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#FAMa

Let's repeat the ARMY's code of conduct? Let's! 🚫 DO NOT GO TO THE AIRPORT 🚫 DO NOT GO TO THE HOTEL DOOR 🚫 DO NOT TRY TO CHASE THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES The B-ARMY is known for always respecting their space when they are here, and they have been coming to our country since 2014. Please, let's at least keep this for the B-ARMY, can we? (translated)

Great player! Baiano Pangaré, also known as Ricardo, said he wanted to stand out in Resta Um to be able to save himself and veto our Cabeção. The guy is so obsessed that he wanted to put himself in the barn hahahaha #AFazenda18 #AFazenda (translated)

Con menores de edad, no. Según la denuncia, un adulto de 23 años, con reconocimiento en redes sociales, inició contacto por TikTok con una menor de 13 años, posteriormente le pidió su teléfono e Instagram, la invitó a encontrarse y se denunció una relación sexual. Su madre acudió a la Fiscalía y desde nuestra representación aportamos los elementos de prueba disponibles. No vamos a permitir que la desinformación y los ataques terminen revictimizando a una menor o silenciando a su familia. Ninguna fama, influencia o número de seguidores está por encima de la protección de un menor de edad. Hasta las últimas consecuencias, dentro de la ley. #ProtecciónInfantil #DerechosDeLosMenores #Justicia

rachele 3d

zeudi aveva pubblicato una storia con i trattamenti disponibili dalla sua dermopigmentista vittoria, dandole un'enorme visibilità internazionale vittoria: "la fama non ti ha cambiata, zeudi. sei rimasta te stessa, un’amica presente, senza mai sentirti superiore a nessuno" https://t.co/A5Thp7jDUA #dermopigmentazione #fama #amicizia

A imprensa bem que tentou jogar a boia de salvação e tratar a treta da maneira mais unidimensional possível ("notícia falsa"), mas Flavinho a recusou. Foi para cima da CNBB e fez jus à fama familiar de truculência. No fundo, onde se cheirava fumaça, é porque havia fogo. #jornalismo #notícias #política

TEATRO-EDICOLA (FRANCESCO GRAVINO) SU “LA STAMPA (SPECCHIO)”, “SEI SEDIE AL TEATRO-EDICOLA” by FRANCESCA TAMBURRINO SOURCE: https://www.lastampa.it/specchio/rubriche/segue-buffet/2026/09/27/news/sei_sedie_al_teatro_-_edicola-15748967/ “SEI SEDIE AL TEATRO-EDICOLA" Per la gioia degli amanti del genere, la notizia è rassicurante: i teatri sono tornati di moda. Forse non erano mai passati ma lievemente appannati dall’interesse per altri generi ritenuti più contemporanei. Errore, il teatro dopo millenni regge all’usura e la negatività lo rinvigorisce. Become a Medium member Riaprono sale date per perse e nuovi spazi fioriscono. Perché il teatro si può fare ovunque, nelle case, nelle strade, sulle ceneri di spazi nati per altro. Per esempio nelle edicole: in molte città questi baracchini vendono di tutto fuorché ciò per cui furono pensate, i giornali. La trovata geniale la si scova nel foggiano con il Teatro-Edicola, il teatro più piccolo del mondo, sei sedie, meno di due metri quadrati, attenta programmazione, repliche ogni quindici minuti e il sold out è facilmente garantito. Un esperimento felice che ha incuriosito perfino la nobile rivista della statunitense Stanford University. La trovata della foggiana San Severo è piaciuta tanto agli allievi della Stanford, che ne hanno fatto un caso di studio. Il risultato è stato pubblicato sulla “Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)” rivista trimestrale e sito web pluripremiato data la sua specializzazione specifica nella copertura di soluzioni multisettoriali ai problemi globali, considerata uno dei punti di riferimento mondiali per l’innovazione sociale. L’articolo “The Six-Seat Revolution”, vale a dire la Rivoluzione delle sei sedie, è stato curato dal ricercatore foggiano Luciano Magaldi sardella, supervisionato dell’editor David V. Johnson e si può recuperare nella sezione Dispatches della “Stanford Social Innovation Review”. Immaginarsi la soddisfazione della compagnia teatrale Foyer 97 che si vede proiettata nella fama globale e nell’interesse planetario, maturata in una pioggia di richieste di duplicazione. In fondo chi non ha uno spazio dismesso e in stato di abbandono da recuperare meritevole d’assurgere a presidio culturale? Intanto i benemeriti dell’idea vincente a ottobre torneranno in scena e già preparano il trentennale della compagnia che cade il prossimo anno. Su quelle sei sedie, loro assicurano, si sono seduti giovani e adulti in egual se pure striminzita misura. Un esperimento che nell’universo dello spettacolo viene seguito con attenzione. Tanto che Biagio Antonacci ha fatto tappa a sorpresa nel Teatro-Edicola dove ha cantato la sua “Iris”. Passanti in capannello oltre il sold out.

