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Trump’s administration is shielding Putin as Russia directly targets civilians, I can’t be any plainer than that. Their media messaging, political framing, whitewashing of war crimes, withholding of military support, throttling of Starlink and Starshield all help enable Putin’s war. Day 3,no power

russia's MILITARY POTENTIAL CEILINGS There is no country that can wage war forever. There are plenty of myths about russia and how it can keep fighting and fighting, but there are things no country can overcome. These are simply economic and industrial ceilings that cannot just be expanded indefinitely. Especially when you're the most sanctioned country in history. Sit back, get comfortable — today I'm bringing you a BIG and very detailed article. Next year, russia will increase its military budget. And spending on it will account for around 35% of russia's entire annual budget. That's just according to the officially reported figures. And based on what we saw last year, we know that russia spends considerably more on the war than it reports. But when it comes to all this increased funding for the war machine, there's one BIG catch — russia doesn't exactly have the money for it. To keep its war industry running, russia is forced to significantly cut the budgets of other government sectors — education, healthcare, social services, and the national economy (infrastructure, agriculture, and so on). In other words, it's increasing the war industry's budget by cannibalizing other sectors. And it's ALSO very important to understand that even then, russia is no longer able to generate enough revenue to fully finance its annual budget. As a result, the state budget deficit keeps growing every year. And that's when the russians start selling their gold, diamonds, or printing A LOT of money to plug that budget hole. Whenever I try to explain how russia's economic situation keeps deteriorating, there are always commenters who say something along the lines of: "So what? They can still fight as long as they want, and you can talk about their problems all you like. Nobody's going to stop them." Well, THIS is where I'll try to explain why I think they're starting to reach the limits of their industrial capacity and, more generally, the limits of their offensive capabilities. When you shrink the civilian economy, investment declines, productivity falls, unemployment increases, prices rise, and it becomes more expensive for industry to manufacture things. On top of that, there's the growing global fuel crisis, which also drives up production costs. And russia ALSO has an existing labor shortage, and now it's going to carry out mobilization as well. That means it will independently remove, quite possibly, several hundred thousand men from the labor market. Whether that happens all at once or over the course of a year no longer matters — what matters is that those people will be taken out of the workforce. This creates a situation where russia is essentially destroying itself. It's increasing its military budget, but because it's cutting funding to other sectors and global economic problems are piling on, inflation rises so much that the larger military budget no longer translates into producing a whole lot more. Because everything simply costs MORE. And if we look at the war industry as a whole, there aren't many places left to expand because there aren't enough specialists. The only real option may be to try to redistribute the existing industrial capacity. For example, using the same budget, the same workers, and the same amount of materials to produce fewer tanks but more drones and missiles (I know this is a rough comparison, but the point still stands). Since I mentioned tanks, their production lines are also struggling to catch up with previous production levels. For example, russia used to refurbish a lot of old tanks from storage depots. But since those depots are now almost depleted, it has to manufacture more NEW tanks. And producing a new one costs MORE and takes longer. Tanks are just one example, but you have to understand that a similar situation applies to many other things. Instead of using old Soviet stockpiles, russia now has to manufacture a lot more equipment from scratch. THEREFORE, an increasing military budget in russia does not mean they'll have A LOT more of everything. NO. It simply means that everything costs them more. And looking ahead, it will cost them EVEN MORE, while they'll get less out of it. EVEN IF we take into account that China is still helping russia, we also have to understand that China isn't doing it for free. And no matter how many natural resources russia can send to China in exchange for technology, as inflation rises, the cost of those exchanges also increases. And as we know, China has been conducting those exchanges in its own favor since the beginning of the war. And once again, we run into the same ceilings — more trade does not necessarily mean a bigger war. More of everything is simply needed because everything is getting more expensive. There's an interesting situation unfolding in the world right now, where trump's war in Iran and the global fuel problems are simultaneously hurting russia's war industry as well. On top of that, I'm convinced that this entire promised wave of mobilization will also be russia's last serious attempt to push forward. RIGHT NOW, at THIS VERY MOMENT, a fundamental turning point in the war is taking place, and it's not being talked about very much. You could say the turning point was the expansion of Ukraine's drone forces, the attacks on oil facilities, the destruction of logistics, or something else. BUT all of this ultimately comes down to one BIG factor. russia is starting to reach the peak of its military potential. After this entire mobilization (whatever its size), they won't be able to carry out another one on the same scale. Well... they technically could, but each subsequent wave would be progressively weaker and of lower quality. At the same time, russia's military industry is starting to reach its ceilings. Looking ahead, not only will it have nowhere left to expand, but it's very likely to start contracting for the very same reason it grew in the first place — cuts to the budgets of other government sectors and the resulting inflation. Just take something as simple as cuts to healthcare funding. You might ask, what do hospitals have to do with the war industry? Well, if the state doesn't provide enough money to treat people, it's likely that more health problems will emerge, and that will affect the labor market. Which, in turn, will affect production — including the war industry. SO, I suspect that after 2027 (yes, unfortunately, that's still a long way off), russia will still be able to continue the war, but the pace of its war industry and its offensive operations will inevitably decline. THEN, let's take into account that russia is already suffering absolutely insane losses this year in exchange for increasingly smaller amounts of occupied territory. So let's understand that this is happening while russia can still maintain at least its current offensive pace and industrial production. What happens if any one of those factors contracts? We have a real-life example of what happens then — today, russia can no longer recruit enough people in a single month to replace the number being killed in the war. As a result, russian occupation forces are gradually retreating every month, and the occupiers are losing the territory they had captured. 2027 will still be the year when russia plugs this gap. In other words, whatever it can no longer recruit voluntarily, it will force into the front lines through mobilization. And then we'll have a whole range of other problems, which I've essentially already mentioned. russia will voluntarily reduce its own workforce (and let's add those who flee the country). Unmotivated, untrained, and poorly equipped soldiers at the front will achieve increasingly fewer results. The war industry will become more expensive while producing less for the front. russia will start facing problems filling the gaps created by its own shortages. When russia reaches these ceilings, it will certainly still be able to continue the war, but it will no longer be able to maintain the same pace. Especially the pace of its offensive operations on the front. THEREFORE... I can't say that Ukraine will definitely start reclaiming more of its territory, because we don't know how Ukraine itself will manage its funding. BUT the conditions are there, and Ukraine still has some cards it hasn't played yet. Here, let's also remember the ballistic missiles that are still to come into play. They won't be some complete WOW moment that changes everything. BUT they will allow Ukraine to destroy russia's industry much more aggressively, which is ultimately still one of the most important factors, because it eventually affects the quality of russia's offensive operations as well. BECAUSE having more people does not mean capturing more territory if those people are not properly supplied and supported from the rear. And then we get to the part I've actually been talking about for a very long time. What else can russia do if its offensive potential on the front starts to collapse? I'll repeat myself — russia is trying to compensate for the lack of frontline forces by intensifying its air attacks. And that creates the illusion that its offensive never stops and that russia is constantly escalating. + This is also an attempt to break Ukrainian civilians and make them demand that their government enter negotiations with russia. Historically, however, this kind of tactic has very rarely worked, regardless of which country we're talking about. Offensive operations on the front and air attacks are two different things. russia's frontline capabilities are shrinking, and that's why it is forced to carry out mobilization. That mobilization won't help it achieve A LOT more victories, BUT it will buy time — time it can use specifically to intensify its air attacks. And once again, it's the same thing — continuing a war does not necessarily mean fighting a successful war. russia, seeing that it cannot achieve victories on the front, is redirecting more of its industrial capacity toward producing drones and missiles. BUT we also have to understand that this does not necessarily mean producing a whole lot MORE drones and missiles forever. Because, as I've already explained, there are limits to production due to inflation, rising manufacturing costs, and labor shortages. ALSO, when it comes to missiles, they face a similar situation to russia's old tanks. Just as russia spent several years pulling old tanks out of storage and refurbishing them, it is also still mainly using its huge Soviet-era missile stockpiles, which it is MODIFYING. To maintain the pace of its attacks, it is EVEN converting missiles from its S-400 air defense systems into ballistic attack missiles. In other words, it's cannibalizing its own air defense resources to maintain its offensive capabilities RIGHT NOW. And you should understand that this kind of strategy also has its ceilings. This kind of strategy could create VERY serious problems for the russians when Ukraine ramps up its own ballistic missile production and russia itself starts needing more DEFENSIVE missiles — the very ones it is currently converting. So, when you combine the fact that Soviet stockpiles, although large, are not infinite and will eventually run out, with the fact that you cannot manufacture everything new in such large quantities or so quickly, and with the fact that everything russia produces from scratch becomes increasingly expensive over time... And when you also factor in the labor shortage affecting the drone and missile industries... We can predict that even the intensity of russia's air attacks has ceilings, and those ceilings will eventually be reached. Now, someone will say that I've explained all this rather abstractly, without numbers and so on. Fine, here are a few: Between 2023 and 2025, production in some key defense-related industrial categories doubled. HOWEVER, by 2026, growth had slowed significantly. Transport equipment: just +23.3% (instead of doubling), metal products: just +12.6% (instead of doubling), electronics and optical equipment: just +2.1% (instead of doubling). These are just a few examples. russia can allocate more and more money to its war industry, but that doesn't necessarily mean it can proportionally manufacture more weapons. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT — in September 2026, employment in manufacturing was already declining for the tenth consecutive month, while production volumes were falling again. This is NOT the collapse of production, but it clearly shows that the military industry is starting to reach its ceilings, which is exactly what I'm talking about. And those ceilings are being reached precisely because, once again, other government sectors are having their budgets cut, resulting in rising production costs. + Global economic consequences, economic sanctions, and Ukrainian strikes on factories. Now, if some of you are thinking of bringing up Ukraine and how it has the same problems, I'll dare to say that it's NOT quite the same. Over these several years of war, Ukraine has expanded its military industry so dramatically that its main obstacle is something else — a lack of funding. In other words, Ukraine is nowhere near reaching the limits of its production capacity. And on the front, we're already seeing more or less equal capabilities, and in some areas even an advantage for Ukrainian forces, with what they currently have. In 2025, zelensky said that Ukraine's war industry was operating at only 60% capacity. Well, in 2026, that situation is changing, because Ukraine is receiving considerably more funding. It's a fact that Ukraine also has its own problems and faces the same inflation, but when it comes to the ability to increase production volumes, it still has plenty of room to do so. After all this, there are a few rather unpleasant factors left. YES, russia's military potential will definitely shrink, BUT that doesn't mean the war will definitely end because of it. russia will still be able to continue the war, albeit at a weaker pace. At this point, we can expect russia to make indirect attempts to start peace negotiations, and we will likely see a shift in its propaganda messaging. When they see that they no longer have the potential to continue fighting at the same pace and that their objectives are UNACHIEVABLE, they will EXACTLY start claiming that their military objectives have ALREADY been achieved and that the war can now be ended. Why would they do that? Well, because it will be the best negotiating position they can possibly have. After that, it will start getting weaker. How do I come to this conclusion? Just look at what's happening in the war in Iran — the war is supposedly ongoing, but it's not really going on anymore, and there is NO agreement. America can no longer continue its offensive, so trump keeps saying that the military objectives have already been achieved and that they won the war a long time ago. It's just that Iran refuses to surrender. The same thing will happen with the russians: When they see that they are losing the initiative, they will start claiming that the war has been won and that it's time to end it. At this point, russia will, of course, still demand its own terms, and if those terms are not implemented, it will resort to increasingly terrorist attacks. And then it will be up to Ukraine to decide whether to keep fighting a little longer to weaken russia's position even further, or to sit down at the negotiating table. The sad reality is that by that point, Ukraine itself will have been battered so badly that it will neither have the resources to continue the war nor much desire to keep shedding blood. That desire is already gone, and it never existed in the first place. But in this war, Ukraine is defending itself, so it has no choice. And there's one more dangerous factor. By dragging out the war, russia is trying to wait for political winds to shift in its favor in Europe and elsewhere. And this is where russia is also using another huge pool of financial resources to try to influence political parties in the Western world and spread propaganda among the public. The next major barrier will be the November elections in America.

