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Russia’s influence operation arrives ahead of the US midterms With weeks remaining before America's November midterm elections, a familiar type of content has begun appearing online. Videos resembling reports from CNN, the BBC and The New York Times accuse candidates of corruption, antisemitism and misconduct. Hollywood actors appear to denounce Democrats. Other clips claim that warnings about Russian interference are themselves a Democratic disinformation campaign. The reports are fabricated. Graphika, which tracks online influence operations, says it has identified a coordinated campaign targeting candidates in competitive US Senate races. It assesses with high confidence that the material was produced by Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka – a long-running Russia-aligned influence operation previously active against elections and political debates in Europe and the United States. The activity coincides with a broader warning from American intelligence officials. Classified assessments reported by The New York Times conclude that the Kremlin has authorised another digital influence campaign ahead of the 2026 midterms, aimed primarily at exploiting existing divisions and undermining confidence in American democracy. There is an important distinction. US officials have not reported evidence that Russia is attempting to manipulate voting machines or alter the counting of votes. The operation is about influencing the information environment surrounding the election. Fake scandals for competitive Senate races Graphika traced a concentrated wave of activity between 10 and 14 September. Likely inauthentic or repurposed accounts distributed videos accusing Democratic politicians of corruption, antisemitism and other misconduct. The targets included Senator Jon Ossoff in Georgia, Representative Chris Pappas in New Hampshire and Texas state representative James Talarico, as well as Senate candidates Sherrod Brown in Ohio, Roy Cooper in North Carolina, Mary Peltola in Alaska, Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, Joshua Turek in Iowa and Troy Jackson in Maine. The selection was not random. These were politicians involved in Senate contests where the result could matter to control of the chamber. The campaign did not rely on a single political narrative. Instead, it attached different accusations to different candidates – corruption, social issues, antisemitism or personal misconduct – while maintaining a consistent production and distribution model. That model is characteristic of Matryoshka: create apparently independent pieces of evidence, disguise them as journalism and distribute them through networks of disposable accounts. Hollywood celebrities who never said what the videos claimed One of the campaign's more distinctive techniques involved genuine footage of American actors. Videos featuring celebrities including Sarah Jessica Parker and Julia Roberts were altered with captions and other material to suggest they were promoting the slogan #AllDemocratsAreCriminals. The technique continued in subsequent material. Fact-checkers identified fabricated New York Times-branded videos using footage of Alyssa Milano, Sean Astin, Rachael Harris, Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden, Annie Potts and Patrick Fabian. Some of the original footage came from Cameo, where actors record personalised video messages. Their authentic images were retained while fabricated audio, captions or surrounding material changed the meaning entirely. Lead Stories compared several of the clips with the originals and found that the supposed political statements did not appear in the genuine recordings. Eric Braeden's representative separately confirmed that the claim he had joined the anti-Democratic campaign was false. The advantage of the technique is straightforward. Generative AI does not need to create a convincing celebrity from nothing. The operator can begin with authentic footage of a recognisable person and manipulate only the elements necessary to manufacture a political statement. Stealing the authority of real newsrooms Celebrity impersonation was only one layer. The operation repeatedly borrowed the visual identity of established media organisations. Graphika identified material impersonating or falsely citing the BBC, CNN and Politico, alongside references to France's VIGINUM foreign-interference agency and journalist Brandy Zadrozny. Other material reproduced New York Times-style branding. Some fabricated reports made an unusual claim: that Democrats themselves were organising disinformation or “false-flag operations” and then blaming Russia. This creates a defensive layer around the influence operation. Instead of merely distributing false political allegations, the campaign also attempts to discredit future reporting about the manipulation itself. If successful, evidence exposing foreign interference can be reframed as part of the conspiracy. Graphika says it assesses with high confidence that Operation Overload produced these videos. The technique is well established. Earlier investigations by CheckFirst and Reset Tech documented hundreds of falsified pieces of content produced by Operation Overload, often impersonating journalists, institutions and major media brands. AI-generated or manipulated material has increasingly become part of