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Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

Badania przeprowadzone przez naukowca z Virginia Commonwealth University ujawniają, że Amerykanie żyją krócej niż mieszkańcy innych krajów rozwiniętych z powodu wielu czynników, w tym epidemii opioidowej, łatwego dostępu do broni palnej oraz problemów społeczno-ekonomicznych, a sytuacja zdrowotna w USA różni się znacznie w obrębie samych stanów. #zdrowie #długośćżycia #umieralność

Mali – a war where some of the people fighting do not exist In Mali's war, an apparently simple question is becoming increasingly difficult to answer: who exactly is speaking to us? A real person? A rebel organisation? A Russian influence operation? A supporter of the military junta? Or somebody who has never existed at all? In September 2026, the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute published Des algorithmes en guerre, a report examining the use of generative artificial intelligence by actors involved in the Malian conflict. Its researchers describe the country as a potential laboratory for AI-assisted information warfare. Separatist networks are deploying synthetic fighters on TikTok. Jihadist propagandists are experimenting with AI-generated imagery. Pro-government accounts are producing large quantities of content celebrating the Malian armed forces. Russia, meanwhile, operates the most developed influence infrastructure of all: pseudo-media outlets, inauthentic accounts, AI-generated text, images and video, and systems designed to artificially amplify their visibility. Artificial intelligence did not create Mali's conflict. The war has been under way since 2012, and its participants have always fought with propaganda as well as weapons. What AI has changed is the economics of that struggle. A new “witness”, commentator, fighter, poster or video can now be produced in minutes. For audiences watching from a phone, distinguishing between genuine documentation, propaganda and material created entirely by an algorithm is becoming progressively harder. Azzghim – the fighter who cannot be killed or interrogated The most striking case documented by the Timbuktu Institute involves accounts associated with supporters of the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, a Tuareg separatist movement fighting the authorities in Bamako. A figure called “Azzghim” appeared on TikTok. He looks like a Tuareg fighter and regularly features in videos attacking Mali's government and Russia's Africa Corps, commenting on the conflict and promoting the cause of Azawad. There is one problem: Azzghim does not exist. Analysis of the videos identified anomalies characteristic of generative AI, including unnatural body movements, visual inconsistencies, irregular colouring and problems with audio synchronisation. According to the Timbuktu Institute, Azzghim is a synthetic character being used as the digital face of a political narrative. The propaganda advantages are considerable. An organisation no longer needs to expose a real spokesman. A synthetic personality can be designed to look exactly as its creators require, speak the appropriate language and appeal to a particular audience. Different characters could potentially be created for younger viewers, traditional communities or different ethnic and social groups. There is another advantage: a synthetic spokesman cannot be arrested, identified or interrogated. Researchers also identified accounts amplifying the material. At the time of the study, TikTok account @tawri.n.azawad had around 207,000 followers and was almost entirely devoted to publishing or repackaging content involving Azzghim. Another account, @asnan831, used a similar synthetic teenage character. An important distinction is necessary. Researchers describe these profiles as belonging to supporters or individuals associated with the FLA. The available evidence does not establish that every account is part of an operation centrally directed by the Front's leadership. The information effect, however, remains significant: a digital community can be constructed around the Azawad cause in which some of the apparent participants may not be real people at all. The jihadists are learning too The picture is different for Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, the al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition that has become one of the most powerful armed groups in the Sahel. Its confirmed use of generative AI remains considerably less sophisticated. In June 2026, JNIM's Az-Zallaqa media apparatus published AI-generated posters promoting material about previous attacks. The images showed fighters in combat but contained familiar generative artefacts: buildings and vegetation merging unnaturally, blurred details and unnaturally smooth surfaces. More important than JNIM's current capabilities is what AI could add to an already sophisticated propaganda apparatus. The organisation already tailors communications to different audiences. UN reporting has documented its use of media channels for broader propaganda while other outlets increasingly distribute material in local languages, including Bambara. Generative AI could dramatically reduce the cost of this strategy, translating material into Fulfulde, Hausa, Zarma or Tamasheq, generating synthetic dubbing and producing multiple versions of the same message. The Timbuktu Institute also considers the future possibility of AI chatbots being used to personalise recruitment. That should not be presented as a capability JNIM has already demonstrated. At present, it is a risk scenario rather than a confirmed operation. Russia has the most sophisticated machine At the other end of the spectrum lies Russia's influence ecosystem. Here, AI is not an isolated experiment but another component of an infrastructure previously developed by Wagner-linked networks, Russian media operations and influence organisations operating across Africa. After Wagner's withdrawal from Mali in 2025, its military role was taken over by the Russian state-controlled Africa Corps. The information infrastructure evolved alongside it. Of particular importance is African Initiative, which presents itself as a news agency but has been identified by France's VIGINUM, the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and the European External Action Service as an important component of Russia's newer influence architecture in Africa. One of the most interesting elements of this ecosystem is a network researchers call AI-Freak. The operation uses generative AI to produce text, images and videos, places them on fake or apparently independent news websites and distributes them through inauthentic accounts. This is supplemented by so-called Black Hat SEO – techniques intended to artificially increase the visibility of content in search engines. Elements of this infrastructure have previously been identified by Meta and OpenAI. In 2024, OpenAI disrupted Russian accounts using ChatGPT to generate articles and comments in English, French and Russian. Some of the French-language content targeted audiences in West Africa. In a later iteration of the operation, AI models were also used to draft scripts for short videos praising the Russian Africa Corps, translate them into French and generate descriptions optimised for social media. This illustrates an important difference between the Russian approach and