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The Baron of Øresund wrote that they had gradually begun to withdraw what he described as their misinformation campaign. He asked whether the same would happen among Danish participants, including Pelle Dragsted, whom he referred to as a communist. #Misinformation #Politik #Danmark (translated)

AFRICA DAILY REPORT — 11 OCTOBER 2026 Key developments of past 24h 1. SUDAN — Drone strike on displaced civilians: reported death toll rises to 41 IMPORTANCE: 10/10 — CRITICAL Emergency Lawyers reported that a drone strike on displaced people in Abu Shandi, Blue Nile state, killed 41, including eight children. The group blamed the RSF, which had not commented. The toll is not independently verified. Source: https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-rsf-military-6cb2c34499234e9bcd33c3c9b49521da 2. ETHIOPIA–ERITREA — Eritrea appeals to UN Security Council Eritrea asked the Security Council to take deterrent measures against Ethiopia and denied Ethiopia's allegation of an Eritrean incursion. Ethiopian troops and allies entered Adigrat, according to residents and Reuters-verified footage. The alleged incursion has not been independently verified. Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-forces-regain-control-border-city-after-reported-eritrean-incursion-2026-10-10/ 3. KENYA — Authorities expand Ebola awareness campaign IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Kenya's health ministry asked churches and faith organizations to raise awareness about Ebola symptoms and early reporting. The campaign follows a fatal imported case from DR Congo; authorities continue tracing contacts and strengthening screening. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/kenyan-health-ministry-urges-churches-to-raise-awareness-about-ebola/ 4. MALAWI — Fuel shortages disrupt transport and commerce IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Motorists in Lilongwe have queued for days for petrol, disrupting commuting, schooling and business. The latest reporting did not establish when supplies would normalize. Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/10/10/malawi-motorists-queue-for-days-as-fuel-shortage-bites 5. DR CONGO — President presses AU mediators for implementation of peace commitments President Felix Tshisekedi met AU mediators in Kinshasa after consultations in Goma and Kigali, calling for concrete implementation of Washington and Doha peace commitments. No new ceasefire agreement was announced. Source: https://presidence.cd/actualite-detail/actualite/le_chef_de_letat_a_recu_le_panel_des_facilitateurs_de_lunion_africaine 6. SOUTH AFRICA — Police reinforce security after anti-migrant violence IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Police increased their presence in Johannesburg and Durban after anti-migrant demonstrations, vehicle burnings and looting. The unrest was partly fuelled by misinformation about an asylum court ruling. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/heightened-security-at-anti-immigrant-hotspots-in-south-africa/ 7. MAURITANIA — Prime minister reappointed following resignation over electricity failures The prime minister was reappointed after resigning amid findings about fires at Nouakchott substations and prolonged power outages. Investigators cited deficiencies in maintenance, protection and emergency management. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/mauritanian-pm-reappointed-hours-after-resignation-over-power-outages/ 8. DR CONGO — Joseph Kabila criticizes government and security situation Former president Joseph Kabila accused the authorities of governance failures and criticized the handling of the eastern Congo conflict. These were his political allegations, not independently established findings. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/former-dr-congo-president-says-the-country-is-in-peril/ 9. MOROCCO — King calls for greater emphasis on youth opportunities King Mohammed VI urged greater focus on education, employment, skills and inclusion following youth-led demonstrations. He also called for revised cooperation with Spain on migration. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/moroccan-king-says-youth-issues-must-be-at-forefront-of-policy-agenda/ 10. KENYA — Erratic rainfall pressures farmers' finances and mental health IMPORTANCE: 7/10 — HIGH Farmers in Nyeri report losses from unpredictable rainfall and dry spells. Local specialists highlight growing stress and anxiety, while advocating climate-smart agriculture, irrigation and mental-health support. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/unreliable-weather-creating-mental-health-issues-for-kenyan-farmers/ #Africa #AfricaNews #AfricaDailyReport #TopNewsOfAfrica #AfricaToday #DRCongo #Rwanda #FelixTshisekedi #AfricanUnion #AUMediators #PeaceProcess #PeaceNegotiations #PeaceAgreements #EasternCongo #M23 #Goma #Kinshasa #Diplomacy #Morocco #KingMohammedVI #GenZ #YouthOpportunities #YouthEmployment #Education #YouthEmpowerment #YouthProtests #SocialDevelopment #MigrationPolicy #Sudan #SudanWar #BlueNile #DroneStrike #CivilianCasualties #DisplacedPeople #RSF #HumanitarianCrisis #WarCrimes #Ethiopia #Eritrea #Tigray #Adigrat #HornOfAfrica #UNSecurityCouncil #RegionalSecurity #Kenya #Ebola #PublicHealth #DiseasePrevention #HealthAwareness #Malawi #FuelShortages #EnergyCrisis #SouthAfrica #AntiMigrantProtests #Xenophobia #MigrationCrisis #Disinformation #Mauritania #PowerOutages #JosephKabila #ClimateChange #KenyanFarmers #FoodSecurity #AfricanPolitics #Geopolitics #AfricaSecurity #HumanRights #AfricanDevelopment #WRLDorg