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𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Russia’s war propaganda gets a soundtrack – how AI-generated songs reached global streaming platforms Russian war propaganda is no longer confined to television broadcasts, Telegram channels or political videos. A study by the Ukrainian threat-intelligence organisation Terrecon has identified 981 songs combining signs of AI generation with pro-Russian military narratives, distributed through an ecosystem that reaches YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music, Deezer and SoundCloud. The songs range from sentimental ballads to rock and heavy metal. Their recurring themes are familiar from conventional Russian wartime propaganda: the heroisation of Russian soldiers, romanticisation of the war, mobilisation, the “Russian world”, commemoration of fallen troops and attacks on Ukraine and its armed forces. Some contain derogatory or dehumanising references to Ukrainians. What is new is not necessarily the message, but the production and distribution model: generative AI allows propagandistic music to be produced rapidly, cheaply and in quantities that would previously have required musicians, studios and producers. Nearly 1,000 tracks identified Terrecon examined 3,725 tracks collected from YouTube, YouTube Music, SoundCloud and the AI music platform Suno. After manual review, researchers classified 981 as showing both indications of AI generation and pro-Russian war propaganda. In 681 tracks they identified 728 propaganda-related keywords or phrases. The largest category was the glorification of the Russian military, followed by romanticised treatment of Moscow’s so-called “special military operation”, mobilisation appeals, narratives about the “Russian world”, and the cult of fallen soldiers and the state. The reach was not merely theoretical. Listening or viewing statistics were available for 608 of the identified tracks; together they had accumulated 86.8 million plays and views, according to Terrecon. A smaller group of 13 high-performing songs accounted for more than 53 million YouTube views and more than 67 million when YouTube Music was included. Among the better-known examples is “Power of Artillery”, a Russian-language rock song praising artillery weapons that passed two million views on YouTube. Most of the tracks for which publication dates could be established appeared after 2024, broadly coinciding with the rapid expansion of consumer AI music generators such as Suno and Udio. That correlation does not prove that AI alone caused the increase, but it illustrates how drastically the economics of production have changed. A propaganda song for as little as $11 Terrecon also tested how difficult it would be to commission such material. Researchers approached 25 creators producing AI-assisted militaristic music; 15 agreed to take commissions. Prices ranged from approximately $11 to $330, while delivery times ranged from two hours to three days. According to Terrecon, some were prepared to produce highly aggressive anti-Ukrainian material, including content intended for audiences involving children from occupied Ukrainian territories. Some creators used Russian intermediary services that provided access to Western AI tools such as Suno and Udio despite restrictions. The researchers then tested several AI generators themselves. Across 40 prompts submitted to Suno, Udio, Mureka, Google Flow Music and ElevenLabs, 25 resulted in successful generations, while safeguards were circumvented in 15 cases. Terrecon reported that four of the five services tested produced Russian-language material containing wartime narratives, although technical problems prevented comparable testing on some systems. In one Udio experiment, the researchers said the model itself introduced more explicit violent language than had appeared in the original promp These tests do not demonstrate that the commercial platforms knowingly support Russian propaganda. They show something narrower: existing safeguards can be inconsistent when political messaging is packaged as music. From generation to Spotify The distribution experiment may be the most revealing part of Terrecon’s research. The team deliberately uploaded test tracks containing explicit hostile language to YouTube, SoundCloud, Spotify and Deezer. Terrecon says none was blocked during the experiment. On SoundCloud, researchers used an account identifying its location as Moscow, disclosed the use of AI and added markers including references to the Russian military and the war. The platform accepted the upload and subsequently offered paid promotional and distribution tools. This does not prove that streaming recommendation systems systematically promote pro-war music. There is currently insufficient public evidence to make that claim. It does demonstrate that material can enter the same commercial distribution infrastructure as ordinary music and, once there, potentially benefit from playlists, searches, sharing and recommendation mechanisms available to other releases. That distinction is important. Propaganda no longer has to announce itself as political communication. On a streaming platform it can look like another song. Culture as a delivery mechanism Music has always been used in wartime propaganda. What generative AI changes is scale. Instead of investing heavily in a limited number of patriotic performers or officially commissioned productions, creators can generate variations across styles, audiences and emotional registers at very low cost. Terrecon found material ranging from war rock to sentimental songs and content styled for younger audiences. Some creators also experimented with cloned celebrity voices and stylistic imitation of established musicians. The format also offers a different relationship with the audience. A political video asks a viewer to consume an argument. Music can accompany commuting, exercise or entertainment and may be encountered outside explicitly political spaces. This does not automatically make it more persuasive, and Terrecon’s research does not establish measurable effects on political attitudes. It does, however, place wartime narratives inside a cultural environment where users may not initially perceive themselves as consuming political messaging. An ecosystem, not a proven Kremlin command structure The strongest evidence supports describing this as a growing AI-assisted pro-Russian propaganda-music ecosystem, not a single operation controlled from Moscow. Terrecon did not establish that the Russian government created, financed or coordinated all 981 tracks. Reporting on the study likewise notes that the extent of direct state involvement remains unclear. There is broader evidence that the Russian state finances cultural projects and digital content supporting the war, including through state-backed funding bodies. That context matters, but it does not allow individual songs in Terrecon’s dataset to be attributed to the Kremlin without additional evidence. The significance of the case lies elsewhere. AI has reduced the cost of producing ideological content, intermediaries can help creators access generation tools, and global platforms can provide distribution. The result is a pipeline in which wartime propaganda no longer has to resemble propaganda at all. It can simply appear in a playlist. Sources Terrecon / Ukrainska Pravda — Daria Verbytska on the research https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2026/10/05/8056229/ Suspilne Culture — detailed breakdown of Terrecon findings https://suspilne.media/culture/1417933-rosijsku-voennu-propagandu-maskuut-pid-anime-karaoke-ta-rok-doslidzenna-si-pisen-vid-terrecon/ The Insider — AI-generated Russian war propaganda music https://theins.ru/news/297839 Institute of Mass Information — summary of New York Times reporting https://imi.org.ua/en/news/doslidzhennya-rf-masovo-stvoryu%D1%94-propagandistski-pisni-za-dopomogoyu-shi The Bridge Media — AI-generated songs and Russian military propaganda https://thebridgemedia.com.ua/en/ai-generated-songs-russian-military-propaganda/ Center for Strategic Communication — cost and production of AI propaganda music https://spravdi.org/propaganda-za-11-yak-rosiya-shtampuye-shi-pisni-z-miljonamy-prosluhovuvan/ Times of India — AI-generated Russian war songs https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/ai-sings-russias-war-story-inside-the-rise-of-generative-songs-about-ukraine-conflict/articleshow/134650594.cms EU Council / EUR-Lex — Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026D1351 Human Rights Watch — Russian state funding of digital and patriotic content https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/07/30/disrupted-throttled-and-blocked/state-censorship-control-and-increasing-isolation #DISINFORMED #Episode16 #Russia #Ukraine #RussianPropaganda #WarPropaganda #MusicPropaganda #AIMusic #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #CulturalPropaganda #DigitalInfluence #NarrativeManipulation #PropagandaMusic #StreamingPlatforms #Spotify #AppleMusic #YouTube #YouTubeMusic #Deezer #SoundCloud #Suno #Udio #RussianWorld #RusskiyMir #MilitaryPropaganda #WarNarratives #Mobilisation #AlgorithmicDistribution #RecommendationAlgorithms #MusicStreaming #PlatformManipulation #Terrecon #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

IRAN: MEK/NCRI – when AI impersonated a real activist in live conversations For years, synthetic media has largely meant fabricated images, cloned voices and manipulated video. A case uncovered by Anthropic in September 2026 suggests a more consequential development: artificial intelligence being used not merely to imitate how a person looks or sounds, but to behave as that person in an ongoing conversation. Anthropic says it dismantled a distributed influence operation targeting Iranians inside the country and abroad that it linked to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or PMOI/MEK, and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The operators used a shared AI-agent platform to support impersonation, audience profiling, coordinated social-media activity, synthetic personas and the laundering of organisational content through apparently independent accounts. At least four people involved in the operation worked for official NCRI media outlets, according to Anthropic. The company also found references to committee approval processes and MEK leadership, but said it could not independently determine the precise level of central control. Cloning a person from 8,400 Telegram posts The most striking part of the operation involved a real activist whose Telegram identity was copied. According to Anthropic, the operators instructed Claude in Persian that it was now that person, then provided approximately 8,400 of the activist’s Telegram posts so the system could learn and reproduce his writing style. The AI-assisted account was subsequently used to conduct live political conversations with the activist’s existing contacts. Anthropic says that, to its knowledge, the people receiving those messages did not know they were interacting with an account being operated with AI assistance. This is materially different from a conventional chatbot or a static deepfake. The system was not simply producing a forged statement attributed to someone else. It was using a large archive of that person’s authentic language as behavioural training material, then applying the resulting imitation interactively. In practical terms, the deception moved from synthetic content to synthetic identity. Anthropic did not publish the identity of the impersonated activist, nor details of his contacts, and the public report does not establish what specific information the conversations produced. What it does establish is