Azzghim. The separatist ecosystem uses AI primarily to manufacture convincing digital personalities. The Russian model increasingly resembles an industrial production line: text, image, video, pseudo-news website, distribution account, search optimisation and additional channels amplifying the narrative. The objective is not merely to convince someone of a single claim. It is to occupy as much of the information environment as possible with narratives advantageous to Moscow: Russia as an effective security partner, the West as a neo-colonial aggressor, France as a source of instability and Russian forces as defenders of African sovereignty. Yet VIGINUM also warns against equating technological sophistication with actual impact. Some Russian influence channels still attract relatively small audiences. A sophisticated operation is not automatically a successful one. The junta is building its own digital reality Mali's military authorities operate within the same contested information environment. Since breaking with France and moving closer to Moscow, Bamako has increasingly restricted independent media space while promoting a narrative built around restored sovereignty, military success and the benefits of its Russian partnership. The Timbuktu Institute highlights the TikTok account @6tm_officiel. At the time of the study, it had more than 436,000 followers and published substantial amounts of AI-generated material presenting Mali's armed forces, the FAMa, and the Africa Corps in a favourable light. One video concerning the battle for Kidal accumulated around 4.7 million views. Again, attribution requires care. Researchers describe the account as being operated by an individual based in Bamako; they do not provide evidence that it is officially managed by the Malian government. It is better understood as part of a wider pro-government information ecosystem in which the boundaries between state communications, supporters and co-ordinated propaganda can be difficult to establish. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has previously identified the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso as important sources of disinformation campaigns in West Africa. Recurring narratives target France, the United Nations, ECOWAS, human-rights organisations and independent media, while presenting criticism of the authorities as part of a foreign conspiracy. Generative AI allows such narratives to be produced faster, more cheaply and in far more variations. Everyone is fighting over a different version of the same war What makes Mali particularly revealing is that multiple actors are using similar technology for very different objectives. FLA-linked networks need digital faces capable of humanising the Azawad cause and attacking Russia's presence. JNIM needs propaganda material and increasingly localised communications. The pro-government ecosystem seeks to portray Mali's armed forces as victorious and reinforce the junta's legitimacy. Russia possesses the broadest infrastructure, in which AI is merely one component of a larger system involving media outlets, websites, local partners, social-media profiles and technical amplification. The result is a war taking place simultaneously in two realities. In the first, soldiers and civilians are killed, towns change hands and the army, separatists and jihadists fight for territory. In the second, every side is trying to determine what the first reality will look like on a smartphone screen. Generative AI does not need to create a perfect deepfake to be effective. It merely needs to increase the number of competing versions of events until an ordinary viewer can no longer easily determine which one deserves to be trusted. That is why Mali matters. It is not showing us the future of information warfare. It is showing us its present. One TikTok video may feature a real soldier. Another may feature a propagandist. A third may feature a fighter who has never existed. And all three can tell completely different stories about the same war. Sources Timbuktu Institute – Des algorithmes en guerre: Comment l'IA générative rebat les cartes du conflit malien https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1731-rapport-des-algorithmes-en-guerre-comment-l-ia-generative-rebat-les-cartes-du-conflit-malien AfricaNews/AFP – “Mali's information war is increasingly being shaped by AI” https://www.africanews.com/2026/09/09/malis-information-war-is-increasingly-being-shaped-by-ai/ OpenAI – research on Russia-origin influence activity and Operation Stop News https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-stop-news-2024/ VIGINUM / FCDO / EEAS – technical report on African Initiative and the AI-Freak network https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250612_TLP-CLEAR_VIGINUM_FCDO_EEAS_Technical_Report_African_Initiative_EN.pdf Africa Center for Strategic Studies – Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/ Timbuktu Institute – analysis of AI use by JNIM https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1735-artificial-intelligence-a-new-propaganda-lever-for-jnim-in-mali?print=1&tmpl=component #Disinformation #Mali #Sahel #Africa #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #AIPropaganda #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #Propaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Azawad #FLA #JNIM #AfricaCorps #Russia #RussianInfluence #TikTok #DigitalWarfare #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Freeman della City di Londra: Onoreficenza Ordinaria per Tutti, Onoraria per Pochi. SOURCE: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/freeman-della-city-di-londra-dal-1996-unonoreficenza-sardella-ph-d--qlt0f/ Abstract La Freedom della City of Londra è un'istituzione di origini medievali documentata fin dal 1237, originariamente concepita per garantire ai cittadini liberi protezione dai vincoli feudali, diritto al commercio e proprietà fondiaria entro le mura della Square Mile (la denominazione del territorio della City londinese). Progressivamente trasformatasi da privilegio economico concreto a riconoscimento civico e simbolico, essa ha mantenuto nel tempo la propria rilevanza attraverso successive riforme normative (notevolmente l'apertura a tutte le nazionalità nel 1996) e conta oggi circa 1.800-2.000 nuove ammissioni annue. Il presente articolo esamina l'evoluzione storico-giuridica del titolo, illustra le molteplici vie di accesso previste dalla normativa vigente (servitù per apprendistato, patrimonio, riscatto per nomina diretta, presentazione tramite le Livery Company (o Compagnie di Livrea) e iscrizione al registro elettorale), e analizza il profilo contemporaneo dei Freemen alla luce di ammissioni recenti a figure di spicco dei mondi della finanza, della cultura, dello sport e delle istituzioni. Contrariamente all'immagine elitaria che circonda molte onorificenze britanniche, la Freedom ordinaria si rivela accessibile a qualsiasi persona, indipendentemente da nazionalità o condizione economica, a fronte di requisiti minimi e di una quota amministrativa di £180-185. Il contributo conclude riflettendo sul significato contemporaneo dell'istituzione: non nei privilegi residuali ormai perlopiù simbolici, ma nella sua funzione identitaria, civico-partecipativa e di connessione con la lunga storia della città più antica e autorevole d'Europa. Parole chiave: Freedom of the City of London; Livery Companies; City