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Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Nie będę bronił - serio? Wielu ludzi, nie wiedzieć czemu, nazywa mnie podżegaczem wojennym. I to mimo, że głównym celem moich wpisów jest informowanie, co my POLACY musimy robić, żeby wojny uniknąć. Bo ja wojnę znam. Byłem rok w dawnej Jugosławii, 1993 r. Środek wojny domowej. Najstraszliwszej jaka może być. Byłem ranny zaliczyłem CASEVAC i trafiłem na krótko do 212th MASH US ARMY (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital). Po krótkim pobycie wróciłem do batalionu. I robiłem dalej swoje, a służba w piechocie ze wspaniałymi ludźmi, była jedną z najtrudniejszych, ale jednocześnie najważniejszych części mojego życia. Dlatego wpisy ludzi, że będę wysyłał ludzi na front, a sam nie pójdę, to skucha. Bo ja już na wojnie byłem. Byłem też w Iraku za Saddama, obserwatorem wojskowym. Też rok, 1998/1999. Widziałem z bliska amerykańskie uderzenie lotniczo-rakietowe Desert Fox z grudnia 1998. I teraz jak co, też się zgłoszę. Wiem, co to jest. A ludzie tak piszący, nawet się do frontu nigdy nie zbliżyli, a jak widać - na samą myśl robią w gacie. Taki wpis dostałem też. Ale odpowiem. Niech Pan nie broni. Jest dość ludzi którzy mają jaja, żeby obronić Pana dupę przed zerżnięciem przez pijanych ruskich żołdaków, zanim poderżną Panu gardło. Nawet ja się zgłoszę, choć nie mam nogi (mogę wiele rzeczy robić, w tym analizy rozpoznawcze, a nawet kierować dronem dalekiego zasięgu), bo jestem facetem, a nie galaretą. Wierzę, że nie jestem sam. Jest wielu Polaków gotowych stanąć w obronie kraju. Ale bądźmy mądrzy i róbmy tak, by nas w ogóle nie zaatakowali. TO JEST MOŻLIWE. Nie dajmy się rosyjskiej dezinformacji i manipulacji, nie wyłaźmy z NATO i UE, nie zrywajmy sojuszy, nie mówmy, że naszego kraju nie warto bronić. I nie mówmy, że i tak jest do dupy, bo nie jest. Nie jest idealny, ale ja mam taki pomysł, żeby tego kraju bronić, czy rządzi KO, czy PiS, czy jakaś Lewica, a nawet ci jeszcze bardziej na prawo, jak oni sami nas nie wprowadzą w kolaborację z wrogiem. Brońmy tego co mamy, bo jak wpadniemy w TAMTEN krąg, to guzik będziecie mogli pisać o państwie z kartonu. Po pierwszym wpisie wpadnie do was ekipa wraz z drzwiami, wywloką was do suki i tak skują mordę, że się odechce. Albo od razu wypierdolą przez okno z odpowiedniego pięta. Umiecie latać? Cieszcie się więc tym co mamy i że każdy może wyrazić swoje zdanie bez żadnych konsekwencji. Jedyną konsekwencją może być to, że wraz z masą innych mu podobnych sprowadzi na nas jakiś gnój. Moi drodzy, jeśli Wam się podoba, i jeśli mam swój czas poświęcać, jeśli chcecie coś poczytać, to poproszę o kawkę, to tylko 10 czy 20 zł. Pozdrawiam wszystkim i dziękuję mocno tym, co kawki kupują. https://t.co/pPHnCSlfpS #Polska #wojna #bezpieczeństwo

Universal Music Group ha annunciato il lancio di una nuova piattaforma musicale basata sull'intelligenza artificiale, in collaborazione con ElevenLabs, per la creazione di remix e mashup, con un rigoroso rispetto delle licenze e la possibilità per gli artisti di partecipare volontariamente al progetto. #IntelligenzaArtificiale #Musica #Innovazione

Venäläistyttö Masha, 12, piirsi koulutunnilla kuvan, jossa ukrainalaisäiti suojeli lastaan ohjukselta. "Kunnia Ukrainalle" ja ei sodalle, ei Putinille." Siitä käynnistyivät järjettömät rankaisutoimet isälle, suoranainen kidutus. Lopulta maastapako. Venästä on tullut yhtä aikaa #KunniaUkrainalle #EiSodalle #VenäjänKansa #FI #UA #RU

In een column bespreekt Merel van Vroonhoven de indoctrinatie van kinderen door de Russische propagandaserie 'Masha en de beer' en de hypocrisie van de Russische ambassade in Nederland, die de vreedzame demonstraties tegen de oorlog in Oekraïne als een bedreiging voor de diplomatieke missie afdoet. #Rusland #Oekraïne #propaganda

