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#MASH
Il Fatto Quotidiano 6d

YouTube has blocked 16 Russian channels in Ukraine, including several related to the animated series Masha and the Bear, considered a tool of Kremlin propaganda. #RussiaUcraina #MashaEOtso #Propaganda (translated)

www.ilfattoquotidiano.it
YouTube blocca 16 canali russi in Ucraina: stop anche per Masha e Orso, considerato “strumento di propaganda del Cremlino”
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ANSA.it 6d

YouTube has blocked 16 Russian channels in Ukraine, including versions of Masha and the Bear, in an attempt to combat Russian propaganda online. #YouTube #Disinformazione #Ucraina (translated)

www.ansa.it
YouTube blocca 16 canali russi in Ucraina, tra cui versioni di Masha e Orso
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Péter Magyar 7d

The Guardian reported on the Prime Minister's remarks on Friday when Péter Magyar posted that this officially marks the end of the Fidesz-KDNP mafia! More than 6 billion forints worth of buried and otherwise hidden cash was found and seized today and yesterday by the National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office in the criminal case against former Minister Viktor Orbán, Miklós Seszták. #SesztákÜgy #NemzetiVagyonvisszaszerzésiHivatal #OrbánViktor (translated)

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Valery Gerasimov 2w

In footage from Ukrainian drones, about a dozen Russian soldiers can be seen; the Telegram channel Mash reported on around a hundred, Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov mentioned more than 600 men, and state media reported over 800. #Sudža #Ukrajina #ruskáarmáda (translated)

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Di.se 2w

The pharmaceutical company Novo has presented positive results from two large observational studies showing a link between their drug Wegovy and improved values in adults with the liver disease MASH. #lever #hälsa #läkemedel (translated)

www.di.se
Positivt studieresultat för leversjukdomar från Novo
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Kate from Kharkiv 3w

15-year-olds Yana and Masha. 💔 Killed by a Russian missile strike on Chernihiv on today. ​The girls were 10th-grade students. They had their whole lives ahead of them. If only it weren't for Russia.

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Ahmad Mansour Wrld summary 3w
German-Israeli psychologist and author

Ahmad Mansour wrote that Arab parties in Israel could be crucial for a majority against Benjamin Netanyahu, but they are not automatically potential coalition partners. He attributed this to different conceptions of Israel's national identity and security and distinguished between the Joint List of Hadash, Ta’al, and Balad and Ra’am under Mansour Abbas. Mansour described Hadash as influenced by communism, Ta’al as Arab-nationalist, and Balad as a party representing a state for all citizens that rejects Israel's definition as a Jewish state. He cited the former Balad chairman Azmi Bishara as an example of conflicts over national loyalty and security, noting that he left Israel in 2007 and resigned his Knesset mandate while being investigated on suspicion of having passed information to Hezbollah during the Lebanon War. Ra’am is the political arm of the southern wing of the Islamic Movement in Israel, whose ideological roots lie in the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas also emerged. Mansour emphasized that Ra’am should not be equated with Hamas: the southern trend focused on political participation rather than violent resistance. Under Abbas, Ra’am prioritized investments, infrastructure, housing, and combating crime. Mansour also referenced Abbas’s contacts with Hamas leadership: in 2016, he participated in talks in Qatar about a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah and confirmed previous meetings with Khaled Mashal. In 2021, Abbas initially negotiated with then-Prime Minister Netanyahu about possible cooperation with Likud. After a coalition with the right-wing camp failed, Ra’am joined Naftali Bennett's and Yair Lapid's government. Since October 7, 2023, the question of trust has become more difficult, Mansour wrote. For many Jewish Israelis, attitudes towards terrorism, recognition of Israel, and the willingness to share security policy decisions are crucial. Therefore, opposing Netanyahu is not enough as a common government program, Mansour concluded. #Israel #Politik #Araberparteien (translated)

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lastampa.it 4w

Rashid Masharawi, a Palestinian director, expresses skepticism regarding the Israeli elections, stating that nothing will change for the Palestinians, as their situation is rooted in a mentality that does not recognize their humanity. #RashidMasharawi #Palestina #DueStati (translated)

www.lastampa.it
Masharawi, il regista palestinese senza illusioni sul voto: “Per noi non cambia nulla”
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mtvuutiset.fi 4w

Twelve-year-old Masha was persecuted for her drawings in Russia and fled to France with her father, where they live in political asylum. #MashaMoskaljova #Venäjä #syrjintä (translated)

www.mtvuutiset.fi
Masha, 12, joutui vainotuksi piirustuksen takia kotimaassaan – joutui pakenemaan Venäjältä
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Onet.pl Oct 17

Masha Lavrova from Kyiv, in an emotional video, shares her fatigue from the war in Ukraine, appealing for understanding of the daily difficulties that are exacerbated by the fear of escalation of the conflict. #Ukraina #wojna #solidarność (translated)

www.onet.pl
"Mam tego tak cholernie dość". Poruszający apel Ukrainki [WIDEO]
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Krzysztof Graj Oct 16

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app
Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society
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Il Messaggero Oct 14

Najmeh Amini, a 23-year-old student, has been sentenced to death in Iran for blasphemy due to a social media post that insulted the prophet, according to a court in Mashhad. #NajmehAmini #Iran #DirittiUmani (translated)

www.ilmessaggero.it
Najmeh Amini, studentessa di 23 anni condannata a morte in Iran per blasfemia dopo un post: «Insulti al profeta»
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Daniel Dočekal Wrld summary Oct 13
Czech publicist

The author stated that Mashable and several other media outlets asked whether the Ukrainian attacks on data centers had silenced Russian bots. He added that he was supposed to discuss the topic on Czech Radio in the morning. https://t.co/FuhWe6Su8f #Ukrajina #Rusko #ČRo #UA #RU (translated)