of London Corporation; onorificenze britanniche; identità civica urbana. Contenuto dell’articolo Introduzione Nel panorama delle onorificenze storiche britanniche, poche istituzioni evocano un immaginario così ricco come la Freedom della City di Londra. Menzionata in film, romanzi e articoli di costume con toni di esclusività e mistero, essa appare frequentemente associata a figure di altissimo profilo: sovrani, capi di Stato, comandanti militari di ritorno dalle guerre. Eppure, a uno sguardo più ravvicinato e metodicamente documentato, emerge un quadro assai diverso: quello di un titolo che, nella sua dimensione ordinaria e non onorifica, è oggi accessibile a un numero considerevole di persone ogni anno, senza che siano richiesti meriti straordinari né mezzi economici elevati. Il presente contributo si propone di esaminare l'istituzione nella sua duplice valenza, storica e contemporanea, con l'obiettivo di sfatare l'equivoco più diffuso: quello che confonde la Freedom ordinaria con la Honorary Freedom (o Freeedom onoraria) quest'ultima effettivamente rara e riservata a figure di standing internazionale. L'articolo ripercorre le origini medievali e l'evoluzione normativa (§ 2), illustra le vie di accesso vigenti (§ 3), discute requisiti, costi e procedimento (§ 4), analizza la composizione contemporanea del corpo dei Freemen (§ 5), esamina diritti, privilegi e obblighi (§ 6), passa in rassegna i destinatari più illustri degli ultimi decenni (§ 7), e conclude con alcune riflessioni sul significato odierno dell'istituto (§ 8). Origini e Sviluppo Storico dell'Istituzione La Freedom della City di London è documentata fin dal 1237, durante il regno di Enrico III, come forma di status civico che designava gli individui non soggetti a un signore feudale e quindi titolari delle protezioni garantite dalle carte della City. In questa accezione originaria, il termine freeman indicava l'uomo libero in senso pieno: colui che poteva commerciare liberamente nel perimetro della Square Mile, il Miglio Quadrato, possedere beni e aderire alle corporazioni di mestiere senza interferenze esterne. I privilegi pratici erano di portata concreta e direttamente funzionali all'economia medievale: esenzione da determinati pedaggi, tra cui il celebre diritto di condurre greggi di pecore attraverso il London Bridge senza pagamento, concessione radicata nel commercio della lana che dominava l'economia inglese, protezione contro l'arresto arbitrario fuori dalla giurisdizione della City, e accesso ai mercati regolamentati dalle corporazioni. Come confermato dalle successive riemissioni della Magna Carta da parte di Enrico III nel 1225, tali libertà erano intrinsecamente legate all'autogoverno della City, che le difendeva dall'ingerenza regia e baronale. La progressiva codificazione dell'istituzione avvenne attraverso ordinanze regie a partire dal XIV secolo: nel 1319 Edoardo II emanò costituzioni che limitavano l'accesso alla Freedom ai membri delle corporazioni di mestiere, vietando l'ammissione di estranei non affiliati e formalizzando così la "servitù per apprendistato" come via principale per i nuovi entrati, mentre la via patrimoniale garantiva la continuità per le famiglie già stabilite. I monarchi successivi , da Edoardo III in poi, confermarono ripetutamente le libertà cittadine attraverso carte concesse spesso in cambio di prestiti finanziari, consolidando l'autonomia della City e il suo ruolo di creditore della Corona. Nel XIX secolo, con l'industrializzazione e l'espansione demografica di Londra, il controllo corporativo sul commercio si rivelò sempre meno applicabile: il Municipal Corporations Act del 1835 ampliò l'eligibilità a chiunque vivesse, lavorasse o avesse un legame significativo con Londra, sganciando parzialmente il titolo dall'appartenenza corporativa e trasformandolo progressivamente in una distinzione onorifica a carattere civico. Nel corso del Novecento ulteriori riforme inclusivizzarono l'accesso: le donne, già ammesse informalmente come vedove ereditiere in epoche precedenti, ma formalmente escluse dalle vie standard, videro riconosciuto il diritto all'ammissione ordinaria, con Angela Burdett-Coutts che aveva già ricevuto la Honorary Freedom (Freeedom Onoraria) nel 1872 e Florence Nightingale nel 1908, mentre la parità formale si consolidò nel XX secolo. Infine, nel 1996, fu abolito il requisito della cittadinanza britannica o del Commonwealth, aprendo il titolo a qualsiasi nazionalità. Le Vie di Accesso: Quadro Normativo Vigente La normativa vigente, gestita dalla Corte del Ciambellano della City of London Corporation, prevede cinque principali modalità di accesso alla Freedom della City londinese, che riflettono i diversi legami storici tra l'individuo e le istituzioni cittadine. Per servitù (by servitude) conferisce il titolo al completamento di un apprendistato formale secondo la Consuetudine di Londra, tradizionalmente della durata di sette anni, presso un maestro freeman di una Compagnia di Livrea (Livery Company). Questa via, la più antica e di maggior portata storica, verifica il merito attraverso la competenza pratica e la lealtà alla corporazione; gli apprendisti finali vengono ammessi senza necessità di approvazione della Court of Common Council qualora iscritti al registro elettorale della City da almeno un anno, e in tal caso non è previsto alcun contributo economico. Per patrimonio (by patrimony) conferisce l'eligibilità automatica ai figli di Freemen, purché il genitore detenesse questo titolo al momento della nascita del candidato e sia fornita adeguata documentazione. Storicamente limitato ai figli maschi, fu esteso alle figlie con il Municipal Corporations Act del 1835. Il candidato doveva aver compiuto il diciottesimo anno di età, non essere un "fallito non riabilitato" e non avere condanne penali rilevanti. Per riscatto (by redemption) costituisce la via aperta a chiunque: il candidato presenta domanda alla Corte del Ciambellano, supportato da due garanti, i Consiglieri Comunali, Aldermen o Liverymen con almeno un anno di atttvità che attestano la sua reputazione, e la pratica è esaminata dal Vicecomitato delle Ammissioni alla Freedom (Freedom Applications Sub-Committee) e approvata dalla Corte del Consiglio Comunale. La quota amministrativa (Freedom Fine) ammonta a £180 dalla revisione tariffaria del 1° aprile 2024 (£185 nella modalità per nomina diretta). Per i candidati iscritti al Ward List, il registro elettorale della City, la procedura è gratuita. La presentazione tramite Compagnia di Livrea (Livery Company) è la via più frequentemente percorsa nella prassi contemporanea: il candidato diviene dapprima membro della propria corporazione di riferimento, a sèguito di una procedura variabile per ciascuna delle 113 Compagnie di Livrea attualmente attive, e successivamente invia la domanda online alla Corte del Ciambellano per il passaggio alla Freedom della City, con approvazione nella quasi totalità dei casi di carattere routinario. Requisiti, Costi e Procedimento I requisiti per l'accesso alla Freedom ordinaria sono di una semplicità sorprendente rispetto all'aura di esclusività del titolo. Il candidato deve aver compiuto diciotto anni, non essere un "fallito non ristabilito" e non avere condanne penali non ancora estinte ai sensi del Rehabilitation of Offenders Act del 1974. Non è previsto alcun requisito di nazionalità, residenza, livello di istruzione o stato patrimoniale. La documentazione richiesta è di carattere