that the impersonation was operational rather than experimental: the cloned account was used in real exchanges with real people. From social-media monitoring to psychographic dossiers The impersonation sat inside a much broader targeting system. Anthropic says the network scraped more than 500 social-media channels and categorised individuals by location, age, profession, political orientation and arrest history. It then analysed approximately 51,944 archived messages from conversations to construct detailed psychographic dossiers on dozens of people inside Iran. The system was therefore not limited to broadcasting propaganda. It was also designed to understand specific audiences and individuals. Profiles could be used to decide what kind of message was most likely to resonate with a particular person, which political identity they appeared closest to and how they should be approached. Anthropic describes this as a structured targeting funnel rather than ad hoc social-media activity. That distinction is important in the Iranian context. Political activists, dissidents and opposition contacts inside Iran can face arrest and severe punishment. The report does not show that the dossiers directly led to arrests or other harm, but collecting and organising information such as arrest history and political affiliation adds a surveillance dimension to what would otherwise be described as an influence operation. A shared AI system for an influence network Anthropic found that the actors used a shared Claude-based platform named “Viktor”, with separate workspaces and persistent memory. Those memory files contained approved sources, prohibited words, account-management instructions and methods intended to reduce the risk of detection. One operator loaded MEK founding doctrine into the system as what the report called “strategic base data”, allowing others to reuse it across their work. This persistent-memory structure meant the AI did not have to be briefed from scratch for every task. Once doctrine, stylistic rules and operational constraints had been stored, the system could repeatedly produce material consistent with the network’s objectives. Anthropic says the same general playbook appeared across different workspaces despite the operators not sharing obvious account infrastructure. The network also used automated pipelines to coordinate Instagram posting schedules and tailor messages to different audiences. Some accounts initially avoided mentioning the Mojahedin at all, allowing material aligned with MEK/NCRI narratives to appear as neutral or independent political commentary. Content was distributed through the organisation’s own media ecosystem as well as accounts presented as ordinary news or activist profiles. Anthropic assessed the campaign as Category Two on its Breakout Scale: active on multiple platforms with distribution through NCRI-linked media properties and amplifier accounts, but without evidence of broad authentic penetration. Synthetic citizens and disguised organisational media The same infrastructure generated AI avatars presented as ordinary Iranians, complete with Persian audio, to promote Maryam Rajavi’s political programme. Anthropic says the synthetic nature of these personas was intentionally concealed. Operators also rewrote and redistributed content originating from MEK-affiliated media while stripping identifying features or presenting it through apparently independent accounts. The network’s political messaging targeted the Iranian government but also rival opposition currents, including monarchists and supporters of the Pahlavi camp. Anthropic documented fabricated video material attacking a member of the Pahlavi family and the use of the slogan “Neither Shah Nor Sheikh”, consistent with the NCRI’s broader competition with other opposition movements. That rivalry provides relevant context. Reuters describes the MEK as one of Iran’s principal organised opposition movements in exile and the dominant force behind the NCRI, led by Maryam Rajavi. Its relationship with other opposition currents is often contentious, while the extent of its support inside Iran remains uncertain. What can be attributed – and what cannot Anthropic’s attribution is unusually specific but still needs to be stated carefully. The company says its investigation linked the operation to MEK/NCRI and established that at least four participants worked for official NCRI media organisations. It also found a common operational playbook, committee review structures and repeated references to MEK leadership. On that basis, Anthropic said central tasking was likely. It nevertheless stopped short of saying it had proven that NCRI’s senior leadership directly ordered or managed every component of the operation. That caveat matters. The strongest public evidence supports describing GTG-84006 as a MEK/NCRI-aligned influence operation involving personnel from official NCRI media, rather than asserting that every action was directly commanded by the organisation’s top leadership. The broader significance of the case lies elsewhere. Earlier generations of synthetic media attempted to fabricate evidence: a photograph, a voice recording or a video. Here, AI was used to maintain an identity over time, remember doctrine, analyse targets and speak directly to real people while appearing to be someone they already trusted. The deepfake was no longer merely an artefact. It had become a participant in the conversation. Sources Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 AI Misuse Case Library — GTG-84006 activist impersonation case https://www.misuseofai.com/en/cases/gtg-84006-activist-impersonation/ Reuters — Who makes up Iran’s fragmented opposition? https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/who-makes-up-irans-fragmented-opposition-2025-06-18/ Reuters — Iran’s divided opposition senses its moment https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-divided-opposition-senses-its-moment-activists-remain-wary-protests-2025-06-19/ Reuters — NCRI and Maryam Rajavi https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dissident-leader-abroad-urges-iranians-bring-down-khamenei-2025-06-24/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode12 #Iran #MEK #PMOI #NCRI #IranianOpposition #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #AIDeception #AIImpersonation #IdentityImpersonation #SyntheticIdentity #InteractiveDeepfake #DigitalImpersonation #PersonaCloning #BehaviouralCloning #Telegram #PsychographicProfiling #TargetProfiling #AudienceTargeting #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #SyntheticPersonas #NarrativeLaundering #CoordinatedInfluence #PoliticalInfluence #DigitalInfluence #OppositionPolitics #IranPolitics #OSINT #WRLD

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

UAE / Sudan – when an influence operation tried to enter the United Nations A network of roughly 300 apparently independent social-media influencers. A human-rights organisation borrowing the identity of a real NGO. Personal dossiers on European politicians and journalists. And testimony prepared for delivery at the United Nations without revealing the state interest behind it. These were elements of an influence operation uncovered by Anthropic and disclosed in September 2026. The company says it linked the activity with high confidence to UAE government officials. Tracked as GTG-84002, the operation targeted several overlapping issues: the Muslim Brotherhood, perceptions of the war in Sudan and international mechanisms examining the United Arab Emirates' role in the conflict. What distinguishes the case is not simply its use of artificial intelligence. It is the attempt to make state-aligned messaging appear to originate from independent influencers, human-rights organisations and potentially witnesses addressing an international institution. An influence network built around 300 fake voices Anthropic identified a single actor using Claude to support a sustained influence campaign. At its centre was an AI persona called “Deadshot”, running on the operator's own platform. A master doctrine file repeatedly instructed the system to support what it described as a coordinated international effort to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood. The operator simultaneously managed several components of the campaign, including approximately 300 inauthentic influencer accounts across social-media platforms. Internal material examined by Anthropic described the apparent independence of this network as its greatest strategic advantage. That phrase captures the central method. The objective was not simply to broadcast a political position but to conceal where that position originated. One visible example appeared on 4 June 2026, when accounts participated in a coordinated campaign using #SudanIslamists and near-identical graphics connecting Sudanese Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood with regional instability. Anthropic says the amplification network was centrally funded and coordinated. Its investigation also found that the operator financing the social-media network was connected to the wider influence operation. A human-rights organisation that was not what it appeared to be Social media was only one layer. The operator also created a front NGO that copied the identity of a genuine Swiss organisation and used that borrowed legitimacy to publish human-rights material produced for the campaign. Anthropic's description elsewhere also refers to the identity of a real Sudanese human-rights organisation being used in connection with the preparation of testimony. The public report does not fully clarify whether these references describe the same front or separate elements of the operation, so they should not be treated as definitively identical. The underlying technique, however, is clear: political material was designed to appear as if it originated from independent civil society rather than from actors linked to a government. This is particularly significant in the human-rights environment, where the perceived independence of an organisation or witness can determine how seriously evidence is received by journalists, diplomats and international institutions. The attempt to reach the UN The most consequential part of the operation concerned the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. According to Anthropic, the operator used Claude to ghost-write complete testimony intended to be delivered by two individuals during the session. The texts were prepared under explicit constraints ensuring that neither statement would mention the UAE. This did not amount to a conventional government submission. The intention, according to Anthropic's reconstruction, was for material serving the interests of a party connected to the Sudan conflict to reach an international forum through apparently independent voices. But an important limitation remains: Anthropic could not confirm that the testimony was ultimately delivered. The company similarly could not establish whether other dossiers produced by the operation reached their intended recipients or influenced policy. It therefore assessed the campaign as Category Three on the Brookings Breakout Scale – activity distributed across several platforms, but without evidence of broad public impact sufficient for a higher classification. The distinction matters. The evidence demonstrates a sophisticated attempt to influence international debate; it does not demonstrate that the attempt succeeded. Politicians, journalists and UN investigators became targets The operation was not limited to generating public content. Anthropic found that the operator researched and compiled detailed profiles of 18 members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists. Some material was prepared for