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Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

Mali – a war where some of the people fighting do not exist In Mali's war, an apparently simple question is becoming increasingly difficult to answer: who exactly is speaking to us? A real person? A rebel organisation? A Russian influence operation? A supporter of the military junta? Or somebody who has never existed at all? In September 2026, the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute published Des algorithmes en guerre, a report examining the use of generative artificial intelligence by actors involved in the Malian conflict. Its researchers describe the country as a potential laboratory for AI-assisted information warfare. Separatist networks are deploying synthetic fighters on TikTok. Jihadist propagandists are experimenting with AI-generated imagery. Pro-government accounts are producing large quantities of content celebrating the Malian armed forces. Russia, meanwhile, operates the most developed influence infrastructure of all: pseudo-media outlets, inauthentic accounts, AI-generated text, images and video, and systems designed to artificially amplify their visibility. Artificial intelligence did not create Mali's conflict. The war has been under way since 2012, and its participants have always fought with propaganda as well as weapons. What AI has changed is the economics of that struggle. A new “witness”, commentator, fighter, poster or video can now be produced in minutes. For audiences watching from a phone, distinguishing between genuine documentation, propaganda and material created entirely by an algorithm is becoming progressively harder. Azzghim – the fighter who cannot be killed or interrogated The most striking case documented by the Timbuktu Institute involves accounts associated with supporters of the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, a Tuareg separatist movement fighting the authorities in Bamako. A figure called “Azzghim” appeared on TikTok. He looks like a Tuareg fighter and regularly features in videos attacking Mali's government and Russia's Africa Corps, commenting on the conflict and promoting the cause of Azawad. There is one problem: Azzghim does not exist. Analysis of the videos identified anomalies characteristic of generative AI, including unnatural body movements, visual inconsistencies, irregular colouring and problems with audio synchronisation. According to the Timbuktu Institute, Azzghim is a synthetic character being used as the digital face of a political narrative. The propaganda advantages are considerable. An organisation no longer needs to expose a real spokesman. A synthetic personality can be designed to look exactly as its creators require, speak the appropriate language and appeal to a particular audience. Different characters could potentially be created for younger viewers, traditional communities or different ethnic and social groups. There is another advantage: a synthetic spokesman cannot be arrested, identified or interrogated. Researchers also identified accounts amplifying the material. At the time of the study, TikTok account @tawri.n.azawad had around 207,000 followers and was almost entirely devoted to publishing or repackaging content involving Azzghim. Another account, @asnan831, used a similar synthetic teenage character. An important distinction is necessary. Researchers describe these profiles as belonging to supporters or individuals associated with the FLA. The available evidence does not establish that every account is part of an operation centrally directed by the Front's leadership. The information effect, however, remains significant: a digital community can be constructed around the Azawad cause in which some of the apparent participants may not be real people at all. The jihadists are learning too The picture is different for Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, the al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition that has become one of the most powerful armed groups in the Sahel. Its confirmed use of generative AI remains considerably less sophisticated. In June 2026, JNIM's Az-Zallaqa media apparatus published AI-generated posters promoting material about previous attacks. The images showed fighters in combat but contained familiar generative artefacts: buildings and vegetation merging unnaturally, blurred details and unnaturally smooth surfaces. More important than JNIM's current capabilities is what AI could add to an already sophisticated propaganda apparatus. The organisation already tailors communications to different audiences. UN reporting has documented its use of media channels for broader propaganda while other outlets increasingly distribute material in local languages, including Bambara. Generative AI could dramatically reduce the cost of this strategy, translating material into Fulfulde, Hausa, Zarma or Tamasheq, generating synthetic dubbing and producing multiple versions of the same message. The Timbuktu Institute also considers the future possibility of AI chatbots being used to personalise recruitment. That should not be presented as a capability JNIM has already demonstrated. At present, it is a risk scenario rather than a confirmed operation. Russia has the most sophisticated machine At the other end of the spectrum lies Russia's influence ecosystem. Here, AI is not an isolated experiment but another component of an infrastructure previously developed by Wagner-linked networks, Russian media operations and influence organisations operating across Africa. After Wagner's withdrawal from Mali in 2025, its military role was taken over by the Russian state-controlled Africa Corps. The information infrastructure evolved alongside it. Of particular importance is African Initiative, which presents itself as a news agency but has been identified by France's VIGINUM, the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and the European External Action Service as an important component of Russia's newer influence architecture in Africa. One of the most interesting elements of this ecosystem is a network researchers call AI-Freak. The operation uses generative AI to produce text, images and videos, places them on fake or apparently independent news websites and distributes them through inauthentic accounts. This is supplemented by so-called Black Hat SEO – techniques