anagrafico standard: certificato di nascita integrale, eventuale certificato di matrimonio o documento attestante il cambio di nome, e se mediante presentazione, il certificato di appartenenza della corporazione di riferimento. La domanda viene inoltrata online tramite il portale della City of London Corporation. La cerimonia di ammissione si svolge alla Guildhall di Londra, nell'Aula Tribunalizia del Ciambellano, ogni giorno feriale tra le 10:30 e le 12:00 e tra le 14:00 e le 15:30. Il neo-Freeman è invitato a leggere ad alta voce la Dichiarazione di un Freeman (Declaration of a Freeman) e a firmare il Registro delle Ammissioni, ricevendo al termine il certificato calligrafato su pergamena e una copia delle Regole di Condotta di Vita (Rules for the Conduct of Life), il documento settecentesco di orientamento morale che invita il titolare a condurre una vita retta, compassionevole e socialmente attiva. Per chi non possa recarsi fisicamente a Londra, la City Corporation ha mantenuto la possibilità di svolgere la cerimonia in modalità virtuale, introdotta durante la pandemia e successivamente conservata. Composizione Contemporanea del Corpo dei Freemen Un dato empirico significativo contribuisce a ridimensionare la dimensione elitaria del titolo: ogni anno vengono ammesse tra le 1.800 e le 2.000 nuove persone, in un corpo complessivo che conta oltre 300.000 ammissioni documentate nel corso dei secoli. Come rileva la stessa City of London Corporation, i Freemen contemporanei comprendono "un'ampia sezione trasversale della popolazione", includendo professionisti, studenti, artigiani, imprenditori, personale militare e cittadini stranieri. Il crescente apporto di studenti universitari, spesso presentati in gruppi dalle proprie istituzioni accademiche e di professionisti internazionali, ha ulteriormente ampliato la base demografica. La cerimonia di gruppo del 2024, in cui 40 individui provenienti da settori che spaziano dalla scienza alla medicina, dall'imprenditoria alle iniziative per la diversità, hanno ricevuto il titolo simultaneamente, esemplifica questa apertura. Va ribadita, tuttavia, una distinzione fondamentale: la Freedom Onoraria della City di Londra costituisce un'istituzione del tutto separata e di portata radicalmente diversa. Concessa dalla Corte of Consiglio Comunale con una risoluzione speciale, è riservata a figure di eccezionale statura internazionalte tipicamente meno di una dozzina di concessioni annue e rappresenta, nelle parole della stessa City Corporation, il massimo onore che essa possa conferire. È questa la Freedom di cui hanno goduto Winston Churchill, la regina Elisabetta II e, più di recente, la presentatrice televisiva Rachel Riley (ottobre 2025) per il suo impegno nell'educazione alla Shoah e nella lotta all'antisemitismo. La confusione tra le due forme è la principale responsabile della percezione distorta dell'istituto nel dibattito pubblico. Il Significato Contemporaneo: tra Identità e Partecipazione Se la quasi totalità dei privilegi pratici un tempo associati alla condizione di Freeman è oggi scomparsa o ridotta a forma cerimoniale solenne, ciò che persiste è il potente valore simbolico e identitario del titolo. La cerimonia conserva elementi di solennità rituale la lettura della Dichiarazione, la firma sullo storico Registro delle Ammissioni, il ricevimento del certificato calligrafato su pergamena, che inscrivono il nuovo Freeman in una catena di continuità di quasi otto secoli, collegando figure eterogenee attraverso un legame condiviso con la storia del Miglio Quadrato (o Square Mile). La nobile istituzione londinese svolge altresì una funzione di coesione nell'ecosistema della City e delle Compagnie di Livrea: le 113 corporazioni attive hanno erogato collettivamente oltre 81 milioni di sterline in attività benefiche nel 2024, con programmi di formazione professionale, borse di studio e apprendistati tecnici che preservano competenze specializzate in settori economicamente rilevanti. Essere Freeman costituisce un prerequisito formale per l'avanzamento a Liveryman, e quindi per l'esercizio dei diritti elettorali nella governance della City: un residuo di democrazia corporativa che, per quanto distante dai modelli di suffragio universale, mantiene una sua logica istituzionale nell'architettura giuridica unica del Miglio Quadrato londinese. Critici di orientamento progressista hanno rilevato che il sistema favorisce reti consolidate e accessi per via ereditaria o professionale, potenzialmente escludendo strati più ampi della popolazione londinese con un bacino di Freemen viventi ben inferiore all'1% dei nove milioni di residenti nella Grande Londra (Great London). Tuttavia, i dati sulle ammissioni recenti, con riconoscimenti che spaziano dall'imprenditoria africana allo sport comunitario, dalla radiofonia alla medicina, suggeriscono una traiettoria di apertura progressiva che, pur senza raggiungere la piena rappresentatività demografica, testimonia la volontà istituzionale di mantenere l'istituto come tradizione viva piuttosto che reliquia esclusiva. Conclusioni L'analisi condotta permette di formulare alcune considerazioni conclusive. La Freedom della City, quella ordinaria, è oggi un'onorificenza accessibile a una platea ben più ampia di quanto l'immaginario collettivo suggerisca: i requisiti di ammissione sono minimi, i costi contenuti, le procedure relativamente snelle e aperte a qualsiasi nazionalità. La persistente confusione con la Freedom Onoraria, riservata a figure di eccezionaleelevatura internazionale, è la principale responsabile di una percezione distorta che merita di essere corretta. Il valore contemporaneo del titolo non risiede nei privilegi residuali, ormai perlopiù solenni e cerimoniali, ma in tre dimensioni complementari: quella identitaria, che connette il titolare a quasi otto secoli di storia istituzionale; quella civico-partecipativa, che attraverso l'accesso alle Livery Companies e al sistema elettorale della City inserisce il Freeman in reti realmente operative; e quella comunitaria, che attraverso i meccanismi di riconoscimento onorifico celebra contributi di portata e provenienza sempre più eterogenee. In questo senso, la Freedom rappresenta un caso di studio istruttivo su come le istituzioni storiche possano reinventarsi senza perdere autenticità, mantenendo vivo il proprio significato attraverso l'inclusione piuttosto che l'esclusione. Riferimenti e Fonti: City of London Corporation. (2024). Freedom of the City of London. https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-us/law-historic-governance/freedom-of-the-city Guild of Freemen of the City of London. (2025). Freedom of the City. https://www.guild-freemen-london.co.uk/freedom-of-the-city Livery Committee. (2025). Freedom of the City. https://liverycommittee.org/about/membership-freedom-and-livery-clothing/freedom-of-the-city/ Municipal Corporations Act 1835. UK Parliament. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. UK Parliament. Grokipedia. (2025). Freedom of the City of London. https://grokipedia.com/page/Freedom_of_the_City_of_London City Solicitors' Educational Trust. (2025). Applying for the Freedom of the City of London. LondradaVivere.com. (2025). La "Freedom of the City of London": un'antica libertà ancora viva. City of London Corporation. (2023). Livery Companies: Charitable Activities Report 2024. ONS / City of London Corporation. (2023). Financial Services Contribution to UK GDP.