that production system. What US intelligence says Russia is trying to achieve The broader strategic picture comes from American intelligence assessments reported on 18 September. According to US officials familiar with classified findings, the Kremlin has authorised a covert digital influence campaign aimed at Americans during the 2026 election season. Its apparent objective is to seed or amplify domestic divisions and weaken confidence in the political process. Some officials described the principal aim as creating disorder rather than helping a single political party. The publicly identified Matryoshka material examined so far, however, has targeted Democratic candidates. Those two findings should not be treated as contradictory. An operation can exploit partisan divisions while serving the broader objective of making the electoral system appear corrupt, chaotic or illegitimate. US officials also reportedly assess the current Russian campaign as less extensive or coordinated than some previous election operations. Moscow is considered less focused on congressional elections than presidential contests and remains heavily occupied by its war against Ukraine. Russia has denied previous US accusations of election interference. An operation with limited reach – so far There is another reason for caution: producing large quantities of disinformation is not the same as successfully influencing voters. Matryoshka has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to manufacture content at industrial speed, but much of its material receives little genuine engagement. Researchers monitoring the network have previously warned against confusing automated distribution and platform view counts with authentic audience penetration. There are exceptions. A fabricated New York Times-style video featuring Jamie Lee Curtis had accumulated nearly 200,000 views on X by the end of 17 September, according to reporting by The New York Times. Other pieces attracted considerably less attention. There is currently no public evidence demonstrating that the campaign has changed voting intentions or will affect election results. What the September activity demonstrates is something narrower but important: a Russia-aligned influence infrastructure previously used against European elections has now turned significant attention towards the American midterms. The basic method has changed little – impersonate trusted media, manufacture scandals and use networks of inauthentic accounts to distribute them. What has changed is the production technology. Authentic celebrity footage, synthetic voices, manipulated video and rapidly generated fake journalism allow the same operation to produce more tailored material for more candidates at lower cost. The objective does not require Americans to believe every fabrication. Creating uncertainty over which videos, news reports and public statements are authentic can itself degrade trust in the information environment surrounding an election. Sources - Graphika — Russia-Aligned Influence Operation Targets US Midterm Candidates, German State Elections https://www.graphika.com/insights/russia-aligned-influence-operation-targets-us-midterm-candidates-german-state-elections - The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections, U.S. Intelligence Finds https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/us/politics/russia-election-disinformation-us-intelligence.html - Kathimerini / The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections https://www.ekathimerini.com/nytimes/1315792/russia-aims-to-inject-chaos-into-elections-us-intelligence-finds/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload: An AI-fuelled escalation of the Kremlin-linked propaganda effort https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-an-ai-fuelled-escalation-of-the-kremlin-linked-propaganda-effort/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload targeting the US election https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-a-growing-disinformation-threat-now-targeting-the-u-s-presidential-election/ - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Alyssa Milano, Rachael Harris and Sean Astin https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-alyssa-milano-rachael-harris-sean-astin-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden and other celebrities https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-leonardo-dicaprio-eric-braeden-other-celebs-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Brennan Center for Justice — AI Is Changing Foreign Election Influence https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/ai-changing-foreign-election-influence - ODNI — previous US intelligence assessment of foreign election information operations https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024.pdf - FBI / ODNI / CISA — previous joint assessment of Russian election influence operations https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-110424 #DISINFORMED #Episode9 #Russia #UnitedStates #USMidterms #Midterms2026 #USElections #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #OperationOverload #Matryoshka #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #FakeNews #PoliticalDisinformation #CelebrityDeepfakes #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #ElectionSecurity #CognitiveWarfare #Graphika #OSINT #Democracy #WRLD