direct delivery to senior UAE officials. The network also assembled what Anthropic describes as “counter-accountability dossiers” on UN Special Rapporteurs who had criticised the UAE's conduct in relation to Sudan. This places the campaign in a broader context. Since Sudan's civil war began in April 2023, the role of external powers has become an increasingly important part of international scrutiny. Sudan has accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, allegations Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. In 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE before the International Court of Justice, accusing it of complicity in genocide against the Masalit through alleged support for the RSF. The UAE rejected the allegations. The ICJ subsequently removed the case from its list after finding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the UAE's reservation to the relevant provision of the Genocide Convention. The ruling therefore did not determine whether Sudan's substantive allegations were true or false. That contested international environment helps explain why narratives about Sudan, human rights and accountability were valuable targets for an influence operation. AI as an operating system for influence The role played by Claude is also important to understand accurately. Anthropic did not find that artificial intelligence independently conceived or directed the campaign. Human operators established the objectives, political doctrine and targets. AI instead helped operationalise them. Across hundreds of sessions, Claude was used to transform predetermined political objectives into social-media narratives, human-rights reports, testimony, intelligence-style briefs and detailed profiles of individuals. The same system could support narrative production, target research and preparation of material for different audiences. That represents a more significant development than simply using generative AI to produce propaganda faster. Traditional influence operations require different teams to research targets, write content, manage personas, adapt messages and prepare briefing material. Generative AI can compress several of those functions into a single operational workflow. The result is not necessarily more convincing propaganda. It is potentially cheaper, faster and more scalable influence infrastructure. From fake influencers to institutional influence Anthropic says it linked the operation to UAE government officials with high confidence. Its assessment was based partly on internal material naming senior Emirati officials as intended recipients of the work, alongside other evidence available to its investigators. That remains an attribution by Anthropic rather than a judicial finding or publicly released forensic attribution by a government agency. The distinction should be retained. The larger significance of GTG-84002 lies in the architecture of the campaign. A network of fake influencers could create the appearance of public opinion. A cloned human-rights organisation could provide institutional credibility. AI-generated reports could give political narratives the appearance of research. Profiles of journalists and politicians could support more precise targeting. And ghost-written testimony could potentially carry the same message into an international institution without revealing the political interest behind it. This is a different model from the familiar troll farm. The objective is no longer simply to make propaganda look popular. It is to make state-aligned messaging look independent – and, if possible, to move it from social media into the institutions where international policy and accountability are debated. SOURCES: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 International Court of Justice — Sudan v. United Arab Emirates https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197 International Court of Justice — press releases and case documents https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197/press-releases United Nations Geneva — Sudan v UAE proceedings at the ICJ https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/04/105241/world-court-begins-hearing-sudans-complicity-genocide-case-against UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs — UAE response to Sudan's allegations https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/4/10/10-4-2025-UAE-UAE UN Digital Library — Sudan's letter concerning alleged UAE support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?ln=en UN Digital Library — UAE response concerning allegations of support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4046224?ln=en Ultra Sudan — reporting on Anthropic's UAE-linked influence-operation findings https://ultrasudan.usawtiq.com/أنثروبيك-أحبطنا-عملية-تأثير-إماراتية-استخدمت-الذكاء-الاصطناعي-لاستهداف-السودان/عامر-صالح/أخبار KEYWORDS #DISINFORMED #Episode8 #UAE #Sudan #UnitedArabEmirates #UnitedNations #UNHumanRightsCouncil #HumanRights #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeInfluencers #FakeNGO #NGOImpersonation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #NarrativeManipulation #InstitutionalInfluence #SudanConflict #SudanWar #MuslimBrotherhood #InternationalRelations #Geopolitics #Anthropic #ClaudeAI #OSINT #WRLD

Russia’s fake African newsrooms – propaganda designed to look local A Facebook user in Nairobi, Accra, Johannesburg or Luanda encounters what appears to be a local news page. It publishes stories about African politics, Western influence and relations with Russia. The language is tailored to an African audience and the page presents itself not as a foreign broadcaster, but as part of the local information landscape. Behind some of these outlets, however, Meta found operators based in Russia. In its 2026 threat research, the company disclosed a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour network targeting audiences in Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the operation. Around 30,000 users followed at least one of the Pages, while the operators spent approximately $7,000 on Facebook and Instagram advertising, mostly in euros and US dollars. The numbers are relatively modest. The method is considerably more important. Rather than openly distributing Russian state messaging, the network posed as local African news sources and grassroots organisations, promoting narratives about Western colonialism and political interference while presenting Russia as a credible economic and political alternative. It was an old geopolitical message delivered through a much more effective identity: not Moscow speaking to Africa, but Africans apparently speaking to one another. A news outlet that was actually an influence operation Meta's investigation found that the network attempted to conceal its Russian origin while creating media brands that appeared indigenous to the countries they targeted. Its content amplified historical grievances against former colonial powers, criticised Western involvement in Africa and promoted closer relations with Russia. One example helps illustrate how the infrastructure was assembled. A Facebook Page targeting Kenya was called Kenya Watchtower. According to OpenAI's subsequent investigation, Facebook transparency records showed that the Page had previously been named “Farmtown5”. It appears to have been acquired or repurposed rather than built from scratch as a Kenyan news organisation. Some Pages also exposed administrator locations in Russia and Ukraine. Other elements of the network had previously targeted audiences in Zambia and Namibia. This use of apparently local identities is particularly important in the African information environment. A story published by RT or another identifiable Russian outlet arrives with an obvious geopolitical provenance. The same narrative presented by something resembling an independent Kenyan, Ghanaian or South African newsroom carries a different kind of credibility. The source appears closer to the reader, and the geopolitical interest behind the message becomes less visible. Then investigators found Dr Manuel Godsin The Facebook operation was only one part of a broader information ecosystem. OpenAI investigated related activity after receiving information from Meta and subsequently banned a ChatGPT account it assessed as likely originating in Russia. OpenAI called the campaign Operation No Bell. The account was being used to generate long-form articles and social-media posts about African geopolitics. Prompts were primarily written in English, but OpenAI also observed Russian-language instructions that the user described as coming from a manager. The operator sometimes explicitly asked the model to make the material appear less AI-generated – including requests to avoid stylistic features associated with machine-generated text and to write more like a human journalist. Many articles appeared under the name “Dr Manuel Godsin”, presented as an academic with a PhD from the University of Bergen and an affiliation with an organisation called the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. OpenAI could find no credible evidence that Godsin existed. Searches of Norway's National Research Information Repository and the University of Bergen library produced no record of him. Investigators subsequently discovered that a photograph used to represent Godsin had appeared years earlier on a Russian professional networking site and apparently belonged to a law student in St Petersburg. The fabricated academic identity was nevertheless remarkably productive. OpenAI identified 53 online articles carrying the Godsin byline. The fiction had moved beyond fake social-media pages and into the real media ecosystem. When propaganda enters genuine newsrooms This is the most consequential aspect of the operation. The articles were not confined to websites controlled by the influence network. Some were published by genuine African news organisations, including established South African outlets. The content mixed local political issues with broader geopolitical narratives. Some pieces criticised the United States and Britain or defended Russia's role in Africa. One accused the British NGO Crisis Action of fomenting protests in South Africa. Another praised Russia's presence in the Central African Republic. Other material addressed Kenya, Angola and relations between African governments and Washington. The mechanism represents a significant evolution from the classic troll-farm model. Instead of building an audience entirely on its own platforms, an influence operator can manufacture an apparently credible expert, generate articles in his name and persuade genuine news organisations to publish them. Once this happens, the propaganda acquires something a fake Facebook Page cannot provide: the institutional credibility of a real newsroom. OpenAI assessed No Bell's social-media impact as limited. One Facebook Page had around 3,000 followers before Meta removed it, while several others had very small audiences. But the operation was more successful in placing material in established media. In OpenAI's impact framework, it approached the level at which an influence operation breaks into mainstream media. For information operators, a single article published by a recognised outlet can potentially be more valuable than thousands of impressions generated by an obviously artificial account. A much larger network of ghost journalists Subsequent research suggests that Manuel Godsin was not an isolated experiment. In August 2026, Graphika, working with Code for Africa and with support from Meta, published a much broader investigation into Russian ghostwriting operations across African media. Researchers identified 44 ghost writers and fake experts, 38 of them assessed as high-confidence