Freeman of the City of London: An Ordinary Honour for All, an Honorary One for Few SOURCE: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/freeman-city-london-ordinary-honour-all-honorary-one-sardella-ph-d--m1alf/ Abstract The Freedom of the City of London is an institution of mediaeval origin, attested as far back as 1237, originally conceived to afford freeborn citizens protection from feudal obligations, the right to trade, and the ownership of property within the bounds of the Square Mile — the territory of the City of London proper. Having evolved progressively from a concrete economic privilege into a civic and symbolic distinction, it has preserved its relevance over the centuries through successive legislative reforms — most notably the extension of eligibility to all nationalities in 1996 — and today records approximately 1,800 to 2,000 new admissions annually. The present article examines the historical and juridical evolution of the title, sets out the several routes of access provided by current regulation (by servitude through apprenticeship, by patrimony, by redemption through direct nomination, by presentation through the Livery Companies, and by registration on the electoral roll), and analyses the contemporary profile of the Freemen in the light of recent admissions of prominent figures from the worlds of finance, culture, sport, and public life. Contrary to the elitist image surrounding many British honours, the ordinary Freedom proves accessible to any person whatsoever, regardless of nationality or financial standing, upon the satisfaction of minimal requirements and the payment of an administrative fee of £180–185. The article concludes by reflecting upon the contemporary significance of the institution: not in the residual privileges, now largely ceremonial, but in its identity-forming, civic-participatory function and its connection to the long history of the oldest and most venerable city in Europe. Keywords: Freedom of the City of London; Livery Companies; City of London Corporation; British honours; urban civic identity. Contenuto dell’articolo Introduction Amongst the historic honours of Britain, few institutions evoke an imaginative world as rich as the Freedom of the City of London. Cited in films, novels, and articles on manners and custom with tones of exclusivity and mystery, it is frequently associated with figures of the very highest standing: sovereigns, heads of state, military commanders returning from the wars. Yet, upon closer and more methodical scrutiny, a markedly different picture emerges: that of a title which, in its ordinary and non-honorary dimension, is today accessible to a considerable number of persons each year, without the requirement of extraordinary merit or elevated financial means. The present contribution aims to examine the institution in its twofold aspect, historical and contemporary, with the object of dispelling the most prevalent misconception: that which confounds the ordinary Freedom with the Honorary Freedom — the latter genuinely rare and reserved for figures of international standing. This article traces the mediaeval origins and legislative evolution (§ 2), sets out the current routes of access (§ 3), discusses requirements, costs, and procedure (§ 4), analyses the contemporary composition of the body of Freemen (§ 5), examines rights, privileges, and obligations (§ 6), reviews the most distinguished recipients of recent decades (§ 7), and concludes with some reflections upon the contemporary significance of the institution (§ 8). Origins and Historical Development of the Institution The Freedom of the City of London is attested from 1237, during the reign of Henry III, as a form of civic status designating individuals not subject to a feudal lord, and therefore entitled to the protections guaranteed by the City's charters. In this original sense, the term freeman denoted the free man in the fullest sense of the word: one who might trade freely within the perimeter of the Square Mile, hold property, and join the trade guilds without external interference. The practical privileges were of concrete scope and directly functional to the mediaeval economy: exemption from certain tolls, including the celebrated right to drive flocks of sheep across London Bridge without payment — a concession rooted in the wool trade that dominated the English economy — protection against arbitrary arrest beyond the jurisdiction of the City, and access to the markets regulated by the guilds. As confirmed by the subsequent reissues of Magna Carta by Henry III in 1225, such liberties were intrinsically bound to the self-governance of the City, which defended them against royal and baronial interference. The progressive codification of the institution took place through royal ordinances from the fourteenth century onwards. In 1319, Edward II issued constitutions restricting access to the Freedom to members of the trade guilds, prohibiting the admission of unaffiliated outsiders, and thereby formalising servitude through apprenticeship as the principal route for new entrants, whilst the patrimonial route ensured continuity for established families. Subsequent monarchs, from Edward III onwards, repeatedly confirmed the civic liberties through charters granted often in exchange for financial loans, consolidating the City's autonomy and its role as creditor to the Crown. In the nineteenth century, with industrialisation and the demographic expansion of London, corporate control over trade proved increasingly unenforceable. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 extended eligibility to any person living, working in, or having a significant connection with London, partially detaching the title from corporate membership and progressively transforming it into an honorary distinction of a civic character. During the twentieth century, further reforms rendered access more inclusive. Women, already admitted informally as widows by inheritance in earlier periods but formally excluded from the standard routes, saw their right to ordinary admission recognised — Angela Burdett-Coutts having already received the Honorary Freedom in 1872, and Florence Nightingale in 1908 — while formal equality was consolidated in the twentieth century. Finally, in 1996, the requirement of British or Commonwealth citizenship was abolished, opening the title to any nationality whatsoever. Routes of Access: The Current Regulatory Framework The current regulations, administered by the Court of the Lord Chamberlain of the City of London Corporation, provide for five principal modes of access to the Freedom of the City of London, each reflecting different historical ties between the individual and the City's institutions. By servitude confers the title upon the completion of a formal apprenticeship under the Custom of London, traditionally of seven years' duration, under a master freeman of a Livery Company. This route, the oldest and of the greatest historical significance, verifies merit through practical competence and loyalty to the guild. Completing apprentices are admitted without the need for approval by the Court of Common Council, provided they have been registered on the City's electoral roll for at least one year, and in such cases no financial contribution is required. By patrimony confers automatic eligibility upon the children of Freemen, provided the parent held the title at the time of the candidate's birth and appropriate documentation is furnished. Historically restricted to sons, it was extended to daughters by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. The candidate must have attained the age of eighteen, must not be an undischarged bankrupt, and must not have relevant unspent criminal convictions. By redemption constitutes the route open to any person whatsoever. The candidate submits an application to the Court of the Lord Chamberlain, supported by two sponsors — Common Councillors, Aldermen, or Liverymen of at least one year's standing who attest to their reputation — and the matter is examined by the Freedom Applications Sub-Committee and approved by the Court of Common Council. The administrative fee (the Freedom Fine) amounts to £180 following the tariff revision of 1 April 2024 (£185 in the case of direct nomination). For candidates registered on the