MY PRESIDENTIAL PLEDGE 🇦🇹🇹🇷 Ekrem İmamoğlu remains imprisoned in Türkiye amid multiple criminal proceedings that he denies; opposition parties and international critics describe the cases as politically motivated, while the Turkish government says the judiciary is independent. https://t.co/UF3I57ylJP #Ekremİmamoğlu #Türkiye #PoliticalPrisoner #AT #TR

As President of Austria, I will make my first official visit to Asia a visit to Taiwan. I will personally open an Austrian Embassy in Taipei. My presidential policy will be clear: deepen Austria–Taiwan relations in trade, technology, investment, research and security cooperation, https://t.co/kf1kRCEVn4 #Austria #Taiwan #Diplomacy #AT #TW

🇦🇹🇮🇱 MY PRESIDENTIAL PLEDGE ON ISRAEL — As candidate for Federal President of Austria, my position is clear: I support one united Israel. I oppose a two-state solution and I oppose Austrian recognition of a Palestinian state. I stand firmly against Hamas and every organization, https://t.co/rHkGZU8b7j #Austria #Israel #Palestine #AT #IL

AFRICA DAILY REPORT — 22 SEPTEMBER 2026 Key developments reported during the previous 24 hours 1. ETHIOPIA — Seven armed opposition groups form a new anti-government alliance — 10/10 (Critical) Seven Ethiopian armed groups, including factions from Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz, announced the Ethiopian Peoples' Forces Alliance for Survival. The coalition brings together groups that previously fought on opposing sides, including the TPLF and Amhara Fano elements. Its stated aim is to challenge Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government. The development is particularly significant amid renewed clashes and tensions around the 2022 Pretoria peace framework. Sources: Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/seven-ethiopian-armed-groups-announce-anti-government-alliance-2026-09-21/ AP: https://apnews.com/article/d348643aa604ebc074d8aade25c97efe 2. MALI — Sources say more than 100 soldiers were killed in JNIM's Dioura attack — 10/10 (Critical) Reuters reports that the September 10 assault by al-Qaeda-linked JNIM on the Dioura military camp killed more than 100 Malian soldiers, substantially above earlier reported figures. Sources cited estimates of roughly 120–130 soldiers killed and more than 100 captured. JNIM has also maintained pressure around Sévaré and Konna, underscoring the deteriorating security position of Mali's military government and its Russian Africa Corps partners. Source: Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/al-qaeda-linked-militants-kill-more-than-100-malian-soldiers-attack-this-month-2026-09-21/ 3. DR CONGO — Amnesty accuses M23 of abuses and mineral trafficking at rebel-controlled mines — 9.5/10 (Very High) Amnesty International says M23 fighters committed abuses including torture, forced labour and killings at artisanal mining sites in eastern DRC and trafficked gold and coltan through Rwanda. The allegations are strategically important because control of mineral production and trade is central to the economics of the eastern Congo conflict. M23 and Rwanda had not responded to the allegations in the reports reviewed. Sources: AP: https://apnews.com/article/5b3ab989adbac990144fed20ca0a5c5e Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/09/drc-m23-fighters-abused-miners-and-trafficked-gold-and-coltan-to-rwanda/ 4. NIGERIA — Survivors describe circumstances surrounding deaths of 37 detainees in Minna — 9/10 (Very High) Reuters interviewed survivors of the detention incident in Niger State in which 37 detainees, many reportedly teenage artisanal gold miners, died after being held in an overcrowded cell. Survivors alleged that an unidentified substance was sprayed inside before detainees developed breathing difficulties and began collapsing. Authorities have not established the cause of death. President Bola Tinubu has ordered an investigation and officials have been suspended. Source: Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/one-after-another-they-started-dying-survivors-recount-deaths-detention-nigeria-2026-09-22/ 5. DR CONGO — Ebola crisis remains a major health emergency as vaccination research expands — 9/10 (Very High) Health authorities are expanding vaccination efforts while research continues into protection against the Bundibugyo strain driving the current outbreak. WHO has reported some progress in the response, but the epidemic remains far from over. CARE warned on September 21 that the Ebola emergency is intersecting with humanitarian pressures and the threat of El Niño-related disruption. Sources: WHO: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON617 CARE: https://www.care.org/media-and-press/as-ebola-spreads-and-el-nino-looms-urgent-investment-is-needed-in-the-drc/ 6. SUDAN — US diplomatic push for a permanent settlement intensifies at UN meetings — 8.5/10 (Very High) Senior US presidential adviser Massad Boulos held talks in New York with Sudanese and Egyptian foreign ministers as diplomatic efforts continue to seek a permanent settlement to Sudan's war. The discussions come amid the UN General Assembly and renewed international attention to Sudan's territorial integrity, humanitarian emergency and the need for a negotiated settlement. Source: Sudan Tribune: https://sudantribune.com/article/319088 7. SUDAN — Another deadly gold-mine collapse highlights wartime mining risks — 8/10 (High) At least 11 miners were reported killed and around 30 injured after a mine shaft collapsed in northeastern Sudan. It was the second major informal-mine disaster reported within a week. Sudan's largely informal gold sector suffers from weak safety regulation, while gold production and smuggling also intersect with the financing of armed actors in the country's civil war. Source: AP: https://apnews.com/article/cc669999ff89b8eb6aca66540100ec97 8. AFRICAN UNION / UNITED NATIONS — Africa pushes institutional reform and greater representation at UNGA — 8/10 (High) African leaders enter UN General Assembly high-level week with institutional reform high on the agenda, including demands for greater African representation in global governance. AU and UN leaders also discussed debt sustainability, critical-mineral value chains, peace and security mechanisms, and conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Libya, the Sahel and DRC. Sources: Africanews: https://www.africanews.com/2026/09/22/african-union-to-push-for-bigger-voice-on-world-stage-at-un-meeting/ AllAfrica: https://allafrica.com/stories/202609210255.html 9. SOUTH AFRICA — Three suspects arrested as investigation into killings of women continues — 7.5/10 (High) South African police arrested three suspects in connection with one of a series of killings of women around Ekurhuleni, east of Johannesburg. Investigators are examining whether multiple cases are connected. The investigation has intensified public concern over femicide and violent crime in South Africa. Source: ABC News / AP: https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/3-suspects-arrested-relation-series-killings-women-south-136613059 10. EGYPT / SOMALIA — Cairo and CIA leadership reaffirm support for Somalia's territorial integrity — 7/10 (Significant) Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met CIA Director John Ratcliffe in Cairo, with discussions covering Somalia, Sudan, maritime security and wider regional crises. Egypt reiterated support for Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, reflecting Cairo's growing security role in the Horn of Africa. Source: Radio Dalsan via AllAfrica: https://allafrica.com/stories/202609210230.html #Africa #AfricaNews #TopNewsOfAfrica #Ethiopia #EthiopianPolitics #ArmedOpposition #PoliticalAlliance #TPLF #Amhara #Oromia #Tigray #AbiyAhmed #PretoriaPeaceAgreement #HornOfAfrica #Mali #Sahel #Dioura #JNIM #AlQaeda #JihadistViolence #Terrorism #Counterterrorism #MalianArmy #SahelSecurity #DRCongo #M23 #AmnestyInternational #HumanRights #HumanRightsAbuses #MineralTrafficking #ConflictMinerals #Gold #Coltan #CriticalMinerals #Rwanda #EasternCongo #AfricanSecurity #RegionalStability #Geopolitics #AfricaToday #wrldorg

Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

#Romania strongly condemns the holding of so-called "presidential elections" in Georgia's occupied Tskhinvali region/#South Ossetia (September 18). The voting and the whole process holds no legitimacy. The outcome is null and void. 🇷🇴 stands firm in support of Georgia’s #Georgia #SouthOssetia #ElectionIntegrity #RO #GE #OS

Today 25 political prisoners were released in Belarus. They are now in Vilnius. As @PACE_News General Rapporteur for a democratic Belarus, I commend the hard work made by US Presidential Envoy @johnpcoale and @Tsihanouskaya. Now all remaining political prisoners must be released. https://t.co/c1DOL3ukYR #Belarus #PoliticalPrisoners #HumanRights #BY #LT #US

MY PRESIDENTIAL PLEDGE — AUSTRIA’S EMBASSY TO JERUSALEM @netanyahu @TimesofIsrael @IsraelinAustria @YairNetanyahu If I am elected Federal President of Austria in 2028, I will make the relocation of Austria’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem a clear foreign-policy priority of my https://t.co/vIkYhIzqwN #Austria2028 #JerusalemEmbassy #ForeignPolicy #AT #IL

WE WILL DEFEND THE UNITED KINGDOM — WHATEVER IT TAKES. 🇬🇧 My presidential policy is clear: keep NATO Britain united, defend our allies, confront and dismantle the political, economic and strategic networks of our enemies, and rebuild the strength of the democratic West. I want a https://t.co/RU9NEihcCw #DefendUK #NATO #DemocraticWest #GB