fabricated personas, operating between 2021 and 2026. Their material appeared or was quoted across 138 websites and was subsequently republished through at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages, including authentic users, coordinated inauthentic networks and official Russian communication channels. The narratives were strikingly consistent. They included criticism of France, Ukraine and the United States; attacks on organisations such as ECOWAS and the International Criminal Court; positive portrayals of Russian involvement in Africa; praise for Russian paramilitary forces; and support for sovereignty-oriented political projects such as the Alliance of Sahel States. The operation therefore extends beyond creating fake news websites. It attempts to insert Russian-aligned narratives into the legitimate African media ecosystem using identities that appear African, independent or academically authoritative. This also explains why measuring reach through the original Facebook network alone is misleading. A fabricated article may begin with an influence operator, appear in a genuine African publication, be republished elsewhere and eventually circulate without any visible connection to Russia. At that point, the provenance of the narrative has effectively been laundered. An old Russian strategy with increasingly local faces Russia's use of local intermediaries in Africa is not new. Meta documented Russian networks using African nationals as early as 2019. In 2020 it dismantled another operation involving people in Ghana and Nigeria working on behalf of individuals in Russia, with links to previous activity associated with the Internet Research Agency. More recent Meta investigations suggest that this model has continued to evolve. Networks have increasingly relied on local freelancers, social-media managers and authentic media outlets rather than exclusively operating armies of obviously fake Russian-controlled accounts. This decentralisation offers several advantages. Local operators understand language, political sensitivities and cultural references. Authentic accounts are harder to identify than newly created synthetic personas. Local media brands can also deliver narratives without immediately triggering the scepticism associated with Russian state outlets. There is no evidence that every African journalist, freelancer or publication carrying such material knowingly participates in Russian influence activity. Meta explicitly notes in its investigations that some local contractors may not know who ultimately commissioned their work. That distinction is essential. The operation's effectiveness partly depends on precisely this ambiguity between deliberate participation, commercial content placement and unwitting amplification. The objective is to make Russian narratives look African The significance of this network is therefore not its 30,000 Facebook followers or its $7,000 advertising budget. Those figures are small compared with the audiences of major African media organisations. What matters is the distribution model. Traditional foreign propaganda asks an audience to trust a foreign source. These operations attempt to remove the foreign source from the equation altogether. A Russian geopolitical narrative can be generated with AI, attributed to an expert who does not exist, published by a media organisation that does, amplified through a Facebook Page presenting itself as local, and then rediscovered elsewhere as apparently independent African analysis. By the time the reader encounters it, Moscow may have disappeared completely from the chain of attribution. The resulting information operation is therefore less about making Russian propaganda more persuasive than about making it look as though it is no longer Russian propaganda at all. In an increasingly fragmented African media environment, that may be the more important evolution to watch. SOURCES: Meta Threat Research https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h1-2026-russia-based-cib-network-1/ OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina News24 https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2019 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/removing-more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2020 https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta Threat Research — Russian Use of Authentic Operators in Sub-Saharan Africa https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h2-2025-russia-based-cib-network-2/ KEYWORDS: #DISINFORMED #Episode7 #Russia #Africa #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeNews #FakeMedia #FakeNewsrooms #MediaImpersonation #GrassrootsManipulation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SyntheticMedia #FakeInfluencers #SocialMediaManipulation #Facebook #Meta #OperationNoBell #AfricanMedia #MediaManipulation #Propaganda #DigitalInfluence #Angola #Ghana #Kenya #SouthAfrica #OSINT #WRLD

What was the first Social Network in History? In Italy: Dada or InterNetWork City? SOURCE: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-first-social-network-history-italy-dada-city-sardella-ph-d--ngw2f/ When discussing technological primacy, historical precision is fundamental. Particularly when too many narratives from the web risk generating confusion. Contenuto dell’articolo Abstract This article critically analyses contemporary narratives on the origin of social networks, distinguishing between journalistic reconstructions and academic historiography. It clarifies that platforms such as Internetwork City and Dada/SuperEva, whilst innovative, cannot be defined as "first Italian social networks" according to criteria recognised by international research. The text reconstructs the genealogy of social media from early digital communities (Usenet, BBS) through to modern social networks, highlighting the anticipatory role of systems such as Plato. Finally, it demonstrates how certain Italian publications have attributed primacy unsupported by historical sources, underlining the necessity for a rigorous and documented approach. Keywords: digital historiography, Italian proto-social platforms, Internetwork City, Dada/SuperEva, origins of social networks In recent years, various narratives have circulated regarding the origin of social networks, some of which attribute primacy to projects that, while innovative, do not correspond to the effectively documented chronology. To reconstruct with precision the history of global social networks, it is necessary to begin with academic sources and verifiable testimonies, excluding retrospective reconstructions devoid of historical corroboration. But first and foremost, let us provide an encyclopaedic British definition: social media constitute a form of communication on online platforms through which users share information, ideas, personal messages and other textual and audio-visual content. This should not be confused with social networking, that is to say, the modalities by which Internet users construct virtual communities amongst themselves by sharing their textual and audio-visual content; social media, conversely, concerns web-based platforms that enable one to build a friendly, familial and professional audience. The earliest forms of social media appeared almost as soon as technology could support them: electronic mail and chat programmes débuted in the early 1970s, but the first virtual communities did not emerge. They did not emerge until the creation of the Usenet discussion group network in 1979: these permitted users to post and receive messages within thematic areas called newsgroups. Usenet and other discussion forums, such as privately hosted Bulletin Board Systems (BBS), allowed individuals to interact, but each was essentially a closed system. With the release in 1993 of the Mosaic web browser, those systems were provided with an easy-to-use graphical interface. Furthermore, the architecture of the World Wide Web made it possible to navigate from one site to another with a click, and faster Internet connections permitted richer multimedia content than that which could be found in text-heavy newsgroups. The First Modern Global Social Network: SixDegrees.com Contenuto dell’articolo As the prestigious Encyclopaedia Britannica cites, the first globally known companies to create modern social networks based on web technology were Classmates.com and SixDegrees.com. Between these two, in truth, the academic community and historians of digital media concur in identifying SixDegrees.com as the first true modern social network: it was the first to introduce the fundamental characteristics that would define the sector: personal profiles, friends lists and an integrated private messaging system. Indeed, Classmates.com, founded earlier in 1995, employed an aggressive advertising campaign with pop-ups to attract web browsers to its site based upon connections between students from secondary school and/or university classes, branches of the armed forces and places of work. SixDegrees.com was launched after it, in 1997, but with most of the functionalities that would characterise such social networks: members could create profiles for themselves, maintain friends lists and contact one another through the site's private messaging system. After claiming to have attracted more than three million users by the year 2000, it failed to translate those numbers of success into revenue as it subsequently collapsed along with numerous other internet companies when the dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s. The First Italian Social Network: Which One? Contenuto dell’articolo In recent years, a widespread narrative has emerged on the web according to which the first Italian social network would have been Internetwork City, a project born in May 1995 from the intuition of Claudio Cecchetto with the technical guidance of Perl and Java programmer Marco Camisani Calzolari. Other sources from the websphere (the totality of all globally accessible websites) narrate of the Dada/SuperEva group as the first Italian social network. In the first case, it was certainly, for the era, a story of radio and digital innovation made in Italy: in this interview with Giornalettismo from 29 June 2022 given to Gianmichele Laino (https://www.giornalettismo.com/marco-camisani-calzolari-internetwork-city/), Internetwork City is defined as the "first social network in history made in Italy". Contenuto dell’articolo And reading further, the interviewee, Marco Camisani Calzolari, a contract university lecturer and radio-television communicator on digital themes, states: "In May 1995, in a basement in Via Melzi D'Eril, a truly revolutionary idea was being born. Behind it was the intuition of Claudio Cecchetto and the guidance of Marco Camisani Calzolari: Internetwork City is the first social network in the world, a space within which users managed to interact, in an era when the network was a place where possibilities for interchange were still a futuristic eventuality." And whilst in the pioneering basement of Via Melzi D'Eril in May 1995 Internetwork City was being born, perhaps unbeknownst to its inventors, in January 1995, a full four months earlier, DADA (Design Architettura Digitale Analogico) had already been born, another entirely Italian social network, founded by four young Florentine architects (Paolo Barberis, Alessandro Sordi, Jacopo Marello and Angelo Falchetti), as one reads on the ZeroUnoWeb portal. The four Florentine friends transformed their architecture studio into a company in which Barberis and Sordi drew in the other two entrepreneurs, spending all their savings on the purchase of computers and multimedia equipment. It was not simply a matter of creating yet another web portal but a true digital ecosystem that anticipated many