Ward List, the City's electoral roll, the procedure is free of charge. By presentation through a Livery Company is the route most frequently taken in contemporary practice. The candidate first becomes a member of their relevant guild, following a procedure that varies amongst each of the 113 Livery Companies currently active, and subsequently submits an online application to the Court of the Lord Chamberlain for admission to the Freedom of the City, with approval in the vast majority of cases being a matter of routine. Requirements, Costs, and Procedure The requirements for access to the ordinary Freedom are of a simplicity that may well surprise, given the aura of exclusivity surrounding the title. The candidate must have attained the age of eighteen, must not be an undischarged bankrupt, and must not have unspent criminal convictions within the meaning of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act of 1974. No requirement of nationality, residence, educational attainment, or financial standing is imposed. The documentation required is of a standard biographical character: a full birth certificate, a marriage certificate or name-change document where applicable, and, where admission is by presentation, the certificate of membership issued by the relevant Livery Company. The application is submitted online through the City of London Corporation's portal. The admission ceremony is held at the Guildhall in London, in the Court Room of the Lord Chamberlain, on every working day between 10.30 and 12.00, and between 14.00 and 15.30. The newly admitted Freeman is invited to read aloud the Declaration of a Freeman and to sign the Admissions' Book, receiving upon its conclusion a calligraphed certificate on vellum and a copy of the Rules for the Conduct of Life — the eighteenth-century document of moral guidance that enjoins the holder to lead a life of rectitude, compassion, and social engagement. For those unable to attend in person, the City Corporation has retained the option of conducting the ceremony virtually, a facility introduced during the pandemic and subsequently preserved. The Contemporary Composition of the Body of Freemen One significant empirical datum serves to diminish the elitist dimension of the title: between 1,800 and 2,000 new persons are admitted each year, within a body that counts over 300,000 documented admissions across the centuries. As the City of London Corporation itself observes, contemporary Freemen comprise 'a broad cross-section of the population', encompassing professionals, students, craftspeople, entrepreneurs, military personnel, and foreign nationals. The growing contribution of university students, frequently presented in groups by their academic institutions, and of international professionals, has further broadened the demographic base. The group ceremony of 2024, in which 40 individuals drawn from fields ranging from science and medicine to entrepreneurship and diversity initiatives received the title simultaneously, is illustrative of this openness. A fundamental distinction must, however, be emphasised. The Honorary Freedom of the City of London constitutes an entirely separate institution of radically different scope. Granted by the Court of Common Council by special resolution, it is reserved for figures of exceptional international stature — typically fewer than a dozen conferred annually — and represents, in the words of the City Corporation itself, the highest honour it is able to bestow. It is this Freedom that has been enjoyed by Winston Churchill, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and, more recently, the television presenter Rachel Riley (October 2025), in recognition of her commitment to Holocaust education and the combating of antisemitism. The confusion between the two forms is the principal source of the distorted public perception of the institution. The Contemporary Significance: Between Identity and Participation While the great majority of the practical privileges once associated with the condition of Freeman have today disappeared or been reduced to solemn ceremonial form, what persists is the powerful symbolic and identity-forming value of the title. The ceremony retains elements of ritual solemnity — the reading of the Declaration, the signing of the historic Admission Register, the receipt of the calligraphed certificate on vellum — which inscribe the new Freeman within a chain of continuity of nearly eight centuries, linking diverse figures through a shared bond with the history of the Square Mile. This venerable London institution also performs a cohesive function within the ecosystem of the City and the Livery Companies. The 113 active guilds collectively disbursed over £81 million in charitable activities in 2024, through programmes of vocational training, scholarships, and technical apprenticeships that preserve specialist skills in economically significant sectors. Being a Freeman constitutes a formal prerequisite for advancement to Liveryman, and therefore for the exercise of voting rights in the governance of the City: a vestige of corporate democracy which, however distant from the models of universal suffrage, retains its own institutional logic within the unique legal architecture of the London Square Mile. Critics of a progressive persuasion have observed that the system favours established networks and access by hereditary or professional routes, potentially excluding broader strata of the London population, with the pool of living Freemen well below one per cent of the nine million residents of Greater London. Nevertheless, the data on recent admissions — encompassing recognition spanning African entrepreneurship, community sport, broadcasting, and medicine — suggest a trajectory of progressive opening which, whilst falling short of full demographic representativeness, attests to the institutional will to maintain the institution as a living tradition rather than an exclusive relic. Conclusions The foregoing analysis permits the formulation of several concluding observations. The Freedom of the City — the ordinary Freedom — is today an honour accessible to a far wider audience than the collective imagination suggests. The admission requirements are minimal, the costs modest, the procedures relatively streamlined and open to any nationality. The persistent confusion with the Honorary Freedom, reserved for figures of exceptional international eminence, is the principal source of a distorted perception that merits correction. The contemporary value of the title resides not in the residual privileges, now largely solemn and ceremonial, but in three complementary dimensions: the identity-forming, which connects the holder to nearly eight centuries of institutional history; the civic-participatory, which through access to the Livery Companies and the City's electoral system inserts the Freeman into genuinely operative networks; and the communitarian, which through the mechanisms of honorary recognition celebrates contributions of an ever more varied scope and provenance. In this respect, the Freedom represents an instructive case study in how historic institutions may reinvent themselves without losing authenticity, preserving their significance through inclusion rather than exclusion. References and Sources: City of London Corporation. (2024). Freedom of the City of London. https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-us/law-historic-governance/freedom-of-the-city Guild of Freemen of the City of London. (2025). Freedom of the City. https://www.guild-freemen-london.co.uk/freedom-of-the-city Livery Committee. (2025). Freedom of the City. https://liverycommittee.org/about/membership-freedom-and-livery-clothing/freedom-of-the-city/ Municipal Corporations Act 1835. UK Parliament. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. UK Parliament. Grokipedia. (2025). Freedom of the City of London. https://grokipedia.com/page/Freedom_of_the_City_of_London City Solicitors' Educational Trust. (2025). Applying for the Freedom of the City of London. LondradaVivere.com. (2025). La 'Freedom of the City of London': un'antica libertà ancora viva. City of London Corporation. (2023). Livery Companies: Charitable Activities Report 2024. ONS / City of London Corporation. (2023). Financial Services Contribution to UK GDP.