Sei sedie al Teatro - Edicola

"Eu não esperava uma repercussão desse nível. Acho que nunca me senti tão famoso." 🎙️ Gustavo Scarpa, do Atlético-MG, sobre a repercussão das siaw críticas literárias. 🎥 @sportv https://t.co/EAbiUCkaXI #fama #repercussão #AtléticoMG

Tanto Klebber quanto Camila conheceram a realidade da vida antes da fama, vieram de famílias humildes e são conscientes. Os dois apoiaram Lula nas eleições de 2022 e pelo visto ele fez questão de apoiar ainda mais dessa vez. Casal belíssimo e bem posicionado! #KlebberToy #CamilaQueiroz #Lula2022

Los rojos tenemos peor fama, pero en España, las 2 veces que se han introducido armas en el congreso, ha sido alguien de derechas. #Política #España #Historia

JÃO 1w

Sim gente o grande favorito é um cara que defende os sapinhos… fecha esse quiosque #RoçaAFazenda https://t.co/7eZbHttEb3 #RoçaAFazenda #RealityShow #Fama

POPTime 1w

🚨 Segundo o TV Fama, o helicóptero em que o cantor Rick, da dupla com Renner, estava, foi localizado. https://t.co/n9Ku8FlAzK #RickERenner #Notícias #Helicóptero

🚨O TV Fama informou que o helicóptero que transportava o cantor Rick e o empresário Bruno Avelar foi encontrado! https://t.co/seqQupaIUn #notícias #helicóptero #RickEvandro

Diffido naturalmente di chi, non avendo più 16 anni ma 51- si presenta con la cresta ma in questo avvio di torneo mi chiedo come e perché al designatore arbitrale è stato consentito di non applicare il regolamento e ignorare il Var. E quando sento dire da #Orsato che il Var non deve intervenire su episodi “ già valutati dall’arbitro di campo” mi permetto di eccepire : “correggere gli errori dell’arbitro di campo” è il motivo per cui è nato il VAR volente o nolente il signor #Orsato, che certo non si porta dietro la fama di essere infallibile. Forse oggi non ce ne rendiamo conto, ma l’interpretazione del regolamento, unita alla mancata applicazione del protocollo var, non hanno migliorato le partite (la media dei falli è più o meno la stessa) : se il giuoco è più fluido il merito è solo delle nuove regole per infortuni e sostituzioni. Aggiungo che evitare di fischiare i contatti minimi non può significare che si giuoca meglio: i falli sono falli, e l’arbitro bravo deve sapere quando fischiare e quando no. Più avanti si entrerà nel vivo del campionato, con in ballo le coppe, lo scudetto e la zona retrocessione, e ce ne accorgeremo tutti. #VAR #calcio #arbitraggio

CHOQUEI 2w

🚨VEJA: Anitta afirma que, acima da fama, o mais importante é o enredo, o samba e as pessoas que trabalham no Carnaval. A cantora disse ainda que sairá com gratidão caso sua presença deixe de fazer sentido, mas ficará enquanto quiserem. https://t.co/Xhd4fMzzpg #Carnaval #Anitta #Música