The Baron of Øresund questioned whether there had been Russian drones over Denmark or if the country had been attacked by a "capable actor," as the government had claimed according to him. He also wrote that politicians and the media had suggested or speculated that Russia was behind the explosion of Nord Stream. He further wrote that there had not been a provocation or a test of NATO when Russia fired a flare at a Danish helicopter, which according to him was flying too close to a Russian warship. He asked when what he described as lies, deception, and misinformation would be regarded as war propaganda. #Misinformation #Krigspropaganda #Rusland (translated)

The Baron of Øresund wrote that a new video, in his opinion, showed a Danish helicopter flying close to a Russian warship, and that the helicopter may have itself been the provocateur in the episode. He referred to Defense Minister Jeppe Bruus calling the video a Russian misinformation campaign and saying that some of the material did not originate from the day in question. The Baron of Øresund asked which parts did, and whether it included the footage of the helicopter near the ship. If it did, he believed that the Russians were justified in reacting as they did, under international law. He wrote that the Folketing and the media should demand answers, but that he did not have high hopes that they would do so. #forsvarspolitik #russiskkrig #modinformation (translated)

Christian Marcussen wrote that a Muslim influencer rejected having answered "Yes" on TikTok to whether she was a terrorist, or "Not yet" to whether she had bombed anyone. She called the images false, he wrote. According to Marcussen, she claimed after a confrontation with Pia Kjærsgaard that the 79-year-old had pushed her four times during a TV recording. Marcussen wrote that neither witnesses nor cameras had captured it, and that the influencer wondered whether the TV company was withholding the footage to protect Kjærsgaard. He noted that footage of Kjærsgaard pushing a woman with a scarf would be among the most sensational in recent times, and added that Kjærsgaard could conversely claim that the images were false. #Islam #Terrorisme #Misinformation (translated)

Mona Juul wrote that she rarely gave space to political opponents and colleagues on her side, but this time she thought it was important to highlight their warnings about misinformation. She mentioned, among other things, that Stinus Lindgreen from the Radical Left had written about daily Russian misinformation on social media and his concern that parts of the population had lost trust in the authorities. According to Juul, Karsten Hønge from SF had described lies and manipulations from the Kremlin, while Troels Lund Poulsen from the Liberal party had talked about anonymous profiles, conspiracy theories, and accusations directed at him. Alex Vanopslagh from the Liberal Alliance had written that Russia spread propaganda, and Ida Auken had warned that actors from St. Petersburg influenced who won Danish elections. Juul wrote that she herself saw conspiracy theories, deliberate misinformation, AI-generated lies, and Russian bot accounts on social media. She called the development a challenge for Danish democracy and believed that politicians must stand together because the truth was under pressure. She highlighted Danish news media and journalists as important for democratic information because the media had accountable editors-in-chief and were responsible to the Danish people and the Press Council. At the same time, she warned against videos on X, whose authenticity could not be established. Juul thanked her political colleagues for addressing coordinated misinformation and said that Russia wanted to create distrust among people. In response, she called for solidarity. #Misinformation #Demokrati #Sammenhold (translated)

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)

The author wrote that Dana Fisher of Talking Climate Collaborative had spoken at Climate Week NYC about online climate misinformation, which she attributed to a small, vocal group funded by fossil fuels. The post also quoted Fisher as saying the group was a minority, but that many people were afraid to discuss climate change.