intended to artificially increase the visibility of content in search engines. Elements of this infrastructure have previously been identified by Meta and OpenAI. In 2024, OpenAI disrupted Russian accounts using ChatGPT to generate articles and comments in English, French and Russian. Some of the French-language content targeted audiences in West Africa. In a later iteration of the operation, AI models were also used to draft scripts for short videos praising the Russian Africa Corps, translate them into French and generate descriptions optimised for social media. This illustrates an important difference between the Russian approach and Azzghim. The separatist ecosystem uses AI primarily to manufacture convincing digital personalities. The Russian model increasingly resembles an industrial production line: text, image, video, pseudo-news website, distribution account, search optimisation and additional channels amplifying the narrative. The objective is not merely to convince someone of a single claim. It is to occupy as much of the information environment as possible with narratives advantageous to Moscow: Russia as an effective security partner, the West as a neo-colonial aggressor, France as a source of instability and Russian forces as defenders of African sovereignty. Yet VIGINUM also warns against equating technological sophistication with actual impact. Some Russian influence channels still attract relatively small audiences. A sophisticated operation is not automatically a successful one. The junta is building its own digital reality Mali's military authorities operate within the same contested information environment. Since breaking with France and moving closer to Moscow, Bamako has increasingly restricted independent media space while promoting a narrative built around restored sovereignty, military success and the benefits of its Russian partnership. The Timbuktu Institute highlights the TikTok account @6tm_officiel. At the time of the study, it had more than 436,000 followers and published substantial amounts of AI-generated material presenting Mali's armed forces, the FAMa, and the Africa Corps in a favourable light. One video concerning the battle for Kidal accumulated around 4.7 million views. Again, attribution requires care. Researchers describe the account as being operated by an individual based in Bamako; they do not provide evidence that it is officially managed by the Malian government. It is better understood as part of a wider pro-government information ecosystem in which the boundaries between state communications, supporters and co-ordinated propaganda can be difficult to establish. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has previously identified the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso as important sources of disinformation campaigns in West Africa. Recurring narratives target France, the United Nations, ECOWAS, human-rights organisations and independent media, while presenting criticism of the authorities as part of a foreign conspiracy. Generative AI allows such narratives to be produced faster, more cheaply and in far more variations. Everyone is fighting over a different version of the same war What makes Mali particularly revealing is that multiple actors are using similar technology for very different objectives. FLA-linked networks need digital faces capable of humanising the Azawad cause and attacking Russia's presence. JNIM needs propaganda material and increasingly localised communications. The pro-government ecosystem seeks to portray Mali's armed forces as victorious and reinforce the junta's legitimacy. Russia possesses the broadest infrastructure, in which AI is merely one component of a larger system involving media outlets, websites, local partners, social-media profiles and technical amplification. The result is a war taking place simultaneously in two realities. In the first, soldiers and civilians are killed, towns change hands and the army, separatists and jihadists fight for territory. In the second, every side is trying to determine what the first reality will look like on a smartphone screen. Generative AI does not need to create a perfect deepfake to be effective. It merely needs to increase the number of competing versions of events until an ordinary viewer can no longer easily determine which one deserves to be trusted. That is why Mali matters. It is not showing us the future of information warfare. It is showing us its present. One TikTok video may feature a real soldier. Another may feature a propagandist. A third may feature a fighter who has never existed. And all three can tell completely different stories about the same war. Sources Timbuktu Institute – Des algorithmes en guerre: Comment l'IA générative rebat les cartes du conflit malien https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1731-rapport-des-algorithmes-en-guerre-comment-l-ia-generative-rebat-les-cartes-du-conflit-malien AfricaNews/AFP – “Mali's information war is increasingly being shaped by AI” https://www.africanews.com/2026/09/09/malis-information-war-is-increasingly-being-shaped-by-ai/ OpenAI – research on Russia-origin influence activity and Operation Stop News https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-stop-news-2024/ VIGINUM / FCDO / EEAS – technical report on African Initiative and the AI-Freak network https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250612_TLP-CLEAR_VIGINUM_FCDO_EEAS_Technical_Report_African_Initiative_EN.pdf Africa Center for Strategic Studies – Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/ Timbuktu Institute – analysis of AI use by JNIM https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1735-artificial-intelligence-a-new-propaganda-lever-for-jnim-in-mali?print=1&tmpl=component #Disinformation #Mali #Sahel #Africa #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #AIPropaganda #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #Propaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Azawad #FLA #JNIM #AfricaCorps #Russia #RussianInfluence #TikTok #DigitalWarfare #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Incredible: the head of Viginum has just dropped Macron! Macron was counting on this body that he created in 2021 to establish his narrative of "Russian interference" and sabotage the presidential campaign... What a slap! At the same time, Xenia Fedorova returns to (translated)

