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AlertesInfos, citing Marianne, reported that Jordan Bardella expressed indignation in 2014 over the police custody of high school students after a "quenelle," in a case related to the glorification of crimes against humanity. Between 2014 and 2018, he also repeated on Twitter expressions popularized by Alain Soral and Dieudonné to criticize Manuel Valls, including "Damn it, anyway!" According to the media, this phrase referenced Valls' remarks about his wife's ties to the Jewish community and Israel. AlertesInfos added that these posts were from the same period as anti-Semitic exchanges that Mediapart attributed to him, which Bardella denied being the author of. His entourage denied any link or ideological proximity with Soral and claimed that Bardella was referring to Florian Philippot in a "classic political response." #Politique #Antisémitisme #LibertéDexpression (translated)

The author said their forthcoming book, “Anti-fascist Economics”, had drawn attacks from people who used sexist insults. They described the current period as the deepest crisis of Western democracy since the Nazi era and said growing up in Nuremberg had shaped their view of anti-fascism as a civic priority. #Antifaschismus #Demokratie #Feminismus #DE

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)

Brown Brothers Media, after transforming news sites into content machines generated by AI, has brutally seen its publications disappear from Google's results following revelations about its dubious practices and the use of plagiarized or artificial content. #IntelligenceArtificielle #MédiasNumériques #GoogleNews (translated)

