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𝗣𝗮𝗸𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻–𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮 — 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟱,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝗶𝗺 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗮 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝘄𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘁𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 A burst of false reports surrounding India's protests over the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls provides a clear example of how genuine political unrest can become a target for cross-border information manipulation. What remains considerably less certain is the scale and command structure of the campaign. Indian intelligence officials have alleged that more than 5,000 social-media accounts were created in Pakistan within roughly two weeks to exploit protests against the electoral-roll revision and the Election Commission. According to reporting based on Intelligence Bureau sources, the accounts were intended to circulate claims of police violence, casualties and government repression, while encouraging those narratives to travel beyond Delhi into other parts of India. Several of the individual fabrications are independently verifiable. One account using the identity “Anushi Tiwari Indian” and the handle @indiantiwari01 circulated old footage with claims that Delhi Police had opened fire on demonstrators. Different posts attributed multiple deaths to the supposed firing and claimed that opposition leader Rahul Gandhi had been shot or injured. Fact-checkers established that footage used to support such claims came from earlier events, including the 2024 farmers' protests, rather than the demonstrations then taking place in Delhi. Delhi Police publicly identified the account and said it had a history of distributing doctored material, old footage and fabricated narratives. Police subsequently registered four cases concerning alleged misinformation around the protests, while officials said hundreds of posts had been removed. India Today later reported that the Delhi Police Cyber Cell had traced the account's IP address to Pakistan and that the account was subsequently withheld in India. Earlier investigations had also documented the same persona circulating misleading material about Indian political and security events. That evidence establishes a meaningful Pakistan-linked component to the disinformation environment. It does not, however, independently establish a 5,000-account ISI network. The larger allegation comes primarily from Indian intelligence reporting. The Statesman, citing an IANS report and an Intelligence Bureau official, said accounts were being operated from several locations including Bhimber, Rawalakot, Sialkot and Peshawar rather than primarily from Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Officials alleged that operators were supplied with narratives to circulate and instructed to tag users outside India to increase their reach. The same reporting connected the activity to “Operation Ground Wire”, described by Indian sources as an effort to recruit Indian nationals to generate material that could then appear to originate domestically. The concept predates the October protests. A September investigation by CNN-News18 alleged that a platform called Bharat Bytes News had been used to recruit young Indian contributors for politically sensitive assignments, with material subsequently handled from Pakistan. There is an important evidential gap. No public list of the alleged 5,000 accounts has been released. There is no published network graph, platform transparency report, forensic infrastructure analysis or dataset allowing independent researchers to reproduce the Intelligence Bureau's assessment. Nor has public evidence demonstrated that all the accounts described in media reports belong to a single centrally controlled network rather than several clusters, individual propagandists and opportunistic accounts exploiting the same political crisis. The attribution to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence is therefore an intelligence claim rather than an independently demonstrated technical attribution. Reporting by Indian outlets repeatedly cites intelligence and police sources, but the underlying evidence has not been released publicly. At the time of this review, no equivalent technical report from Meta, X, Google or another major platform had been identified that confirmed the existence of a 5,000-account ISI-controlled operation. This distinction matters particularly in the India–Pakistan information environment. Both states routinely accuse the other of covert influence and disinformation. Pakistan itself has alleged Indian-backed social-media operations targeting Pakistani institutions, and Islamabad has previously rejected Indian security allegations as politically motivated. That does not invalidate evidence surrounding particular Pakistan-based accounts, but it raises the evidential threshold required for attributing thousands of accounts to a state intelligence service. There is another reason for caution. The information environment around the Indian protests contains misinformation from more than one political direction. Independent fact-checkers have identified AI-generated protest scenes, old videos recaptioned as current events and fabricated images supporting competing narratives. In an earlier case involving the Cockroach Janta Party protests, BOOM and Alt News found that Delhi Police themselves had incorrectly dismissed authentic footage as fake. Government attribution should therefore be treated as evidence to investigate, not as a substitute for forensic verification. No confirmed individual mastermind can presently be named for the October 5,000-account operation. “Anushi Tiwari Indian” is a documented online persona, not a verified real-world identity. Earlier reporting on the broader Ground Wire allegation named individuals said to be Pakistani handlers, including a person identified as Abdullah Shad and a Pakistani military officer described as Lieutenant Colonel Zia. Those identities have not been independently established through publicly available judicial records, financial evidence or a technical attribution report, and there is insufficient evidence to identify either man as responsible for the current 5,000-account campaign. The most defensible conclusion is narrower but still significant. A cluster of false narratives exploiting India's election-related protests existed; several prominent examples have been independently debunked; and at least one central amplifier has been reported by police investigators as Pakistan-based. The much larger claim — that more than 5,000 newly created accounts form a coordinated ISI operation — remains plausible but unproven on the public evidence currently available. For an information operation, that gap between what can be demonstrated and what intelligence authorities say they know is itself part of the story. 𝗦𝗢𝗨𝗥𝗖𝗘𝗦 1. The Statesman — “Pakistan creates 5,000 fake social media accounts amid anti-SIR protests: IB official”, 14 October 2026. This is the principal published source for the 5,000-account figure, alleged geographic distribution and Operation Ground Wire connection. The Statesman https://www.thestatesman.com/india/pakistan-creates-5000-fake-social-media-accounts-amid-anti-sir-protests-ib-official-1503650989.html 2. India Today — “ISI-linked accounts post fake Rahul injury video, deaths amid Delhi protests”, 13 October 2026. Documents the fake Rahul Gandhi injury story, false casualty reports and attribution supplied by security sources. India Today https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/anti-cec-protests-isi-linked-pakistan-accounts-spread-false-rahul-gandhi-injury-claim-fake-deaths-amid-delhi-protests-3016235-2026-10-13 3. India Today / PTI — Delhi Police investigation, four FIRs and approximately 500 posts removed, 13 October 2026. India Today https://www.indiatoday.in/cities/delhi/story/delhi-police-files-four-firs-removes-500-posts-over-protest-misinformation-3016760-2026-10-13 4. The New Indian Express — Delhi Police warning concerning @indiantiwari01, 12 October 2026. Includes the police's public identification of the account and its description of previous fabricated narratives. The New Indian Express https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/delhi/2026/Oct/12/delhi-police-warns-of-action-over-fake-claim-of-firing-at-rahul-gandhi-rally-300-posts-taken-down 5. India Today — “Pakistani Fake News Account Banned on X Over Fabricated Videos on Delhi Protests and Rahul Gandhi”, 15 October 2026. Reports the Cyber Cell finding that the account's IP address traced to Pakistan. India Today https://www.indiatoday.in/india/video/pakistani-fake-news-account-banned-on-x-over-fabricated-videos-on-delhi-protests-and-rahul-gandhi-ytvd-3017879-2026-10-15 6. The Quint / WebQoof — independent verification of old footage falsely presented as Delhi Police firing on protesters. The investigated post from @indiantiwari01 had accumulated more than 35,000 views when checked. TheQuint https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof/old-video-farmers-protest-falsely-linked-to-cjp-delhi-police-firing-fact-check 7. BOOM — “Old Farmers Protest Video Falsely Shared As Fatalities From October 10 Protest”, 10 October 2026. Independent visual verification of another falsely contextualised protest video. BOOM https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/old-farmers-protest-video-falsely-shared-as-fatalities-from-october-10-protest-32352 8. Newschecker — independent fact-check of the false Delhi Police firing and casualty story, 13 October 2026. Newschecker https://www.newschecker.in/fact-check/old-video-shared-as-delhi-police-firing-at-rahul-gandhi-led-march-against-cec 9. DFRAC — earlier investigation of the “Anushi Tiwari Indian” persona during the September BRICS information environment. This establishes that the account's misleading activity preceded the October protests. DFRAC_ORG https://dfrac.org/en/2026/09/16/brics-summit-disinformation-fake-and-misleading-claims-flood-social-media/ 10. ETGovernment — Maj Gen Rajan Kochhar (Retd), analysis of the earlier Ground Wire allegations, September 2026. Importantly, the article itself stresses that claims concerning named operators, payment mechanisms and Bharat Bytes require independent verification. ETGovernment.com https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/amp/blog/the-evolution-of-proxy-warfare-how-narrative-manipulation-is-transforming-india-pakistan-conflict/134347274 11. BOOM — AI-generated imagery falsely connected to the election-related protests, 12 October 2026. Demonstrates that the broader information disorder was not confined to the specifically Pakistan-attributed examples. BOOM https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/ai-visuals-falsely-shared-as-real-fuel-misinformation-amid-cec-protests-32353 12. Alt News — investigation showing that Delhi Police had incorrectly labelled genuine July protest footage as fake. Relevant to the need for independent verification of official fact-checking claims. Alt News https://www.altnews.in/hindi/baton-with-nails-videos-indeed-from-july-20-protests-delhi-police-pibs-fact-check-incorrect/ 𝗞𝗘𝗬𝗪𝗢𝗥𝗗𝗦 #Disinformed #Disinformation #Propaganda #InfluenceOperations #India #Pakistan #ISI #ElectionSecurity #ElectionIntegrity #SIR #SpecialIntensiveRevision #DelhiProtests #RahulGandhi #GyaneshKumar #SocialMedia #FakeAccounts #FakeNews #InformationWarfare #CognitiveWarfare #HybridWarfare #OSINT #DigitalPropaganda #ForeignInfluence #InformationOperations #FactChecking #CyberSecurity #OperationGroundWire #PakistanIndia #PoliticalDisinformation #InformationIntegrity