#Mali JNIM revendique le bombardement de Sévaré aux obus de mortiers & roquettes SPG9 et affirme que « 4 drones de fabrication turque et des hélicoptères ont été touchés et la destruction de la base de pilotage/radars […] 33 morts parmi les FAMa et Africa Corps dont un capitaine https://t.co/7A1QOgGWwg #Mali #JNIM #sécurité #ML

Fede 2w

Guenda: "Quando sono uscita dal gf sembravo Michael Jackson per la fama, poi ne ho preso anche le sembianze" Lei è entrata da 5 ore ma ha sparato già 500 perle diverse #gfvip https://t.co/Q5tqtj3eeO #GFvip #realityshow #fama

“A nossa divergência não é política. A nossa divergência é moral.” Talvez. Mas, do alto do Olimpo, é realmente difícil compreender a moral de quem vive no Brasil real. A moral de quem trabalha meses apenas para sustentar uma máquina pública insaciável. De quem paga impostos sufocantes e, ainda assim, não recebe segurança, saúde ou educação à altura. De quem sai de casa sem saber se voltará, vê seus filhos crescerem sem perspectivas e luta todos os dias para construir algum futuro. É muito confortável transformar divergência política em julgamento moral quando se observa o país de uma realidade protegida, cercada de privilégios que a imensa maioria dos brasileiros jamais conhecerá. Enquanto milhões sobrevivem entre impostos, violência, serviços públicos precários e o velho pão e circo, parte de uma elite artística milionária desfruta de uma vida nababesca e ainda se concede o direito de olhar para baixo e determinar quem possui ou não “moral”. Discordar é legítimo. Democrático, inclusive. O que não deveria ser legítimo é confundir fama, dinheiro e posição social com superioridade moral. Moral não se proclama do alto do Olimpo. Moral se demonstra no chão da vida real. #Moralidade #JustiçaSocial #Brasil

«La mili tiene mala fama, pero a mí me enseñó el valor de hacer algo por los demás»

El chef José Andrés: «La mili me enseñó mucho. Tendría que haber un servicio, si no militar, sí social para los jóvenes»
www.abc.es

