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I met Javier Milei! To all our followers, know that he thanks us for the cultural battle we are fighting in France! In addition to this handshake that obviously filled me with joy, here are the key points I take away from his speech in Paris: To reassure investors about the stability of Argentina, he explained at length his optimism for the presidential election in October 2027: "We have made the hardest effort before asking for the trust of voters next year. If we repeat the success of last year's legislative elections, we will pass in the first round. And finally have a majority in both chambers of Parliament. Imagine what we can do with a parliament on our side, given that we made the biggest reform in history with the entire state apparatus against us. Get ready. Because you are going to witness a dazzling miracle! We have fulfilled all our campaign promises by the mid-term. Now we are tackling the so-called 'impossible' reforms. We will not return to the economic shamanism worthy of the USSR of the Peronist left. Because 70% of Argentines have understood and do not want to go back. In 2023 we had a bunch of promises, today we have a bunch of facts, figures, and successes. We are prepared for all attempts at destabilization. Political and economic. We are very optimistic. We play better than them and we will win! The Argentines choose the path of prosperity and definitively abandon that of decay. If we win, interest rates will fall, capital will accumulate, and productivity will increase very quickly. This will lead to a huge rise in real wages, a drop in poverty, and the dream of a great Argentina will become more tangible every day. We will have the greatest growth in the West. We have firsthand experienced socialist collapse. Europe is following the same path today. Argentina is now going the other way, and those who invest there now will be the big winners. So come be part of this Argentine revolution and VIVA LA LIBERTAD CARAJO!" (translated)

"Nous sommes au devant de tentatives de déstabilisation de la campagne présidentielle qui vont être extrêmement nombreuses et bien organisées"Le président du Rassemblement national, Jordan Bardella, a dénoncé mardi 29 septembre "les prémices d'une guerre totale" et une "tentative de déstabilisation de la campagne présidentielle", après la publication d'un article de Mediapart l'accusant d'avoir tenu des propos antisémites en 2013. #RassemblementNational #antisémitisme #JordanBardella

Jordan Bardella a dénoncé les tentatives de déstabilisation du Rassemblement national après des accusations d'antisémitisme portées contre lui par Mediapart, déclarant que cela représente les prémices d'une guerre totale contre son parti. #RassemblementNational #antisémitisme #JordanBardella

« La France, comme l’Union européenne, continuera d’entraver les activités de déstabilisation menées par la Russie sur notre sol »« La France, comme l’Union européenne, continuera d’entraver les activités de déstabilisation menées par la Russie sur notre sol », a réagi jeudi le ministre français des Affaires étrangères Jean-Noël Barrot. #XeniaFedorova #Sanctions #UnionEuropéenne

"La France, comme l'Union européenne, continuera d'entraver les activités de déstabilisation menées par la Russie sur notre sol, s'est aussitôt félicité le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Jean-Noël Barrot, sur X. Notre détermination est entière : ceux qui pensent pouvoir conduire impunément des manœuvres hostiles à notre démocratie en subiront les conséquences."La France, comme l'Union européenne, continuera d'entraver les activités de déstabilisation menées par la Russie sur notre sol, s'est aussitôt félicité le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Jean-Noël Barrot, sur X. #XeniaFedorova #sanctions #UnionEuropéenne

Je crois que certains ici ne comprennent pas bien la nature de la menace russe, ni leurs méthodes : Le jour où la Russie attaquera un autre pays européen, ça ne sera probablement pas de front avec une attaque totale. Ils feront comme dans le Donbass : envoi de soldats russes sans uniformes officiels, destabilisation d’une région (comme Narva en Estonie par exemple), puis guerre de proxy, avec la machine de propagande qui tournera à plein régime pour expliquer que c’est la faute de l’OTAN et de l’Europe. Et comme d’habitude les dirigeants européens seront paralysés par la peur, ne sauront pas comment réagir, et les politiciens populistes diront « on ne va quand même pas mourir pour Narva ! Il faut discuter avec Poutine ! Le plus important c’est faire la paix ! 🕊️ » #Russie #Guerre #SécuritéEurope

Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

Au moment du déclenchement de l’attaque américano-israélienne sur l’Iran, le 28 février, j’avais alerté sur le risque démesuré de déstabilisation du monde. Une intervention sans but de guerre précis, autre que le rêve israélien de changement de régime, et ne tenant pas compte des #Iran #Guerre #Déstabilisation #US #IL #IR

Serbia: do not cross into Kosovo. No troops. No armed proxies. No destabilisation. No military adventure. Any incursion would create a grave regional security crisis and risk confrontation with KFOR. The lesson of the Balkans is clear: escalation brings destruction, not https://t.co/a07XXNqH9T #Serbia #Kosovo #KFOR #RS #XK

Nous aurons droit au même traitement. En Allemagne, à la veille d’élections décisives, des actions de déstabilisation sont menées pour faire redouter la guerre avec la Russie dans l’espoir paradoxal (mais c’est ainsi que nous voient nos ennemis) de faire remonter les votes en https://t.co/tjQJij2Los #ÉlectionsAllemagne #Déstabilisation #GuerreRussie #DE #RU

THE GERMAN MEDIA ARE TRYING TO TOPPLE MERZ. Day after day, the same pattern: Scandal. Crisis. Division. Weakness. “Merz under pressure.” “Government in chaos.” “Germany isolated.” This is no longer normal criticism. It has become a permanent campaign of political destabilisation. https://t.co/m6zfSxqzxn #Merz #Germany #MediaBias #DE

La Russie a accusé les candidats à la présidentielle française de 2027 d'instrumentaliser la menace russe pour leur campagne, en niant les allégations d'opérations de déstabilisation menées par des réseaux prorusses qui auraient ciblé ces mêmes candidats, tout en insistant sur le manque de preuves concernant ces accusations. #IngérenceRusse #Présidentielle2027 #Désinformation

I ACCUSE ALEKSANDAR VUČIĆ — 2014 TO TODAY I accuse Aleksandar Vučić and his regime of pursuing terror, intimidation and destabilisation against Kosovo with genocidal intent toward Kosovo Albanians. This is my political accusation. Since Vučić came to power, Serbia has refused https://t.co/QJTDAOH9nx #Vucic #Kosovo #Genocide #RS #XK