J’abonde dans le sens d’Alla Poedie, et je vais même plus loin : après « Masha et Michka », il faut absolument interdire « Petit ours brun ». Il faudrait être naïf en effet pour ne pas voir dans ce dessin animé présentant une famille ours décidée à bien élever son ourson, une tentative insidieuse de l’affreux Poutine de rentrer dans la tête de nos enfants et de leurs parents… @lci @AllaPoedie #DessinsAnimés #Éducation #LibertéDExpression

L'Ucraina ha imposto sanzioni a cinque cittadini russi e quattro società per la serie animata Masha e Orso, accusandoli di diffondere narrazioni filorusse che rappresentano una minaccia per la sicurezza nazionale, con l'intento di richiedere a piattaforme come Netflix e Google di interrompere ogni collaborazione con queste entità. #Ucraina #Zelensky #MashaEOdore

Zelensky ha firmato un decreto che impone sanzioni contro cinque cittadini russi e quattro organizzazioni legate alla produzione del cartone animato 'Masha e Orso', accusato dall'Ucraina di "diffondere narrazioni filorusse mascherate da contenuti per bambini". Nel mirino ci sono lo studio Animaccord, creatore della serie, il suo fondatore, il CEO, nonché sceneggiatore, regista e produttore, il co-autore della serie e il detentore dei diritti del cartone animato #Ucraina #Sanzioni #MashaEOso

Una notte di attacchi missilistici russi su Kiev ha causato almeno 16 morti, incluso un attacco a un ospedale pediatrico, spingendo il presidente ucraino Zelensky a chiedere urgentemente il rafforzamento degli intercettori da parte dei partner occidentali, mentre ha imposto sanzioni a cittadini e organizzazioni russe coinvolte nella serie animata Masha e Orso. #Kiev #Zelensky #guerra

🚨 Confira o relato EXCLUSIVO ao Update Swift Brasil de um membro votante do GRAMMYs presente ontem no evento da Academia com a presença de Taylor Swift. 1. Como você percebeu que a Taylor Swift estaria presente antes do evento começar? - Achei muito estranho o convite ser sobre a Taylor Swift sem mencionar a presença dela e tive certeza quando a equipe do evento recolheu os celulares de todos no check-in, algo que nunca tinha acontecido em outros eventos que eu participei. 2. As performances e falas de Taylor Swift foram gravadas? - Tudo estava sendo filmado e fotografado. Imagino que ao checar o site do Grammy Museum, ou o site do Grammy, isso vai aparecer em algum momento. 3. Quais foram as principais impressões que você teve sobre a personalidade da Taylor Swift? - Ela é uma pessoa muito doce, humilde, divertida e pé no chão, que age muito por intuição. Mesmo que sua gravadora ou um algoritmo digam que ela deve fazer 'X', se o coração dela disser 'Y', ela faz. E ela realmente tem uma conexão linda com seus fãs... 4. Como foi a experiência de conversar pessoalmente com a Taylor Swift? - Ela consegue isolar todo o barulho e as distrações ao redor, dando foco total e absoluto para a pessoa com quem está conversando — algo que só tinha sentido antes ao conversar com o ex-presidente Bill Clinton. 5. Ela mencionou alguma música de outro artista que serviu de inspiração para suas composições? - Sim, ela mencionou que o final da música "Drops of Jupiter", da banda Train (falou especificamente o trecho "Na Na Na"), serviu de inspiração para suas composições no início da carreira. 6. Você sabe quais foram as músicas que ela cantou/performou nesse evento? - Não tenho certeza de todas, pois sou um produtor de rock e não conheço o catálogo dela tão bem. Ela fez algo parecido com a Eras Tour, misturando várias músicas em uma só (mashup). #TaylorSwift #GRAMMYs #UpdateSwiftBrazil

In de derde editie van de expositie 'Artists against the Kremlin' in De Balie protesteren Russische kunstenaars, waaronder Masha Trebukova, tegen de oorlog in Oekraïne met kunstwerken die de herinnering aan slachtoffers en de onderdrukking door het Kremlin belichten en benadrukken de discrepantie tussen de liefde voor de Russische cultuur en de gruweldaden die daarmee gepaard gaan. #ArtistsAgainstTheKremlin #OorlogInOekraïne #RussischeKunstenaars

🇬🇧 50 parlamentares britânicos da esquerda à direita pedem ao Ministério da Cultura do país que o desenho Masha e o Urso seja retirado dos serviços de streaming do Reino Unido por considerá-lo propaganda russa “nada sutil”. Eles citam um episódio em que a personagem principal usa um boné semelhante aos usados pela polícia da época da União Soviética. #MashaEoUrso #Propaganda #Cultura

Cinquante députés britanniques demandent le retrait du dessin animé « Masha et Michka » des plateformes, l'accusant de normaliser des symboles militaires soviétiques et de « militariser les esprits » des enfants, tandis que le studio Animaccord rejette ces accusations et défend la série contre des critiques jugées « absurdes ». #MashaEtMichka #Propagande #Animation