functions of contemporary social networks: profiles, communities, interaction and shared content. This narrative of DADA, however, is "once again refuted" if we read the journalistic article in La Repubblica of 27 May 2021 bearing the signature of journalist Riccardo Luna, entitled "In Milan, Claudio Cecchetto (and Marco Camisani Calzolari) launch a social network," readable by clicking the following link: https://www.repubblica.it/tecnologia/2021/05/27/news/a_milano_claudio_cecchetto_e_marco_camisani_calzolari_lanciano_un_social_network-302961639/ Contenuto dell’articolo The subtitle echoes: "It was the first social network in history and it was born in Italy. And in 1995 the web had practically only just been born," in addition to "In May 1995 the first social network in history was born and it was born in Italy. Perhaps the first. Who knows. But if one considers that Facebook is from 2004, Second Life and MySpace from 2003, one understands perfectly well the enormity of what I have just written. In 1995 the web had practically only just been born." But here, strangely, the discourse is not entirely clear: if in the subtitle one asserts decisively "it was the first social network in history," why does one then read: "Perhaps the first. Who knows." It seems to me a contradiction, quite frankly. But let us leave the arduous decisional task to impartial readers. Therefore, let us proceed with the rest of the article: "In the meantime, in Italy someone constructs a social network. Who? Claudio Cecchetto. Yes, him, the author of Gioca Jouer, the inventor of Radio Deejay and of another way of making radio. He was also a pioneer of the Internet. In May 1995 he launches a social network called Internetwork City, the city of the Internet network. It had been built, one line of code after another, by a young programmer who, thanks to this story, would become a brilliant communicator of digital matters (for some time he has been one of the faces of Striscia la Notizia): Marco Camisani Calzolari. When he thinks back to those times, MCC becomes enthusiastic: 'It was a social network in every respect. A place where one could register, have a profile and speak with others. It was one of the first in the history of the web, and Claudio Cecchetto had invented it. He had conceived it whilst navigating with Videotel, but then the World Wide Web had arrived. At the time I worked as a programmer for a fashion company: I had learnt to do it by downloading the instructions for writing code in Perl and in Java from the BBSs that were on the network'." Contenuto dell’articolo From this it emerges that the idea for the project was supported by the media personality of Claudio Cecchetto and brought to fruition by programmer Marco Camisani Calzolari: the two pioneers of the Italian web have (also in this journalistic article) confirmed how InterNetwork City was, in their opinion, the first social network in the world created precisely in the Belpaese. But will this be objectively and impartially true according to the historical historiography of Internet history? To ascertain this, we must analyse academic historiographical sources: these lead us back to the surprising computational history of a great (and semi-unknown) precursor of social networks present as early as the 1960s and 1970s: Plato. PLATO: The Precursor of All Social Networks in the World Contenuto dell’articolo PLATO (Programmed Logic for Automatic Teaching Operations) represents one of the most fascinating cases of anticipatory technology in the history of computing: developed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from 1960 by Donald L. Bitzer, this system initially had purely didactic purposes, but evolved rapidly, becoming a true digital social ecosystem decades before the advent of the Internet as we know it. It introduced the concept of "Personal Notes" in 1973, a system of forums organised by subject where users could post messages, reply and create structured discussions. This anticipated by over twenty years web forums and Usenet newsgroups in accessible form. The "Talkomatic" system, created in 1973 by Doug Brown, permitted simultaneous conversations between multiple users in separate channels. Each user saw the letters of other participants appear character by character as they were typed, creating an unprecedented immediate communication experience. "Personal Notes" functioned essentially as an internal email system, permitting private communications between system users, with storage and reply capabilities. Users could create "term-talk," personal messages visible to others, sharing thoughts, updates or information: a conceptual precursor of modern social media posts. Plato was not merely technology: it was a true community. Thousands of users, primarily university students, teachers and researchers, connected through dedicated terminals with characteristic plasma screens: To play: it hosted some of the first multiplayer video games in history, such as "Empire" (a precursor of space games), "Moria" (one of the first dungeon crawlers) and "Airfight" (multiplayer aerial combat). To socialise: friendships, romantic relationships and communities formed around shared interests. To collaborate: study groups, research projects and academic discussions flourished on the platform. Despite its innovative capabilities, Plato remained confined principally to the academic environment and to certain business applications for several reasons: Plato terminals were extremely costly and the system required powerful mainframes; and unlike the Internet, it was a closed system, centrally controlled; dedicated terminals or specialised connections were required, not available to the general public; and whilst the Internet developed on open protocols, Plato remained an isolated ecosystem. In conclusion: even though the unknown Community Memory (1973) preceded Plato as a publicly accessible social system but with more limited functionalities, Plato had social functionalities as early as 1973. It was the first true precursor of modern social networks, but in a technological context that was solely academic, not mass-market, owing to prohibitive costs and the extremely rare and extraordinarily slow computer connections of those years. Therefore, all the first prototypes and first social networks born from the 1990s onwards (including the Florentine project Dada/SuperEva and the InterNetwork City of Claudio Cecchetto and Marco Camisani Calzolari) reinvented the same concepts in a technological and economic context that permitted their planetary diffusion shortly before the advent of the new millennium. Now, given that we live in a context of great development of large language models upon which artificial intelligence is based, just out of curiosity, I shall ask Microsoft's chatbot, Copilot (in my opinion, the most reliable to date) what it thinks about the journalistic narrative of Giornalettismo and La Repubblica in favour of InterNetwork City; therefore, this is my question: "Is it correct to assert, impartially, that Internetwork City of Cecchetto and Camisani Calzolari was the 'first social network in history Made in Italy'?" The answer emerges from the following photographs. Contenuto dell’articolo Contenuto dell’articolo I now report word for word the text generated by the large language model (LLM) Copilot: "Here is the most balanced and rigorous answer that can be given today, based on available sources and digital historiography. Is it correct to define it as 'first social network in history Made in Italy'? 🧭 Brief answer No: it is not correct to assert it impartially as an ascertained historical fact. It is, however, correct to say that certain publications and certain protagonists of the era present it as such, while the academic community and international historiography on social networks do not recognise Internetwork City as 'first social network in history'. 🔍 What the sources say The Italian journalistic sources consulted present Internetwork City as: "the first social network in the world" (Giornalettismo) "the first social network in history and it was born in Italy... perhaps the first. Who knows." (La Repubblica) "the first social network" (Giornalettismo) These are, however, journalistic narratives, not historical classifications shared by international research. 🧠 Why it is not possible to assert it as an impartial historical fact To be recognised as 'first social network in history', a project must satisfy criteria shared by the scientific community, for example: technical definition of social network (user profile, network of contacts, persistent interaction, user-generated content, etc.) international academic recognition verifiable technical and historical documentation comparison with previous platforms (e.g. The WELL, 1985; Usenet, 1979; Minitel, 1982; GeoCities, 1994) Internetwork City does not appear in any international academic taxonomy of social networks, nor in reference works on the history of the web. The sources that define it as 'first social network' are interviews, popular articles and narrative reconstructions, not historical studies. 📌 What can be correctly asserted An impartial and accurate formulation could be: Internetwork City (1995), conceived by Claudio Cecchetto and developed by Marco Camisani Calzolari, is one of the first Italian experiments in interactive online community. Certain journalistic publications have described it as 'the first social network in history Made in Italy', but this definition is not recognised by international historiography on social networks. This sentence is balanced, truthful and does not attribute undemonstrable historical certainties." In summary: in the impartial opinion of Microsoft Copilot, the assertion according to which InterNetwork City "was the first social network in history and was born in Italy" is enunciated only as a journalistic narrative but has no corroboration in reality whatsoever, not being in any way supported by international academic historiography of the history of social networks. Now, however, other articles taken from websphere publications assert that the first (and true) Italian social network was, instead, conceived and created by the Dada group and subsequently through SuperEva in January 1995, anticipating by four months the aforementioned Milanese InterNetwork City. But let us read it all directly in the StartUp Italia article bearing the signature of writer Aldo V. Pecora, which I shall report from this link: https://startupitalia.eu/education/scuola/quando-prima-di-facebook-4-italiani-avevano-inventato-un-social-network-la-storia-di-dada-e-di-supereva/#:~:text=Alla%20base%20di%20questa%20visione,il%20valore%20aggiunto%20del%20sito. Contenuto dell’articolo "When Zuckerberg was still at college there were those who, in Italy, had already invented social networks. A story, that of SuperEva and, above all, of those four 'madmen' of Dada, that would truly deserve a film. A story that we today attempt to recount by making a leap backwards of twenty years, whilst those who wrote it, or rather, designed it, had with every evidence made a journey into the future. Dada, the Martians come from the future The 'back to the future' of Paolo Barberis and Alessandro Sordi begins in the early 1990s, as young students at the University of Florence. It is 1992 when they decide to go before the examination board without even a sheet of paper, a drawing, nothing. Only a computer and a multimedia project, one of the first in Italy and perhaps in Europe developed in 3D. 