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Little Think Tank estimated that Bruno Pomart's remarks were perfectly audible and that the expression "revolutionaries of Allah" had been used appropriately. He added that claiming that the meaning and interpretation did not correspond to the words spoken was a denial that was hard to justify, and called for no longer treating the public as naive. https://t.co/X78no3tXAL #Révolution #Public #Interprétation (translated)

Actu Foot relayed the comments of Bixente Lizarazu, who acknowledged having heavily criticized Ousmane Dembélé in the French national team and believed that analyses often focused on the short term. He stated that the forward was a very good player and that his Ballon d'Or was not a coincidence. Lizarazu explained that Dembélé played at Paris Saint-Germain in a particular system, where he interpreted the role of center forward as desired by Luis Enrique. He added that Zidane had tried to place him in similar conditions in the national team by playing him in that position, without success. According to Lizarazu, however, the player was not being questioned and could produce such performances when he was confident. https://t.co/qbMIB6gYWO #OusmaneDembélé #PSG #Football (translated)

Little Think Tank denounced being insulted without reason or relevance to the discussion, deeming the level of disrespect on the social network particularly high. It specified that the emojis it had used expressed discomfort and some nervousness about the situation, and called for not attributing intentions to people without basis or insulting them because a personal interpretation is displeasing. #Respect #Communication #RéseauxSociaux (translated)

"We will prohibit any transaction with this rogue court in order to deprive it of its resources and paralyze its ability to function," said U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose remarks leave little room for interpretation: "Either the ICC ends its threats, or we will end the ICC." #CPI #sanctions #UnionEuropéenne (translated)

Stellantis is changing its strategy to give more freedom to its 14 brands like Opel, thereby creating new opportunities for innovative models and different interpretations of the automobile, while the challenge remains to secure sufficient investments for the relaunch of the brands. #Stellantis #Automobilindustrie #Markenpolitik (translated)

U.M. OSINT wrote that Yandex data centers in Sasowo were hit on the night of October 8, 2026, in Kaluga on October 9, and in Vladimir on October 11. All three locations are far from Ukraine. Following an English-language address by Volodymyr Zelensky, bot activity noticeably decreased, the author reported, but questioned whether this indicated an actual decline in propaganda bots. The frequently cited graph from Cloudflare Radar shows a drop in automated HTML requests to websites, U.M. OSINT explained. Such requests could come from crawlers that create previews for shared links or from services that provide search engines and chat AI with information. Propaganda bots could be included, but they don’t have to be. The author also pointed out that propaganda is coming from Iran, Turkey, China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Attacks on data centers make sense as military targets, U.M. OSINT wrote. He expected further Ukrainian attacks and mentioned Ivanteyevka and Mytischchi as possible next targets. He claimed that Russian air defenses could not adequately protect such facilities. At the same time, damage to Yandex services could impair Russian armed forces, which the author claimed use them for maps and possibly for drone operations. However, Yandex has not been shut down, U.M. OSINT wrote: the company has two additional large data centers and possibly dozens of smaller ones. Data can be shifted. According to IODA data from the Georgia Institute of Technology, connectivity has dropped by about 72 percent compared to the previous average. The attack harms Russia, but how severely remains to be seen. The claim that all propaganda bots have disappeared due to this is based on a misinterpretation and is not supported by the available information, the author explained. #Russland #Propaganda #Yandex (translated)