⚡️🇫🇷INFO -Challenges rapporte que Marc-Antoine Brillant, patron de #Viginum, quitte ce service de l’État contre les ingérences numériques étrangères pour lancer avec Havas, contrôlé par la famille #Bolloré, une agence dédiée aux menaces informationnelles et à la contre-influence. #Viginum #Information #ContreInfluence

C'est fascinant d'observer en temps réel, la mise en place d'un régime totalitaire, à base de lois putassières, de mensonges et de mauvaise foi. Un grand merci à Von der Leyen, Macron, Merz, le DSA, l'Arcom, Viginum, les putes des médias etc, etc, pour nous offrir ce spectacle... #Politique #Liberté #Totalitarisme

Gabriel Attal, a candidate for the French presidency, is once again the target of disinformation operations attributed to pro-Russian actors, with videos and fake reports being disseminated on digital platforms, according to the Viginum service, which combats foreign interference. (translated)

Trois candidats plus ou moins proches de l’héritage macronisme ou de son positionnement originel proclament avoir été victimes d’ingérences russes. Viginum, l’instance chargée d’assurer une veille, a alerté sur de fausses informations avant même qu’elles ne soient parvenues à la https://t.co/5SlcJzcgjt #Macronisme #IngérencesRusses #Désinformation

"Deuxième attaque contre Gabriel Attal : la Russie veut semer le chaos en France." Traduction : Viginum a trouvé un nouveau photomontage que personne n'avait vu. À l’heure des missiles, drones, attentats, empoisonnements, exode, parler d’"attaque" et de "chaos" pour ça, n'est pas seulement ridicule, c'est indécent. #France #Russie #Chaos

⚡️🇫🇷FLASH - Alors que #Viginum, le service chargé de lutter contre les #ingérences numériques étrangères, recommande aux candidats à la présidentielle de ne pas médiatiser ces opérations afin de ne pas les amplifier, Gabriel #Attal, très présent dans les médias cet été, en a fait un « objet de #communication », indique Le Monde. Celle qui le visait n’a eu qu’un « très faible retentissement sur le débat public »…avant sa médiatisation. BFMTV évoque à peine « quelques milliers de vues » provenant de « 4 comptes sur X ». #Viginum #communication #élections

Alors après le « mode opératoire russe » Storm 1516 d’où sont sorti toute les dernières « ingérence russe » de la saison (Macron, Philippe, Glucksmann…) Viginum a décidé de varier un peu : Attal a cette fois été visé par le réseau « Matriochka ». Matriochka ça sonne bien Rukov mais alors là on parle de ruskov vraiment mais alors vraiment pas discret, tellement pas discret qu’on se demande même si ils ne le font pas exprès… « Matriochka » est en effet un réseau coordonné qui fonctionne en deux temps : - un premier réseau de bots publie une fake news très grossière via une fausse vidéo ou une fausse page qui usurpe l’identité d’un média (certains avec des marqueurs cyrillique visibles). Ces fake news ont été primo-diffusé sur 3 chaînes Telegram russophone rémunérée, puis traduite en plusieurs langue via ces bots (dont le français) - un second réseau de bots se chargent d’aller alerter des fact-checkers occidentaux pour dire « hey regarde la fake-news publié par un troll bizarre » - certains sont même allés jusqu’à envoyer des mails aux fact-checker pour leur demander de vérifier une fake news posté sur un Telegram russe ou un site russe comme Pravda Oui oui. Les services du GRU se sont dit : tiens on va payer des chaînes telegram russe où on peut y poster ce qu’on veut contre de la monnaie (il y en a une de ces chaînes russes qui s’appelait même @ThehandofKremlin , ça s’invente pas) afin d’y poster des fake news, puis on va aller poster ces fake news d’origine russe via des bots sous le nez des fact-checkers occidentaux. Avouez que c’est quand même spécial comme « ingérence russe ». Pourquoi les russes feraient un truc pareil ? L’hypothèse que fait Viginum est que le but de Matriochka est d’esperer « discréditer » un fact-checker qui tomberait dans le piège d’une « fake news », ou de « saturer » leur capacité d’investigation pour faire « diversion » sur les autres fake news publié par les autres trolls russes. …Pourquoi pas hein…? Les « narratifs » sont aussi intéressants : Viginum explique que Matriochka publie essentiellement des fake news grossière contre l’Ukraine ou Zelensky, et ses dirigeants soutiens, dont le président français, évidemment. Donc pas de doute sur « l’origine ». En ce qui concerne la France, des fake news visaient à monter que les « JO étaient un échec », ou d’autre fakes news résumées par Viginum comme « visant notamment à créer une défiance envers les institutions françaises et les membres du gouvernement ». Vivement que notre bon Gouvernement nous protège de ces trolls russe qui manipulent nos pauvres concitoyens pour qu’ils se defient de lui, alors que sans ces trolls russes nous aimerions tous notre Président, et nous voterions tous Gabriel Attal. Ou Édouard Philippe. #IngerenceRusse #FakeNews #FactChecking