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Il Fatto Quotidiano Oct 1

A 51-year-old Palestinian, Mashhour Shaher Yassin, was killed and three others were injured during an attack by extremist Israeli settlers on the Arab village of Yasuf in the West Bank. #Cisgiordania #Palestina #Israele (translated)

www.ilfattoquotidiano.it
Muore un palestinese in un assalto dei coloni in Cisgiordania: ferite anche altre tre persone
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Krzysztof Graj Oct 1

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

www.anthropic.com
Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 / Anthropic
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Jan Piński Wrld summary Oct 1
Polish journalist and chess player

Horrifyingly true image of the Polish healthcare system. Mash, Paragraph 22 meet at the Emergency Room. Read by Bartosz Głogowski. Highly recommend. #polskasłużbazdrowia #zdrowie #literatura #PL (translated)

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Garry Kasparov Wrld summary Sep 30
Russian chess grandmaster and activist

En 2012, Kasparov le confesó a la escritora Masha Gessen que lo que más le gustaba de viajar al extranjero era poder prescindir de sus guardaespaldas por un tiempo. #Rusia #GarryKasparov #disidentes

Rusia planificó matar a Kasparov y a otros disidentes este verano
www.elmundo.es
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Michał Fiszer Wrld summary Sep 29

Nie będę bronił - serio? Wielu ludzi, nie wiedzieć czemu, nazywa mnie podżegaczem wojennym. I to mimo, że głównym celem moich wpisów jest informowanie, co my POLACY musimy robić, żeby wojny uniknąć. Bo ja wojnę znam. Byłem rok w dawnej Jugosławii, 1993 r. Środek wojny domowej. Najstraszliwszej jaka może być. Byłem ranny zaliczyłem CASEVAC i trafiłem na krótko do 212th MASH US ARMY (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital). Po krótkim pobycie wróciłem do batalionu. I robiłem dalej swoje, a służba w piechocie ze wspaniałymi ludźmi, była jedną z najtrudniejszych, ale jednocześnie najważniejszych części mojego życia. Dlatego wpisy ludzi, że będę wysyłał ludzi na front, a sam nie pójdę, to skucha. Bo ja już na wojnie byłem. Byłem też w Iraku za Saddama, obserwatorem wojskowym. Też rok, 1998/1999. Widziałem z bliska amerykańskie uderzenie lotniczo-rakietowe Desert Fox z grudnia 1998. I teraz jak co, też się zgłoszę. Wiem, co to jest. A ludzie tak piszący, nawet się do frontu nigdy nie zbliżyli, a jak widać - na samą myśl robią w gacie. Taki wpis dostałem też. Ale odpowiem. Niech Pan nie broni. Jest dość ludzi którzy mają jaja, żeby obronić Pana dupę przed zerżnięciem przez pijanych ruskich żołdaków, zanim poderżną Panu gardło. Nawet ja się zgłoszę, choć nie mam nogi (mogę wiele rzeczy robić, w tym analizy rozpoznawcze, a nawet kierować dronem dalekiego zasięgu), bo jestem facetem, a nie galaretą. Wierzę, że nie jestem sam. Jest wielu Polaków gotowych stanąć w obronie kraju. Ale bądźmy mądrzy i róbmy tak, by nas w ogóle nie zaatakowali. TO JEST MOŻLIWE. Nie dajmy się rosyjskiej dezinformacji i manipulacji, nie wyłaźmy z NATO i UE, nie zrywajmy sojuszy, nie mówmy, że naszego kraju nie warto bronić. I nie mówmy, że i tak jest do dupy, bo nie jest. Nie jest idealny, ale ja mam taki pomysł, żeby tego kraju bronić, czy rządzi KO, czy PiS, czy jakaś Lewica, a nawet ci jeszcze bardziej na prawo, jak oni sami nas nie wprowadzą w kolaborację z wrogiem. Brońmy tego co mamy, bo jak wpadniemy w TAMTEN krąg, to guzik będziecie mogli pisać o państwie z kartonu. Po pierwszym wpisie wpadnie do was ekipa wraz z drzwiami, wywloką was do suki i tak skują mordę, że się odechce. Albo od razu wypierdolą przez okno z odpowiedniego pięta. Umiecie latać? Cieszcie się więc tym co mamy i że każdy może wyrazić swoje zdanie bez żadnych konsekwencji. Jedyną konsekwencją może być to, że wraz z masą innych mu podobnych sprowadzi na nas jakiś gnój. Moi drodzy, jeśli Wam się podoba, i jeśli mam swój czas poświęcać, jeśli chcecie coś poczytać, to poproszę o kawkę, to tylko 10 czy 20 zł. Pozdrawiam wszystkim i dziękuję mocno tym, co kawki kupują. https://t.co/pPHnCSlfpS #Polska #wojna #bezpieczeństwo

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Střípky z minulosti 🕰️ Wrld summary Sep 17

Dne 17. září 1972 odvysílala americká televizní 📺 stanice CBS první díl válečného komediálního seriálu ✨M*A*S*H✨, který se později zařadil mezi nejznámější televizní seriály vůbec. https://t.co/GcrqkhsNRM #MASH #televize #historie

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ANSA.it Sep 13

Universal Music Group ha annunciato il lancio di una nuova piattaforma musicale basata sull'intelligenza artificiale, in collaborazione con ElevenLabs, per la creazione di remix e mashup, con un rigoroso rispetto delle licenze e la possibilità per gli artisti di partecipare volontariamente al progetto. #IntelligenzaArtificiale #Musica #Innovazione

www.ansa.it
Universal Music lavora ad una piattaforma musicale basata sull'IA
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