The Elite Origins of Marxist Revolution Bertrand Russell, a socialist who visited Moscow in 1920, observed that the Bolsheviks resembled religious fanatics more than political theorists. Lenin quoted Marx and Engels as a pastor recites Scripture. In his *History of Western Philosophy*, Russell described the parallels: dialectical materialism replaces God, the Communist Party becomes the church, communist revolution the Second Coming, punishment for capitalists hell, and the communist commonwealth heaven. The *Communist Manifesto* declares that its aims can be achieved only through “the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.” Marx sought to destroy the existing world and assumed that an undefined utopia would rise. If Marxism claims to speak for the oppressed, why has it so often been adopted by elites? Marx came from an upper-middle-class family that owned vineyards and employed servants. Friedrich Engels, his chief supporter and financier, inherited wealth from his family’s textile business. Lenin’s family owned property and employed servants, while Mao Zedong’s family was considerably wealthier than ordinary Chinese peasants. Fidel Castro’s family owned a large estate, Che Guevara came from an affluent background, and Pol Pot’s family had connections to Cambodia’s royal court. Pol Pot encountered Marxism while studying in Paris. These men went on to create, support, or lead revolutions that killed millions of the people they claimed to represent. This was no accident. The *Communist Manifesto* states that “a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat,” especially those who understand “the historical movement as a whole.” Marx therefore incorporated an explanation for his own class position into the movement’s founding text. Lenin expanded this idea, arguing that workers left to themselves could achieve only “trade-union consciousness.” Socialist theory, he believed, had to be brought to them by educated elites—the revolutionary vanguard. Although Marxism and communism are commonly portrayed as movements created for the poor, the men who developed and led them were, almost without exception, members of the elite.