CIVICO 33 — “ORTA NOVA SOUND LAB”: FROM CAPITANATA TO “BROADWAYWORLD”, THE “COMMUNITY BAND” PROJECT CONQUERS NEW YORK SOURCE: https://www.civico93.it/orta-nova-sound-laab-dalla-capitanata-a-broadwayworld-il-progetto-banda-di-comunita-conquista-new-york/ The social laboratory promoted by ANBG and the Ministry of Culture has landed on the world’s largest theatre network, thanks to the article co-authored by Chris Rabinowitz and the Orta Nova-born author Luciano Magaldi Sardella. There is a brass thread linking Piazza Mario Frasca to Broadway. It is called “Orta Nova Sound Lab” — the Community and Social Regeneration Band through Music — the project officially presented on 21 September last at the C-Lab MAO FM 19.77 of brothers Luca and Erminio Ferrandina, which is enjoying unprecedented media coverage for a band-cultural initiative born in the Province of Foggia. Its journalistic success was sealed on 28 September last by its arrival on BroadwayWorld, the world’s most authoritative portal dedicated to theatre and live performance, based in New York with over 1.5 million global monthly visits. A result that was by no means a foregone conclusion, which projects a story from the Apulian periphery into the international cultural news circuit. The article, entitled Orta Nova Sound Lab Launches Youth Community Band in Southern Italy, is jointly by-lined by New York editor Chris Rabinowitz, journalist for the American publication, and his Italian co-author Luciano Magaldi Sardella, an international author originally from Orta Nova, engineer, academic journalist, and researcher active between Italy and abroad. The dual Italo-American by-line symbolises how a “local good practice” can become global news when it is recounted with expertise and rootedness. The Project: The Band as Social Regeneration “Orta Nova Sound Lab” is promoted by the Associazione Nazionale Bande da Giro (ANBG), chaired by Benedetto Grillo, and was admitted for funding under the public call of the Ministry of Culture pursuant to Director General Decree of 7 April 2026, reg. no. 149, aimed at the “Strengthening of research activities and dissemination of musical practices in peripheries and in areas of high social vulnerability”. It is realized with the support of the Comune di Orta Nova and with the collaboration of a solid civic network: A.P.S. MAO FM 19.77, the Istituto di Istruzione Superiore “A. Olivetti”, the Istituto Comprensivo “Sandro Pertini”, the Music Art association, and the C.I.S.A. of Foggia. As BroadwayWorld itself emphasised, this is the first initiative in Italy to reinterpret the distinctive tradition of touring bands (bande da giro) and youth orchestras within a ministerial call dedicated to urban peripheries and social vulnerability. A model that dialogues explicitly with the spirit of the so-called “Caivano Decree” (Law Decree 123/2023) for combating youth distress, educational poverty, and juvenile crime. The idea, in its disarming simplicity, was summarised by the project director for ANBG, Antonella Spagnoletti: “The band is aggregation! The band is cohesion. Bringing these youngsters together, educating them, and enabling them to live in a manner different from the social-media world is among the primary objectives of our association.” A concept reiterated by the Mayor of Orta Nova, Eng. Domenico Di Vito: “This is an important project that can certainly make a difference compared with the past, because all the ingredients are there to network the entire cultural and social world that exists in Orta Nova and that must be valorised. The administration’s commitment is to ensure sustainability, structure, and continuity over time.” Taking part in the launch press conference, moderated by journalist Giuseppe Di Bisceglie, in addition to President Grillo, Director Spagnoletti, and Mayor Di Vito, were Regional Councillor Grazia Maria Starace, Councillor for relations with the third sector Sebastiano Battista, Councillor for Culture Vittoria Mastrogiacomo, and educational professor Alfredo Coppola, contact person for the Olivetti Institute. Why the Story Went International The “Orta Nova Sound Lab” band project demonstrates that when a project has anti-mafia roots, pedagogical value, and a credible institutional network, the press responds. From local and national titles such as Cassa Armonica, Ansa Puglia, TGNorba, Corriere della Sera Bari, RaiNews TGR Puglia, La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, Amica9TV, Brindisi In, Blasting News Italia, TRM Network, Secolo XIX, FoggiaToday, PlayNews24, Stato Quotidiano, and many others, which thoroughly documented the conference, the coverage reached “Broadway World”, which read the Orta Nova experience as a “social laboratory” capable of answering the mafia with music. This change of scale derives from joint work and also from the liaison work carried out by Luciano Magaldi Sardella, who, together with New York editor Chris Rabinowitz, succeeded in translating for an Anglophone audience the profound meaning of a town band which, in Apulia, is not folklore, but a civil garrison, a concrete alternative to the screen and to social disintegration. In a South often narrated only for its emergencies, Orta Nova chooses to be recounted for its capacity to generate community. And this time, the news has travelled around the world, starting from a piazza in the Daunia. The Calendar The pathway, which is entirely free of charge, provides instrumental workshops for wind and percussion, ensemble music lessons, and collective rehearsals with qualified teachers and conductors, open to aspiring musicians, families, schools, and citizens. The programme that has attracted the attention of the national and now international press is structured as follows: October 2026: parade of marching bands through the streets and public spaces of Orta Nova, to recover the historic value of the band as a popular and identity-based expression. November–December 2026: high-profile concert season with the Gran Concerto Bandistico di Conversano and the Gran Concerto Bandistico “Biagio Abbate” Città di Bisceglie, an artistic training ground for young pupils. Inclusion Focus: a special evening dedicated to women in music with the Orchestra Note di Puglia, an ensemble composed entirely of professional women musicians, to reinforce the values of equal opportunities. January 2027: first official concert of the newborn Community Band of Orta Nova, a foundational act and public restitution of the work accomplished. (translated)

The Omani co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami, currently detained in the United Arab Emirates after attacking the captain of a Flydubai flight, is the subject of an investigation into his troubled past, including potential links to radicalization in Australia and controversial posts on social media. #Flydubai #MoyenOrient #Radicalisation (translated)

Gabrielle Cathala stated that France Télévisions had considered entrusting sensitive data about its viewers' political preferences to an Israeli company, whose CEO develops and markets online political targeting tools. She indicated that the group had backed down after being informed of the publication of a Mediapart article and asked its management to explain immediately. https://t.co/2cg0oVeewn #France #Médias #Politique (translated)

