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The author wrote that US researchers had already identified a network of approximately 200,000 suspicious Facebook accounts supporting AfD content in 2019. A large portion of the accounts exhibited typical characteristics of artificial opinion amplification. It remained unclear who had controlled the network. #FakeNews #SozialeMedien #Desinformation #US (translated)

The account BrennpunktUA wrote that the SPD and the Greens would pay a high political price for their joint course with the Left in Berlin. Over the past 24 hours, he had seen numerous posts from people on X, including celebrities, who had announced their departure – particularly from the Green Party. BrennpunktUA praised those who had publicly stated that for them a line had been crossed the day before. Those who appear with the motto "Never again is now" and simultaneously bring the Left to power in Berlin have, in his opinion, forfeited the right to morally instruct others. The departing members justified their decision among other things with anti-Semitism, the glorification of Islamist terror, and tolerated connections to criminal Arab clan structures. He described the joint statement of the three parties from the day before as worthless. He wrote that he himself had left the FDP many years ago – for different reasons, although it politically remains closest to him. He knows, therefore, how difficult it is to leave a party, especially since memberships are often linked to personal networks and close friendships. He therefore showed great respect for those who left, as they were also taking personal disadvantages into account. #Politik #Grüne #Antisemitismus (translated)

The AfD faction in the German Bundestag announced that it had introduced a bill on Thursday aimed at restoring freedom of opinion in social networks to the Bundestag. Stephan Brandner stated that the situation in Germany was poor in areas such as the economy, finance, internal and external security, education, and freedom of opinion. At the same time, he emphasized how important freedom of opinion is and demanded a return to a free community in which the state and its representatives serve the people and do not persecute them. #Meinungsfreiheit #SozialeNetzwerke #Bundestag (translated)

An internationally operating violence network, also active in Austria, lures children and teenagers to self-harm and criminal activities through online platforms, while security authorities take action to combat the phenomenon. #OnlineGewalt #KinderUndJugendliche #CyberKriminalität (translated)

In a large-scale operation against an alleged money laundering network, over 30 locations were searched in seven federal states, and four suspects were arrested, including a 72-year-old main suspect, who is believed to have established a complex network to launder money for other criminals. #Geldwäsche #Kriminalität #Festnahmen (translated)

Die Ausschreibung zur Erweiterung des Netzwerks der „Notschwestern“ ist gestartet, um die Unterstützung und Versorgung in Notfällen zu verbessern. It seems that you didn't provide an article for me to analyze. Please provide the content of the article, and I will help you select the most fitting hashtags!

The author wrote that some consulting networks have become problematic overall. This is not only because former employees economically exploited their knowledge and contacts, but also because the networks often tapped into personal relationships with active politicians or civil servants, or tried to exert political influence. #Consulting #Politik #Netzwerk (translated)

"Especially employees with particularly sensitive security-relevant knowledge can come into the focus of foreign powers that use them as instruments of espionage or manipulation." CDU security politician Roderich Kiesewetter also spoke of such "consultant networks," in which former members of the public service often promote their expertise and contacts after the end of their active service. #Geheimdienst #Sicherheitspolitik #Spionage (translated)

Reza Pahlavi Communications published a statement that had reportedly been signed by 133 Iranian political prisoners and activists. In it, the signatories thanked the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom for awarding the Freedom Prize 2026 to the Iranian people and for commissioning Prince Reza Pahlavi to accept it. The signatories wrote that during the protests on January 8 and 9, 2026, people had demanded an end to the Islamic Republic and more freedom. Published reports and estimates indicated tens of thousands of deaths and thousands of arrests. They stated that executions continued and death sentences were imposed in part based on confessions coerced under torture and in unfair trials. The authors referred to Reza Pahlavi as their political representative and supported him in leading a transition to a free, democratic Iran. They wrote that the Iranian people should decide on the future form of government in a free vote. They urged governments and international institutions to prevent executions, release political prisoners, and grant independent observers access to prisons. Additionally, they called for an end to business with the Islamic Republic, for a transparent use of frozen Iranian assets to support the freedom movement, and for better access to secure internet, including through Starlink. The letter was dated October 2026. #Iran #Freiheit #Menschenrechte (translated)

The author wrote that the Algerian writer and regime critic Boualem Sansal had warned the West – similar to Peter Scholl-Latour long before – about the absolute claims of Islam. According to Sansal, Islamism had taken hold in Algeria and built networks; initially, this had seemed new. #Algerien #Islamismus #Freiheit #DZ (translated)

Regina Laska wrote to Alice Weidel that the Day of German Unity had been the day before and Friedrich Merz had arrived in Kyiv that morning – just hours after Moscow had warned against a stay there and announced further massive attacks. The one billion euros, according to reports, was not an additional sum but rather planned military aid. Laska stated that aid to Ukraine is often pitted against pensions, health insurance, and the cost of living. According to The Insider, Russian Telegram networks are currently spreading this narrative in Latvia as well. There, the explicitly pro-Ukrainian government won decisively the day before. Latvians live right next to Russia and not in neutral Switzerland, wrote Laska; apparently, they seem to know better which bill will ultimately be more expensive. #Deutschland #Ukraine #Politik (translated)

Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

The article highlights the extremist connections and activities of the organization "Rote Hilfe" in Berlin, to which the politician Elif Eralp belonged until 2025, and documents its support for left-wing extremist movements as well as its role as a network for the legal interests of alleged offenders. #RoteHilfe #Linksextremismus #Berlin (translated)