The author thanked an ambassador for what they described as a timely clarification and said they regretted that some Romanian citizens had spread and continued to spread misinformation. They added that Romania and the United States shared the challenge of protecting public debate. #Romania #USRelations #Misinformation #RO #US

The author wrote that the Iran conflict was entering a phase in which it was becoming nearly impossible to trust information, and compared the information environment to that of the late Soviet Union. They sarcastically referred to the United States as the “USSA.” https://t.co/iYItpxgsHT #IranConflict #Misinformation #USPolitics #IR #US

26.09.2026 DESINFORMANTER Jeg ved ikke hvad der er galt med de her sølvpapirshatte der mere tror på den russiske Ambassadør end på danske ministre Disinformationen Misinformation og en hel del trolde der er falske profiler I min læring for Værnepligtige fra dengang står der om 5. Kolonne ’det er en skjult gruppe af mennesker der arbejder aktivt for fjenden.’ og det må være femte kolonne i letvægtsudgaven der kommenterer på de sociale medier. Er det dem eller er det hyrede kriminelle eller er det russere der har punkteret mine dæk ødelagt mit kamera smadret min eksterne harddisk?

Kender I historien om Peter og russerne? Nord Stream 1 og 2 blev sprængt i luften. “Det var russerne,” sagde Peter. Senere pegede den tyske efterforskning i en helt anden retning. Der blev meldt om droner over dansk luftrum. “Det er russerne,” sagde Peter. Senere viste efterforskningen, at langt de fleste observationer slet ikke kunne bekræftes som droner. Og der blev ikke fremlagt beviser for, at Rusland stod bag. “Lad være med selv at undersøge tingene. Stol på de rigtige medier,” sagde Peter. Men efterhånden begyndte folk at stille et andet spørgsmål: Hvor mange gange kan Peter råbe “russerne”, før man begynder at kræve dokumentation, inden man tror på ham? #Rusland #Efterforskning #Misinformation

De næste timer vil vi se X bliver oversvømmet med kommentarer om at vi ikke kan stole på FEs nye trusselsvurdering. Det mest skræmmende er, at der blandt afsenderne af den slags kommentarer også vil være danskere, der stoler mere på Kremls løgnagtige propaganda end FE. #fokus #sikkerhedspolitik # misinformation

Supporting children in the digital age means supporting the families around them. At #DLW2026, we explored how #MediaAndInfoLiteracy can help parents navigate #AI, social media, misinformation, online safety, and digital well-being, and help children learn, grow, and thrive. https://t.co/Y1zM17LDcl #DLW2026 #MediaAndInfoLiteracy #DigitalWellbeing #Thetweetdoesnotmentionanyspecificcountries.Therefore #thereturnwouldbeanemptystring.

Literacy today is more than reading and writing. #MediaAandInfoLiteracy is today’s literacy, helping us question information, spot misinformation, navigate AI and digital media, and participate responsibly online. @UNESCO is working to make MIL accessible to all. #LiteracyDay https://t.co/txNuadpwz9 #MediaLiteracy #InformationLiteracy #LiteracyDay #UN

Ros til DR for at anerkende, at deres artikel og deres korrespondents udtalelse om Israels nationale sikkerhedsminister var baseret på en misforståelse. Itamar Ben-Gvir opfordrede IKKE til at slå 30-40 vilkårlige palæstinensere ihjel hver dag. Derfor var korrespondentens konklusion om, at det var en opfordring til at begå krigsforbrydelser, heller ikke korrekt. Det er præcis sådan, man skal agere som ansvarligt medie, når man begår fejl. Tilbage står Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke @ActionAidDK og @Enhedslisten der igangsatte en kampagne for sanktioner mod Israel bl.a. på baggrund af DR’s artikel. De har mig bekendt ikke trukket deres kampagner eller anklager tilbage. Hvorfor? Hvordan kan man stadig advokere for sanktioner mod et land på baggrund af misinformation? #Misinformation #Medieansvar #IsraelPalæstina

Migranter i Ceuta angriber militærkøretøj, politiet eskorterer skolebørn og skyder med gummikugler, grov kriminalitet... Men hvad har vi fået at vide? Moderaterne: Der er styr på det. Enhedslisten: Ren MAGA-misinformation. Forsker: Hysterisk reaktion. https://t.co/fp4Wa2v0fv https://t.co/lIDislf5Zs #Ceuta #Migranter #Kriminalitet

Together with the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, @WHO & partners, the @UN is aligning behind five priorities to build an integrated Ebola response on the ground: - Expand community engagement to build trust & counter fear & misinformation. - Strengthen #EbolaResponse #CommunityEngagement #PublicHealth #CD #UN