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Re-professionalizing and de-politicizing DoD will be crucial. And doable, as this thread with specifics shows. Add Thiel-Palantir to Musk-SpaceX and Luckey-Anduril review. Courts martial for boat bombings. Problem is, it’ll take political will, and there’s at least two more years of damage to go.

AS Roma expressed condolences for the passing of Roberto Bernabai, described by the club as a respected journalist and a historic figure in sports journalism. The organization remembered his passion and professionalism, and expressed closeness to his family and loved ones. https://t.co/2PUEUcXZxT #ASRoma #giornalismo #cordoglio (translated)

The Cinghio described October 20 as a difficult day for Sempio's defense, stating that in various broadcasts regarding the Garlasco case three reconstructions presented in the previous weeks as certainties had been disputed. At Mattino Cinque, he reported, the reconstruction of the Prosecutor's Office had been illustrated, according to which the comment published on the podcast dated back to April 15, the day after the soliloquy of the three phone calls: this, according to the author, would have cast doubt on the hypothesis that the soliloquy had begun in response to that comment. In the afternoon, he continued, Skin had presented the Prosecutor's interpretation of the intercepts from 2017, deemed relevant to reconstruct what Sempio knew about the matter. The Cinghio noted that this reading contrasted with the statements made by lawyer Taccia and commentators Oliva and Longo, according to whom Sempio would not have been involved. In the evening, he added, Milo Infante had shown that he could wear two shoes, one size 43 and one size 42, even though he had size 44 and a half, after the video of "Cenerentolo" showed difficulties in putting on the shoe. The author clarified that the demonstration did not constitute definitive proof, also due to differences in shape, fit, and foot characteristics. The Cinghio criticized the defenses' reconstructions, arguing that they could weaken their credibility and appear misleading to the public. He also stated that the public had the right to question the defense's arguments, especially when they were repeatedly presented as indisputable. #Garlasco #Garlasco #Giustizia #Processo (translated)

Former Chancellor Karl Nehammer had to interrupt a train journey in Ukraine due to a drone alarm before arriving in Kiev as a senior EU official, and emphasized the professionalism and composure of the people in the war-torn region. #Nehammer #UkrainischeKrise #Drohnenalarm (translated)

Hilda Spruit also asked NU.nl to pay attention to citizens outside the asylum and integration chain who had taken in a status holder. She pointed out that Laura Faber worked in that chain and wrote that according to NU.nl there were more citizens who had provided shelter to a status holder. https://t.co/tUHaNJitSs #asiel #integratie #statushouders (translated)

The law enforcement forces have guaranteed the right to demonstrate with their usual professionalism, intervening with balance and caution in critical situations where it was necessary to do so. In any case, the treacherous actions carried out by these agitated professionals of disorder will not go unpunished. In addition to numerous arrests, investigation activities have been initiated to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. The minor age of some protagonists cannot suggest any form of impunity. The line of the Ministry of the Interior, as always, is aimed at preventing violence to avoid worse troubles, but without discounts on individual responsibilities that will be contested in criminal proceedings. Those who engage in such illegal actions will face the corresponding response from the State, which will apply existing laws. This is clearly blatant violence that will not achieve any result, said the Minister of the Interior, Matteo Piantedosi. #ForzediPolizia #SicurezzaCittadina #ViolenzaInStrada (translated)

The law enforcement agencies have guaranteed the right to protest with their usual professionalism, intervening with balance and caution in critical situations where it was necessary to do so. In any case, the treacherous actions carried out by these agitated professionals of disorder will not go unpunished. In addition to the numerous arrests, investigation activities have begun to bring those responsible to justice. Neither the minor age of some of the participants can suggest any form of impunity. The line from the Viminale, as always, is aimed at preventing violence to avoid worse troubles but without leniency on individual responsibilities that will be contested in criminal proceedings. Those who engage in such illegal actions will face the ensuing response from the State, which will apply the current laws. This is clearly brutish violence that will achieve no results. Thus said the Minister of the Interior, Matteo Piantedosi. #ForzedellOrdine #Violenza #Proteste (translated)

The law enforcement agencies ensured the right to protest with their usual professionalism, intervening with balance and caution in critical situations where it was necessary to do so. Thus said the Minister of the Interior, Matteo Piantedosi. #ForzeDellOrdine #Violenza #Manifestazioni (translated)

The law enforcement agencies have guaranteed the right to protest with their usual professionalism, intervening with balance and caution in critical situations where it was necessary to do so. In any case, the treacherous actions carried out by these agitated disorder professionals will not go unpunished. In addition to numerous arrests, investigative activities have been initiated to bring those responsible to justice. Neither the minor age of some protagonists can suggest any form of impunity. The Viminale's line, as always, is aimed at preventing violence to avoid worse troubles but without discounts on individual responsibilities that will be contested in criminal proceedings. Those who are protagonists of such illegal actions will face the corresponding response from the State, which will apply existing laws. This is clearly crude violence that will achieve no results. #Manifestazioni #Giustizia #Sicurezza (translated)

Emanuel Boeminghaus reported that a supervisor at a SIXT station in Palma de Mallorca had pointed out a small damage on his driver's license. A week earlier, he had rented a vehicle in Salzburg without any issues using the same document. After Boeminghaus referred to the situation as "kindergarten," he was reportedly denied further service according to his report. His request to be served by another employee was also declined because the colleague in question was the supervisor. Renting with his girlfriend's driver's license was also not possible. The situation occurred in front of his wife and their frightened child. Boeminghaus wrote that he acknowledges that SIXT has the right to check driver's licenses and refuse rentals when there are justified doubts. However, he criticized the handling of the disagreement and the refusal to let another employee review his case. From his perspective, the location has a significant problem in dealing with customers and complaints. He expects professionalism and an objective approach to conflicts from an international rental car company. #SIXT #Kundendienst #Mallorca (translated)

Katie Zacharia's profile has attracted controversy since her appointment: Trump had referred to her as an “attorney” during her presentation, but American newspapers had raised doubts about it since her name did not appear in the professional registers. #Trump #KatieZacharia #PoliticaUSA (translated)

Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi emphasizes how the difficult day was managed by the police forces "with firmness combined with professionalism and balance, even in the face of unprovoked aggression and violence." #NoMeloniDay #StudentiInProtesta #DirittoAllIstruzione (translated)

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Beth Jenkins, a 42-year-old mother, faced six years of medical dismissal regarding her breast cancer symptoms, being repeatedly told she was too young for the disease before finally receiving a diagnosis of stage two lobular breast cancer, which she attributes to a lack of proper attention from healthcare professionals. #BreastCancerAwareness #PatientAdvocacy #WomenHealthIssues