Tafouk TV – how three Sahel military governments are building a common information system Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are no longer relying only on speeches, social media or their existing national broadcasters to shape the information environment around the Alliance of Sahel States. They are building a shared, permanent media infrastructure. At its centre is Tafouk TV, the confederal television channel of the AES, broadcasting from Bamako. Its creation was formally agreed by the three governments in December 2025, its governing structure was installed in 2026 and regular programming began in September. The project is explicitly presented by AES authorities as an instrument of “information sovereignty” and what Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop has called “narrative sovereignty”. A television channel built by three military governments Tafouk TV is fundamentally different from a covert bot network or a collection of anonymous propaganda accounts. Its ownership and political purpose are public. It is an institutional broadcaster created by the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all currently led by military authorities. Malian government documents describe the channel as a common media instrument intended to strengthen communication across the confederation, promote regional identities and respond to what the AES sees as hostile narratives and disinformation. The project sits alongside Daandè Liptako, a shared radio service, and broader plans to develop common information structures across the three states. That institutional architecture is important. A social-media influence network can disappear when accounts are suspended. A television channel, radio network and future news agency can develop journalists, archives, correspondents, distribution agreements and continuous daily output. The result is not a temporary campaign but potentially a long-term information system. Russia enters through RT The Russian connection is also public. In July 2026, Tafouk TV signed a cooperation agreement with RT, the Russian state-funded international broadcaster. The memorandum was signed by Tafouk TV director-general Salif Sanogo and Natalia Lebedeva, director of RT en français. It provides for content exchange, expertise-sharing and joint coverage of major events in Russia and the Sahel. RT described itself as Tafouk TV's first international partner. This makes Tafouk part of a much broader geopolitical realignment in the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have reduced cooperation with France and other Western partners while deepening political, diplomatic and security relations with Moscow. But the distinction is important: there is no public evidence that Russia owns Tafouk TV, finances the entire channel or directly controls its editorial decisions. The most precise description is therefore a state-owned AES broadcaster with a formal partnership with Russian state media, rather than a Russian-controlled television station. The battle over the narrative AES officials make little attempt to hide the strategic role they expect the channel to play. During a visit to Tafouk TV shortly after regular broadcasting began, Abdoulaye Diop described communication as another strategic front alongside defence, diplomacy and development. He spoke of a geopolitical environment characterised by a “war of narratives” and said the AES needed its own media to defend its interests and strengthen its narrative sovereignty. Mali's government has similarly described Tafouk TV as an instrument of information sovereignty, regional cohesion and Sahelian identity. The first governing-board meetings emphasised digital distribution, national languages and the creation of a new generation of Sahelian journalists capable of carrying the confederation's message at home and abroad. Early reporting examined by the Financial Times found patriotic programming, interviews with officials and positive reporting from conflict zones. The newspaper described the project in the context of the three governments' attempts to challenge Western media narratives and strengthen their legitimacy while facing continuing jihadist insurgencies. Why this is not simply another disinformation operation It is important not to use propaganda and disinformation as synonyms. A state broadcaster can systematically promote the government's preferred interpretation of events without every story being false.Tafouk TV's significance therefore lies less in individual fabricated claims than in the information architecture being created around it: three governments operating a shared broadcaster, common radio infrastructure and potentially other confederal media, while cooperating with Russia's international state-media system. This development is taking place while independent media conditions across the three countries are deteriorating. Reporters Without Borders ranked Burkina Faso 110th, Niger 120th and Mali 121st in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, pointing to arbitrary detentions, restrictions on journalists and suspensions of media outlets across the AES states. That context changes the importance of Tafouk TV. A new state broadcaster entering a diverse and competitive media environment is one thing. A common government-controlled broadcaster expanding while alternative sources face restrictions is another. From influence campaigns to permanent infrastructure Tafouk TV illustrates an important evolution in the information contest in the Sahel. Russian and pro-Russian influence in Africa has often relied on social-media networks, influencers, fake experts, local partners or apparently independent media outlets. Tafouk represents something more durable: formal state institutions can now carry many of the same geopolitical narratives openly and continuously. The audience figures are not yet sufficiently established to demonstrate how influential Tafouk TV will become. It may eventually reach far fewer people than some viral online operations, or its television, radio and digital infrastructure may give it far greater long-term significance. Sources Government of Mali — Tafouk TV governing board and strategic mission https://gouvernement.ml/conseil-dadministration-de-tafouk-tv-installe-a-bamako-le-ministre-alhamdou-ag-ilyene-trace-les-orientations-strategiques-de-la-chaine-confederale/ Government of Mali — Abdoulaye Diop and “narrative sovereignty” https://gouvernement.ml/communication-confederale-de-laes-sem-abdoulaye-diop-a-la-decouverte-de-tafouk/ Government of Mali — creation of Tafouk TV and Daandè Liptako https://gouvernement.ml/conseil-national-de-la-transition-le-cnt-adopte-deux-textes-majeurs-relatifs-a-la-creation-de-tafouk-tv-et-de-la-radio-daande-liptako/ Government of Mali — ratification and information-sovereignty objectives https://gouvernement.ml/2026/05/30/ Government of Mali — Tafouk TV board and Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga https://gouvernement.ml/television-de-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel-tafouk-tv-les-membres-du-conseil-dadministration-prennent-les-orientations-et-conseils-du-premier-ministre-abdoulaye-maiga/ RT en français — cooperation agreement between RT and Tafouk TV https://rtenfrance.tv/news/136036-rt-devient-premier-partenaire-international-tafouk-tv-chaine-commune-aes APA News — Tafouk TV and Daandè Liptako common AES media infrastructure https://fr.apanews.net/communication/tafouk-tv-et-daande-liptako-le-mali-consolide-les-medias-communs-de-laes/ APA News — Tafouk TV begins regular programming https://fr.apanews.net/communication/aes-tafouk-tv-demarre-ses-programmes/ Financial Times — Sahel juntas launch Tafouk TV with Russian backing https://www.ft.com/content/259b49a1-8eda-4e8d-84c7-45323988b07b Reporters Without Borders — 2026 Press Freedom Index: Africa https://rsf.org/en/classement/2026/afrique Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode18 #TafoukTV #AES #AllianceOfSahelStates #Sahel #Mali #BurkinaFaso #Niger #Russia #RussianInfluence #RussianMedia #RT #RussiaToday #StateMedia #StatePropaganda #InformationSovereignty #NarrativeSovereignty #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #StrategicCommunication #MediaInfluence #MediaControl #Propaganda #Disinformation #ForeignInfluence #FIMI #Africa #WestAfrica #MilitaryGovernment #MilitaryRule #SahelMedia #DaandeLiptako #MediaInfrastructure #NarrativeControl #PressFreedom #MediaFreedom #Geopolitics #OSINT #WRLD

