiągnąć sukces również wtedy, gdy duża redakcja publikuje artykuł wyjaśniający, że konkretny film jest fałszywy – sama informacja o jego istnieniu trafia wtedy do znacznie większej publiczności. Setki tysięcy wyświetleń, ale ilu prawdziwych odbiorców? To najważniejsze zastrzeżenie dotyczące całej operacji. Matryoshka wygląda na potężną machinę propagandową, ale jej rzeczywisty wpływ jest trudniejszy do udowodnienia. ISD znalazł liczne przykłady sztucznego pompowania statystyk. Jeden z postów miał ponad 110 tys. wyświetleń i 405 polubień, ale ani jednego komentarza, mimo że konto posiadało zaledwie dwóch obserwujących. W innym przypadku liczba wyświetleń wzrosła w kilka minut z dziewięciu do ponad 114 tys. Wszystko wskazuje więc na wykorzystanie botów lub kontrolowanych kont do stworzenia wrażenia ogromnego zainteresowania. Wcześniejsze badania Operation Overload również pokazywały niewielkie organiczne zaangażowanie, a platformy usuwały znaczną część materiałów. Nie ma podstaw, aby twierdzić, że Matryoshka przekonała setki tysięcy niemieckich wyborców albo zdecydowała o wyniku wyborów. Nie oznacza to jednak, że operacja jest niegroźna. Dzięki AI koszt produkcji kolejnych fałszywych filmów, artykułów i nagrań gwałtownie spada. Jeden zespół może atakować dziesiątki polityków, działać w wielu językach i jednocześnie obsługiwać kampanie dotyczące kilku państw. Nie chodzi o jeden fake news Matryoshka dobrze pokazuje, jak zmienia się rosyjska dezinformacja. Dawna farma trolli opierała się na ludziach piszących posty i komentarze. Dziś powstaje przemysłowy model produkcji: sztuczna inteligencja generuje materiał, kopiowana jest identyfikacja prawdziwego medium, syntetyczny głos uwiarygadnia nagranie, sieć kont sztucznie zwiększa jego popularność, a oznaczanie dziennikarzy ma przenieść historię do głównego obiegu informacji. Celem nie musi być przekonanie Niemców, że konkretny polityk naprawdę popełnił przestępstwo. Znacznie bardziej wartościowe może być wywołanie przekonania, że politykom, mediom i instytucjom demokratycznym w ogóle nie można ufać. I właśnie dlatego Matryoshka jest interesującym przykładem współczesnej operacji wpływu. Rosja nie musi sprawić, żeby odbiorca uwierzył w jedną fałszywą historię. Wystarczy, że po setkach podobnych historii zacznie się zastanawiać, czy można jeszcze uwierzyć w jakąkolwiek. ŹRÓDŁA: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/investigation-an-old-dog-with-no-new-tricks-matryoshka-targets-regional-elections-in-germany/ https://www.lfv.bayern.de/aktuelle-meldung-zur-informationsmanipulationskampagne-matryoshka/?utm_source=chatgpt.com https://amp.dw.com/pl/operacja-matrioszka-wybory-w-niemczech-na-celowniku-rosyjskich-s%C5%82u%C5%BCb/a-78223923?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Les fact-checkeurs latino-américains ont appelé Meta à ne pas remplacer le fact-checking indépendant par les notes des internautes, exprimant des inquiétudes quant à l'efficacité de ce système face à la désinformation croissante dans la région. #FactChecking #Désinformation #LatAm