Press Briefs reported that, according to an investigation by Mediapart, France Télévisions had considered entrusting Terrific, an Israeli company, with an interaction tool intended for viewers of the political show "L’Heure de vérité," scheduled for the 2027 presidential election. The tool would have also allowed for the collection of sensitive data on the political preferences of millions of French people, including users of the Franceinfo website. According to the account by Press Briefs, the CEO of Terrific had co-founded a company specializing in online political profiling and targeting, raising internal concerns about data protection and a risk of foreign interference. An employee of public broadcasting reportedly believed that a "French Cambridge Analytica scandal" had been narrowly avoided. Press Briefs also indicated that Mediapart reported that the contract had been established without a call for bids, even though an internal solution existed, and that the data protection officer had initially been unable to review the contract. Despite the alerts, management reportedly maintained the project before abandoning it, officially citing cybersecurity reasons, a few days after learning of the impending publication of the investigation. https://t.co/j1gM9yINvy #présidentielle #données #ingérence (translated)

Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

Ilan Gabet stated that Thaïs d’Escufon had expressed joy over the mutilation of a 16-year-old boy. He considered that it illustrated the system's failures in the face of online hate and criticized her for spreading hostile content on social media for years. He asked why she had not been condemned or banned from social media, a measure that he believed the law would allow, and why her posts had not been sanctioned by moderation. He finally asked when the authorities would put an end to the situation. #HaineEnLigne #LibertéDexpression #JusticeSociale (translated)

Médias Citoyens stated that Ilan Gabet had appeared eight times on the Estelle Midi program on RMC between May 28 and October 2, 2026, on May 28, June 29, July 7, August 31, September 10, September 16, September 25, and October 2. According to the collective, the presenter and the channel's banners had each time introduced him as "a law student," without mentioning his public political engagement. Médias Citoyens indicated that Gabet identified himself as an activist and expressed his closeness to La France Insoumise and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, particularly by relaying their positions. The collective also noted that he had shared a message from Mélenchon on the dynamics of LFI and the ability of other left-wing parties to compete with it. Considering that this presentation lacked transparency regarding the profile of a guest in a debate and opinion program, Médias Citoyens announced that it had referred the matter to ARCOM. #politique #transparence #médias (translated)

Actu Foot reported that Cristiano Ronaldo liked an Instagram post in which Filipe Melo criticized the players of the Portuguese national team. Melo believed that they did not treat Ronaldo the way Argentine players treated Messi and that none of them were on Ronaldo's level. #CristianoRonaldo #Football #ÉquipeNationale (translated)

"The pseudo-evidence from Mediapart has finally been released: crude edits, obscure manipulable screenshots, taking up despicable remarks that I have obviously never made. Since Monday and the publication of the Mediapart investigation, Jordan Bardella has denounced 'blatant fakes'." #Antisémitisme #Mediapart #RassemblementNational (translated)

Bally Bagayoko welcomed the decision of the Alternative Communist movement to join the approach of La France Insoumise and its candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon for the upcoming presidential elections. He presented this choice as a gesture of unity on the left, based on a program for change, as he believed that the far-right was at the gates of power. He asserted that Mélenchon continued to unite and expand the gathering, while others were shutting themselves in a dead end that he deemed irresponsible. Bagayoko also praised Patrice Leclerc for his commitment to unity. He indicated that the general assembly of Alternative Communist had adopted a text open for signatures from those who identify with the communist sensibility, whether they are party members or not, and that the first signatories would be published on October 14. #Unité #Rassemblement #Gauche (translated)

I am shocked by @J_Bardella's reaction after the second publication from @Mediapart concerning him. It is not a matter of "gross montages" but a restitution of conversations in which he participated and during which he made anti-Semitic comments. Who then #antisemitisme #libertédepression #médiapart #FR (translated)

🚨 Cristiano Ronaldo's fans 🇵🇹 have flooded the comments of Rasmus Højlund's 🇩🇰 latest Instagram post to shower him with praise after his goal and his "SIUUU" against Portugal. 😂 CR7 ON THE STREET! 😌❤️🐐 https://t.co/traXNhlBjw #CristianoRonaldo #RasmusHøjlund #Football (translated)

Édouard Philippe declares that it is nearly established that Jordan Bardella made outrageously anti-Semitic remarks, following the publication of an article by Mediapart that authenticated messages dating from 2013 attributed to him. #Antisémitisme #JordanBardella #Mediapart (translated)