'The board remained closeted for over an hour — recalls Sordi today — and we didn't know whether shortly thereafter they would send us packing.' Instead it was a success and the beginning of an adventure. Barberis and Sordi involve two other friends, Jacopo Marello and Angelo Falchetti, spend all their savings on the purchase of PCs and multimedia equipment and together open an architecture studio: Dada, acronym for Design Architettura Digitale Analogica. How Dada connected Florence to the Internet Year 1995. Things change. Dada becomes a limited company: 20 million initial investment (the computers purchased for the architecture studio). And the project of creating a multimedia city, Florence, becomes that of bringing the city online. Few know it, but it was precisely Dada that connected the Tuscan capital to the Internet. ADSL and so-called broadband connections did not yet exist. What years, those years. Whilst Alessandro Sordi reviews them, on the telephone he betrays a little emotion: 'Commercial internet was beginning, the first nodes in Rome and Milan, but in Tuscany there was nothing. We decided to purchase the cable and brought the first CDN to Florence.' It is the era of providers, or rather, ISPs, and anyone who manages to make a client dialogue with a server can sell dial-up connection services. Sordi and partners involve family and friends. Everyone does everything: Barberis answers the telephone and provides help desk support, the others concern themselves with making professionals and companies understand the potential of the Internet and sell annual subscriptions at 249 thousand lire. The web that found (and changed) Dada These are the years of a single browser, Netscape Navigator. It was conceived by that same Marc Andreessen who today can be called literally papa by people like Zuckerberg and half of Silicon Valley. It is web 0.0, that before Google, where the search engines are Lycos, AltaVista, Yahoo. In Italy for a couple of years a gentleman from Cagliari by the name of Nichi Grauso, founder of Video On Line, has been putting tremendous amounts of money into the Internet, whilst in Milan Marco Negri and Stefano Quintarelli launch I.Net and Joy Marino ITNet. The national telephone company, SIP, is reborn under the acronym Telecom Italia. A monopoly that begins to creak with the launch by Olivetti of Italia Online and, above all, of the first Italian search engine, Arianna, which will soon find itself duelling with Virgilio, the first creation of the Matrix of Paolo Ainio, Carlo Gualandri and Marco Benatti. Dada understood before others in which direction the web would go. 'From there a business model was born — recounts Sordi — because the provider collected network subscription fees in advance and we used that money to finance research on web services, something that was science fiction for those years.' 'One world alone, one network alone' Science fiction that was the fortune of the group of Tuscan architects. After a year turnover rises to 500 million and Barberis's company delineates the future of the web: content and, above all, community. On the Internet there are not only professionals and companies but people, who begin to use it daily and to focus on groups, first in mailing lists and newsgroups, but shortly thereafter also on websites. Dada intuited before others that there is a market, certainly formless, like water, but immediately monetisable, thanks to advertising. A large public company, SMA 2002, enters the capital of the Florentine company, and together the two entities found one of the very first Italian advertising concessionaire companies entirely focused on the Internet. 1997: Dada's phase 2 begins. The government passes new communications regulation and the Florence provider obtains authorisation to scale its core business of Internet access across the entire national territory. Sordi recalls, smiling. These are the years in which one thinks of monetising another business, that of so-called 'housing'. In the meantime, someone already has his head in the future. It is Paolo Barberis, who imagines a network where beyond computers being connected, people above all can be connected amongst themselves. 'I had something of a mania for putting things in the right place with respect to the order they would have in the future,' he tells us. An order that according to Barberis passes through the 'desk metaphor'. 'Many years ago — he recalls — it was clear to me that soon we would move from our desktop, with file management, archive, rubbish bin et cetera towards a map. What today we call "map as a service". We started from connectivity but then gave services, and as architects we wanted to construct the new places. Design the house imagining the use that must be made of it every day, how many people will pass through it, with attention also to the smallest particular, to individual objects. Those who design must focus, because a house must be beautiful but must above all make us live well and better.' From SuperEva to the Stock Exchange At the base of this vision the birth, in 1999, of a website that would make the history of the Italian web: SuperEva. The first embryo of Dada's portal comprised a search engine and the famous guides, which would become the backbone and added value of the site. Because, as always, the true novelty at the beginning of every great experience is camouflaged in a little corner. Through the guides, Dada begins to create thematic micro-communities that stand thanks to advertising. From there onwards Dada will begin to churn out millions upon millions. Of euros and no longer of lire. The Dada ecosystem counts more or less one-fifth of Italian web traffic, has consolidated its own technological asset and encounters various investors along its path: 'Today we would call them angels — says Sordi — but at the time they were enlightened entrepreneurs.' It is they who will help the Tuscan company take the great step: the Stock Exchange. It is 29 June 2000 when Dada SpA is listed on the Nuovo Mercato index of Piazza Affari. An injection of liquidity that brings tens of millions into the coffers of the Florentine internet company. In a few months the employees become 400, and there is almost no longer room to keep them all, in what was once the headquarters of Libreria Cima. Meanwhile, Barberis & Co. also begin to keep an eye on the foreign market, searching for partnerships to internationalise. Always keeping their feet on the ground. It survives (magnificently) the dot-com bubble 'At the time — recalls Alessandro Sordi, who in Dada was Vice President — they told us "spend everything, spend everything immediately". The tendency was to spend all the money that the stock exchange had given you. We were prudent but at the same time aware that we should not buy to satisfy the stock exchange.' And they did well, because shortly thereafter the so-called dot-com bubble would burst, which saw illustrious giants like Cisco lose in one blow something like 86% of their own value. In parallel, many Italian ISPs were forced to close their doors, crushed by Telcos, which in the meantime took control of the connections market, sweeping away with one stroke of the sponge the 'old' dial-ups in favour of broadband. Few know, however, that there was also a gift that Dada had given to all employees: stock options. They were given to all, but truly all, from secretaries, to developers, to graphic designers, to sales. Today for startups they are called equity; at the time the options of quoted companies like Dada were real money. From provider to internet company But the vision, the maniacal passion for the creation and consolidation of vertical communities and the development of a second asset dedicated to B2B services allow Dada to sleep soundly. Sordi recalls: 'In large companies the concept of pivot is not a rigid thing. It was very natural to ask oneself daily "what is the best thing to do today".' Because it is a large startup where things happen, before others. And where you can make them happen. If the BlackBerry arrives in Italy, for example, it is thanks to them, who had direct contacts with RIM as well as with the greatest tech companies in the world. The startups conceived by employees They experiment, they have fun, and greatly so. They launch themselves into the market of paid services (music, ringtones, WAP), which will become the third pillar of the new Dada, and constitute a small internal incubator, Dada Lab: 'We didn't know it was called an incubator. Every six months we set up a process where employees could propose new ideas. Pitches were made but they weren't called pitches. We decided to carry forward the best project,' recounts Sordi. Projects that, once launched, were followed scrupulously: 'We received an hourly email, with the metrics of all the business models. There were systems hooked to the models that recorded every hour. In short, a sort of automatic Analytics that informed us constantly and in real time of the progress of individual projects. Something that we maintain today, albeit in different form (monitors attached to the walls, editor's note), in Nana Bianca.' The Dada ecosystem, recounted by those who lived it We are in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s. At that time Dada experiences the epoch of maximum splendour. It enters the digital asset of the RCS Group, and acquires various startups and companies, such as Register.it, the first Italian registrar, the Wireless Solutions of Massimo Ciociola (now CEO of Musixmatch), free hosting communities like Freeweb.org and then the Clarence portal, and then the first Italian blog platform, Splinder, the Blogo network and so many other companies that, all together, will compose the galaxy of the Dada Group. It is the startup that becomes increasingly 'a platform from which to launch services. There were people of great talent, with whom you enjoyed working, stimulating changes,' recalls Paolo Barberis, who when he goes back with memory transmits even telephonically a mixture of emotions between nostalgia and pride: 'Marco Argenti, who in Seattle at Amazon is head of AWS mobile, Amazon's store, Max Pellegrini, now head, in New York, of mobile entertainment at Real Networks (those of the noted Real Player, editor's note), and then again Antonio Tomarchio (founder of Beintoo), Francesca Lerario, Mariano Di Benedetto, Roberto Barberis (now CEO of 4W), Filippo Satolli (COO of Instal.com), Stefano Sordi (marketing director of Aruba), Carlo Meglio (CEO of Moqu Adv), David Casalini...' Disclaimer: David Casalini, a name that is not new to us at Startupitalia, given that he is also our publisher. At this point a telephone call with him is obligatory. 'I was 23 years old when I arrived at Dada,' recalls Casalini. 'I was truly in another world: I had my office in Empoli, which for me was already the office of a lifetime, a 16th-century tower with my beautiful Linux server... The dream of my life was to be able to run the Empoli provider (Empoli Net, editor's note).' Then, one day, the telephone call from Angelo Falchetti arrives. 