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The article describes how an anonymous user of a social media platform became concerned about the unauthorized possession of personal data of Warsaw residents, which prompted a politician to intervene with the head of the UODO to verify compliance with data protection regulations. (translated)

Here, RA Vosgerau beautifully illustrates that one cannot simply assert unconstitutionality by claiming that statements are unconstitutional. Individual politicians who want to ban the opposition are hardly capable of making judgments about what is unconstitutional or constitutional. Of course, there are many statements that one would like to criticize the AfD for, but especially in light of the past and statements by Merz, Merkel, Strauss, Genscher, Kohl, or even Adenauer, these are not new statements; they have been made a long time ago and across party lines. (translated)

Many people have complained to @NOS about that bizarre video (see my article: https://t.co/FufqioH1Au) and now people are sending me the standard response that apparently everyone receives. To be honest, we were not planning to submit a complaint. But we are going to do it anyway. (translated)

What irony. Once a rebel, a journalist fighting against the arrogant establishment. Today he dances on a yacht, mocking investments in public services. He laughs at investments that allowed young working parents in small towns to send their child to daycare. At public transport, which allows for cheaper and faster commutes to work. At social housing, support for people with disabilities, vocational training in small towns, connecting sewer systems and the internet to places in Poland that would never be reached commercially. Mr. Stanowski reduces it to... "Haha, yachts." Mr. Stanowski, not everyone has a limousine, a chauffeur, money for private schools, and a villa near Warsaw. There are people who do not have all of this and need daycare, good public schools, trains, and buses for a dignified life. (translated)

Life in Germany is getting more and more expensive. In September, inflation rose to over three percent. In terms of energy, the increase is even at 14.9 percent. The biggest price driver is fuel. Consumers had to pay almost 50 percent more for fuel in September compared to a year earlier. And what is the federal government doing? They are giving citizens a measly 17 cents, which doesn't even fully reach the consumer. The fuel discount, which comes into effect on October 1 after months of inaction by the Merz government, is a bad joke considering the enormous inflation! Not 17 cents, one euro would be appropriate! A price cap of 1.50 euros for fuel in Germany is urgently needed. This is possible if the CO2 price is abolished, the energy tax is halved, and the value-added tax on fuel and energy is reduced to 7 percent. (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

💬 At the Bloomberg Luxembourg Investment Summit 2026, I spoke about the growing need to invest in defence and the defence industrial & technological base. The war in Ukraine teaches a brutal truth: warfare is evolving faster than bureaucracy. We must adapt. https://t.co/02aNX8f3O0 #Defence #Investment #Warfare #LU #UA

Why has Reinaldo Azevedo not yet responded whether he had a contract with Vorcaro and if Walfrido Warde (the same one who organized the Vorcar-Lula meeting) offered the services of the "journalist" (prostitute) to Daniel Vorcaro to defend the banker in front of public opinion? The dialogues are out there circulating... only that UOL, CNN, and Metropoles have refused to publish them to protect the colleague. I continue to await a statement from Mr. Garrisson and also now for the mentioned outlets to refute me or explain why they are so passionately protecting Reinaldo. (translated)

It is worth recalling Ceferin's words from April 2023: I cannot comment on the Negreira case directly for two reasons: first, because we have an independent disciplinary committee for that, and second, because I have not dealt with this matter in detail. However, I can say that it is one of the most serious things I have seen in football. I have been informed, and the situation is extremely serious. At the level of the Spanish league, the case has obviously expired and cannot have sporting consequences, but as far as UEFA is concerned, nothing has expired. (translated)

✅ OFFICIAL: FC Barcelona responds to the statement from Real Madrid. UEFA has not initiated any new disciplinary proceedings against FC Barcelona. The proceedings began in 2023 with the appointment of two investigators, who have since taken actions they deemed necessary. The club has always complied with all their requests. These proceedings have not been resumed because they were never closed. UEFA's statement confirms the receipt of documentation sent by Real Madrid and its assessment by investigators as part of the ongoing investigation. The statement explicitly refers twice to the ongoing investigation and review. Therefore, it does not announce the initiation, resumption, or reactivation of any case, nor does it contain any statements regarding the substance or value of the submitted documentation. It is up to the investigators to decide what actions they consider appropriate in relation to this documentation. To date, they have not approached FC Barcelona with any new requests nor have they relayed Real Madrid's complaint to the Club. If they do, the Club will respond accordingly, as it has done so far. According to the applicable regulations, this act is subject to the resolution of the criminal proceedings ongoing in Spain and will remain there. Since the beginning of the investigation, FC Barcelona has been obtaining UEFA licenses without objection and has participated in UEFA competitions. [@FCBarcelona] (translated)

Ladies and gentlemen, there is a new report on the impact of Ukrainians on the Polish economy. Just take a look for yourselves: According to the report, in 2025, refugees from Ukraine contributed to the generation of 2.4% of Poland's GDP; This value corresponds to approximately 94 billion PLN. Such a part of our economy. (translated)

Terrorists in press vests: the @IDF just published an initial list of 170 Gazan terrorists who doubled as journalists during the war. Including stringers from @AlJazeera @Reuters @cnni @BBCWorld @AP @AFP and many others. https://t.co/cpPCdjXI0U https://t.co/2blHs9MUrw #Journalism #Terrorism #MiddleEast #IL #PS #QA #US #GB #FR

When neighbours remember the wounds of the past together, they open the way to a shared future. In Morinj, I joined Montenegro’s Deputy Prime Minister Ibrahimović and Croatia’s Foreign Minister Grlić-Radman to pay tribute to Croatian prisoners of war. The EU was built by https://t.co/XVkBmCjTDS #Pomirenje #ZajedničkaBudućnost #EvropskaUnija #ME #HR