El exvelocista británico Leon Baptiste, campeón en los Juegos de la Commonwealth de 2010, se encuentra en prisión en Marruecos cumpliendo una condena de ocho meses por agresión sexual a un menor, tras haber desaparecido durante varios meses antes de que se revelara su paradero. #LeonBaptiste #agresionsexual #Deportes

Südafrikas Schwimmstar Chad le Clos trauert um seinen langjährigen Nachbarn, der bei einem verheerenden Brand in seinem Wohnblock ums Leben kam, während er gleichzeitig einen Medaillen-Rekord bei den Commonwealth Games aufstellte und eine Spendenaktion zur Unterstützung der von der Brandkatastrophe betroffenen Nachbarn ins Leben rief. #ChadleClos #Brandkatastrophe #Gemeinschaft

Glasgow's British Commonwealth Games demonstrated that the event can survive with a smaller format, as it successfully hosted nearly 3,000 athletes from 74 nations despite facing criticism for its reduced scale and notable absences of top athletes, highlighting its importance for smaller countries and regional representation in international sports. #RahvasteÜhendus #Glasgow2023 #Spordivõistlused

Madias Ngake, atleta camaronense, fugiu do seu país após os Jogos Olímpicos de Londres em 2012 devido à sua orientação sexual, viveu nas ruas em Inglaterra, trabalhou em limpeza e, após um renascimento no desporto, destacou-se nos Jogos da Commonwealth, embora ainda nunca tenha visto a medalha olímpica de bronze que conquistou após a desqualificação das atletas à sua frente. #Desporto #Camarões #MadiasNgake

Tânărul înotător scoțian Archie Goodburn, diagnosticat cu cancer la creier, a reușit să se califice în finala probei de 50 de metri bras la Jocurile Commonwealth de la Glasgow, demonstrând o voință de fier în fața unui diagnostic pesimist care îi prognoza o speranță de viață limitată. #Cancer #Înot #Inspirație

Un accident grav a avut loc la Jocurile Commonwealth, unde gimnastul britanic Gabriel Langton a căzut de la aproape trei metri în timpul finalei pe echipe și a fost transportat de urgență la spital, însă medicii au exclus complicațiile grave și sportivul urmează să fie externat. #accident #gimnastica #JocurileCommonwealth

🇬🇧 FLASH | Le gymnaste anglais Gabriel Langton a été victime d'une terrible CHUTE lors de son passage à la barre fixe aux Jeux du Commonwealth, entraînant l'interruption de la compétition. Pris en charge par les secours, il a été ÉVACUÉ vers un hôpital où son état est jugé rassurant. https://t.co/7knkXxZ3SL #Gymnastics #CommonwealthGames #Injury

Na Commonwealth Games v Glasgow se rodiče zmizelé Maddie McCann, Kate a Gerry, poprvé po dlouhých téměř 20 letech soustředili na sportovního ducha, když fandili svému synovi Seanovi, který se kvalifikoval do finále v plaveckém závodě na 400 metrů volným stylem. #McCann #CommonwealthGames #SeanMcCann

Na Igrama Commonwealtha u Glasgowu finale muškog ekipnog natjecanja u gimnastici prekinuto je zbog teške ozljede engleskog gimnastičara Gabriela Langtona, koji je pao s preče na glavu i vrat, ostajući nepomično ležati, no prema prvim informacijama, liječnici su uspjeli stabilizirati njegovo stanje i mladi gimnastičar je počeo pomicati noge. #gimnastika #IgreCommonwealtha #GabrielLangton

Sean McCann, il fratello minore di Madeleine McCann, scomparsa nel 2007, si prepara a rappresentare la Scozia nel nuoto ai Giochi del Commonwealth di Glasgow, mentre sogna di partecipare alle Olimpiadi del 2028, costruendo una carriera sportiva distante dai riflettori del tragico caso familiare. #Nuoto #Scozia #Olimpiadi

Sean McCann, der Bruder der vermissten Maddie McCann, hat sich zu einem erfolgreichen Schwimmsportler entwickelt und ist nun Schottlands Hoffnungsträger für die Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, während die Ähnlichkeit seiner markanten grünen Augen mit denen seiner Schwester weiterhin im Hintergrund bleibt. #MaddieMcCann #SeanMcCann #Schwimmen