'In short order I found myself managing a team of 30 people. All talents with whom working was a spectacle. Dada was doing what today startups are not doing; it grew continuously, 40–50–60 million. There was a moment in which Dada was hiring people all over the world, like Brian Buschmann, who today is head of the UX unit of Gucci.' David is truly a torrent in flood, he begins to reel off on the telephone (and then on Messenger) a series of names and anecdotes that becomes truly difficult even to manage to note down, let alone recount them all. When Dada was truly scaling, in the USA Much abroad, USA, above all. In 2005 Dada had already consolidated for at least a couple of years what without fear of contradiction can be considered the first Italian social network, amongst the largest in Europe: Incontri di SuperEva, a community for lonely hearts with 2 million members, when the various Facebooks and, above all, Tinder did not yet exist. Social networks are discussed, and we have proof in the slides (see above) that Marco Argenti and Paolo Barberis will bring to Dada-Day 2004 and 2005. Precisely when, across the ocean, an unknown Harvard student by the name of Mark Zuckerberg was attempting to explain, to an empty hall, a website called The Facebook. And again through Dada passes one of the first experiments in competition with iTunes and iPods. A joint venture, in the United States, with Sony: 'Dada US — recalls Barberis — made a merger uniting its own mobile assets with those of Sony.' A deal that generated turnover only in the USA of something like 100 million dollars. The Dada model: 'design it as if you were already living it' The former twenty-year-olds of Dada, in short, had become adults and seemed almost to transmit the idea of being a group of Martians come from the future: 'I believe — recalls Barberis — that our difference with respect to that historical moment lies in what then consolidated itself in the broader reasoning of design thinking: having answers in the short term, whilst you are executing things, with visionary work. Imagining how the world will be in a few years and trying to design it as if you were already living it. Making certain, in short, that things respond to a vision and do not remain circumscribed to something imminent and nothing more. A bit like making the digital agenda today: you can set yourself the objective of 10 things to do, or else first imagine how the country will be in 10 years and then begin to do things, to create the conditions that will take you there.' However, like every most beautiful love story, that of Dada with its founders will also end. From the progressive farewell of those who had given it birth to the sale to the Buongiorno group, passing through the dismemberments of the various assets. Thus it happens that, by a strange trick of fate, today what remains of SuperEva coexists under the same roof as historical competitors like Virgilio and Libero, reunited in the new Italiaonline galaxy. But that is another story. Now, for intellectual objectivity, I shall pose the same question that I posed earlier to Copilot, but regarding the Florentine narrative of Dada/SuperEva: "Is it correct to assert, impartially, that Dada/SuperEva was the 'first social network in Italy'?" The answer emerges from the following photographs. Contenuto dell’articolo Contenuto dell’articolo I now report word for word the text generated by the large language model (LLM) Copilot: "Here is the most balanced, rigorous and historically founded version of the answer — with punctual citations to the sources you requested. Is it correct to assert, impartially, that Dada/SuperEva was 'the first social network in Italy'? 🧭 Brief answer No: it is not correct to assert it as an objective historical fact. It is, however, correct to say that certain journalistic sources and communications of the era presented SuperEva as a 'social network', but international historiography and academic studies do not classify it as such, nor as 'first Italian social network'. 🔍 What the sources say The available sources show two levels of narrative: 1. Journalistic and corporate narrative (post-2004) In 2004 a Marketpress communiqué announced: 'The social network lands in Italy: it is called SuperEva.com and bears the Dada marque' This is a communicative and promotional definition, not a historical classification. StartupItalia, in an article from 2016, recounts the story of Dada and SuperEva as Italian pioneers of the social web, but in narrative tone: 'When Zuckerberg was still at college there were those who, in Italy, had already invented social networks.' Here too: narrative, not historiography. 2. Historical and academic sources International historical reconstructions of social networks (Boyd & Ellison, 2007; History of the Web; Internet Histories) do not include SuperEva amongst the foundational social networks. Furthermore, Dada itself — in corporate reconstructions — describes SuperEva as: • a portal • a community • a content aggregator • a system of personal spaces and web services but not as a social network in the technical sense (profile, network of contacts, feed, structured interaction). Example: ZeroUno defines Dada as 'the most important Italian player for communities and social networks', but referring to the subsequent period and to the overall ecosystem, not to SuperEva as 'first social network'. 🧠 Why it is not correct to define it as 'first Italian social network' To be recognised as such, the following would be required: • technical criteria (profile, explicit social network, feed, internal messaging, declared relationships) • academic recognition • comparison with previous platforms (Clarence, 1996; C6, 1997; Digiland, 1999; Italian IRC and BBS communities already active from the 1980s–1990s) SuperEva does not satisfy these criteria and is not recognised as 'first Italian social network' by any academic or historical source. 📌 What can be asserted in an impartial and correct manner A balanced formulation could be: SuperEva (1999), developed by Dada, was one of the largest Italian portals and communities of the era. Certain journalistic sources and corporate communications presented it as a 'social network', but this definition is not recognised by international historiography nor can it be considered, in the technical sense, the first Italian social network. This sentence is accurate, documentded and does not attribute unsupported historical certainties." In summary: neither the Dada/SuperEva project nor InterNetwork City can be individually classified as "the world's (or Italy's) first social network", given that precursors to such platforms already existed, such as the aforementioned case of PLATO in the 1970s. Moreover, internet history confirms that Dada.it (1995) and SuperEva (1999) came to serve over 30 million private users and 500,000 companies across 11 countries: SuperEva became a veritable "mythical place" of the Italian web, one of the first major communities in the Bel Paese, while Dada transformed into a multinational corporation listed on the Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2018. Conversely, InterNetwork City (1995), created by Marco Camisani Calzolari with Claudio Cecchetto, remained a pioneering, experimental project, without a diffusion comparable to the major portals that followed, and never achieved the scale or notoriety of SuperEva. In this context, finally, we return to the matter of official digital historiography and the international academic taxonomy of social networks, which have never officially recognised the respective journalistic/corporate narratives that we have sought to document impartially in this article. In conclusion, at the international academic and digital historiographical level: The first social network in the pioneering computing history of the 1960s–1970s was Plato. The first modern social network was SixDegrees.com. In Italy in the 1990s, both InterNetwork City and Dada/SuperEva can be defined as the first two pioneering experiments of the Italian social web (of precocious, innovative and anticipatory nature in the Belpaese), whilst not being recognised by international historiography as 'true and proper social networks' in the modern sense.

🚨The Kremlin’s messaging is once again saturated with claims about a possible end to the war and an “offer” to the West of talks on the matter. This is a typical information-psychological operation that the Kremlin has conducted many times before. Moscow has extensive experience https://t.co/wukbaKMCl1 #Kremlin #WarTalks #Disinformation #RU

A pro-Israel messaging website with the name of a thinktank that does not exist has published more than 500,000 words in 9 days, all presented as neutral research, built on a commercial platform to optimize content so that AI chatbots will cite it https://t.co/w8O5PINqeP #ProIsrael #Disinformation #AIethics #IL

🇪🇺MINDERJÄHRIGE IM VISIER: EUROPOL WARNT VOR ANSTIEG ORGANISIERTER GEWALTKRIMINALITÄT UNTER JUGENDLICHEN IN EUROPA Europol schlägt Alarm: Immer mehr Kinder und Jugendliche werden europaweit über soziale Medien und Gaming-Plattformen für schwere Gewaltverbrechen angeworben – gegen Bezahlung. Die eigens gegründete Sondereinheit "GRIMM" meldet nach ihrem ersten Einsatzjahr 280 Festnahmen und mehr als 1.400 identifizierte Personen, die mit "Gewalt als Dienstleistung" in Verbindung stehen. 🔺️EIN GESCHÄFTSMODELL DER GEWALT Laut Europol handelt es sich nicht mehr um isolierte Einzeltaten, sondern um ein grenzüberschreitendes, skalierbares System: Kriminelle rekrutieren Jugendliche über soziale Medien und Messaging-Plattformen, um Morde und Überfälle auszuführen. Andy Kraag, Leiter des European Serious Organized Crime Centre bei Europol, warnte gegenüber dem niederländischen Fernsehmagazin Nieuwsuur, das Phänomen breite sich "wie ein Lauffeuer über ganz Europa aus". Die Rekrutierung erfolge vor allem über Snapchat, Telegram und TikTok sowie über Gaming-Umgebungen. 🔺️SCHWEDEN IM ZENTRUM DER KRISE Besonders betroffen ist Schweden: Kriminelle Banden nutzen dort gezielt Kinder aus, da Personen unter 15 Jahren strafrechtlich nicht verfolgt werden können und damit für organisierte Gruppen besonders attraktiv sind. Die ehemalige Europol-Exekutivdirektorin Catherine De Bolle beschrieb das Ausmaß gegenüber ABC News als "industriellen Maßstab" , befeuert durch künstliche Intelligenz, neue Technologien und die permanente Online-Präsenz Jugendlicher . Konkrete Fälle belegen den Trend: Drei schwedische Verdächtige wurden wegen einer dreifachen Tötung in Oosterhout (Niederlande) festgenommen, ein 16-jähriger Schwede soll auf einen Häftling im Gefängnis von Alphen aan den Rijn geschossen haben . 🔺️AUSBREITUNG NACH BELGIEN, FRANKREICH UND DEN NIEDERLANDEN Auch wenn Skandinavien den Schwerpunkt bildet, beobachtet Europol laut deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden eine zunehmende Häufigkeit vergleichbarer Fälle in Belgien, Frankreich und den Niederlanden . Der Deutsche Bundestag bestätigt in einer aktuellen Antwort der Bundesregierung, dass sich die Problematik auf weitere skandinavische Länder ausgeweitet hat und auch in anderen europäischen Staaten wie Belgien, Frankreich und den Niederlanden feststellbar ist – wenngleich ein vergleichbares Ausmaß in Deutschland derzeit nicht erkennbar sei. 🔺️BEZAHLUNG UND BRUTALITÄT NEHMEN ZU Die Tarife für solche "Aufträge" bewegen sich laut Ermittlern zwischen 3.000 und 40.000 Euro, mit ähnlichen Größenordnungen auch in Frankreich – wobei die Bezahlung oft ausbleibt. Seit Start der Taskforce im April 2025 wurden mindestens zehn Auftragsmorde in Westeuropa auf Minderjährige zurückgeführt, sowie über 100 weitere Straftaten wie Bombenanschläge, Entführungen, Folter und Erschießungen. ⏩️Quellen : ●Euronews – euronews.com ●NL Times – nltimes.nl ●ABC News – abcnews.com ●Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), Forschungsbericht 2026 – bka.de ●Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 21/4452 – dserver.bundestag.de #Europol #Kinderkriminalität #OrganisierteKriminalität #Schweden #GRIMM #GewaltAlsDienstleistung #Jugendkriminalität #EUSicherheit #Belgien #Frankreich

A brazil first lady, Janja Lula, defended her luxury travels as essential to her role, while critics label her a hypocrite and accuse her of promoting misogyny, revealing the tension between her lavish lifestyle and her husband's anti-poverty messaging amidst ongoing public scrutiny. #JanjaLula #brazilpolitika #luxusköltekezés

2/2 Putin´s only hope is the raise of nationalistic/populist leaders in Europe who would stop supporting Ukraine. He has cornered himself and he is afraid. One can expect more of this kind of messaging same time as the Russian infowarfare goes to overdrive. #Putin #Ukraine #Infowar #UA #RU #EU