Search

The author stated that the presidential election would be marked by "permanent and massive" Russian interference, adding that the stakes were too high for Vladimir Putin. He said that the GRU had already been identified as being behind a disinformation campaign targeting him and that the SVR labeled him as the ideologue of what he called an expression whose connection was provided in his message. https://t.co/RxN4YUH8ee #ÉlectionPrésidentielle #Désinformation #IngérenceRusses #RU (translated)

The court rejected François Piquemal's (LFI) appeal against the election of Jean-Luc Moudenc in the municipal elections of Toulouse, considering that the foreign digital interference mentioned had no significant impact on the outcome of the vote. #Municipales2026 #IngérencesNumériques #LFI (translated)

Patrick Champagnac called for an investigation into the socialist primary in order to find out, according to him, the identity and origin of the voters. He contested the use of electronic voting, which he considered unreliable and controversial, and stated that it offered no traceability or authentication of voters, including those who voted from abroad. He also mentioned information suggesting that 90,000 "ghost voters" were not members of the Socialist Party. He believed that this lack of transparency harmed democracy and the image of France. He also raised the possibility of manipulation aimed at designating Raphaël Glucksmann as the sole social-democratic candidate capable of blocking Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. If such an operation had taken place, he wrote, the French people would have the right to know the responsible parties and participants. Patrick Champagnac finally stated that foreign interference from Russia or Israel had already targeted electoral campaigns in France, sometimes, according to him, with the discreet support of certain communities. #Presidentielle2027 #Democratie #Election #France (translated)

Charles Alloncle stated that his book, *I Swear to Tell the Whole Truth*, published a week earlier, was number 2 in sales and had already been read by thousands of people. He claimed that France Télévisions and Radio France had refused, despite several requests, to give him airtime to discuss it. He attributed this refusal to a "boycott" and accused the two groups of wanting to hide the use of public money. He notably mentioned karaoke events costing 250 million euros, severance payments exceeding 500,000 euros, billions of euros in contracts made outside public procurement rules, as well as conflicts of interest and nights in luxury hotels at 1,700 euros. Alloncle also accused the media of spreading misleading information and discrediting him, and denounced pressures aimed, according to him, at silencing him, including withheld documents, judicial intimidation, and surveillance in Paris. He wrote that his six-month investigation had uncovered a system serving their interests and that his book described the methods and excesses involved. (translated)

Marcel wrote that Bolsonaro's heir had not yet won the election, despite the interference he attributed to Donald Trump, and that Brazil still had a slim chance of preventing South America from fully tipping into fascism. https://t.co/yzeBpQph40 #Brésil #Trump #Fascisme (translated)

Beatrice Rosen wrote that she saw a video in which Philippe de Villiers asked Emmanuel Macron to activate the state of emergency. According to her, Macron was trying to make the opposition demand this measure themselves and was allowing the situation to worsen for this purpose. She believed that several scenarios were being tested before the election to provoke widespread chaos, citing external and internal interference as well as riots. She added that a new form of state of emergency had been created in the law. Rosen clarified that this did not mean nothing should be done, but accused those she targeted of allowing the situation to deteriorate until the state of emergency appeared as the only option, with the consent of the population. She compared this strategy to that of debt, asserting that the country would be brought to a level of indebtedness such that the federalization of the European Union would be presented as the only solution to "save" it. #ÉtatDurgence #CrisePolitique #France (translated)

Si Marine Le Pen devient Présidente de la République, on va avoir droit à 5 ans de désintégration européenne, 5 ans de capitulation devant la Russie, 5 ans d'ingérences massives, 5 ans d'indignité internationale et de loi du plus fort. Si vous voulez que la France se couche et #MarineLePen #Europe #France #FR #RU

Les sénateurs socialistes, dirigés par Rachid Temal, appellent à établir une doctrine de dissuasion démocratique en France face aux ingérences étrangères, insistant sur la nécessité d'une résilience permanente pour protéger notre démocratie menacée par des attaques autoritaires. #Démocratie #IngérencesÉtrangères #Résilience

🎙️À quel point les ingérences états-uniennes sont-elles ancrées au sein des démocraties européennes ? Quel rapport les partis d’extrême droite européens entretiennent-ils avec le trumpisme ? Je reçois @MelissaBellCNN, correspondante de CNN en France et autrice de « Sous #Trumpisme #DémocratiesEuropéennes #ExtrêmeDroite #US #FR

La France insoumise est la force politique la plus visée par des ingérences étrangères. Lors des dernières élections municipales, 3 de nos candidats ont été visés par des ingérences qui venaient d'Israël. Le gouvernement doit agir de toute urgence. https://t.co/KXvNPHzV3P #France #Politique #Elections

Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

Jessikka Aro, une journaliste finlandaise, a été victime de quatre ans de cyberharcèlement après avoir révélé les activités d'une usine à trolls à Saint-Pétersbourg, illustrant les dangers de la guerre de l'information et la nécessité de se protéger contre les ingérences étrangères. #Journalisme #Cyberharcèlement #Propagande

Le président Emmanuel Macron a alerté sur les menaces hybrides russes pesant sur la France, soulignant l'intensification des ingérences informationnelles à l'approche de l'élection présidentielle de 2027, avec 107 incidents rapportés en 2025. #Élection2027 #IngérenceRusse #MédiasFaux

Macron sait très bien que c'est la fin de partie pour lui et que la colère des Français est immense. Cette colère ne doit pas se retourner contre nous en le laissant l'utiliser par la mise en place d'un régime d'exception du fait "d'ingérences" ou de violentes mobilisations. https://t.co/YqvcBXKQZw #Macron #ColèreFrançaise #RégimeD'exception #FR

L'article examine l'escalade potentielle de la menace russe en Europe, notamment à travers des ingérences et des tentatives de sabotage, en soulignant les préoccupations de certains pays européens face au risque d'une guerre ouverte, tout en mettant en lumière l'attention accrue de la France sur cette réalité. #MenaceRusse #GuerreEnEurope #Ingérence étrangère

Le portable de la conseillère Moyen-Orient à la cellule diplomatique de l’Élysée, a été récemment piraté par les services de renseignement israéliens, Les ingérences israéliennes contre la France doivent cesser ! https://t.co/fG3TwNH2Im https://t.co/Izj5HF20Vo #Israël #Diplomatie #CyberEspionnage #FR #IL