Eric Larchevêque stated that after the registration, they had been given earplugs. He added that he had been able to keep his phone and his DJI Pocket to film, and that they were soon to be called to board a shuttle that looked like an ordinary bus. He specified that no Cybercab was in sight. #voyage #aventure #exploration (translated)

Vláďa Foltán wrote that Volodymyr Zelenskyy "was fact-checking Trump" and pointed out that prices are rising due to the war in the Middle East and the blockade of Hormuz. According to Foltán, almost everyone understands this, and people should hear what the reality is. He called for fair and open communication with the public and for the "playing" with them to stop. https://t.co/d64ZuWGuqx #Zelenskyj #válka #politika (translated)

We'll see each other tomorrow - Shmoo wrote that former Prime Minister Leszek Miller has shared the profile of the Legal Services Center. The author claimed that the account is directly linked to the Lega Artis service, which fact-checking organizations have repeatedly described as a part of a network spreading Russian propaganda coming from Sputnik and RIA Novosti. #propaganda #faktczekowanie #LegArtis (translated)

The author claimed that Arcom now wanted to regulate political podcasts that were outside its control. He also accused the government of launching its own X account dedicated to fact-checking to silence critics, believing that its policy was leading to a budgetary disaster accompanied by austerity. https://t.co/vgCzoxGcUB #podcast #politique #factchecking #FR (translated)

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)

Cerfia indicated that the government had launched a fact-checking account on X called "Let's Be Precise." According to the media, it was meant to address information deemed false or misleading, particularly regarding the 2027 budget, relying on facts, figures, and official sources, and to promote a debate based on verifiable data. #FactChecking #Budget2027 #Vérité (translated)

The post said high blood pressure often caused no symptoms but could increase the risk of heart attack and stroke. During EU Screening Week, it said it was encouraging people, alongside the European Society of Cardiology, to know their blood pressure figures, noting that a check took less than a minute.