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A few days ago, the collection of proposals for the Youth Word of the Year 2026 started. Theoretically, the jury chooses them from all the proposals. After publishing this map in August, I received hundreds of comments like "now everyone says that" from young people outside my bubble of followers. (translated)

The article argues that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has deliberately sabotaged peace efforts for decades, as evidenced by his controversial decision regarding the Wailing Wall in 1996, which led to violent conflicts and serious consequences for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. (translated)

FOR the proposal! • The government’s policy plays into Russia’s hands. • It undermines the trust of our allies. • It sows hatred towards Ukrainians. • It has thrown Havel’s diplomacy in the trash and replaced it with Macinka’s disgrace. Every member of parliament who does not want their children to be ashamed voted FOR. (translated)

Green: Lesor in 76 matches with the jersey of #paobc: 426 free throws, 5.61 average!!! Red: Vezenkov in 242 matches with the jersey of #olympiacosbc: 703 free throws, 2.9 average. We move on. (translated)

I invite you to Stargard for a meeting with the President of the Republic of Poland @NawrockiKn 🇵🇱 Tomorrow, October 2nd, at 5:00 PM in the Stargard Market Square, the President of the Republic of Poland Karol Nawrocki will be there. 🇵🇱We invite all residents of Stargard, the Stargard County, and the entire Szczecin region. See you tomorrow. Please arrive half an hour earlier, so by 4:30 PM. First Poland. First Poles. 🇵🇱 (translated)

The article describes how an anonymous user of a social media platform became concerned about the unauthorized possession of personal data of Warsaw residents, which prompted a politician to intervene with the head of the UODO to verify compliance with data protection regulations. (translated)

In his column, Frits Abrahams discusses the shocking fraud case surrounding Manchester City, where the luxuriously positioned club management was found guilty of 114 out of 115 allegations of financial violations, and he criticizes the pervasive corruption in global paid football. (translated)

"This spontaneous movement was born from exasperation at absolutely undignified educational conditions (...) It is time for the Prime Minister to stop playing the strategy of decay and provocation." In response, Manuel Bompard, national coordinator of LFI, questioned by AFP, immediately called on the government "not to fall into conspiracy theories and the infantilization of high school students." (translated)

After their last C1 win and the arrival of Mbappe that was taking shape, he was convinced that Barça was FINISHED to the point where he considered his Super League by getting cozy with Laporta with his speech at the time “we need a competitive Barça” strangely Negreira did not exist at that moment 😂 In his head, there was absolutely NO scenario where his team would collapse after Mbappe's arrival and in the other direction Barça would become strong again Result? A 3rd blank season on the horizon. This has the consequence not only of putting obstacles in the way of his SAD project that he wanted to implement for a long time but even worse…his risk of resignation that has been looming since last season Last resort then? Negreira but the clock is ticking old man…Laporta will make you resign for the 2nd time. (translated)

What irony. Once a rebel, a journalist fighting against the arrogant establishment. Today he dances on a yacht, mocking investments in public services. He laughs at investments that allowed young working parents in small towns to send their child to daycare. At public transport, which allows for cheaper and faster commutes to work. At social housing, support for people with disabilities, vocational training in small towns, connecting sewer systems and the internet to places in Poland that would never be reached commercially. Mr. Stanowski reduces it to... "Haha, yachts." Mr. Stanowski, not everyone has a limousine, a chauffeur, money for private schools, and a villa near Warsaw. There are people who do not have all of this and need daycare, good public schools, trains, and buses for a dignified life. (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the annual Valdai Club forum that Russia did not start the war, but was forced to defend itself due to obvious aggression, while emphasizing the importance of strengthening defensive capabilities and cooperation for a peaceful future. (translated)