Mali – a war where some of the people fighting do not exist In Mali's war, an apparently simple question is becoming increasingly difficult to answer: who exactly is speaking to us? A real person? A rebel organisation? A Russian influence operation? A supporter of the military junta? Or somebody who has never existed at all? In September 2026, the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute published Des algorithmes en guerre, a report examining the use of generative artificial intelligence by actors involved in the Malian conflict. Its researchers describe the country as a potential laboratory for AI-assisted information warfare. Separatist networks are deploying synthetic fighters on TikTok. Jihadist propagandists are experimenting with AI-generated imagery. Pro-government accounts are producing large quantities of content celebrating the Malian armed forces. Russia, meanwhile, operates the most developed influence infrastructure of all: pseudo-media outlets, inauthentic accounts, AI-generated text, images and video, and systems designed to artificially amplify their visibility. Artificial intelligence did not create Mali's conflict. The war has been under way since 2012, and its participants have always fought with propaganda as well as weapons. What AI has changed is the economics of that struggle. A new “witness”, commentator, fighter, poster or video can now be produced in minutes. For audiences watching from a phone, distinguishing between genuine documentation, propaganda and material created entirely by an algorithm is becoming progressively harder. Azzghim – the fighter who cannot be killed or interrogated The most striking case documented by the Timbuktu Institute involves accounts associated with supporters of the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, a Tuareg separatist movement fighting the authorities in Bamako. A figure called “Azzghim” appeared on TikTok. He looks like a Tuareg fighter and regularly features in videos attacking Mali's government and Russia's Africa Corps, commenting on the conflict and promoting the cause of Azawad. There is one problem: Azzghim does not exist. Analysis of the videos identified anomalies characteristic of generative AI, including unnatural body movements, visual inconsistencies, irregular colouring and problems with audio synchronisation. According to the Timbuktu Institute, Azzghim is a synthetic character being used as the digital face of a political narrative. The propaganda advantages are considerable. An organisation no longer needs to expose a real spokesman. A synthetic personality can be designed to look exactly as its creators require, speak the appropriate language and appeal to a particular audience. Different characters could potentially be created for younger viewers, traditional communities or different ethnic and social groups. There is another advantage: a synthetic spokesman cannot be arrested, identified or interrogated. Researchers also identified accounts amplifying the material. At the time of the study, TikTok account @tawri.n.azawad had around 207,000 followers and was almost entirely devoted to publishing or repackaging content involving Azzghim. Another account, @asnan831, used a similar synthetic teenage character. An important distinction is necessary. Researchers describe these profiles as belonging to supporters or individuals associated with the FLA. The available evidence does not establish that every account is part of an operation centrally directed by the Front's leadership. The information effect, however, remains significant: a digital community can be constructed around the Azawad cause in which some of the apparent participants may not be real people at all. The jihadists are learning too The picture is different for Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, the al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition that has become one of the most powerful armed groups in the Sahel. Its confirmed use of generative AI remains considerably less sophisticated. In June 2026, JNIM's Az-Zallaqa media apparatus published AI-generated posters promoting material about previous attacks. The images showed fighters in combat but contained familiar generative artefacts: buildings and vegetation merging unnaturally, blurred details and unnaturally smooth surfaces. More important than JNIM's current capabilities is what AI could add to an already sophisticated propaganda apparatus. The organisation already tailors communications to different audiences. UN reporting has documented its use of media channels for broader propaganda while other outlets increasingly distribute material in local languages, including Bambara. Generative AI could dramatically reduce the cost of this strategy, translating material into Fulfulde, Hausa, Zarma or Tamasheq, generating synthetic dubbing and producing multiple versions of the same message. The Timbuktu Institute also considers the future possibility of AI chatbots being used to personalise recruitment. That should not be presented as a capability JNIM has already demonstrated. At present, it is a risk scenario rather than a confirmed operation. Russia has the most sophisticated machine At the other end of the spectrum lies Russia's influence ecosystem. Here, AI is not an isolated experiment but another component of an infrastructure previously developed by Wagner-linked networks, Russian media operations and influence organisations operating across Africa. After Wagner's withdrawal from Mali in 2025, its military role was taken over by the Russian state-controlled Africa Corps. The information infrastructure evolved alongside it. Of particular importance is African Initiative, which presents itself as a news agency but has been identified by France's VIGINUM, the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and the European External Action Service as an important component of Russia's newer influence architecture in Africa. One of the most interesting elements of this ecosystem is a network researchers call AI-Freak. The operation uses generative AI to produce text, images and videos, places them on fake or apparently independent news websites and distributes them through inauthentic accounts. This is supplemented by so-called Black Hat SEO – techniques intended to artificially increase the visibility of content in search engines. Elements of this infrastructure have previously been identified by