The Renaissance candidate in the presidential election, Gabriel Attal, was targeted by a Russian misinformation operation, revealed by the Viginum service, which also targeted other candidates like Édouard Philippe and Raphaël Glucksmann, in a series of digital interferences aimed at sowing confusion ahead of the elections. (translated)

Gabriel Attal, candidate for the French presidential election, was the target of an attempted destabilization by pro-Russian networks, confirmed by Viginum, which detected a disinformation operation related to the Matriochka campaign, after other candidates like Édouard Philippe and Raphaël Glucksmann were also recently targeted. (translated)

Droit de réponse. Dans son édition du 31 juillet, @lalettre_fr établit un lien de cause à effet entre "Becoming Brigitte" et le projet de loi relatif aux "ingérences étrangères dans la vie démocratique". Or "Becoming Brigitte" n’a jamais été détecté, et à juste titre, comme relevant d’une quelconque "ingérence étrangère" par @Viginum_Gouv, le service technique compétent en la matière, rattaché à Matignon. La triste vérité, c’est que, depuis le début, c'est le macronisme qui est une "ingérence étrangère". Demandez à Olivier Marleix ou à Éric Dénécé… Ah non, ils ont été retrouvés "suicidés"... #DroitDeRéponse #Macronisme #IngérencesÉtrangères

En 2012, Hollande, Sarkozy et Bayrou rencontrent J. Dorsey, alors PDG de Twitter. A partir de 2018 au moins, Macron reçoit et échange avec Dorsey. A l’époque, il n’existe ni Viginum ni DSA pour protéger des possibles ingérences numérique. Pourquoi les médias n’ont rien dit ? https://t.co/EgUjdVqJoL #Twitter #Politique #Médias

Ne vous laissez pas manipuler, @AgnesEvren nous prend pour des cons. Elle nous explique qu’aucune proposition de loi n’a encore été déposée. Évidemment : elle vient seulement de cosigner le rapport qui recommande de les écrire. Elle prétend refuser toute « police de la pensée », mais propose un observatoire chargé de désigner des utilisateurs « fautifs », de les invisibiliser, de faire retirer des contenus et même de suspendre des algorithmes pendant les élections. Elle assure que le rapport ne prend pas position « sur le fond », tout en proposant de définir officiellement la désinformation, d’évaluer les contenus et de les classer selon des risques faibles, élevés ou inacceptables. Elle nie enfin toute « ingérence intérieure » parce que l’expression exacte n’est pas employée, alors que le rapport parle noir sur blanc de « manipulation interne » et prévoit une sorte de Viginum chargé de surveiller les citoyens français. Tout est là, mais sous un autre vocabulaire : la censure devient « invisibilisation », la surveillance politique devient « observatoire indépendant », la labellisation devient « service d’intérêt général » et l’ingérence intérieure devient « manipulation d’origine interne ». Ne vous faites pas avoir. #Censure #Manipulation #LibertéD'expression

Un rapport de Viginum révèle des manipulations coordonnées visant à discréditer des candidats de La France insoumise lors des municipales de 2026, incluant la création de faux sites et l'utilisation de réseaux sociaux pour propager des accusations trompeuses et altérer l'information des citoyens. #IngérenceÉtrangère #FranceInsoumise #Municipales2026

Qui a commandité ces opérations d’ingérence ? Quels liens avec les fausses publicités diffusées massivement à Toulouse la veille du second tour ? Le gouvernement doit donner à la Viginum les moyens de trouver les commanditaires et les sanctionner. 🧵 #Ingérence #FauxPublicités #Gouvernement