Meta and OpenAI. In 2024, OpenAI disrupted Russian accounts using ChatGPT to generate articles and comments in English, French and Russian. Some of the French-language content targeted audiences in West Africa. In a later iteration of the operation, AI models were also used to draft scripts for short videos praising the Russian Africa Corps, translate them into French and generate descriptions optimised for social media. This illustrates an important difference between the Russian approach and Azzghim. The separatist ecosystem uses AI primarily to manufacture convincing digital personalities. The Russian model increasingly resembles an industrial production line: text, image, video, pseudo-news website, distribution account, search optimisation and additional channels amplifying the narrative. The objective is not merely to convince someone of a single claim. It is to occupy as much of the information environment as possible with narratives advantageous to Moscow: Russia as an effective security partner, the West as a neo-colonial aggressor, France as a source of instability and Russian forces as defenders of African sovereignty. Yet VIGINUM also warns against equating technological sophistication with actual impact. Some Russian influence channels still attract relatively small audiences. A sophisticated operation is not automatically a successful one. The junta is building its own digital reality Mali's military authorities operate within the same contested information environment. Since breaking with France and moving closer to Moscow, Bamako has increasingly restricted independent media space while promoting a narrative built around restored sovereignty, military success and the benefits of its Russian partnership. The Timbuktu Institute highlights the TikTok account @6tm_officiel. At the time of the study, it had more than 436,000 followers and published substantial amounts of AI-generated material presenting Mali's armed forces, the FAMa, and the Africa Corps in a favourable light. One video concerning the battle for Kidal accumulated around 4.7 million views. Again, attribution requires care. Researchers describe the account as being operated by an individual based in Bamako; they do not provide evidence that it is officially managed by the Malian government. It is better understood as part of a wider pro-government information ecosystem in which the boundaries between state communications, supporters and co-ordinated propaganda can be difficult to establish. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has previously identified the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso as important sources of disinformation campaigns in West Africa. Recurring narratives target France, the United Nations, ECOWAS, human-rights organisations and independent media, while presenting criticism of the authorities as part of a foreign conspiracy. Generative AI allows such narratives to be produced faster, more cheaply and in far more variations. Everyone is fighting over a different version of the same war What makes Mali particularly revealing is that multiple actors are using similar technology for very different objectives. FLA-linked networks need digital faces capable of humanising the Azawad cause and attacking Russia's presence. JNIM needs propaganda material and increasingly localised communications. The pro-government ecosystem seeks to portray Mali's armed forces as victorious and reinforce the junta's legitimacy. Russia possesses the broadest infrastructure, in which AI is merely one component of a larger system involving media outlets, websites, local partners, social-media profiles and technical amplification. The result is a war taking place simultaneously in two realities. In the first, soldiers and civilians are killed, towns change hands and the army, separatists and jihadists fight for territory. In the second, every side is trying to determine what the first reality will look like on a smartphone screen. Generative AI does not need to create a perfect deepfake to be effective. It merely needs to increase the number of competing versions of events until an ordinary viewer can no longer easily determine which one deserves to be trusted. That is why Mali matters. It is not showing us the future of information warfare. It is showing us its present. One TikTok video may feature a real soldier. Another may feature a propagandist. A third may feature a fighter who has never existed. And all three can tell completely different stories about the same war. Sources Timbuktu Institute – Des algorithmes en guerre: Comment l'IA générative rebat les cartes du conflit malien https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1731-rapport-des-algorithmes-en-guerre-comment-l-ia-generative-rebat-les-cartes-du-conflit-malien AfricaNews/AFP – “Mali's information war is increasingly being shaped by AI” https://www.africanews.com/2026/09/09/malis-information-war-is-increasingly-being-shaped-by-ai/ OpenAI – research on Russia-origin influence activity and Operation Stop News https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-stop-news-2024/ VIGINUM / FCDO / EEAS – technical report on African Initiative and the AI-Freak network https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250612_TLP-CLEAR_VIGINUM_FCDO_EEAS_Technical_Report_African_Initiative_EN.pdf Africa Center for Strategic Studies – Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/ Timbuktu Institute – analysis of AI use by JNIM https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1735-artificial-intelligence-a-new-propaganda-lever-for-jnim-in-mali?print=1&tmpl=component #Disinformation #Mali #Sahel #Africa #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #AIPropaganda #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #Propaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Azawad #FLA #JNIM #AfricaCorps #Russia #RussianInfluence #TikTok #DigitalWarfare #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Rapport - DES ALGORITHMES EN GUERRE : Comment l'IA générative rebat les cartes du conflit malien

MANUEL SOS LA PERSONA MÁS RASCA OLLA DE TODO EL UNIVERSO ! JURAS FAMA Y BUEN JUEGO ….. Y SOS UNA MIERDA DE PERSONA, ENTRASTE A “DEJAR DE SER EL NOVIO DE ZOE” Y AHORA MOSTRAS QUE SOS : EX DE ZOE, EX DE LOLA , ENVIDIOSO DEL ÉXITO GENUINO Y BUENA GENTE DE FRANQUI, POR FAVOR ÁNDATE DE ARGENTINA MANUEL AL 9009 PARA IRSE NOSE A DONDE #Argentina #RealityShow #Drama