Miró criticized that the left was spreading a graphic that was supposed to prove that the AfD was supported by bots from Russia. According to Miró, the image lacked source citations; it was also unclear which activity was measured by whom and on which platform, and how the results were compared to those of other parties. A more detailed investigation, according to his account, had revealed that both the data and its interpretation were completely useless. In conclusion, he commented on the graphic ironically. #Politik #AfD #Faktenprüfung (translated)

Anthony Marcotte questioned the call, wondering if Tarasov could have made the save without Jake Evans in front of the net. He pointed out that the goalie was already on his knees and had been beat to his left, while Evans was on the right. Marcotte stated that he did not understand the decision or the interpretation of this rule. #Hockey #Règlement #Sport (translated)

The author argued that whether genocide was occurring in Gaza was not merely a matter of semantics, and said people who had previously made confident assertions were now quietly retreating from them. They rejected describing it as a borderline case, a matter of interpretation or an issue on which reasonable people could disagree.

The 2027 budget for national education, according to La France insoumise, indeed foresees a decrease compared to inflation, as well as the elimination of nearly 1,600 teaching positions, but the government disputes this interpretation of the figures. #BudgetEducation #FranceInsoumise #Inflation (translated)

Baha described the excitement surrounding the events in Saxony-Anhalt as exaggerated and wrote that actions are being taken there at one's own discretion. Schulze's previous promises were seen as unrealistic; the CDU is not solely responsible, but also all those who believed they could replace a parliamentary majority with a specific stance. The author pointed out that the SPD and the Greens also voted with the AfD when it suited them, accusing them of only observing the firewall in the case of the Union. Political observers, in his view, have no connection to reality in the country. The criticism does not come from Magdeburg, but from an "ivory tower," in which the Union is collectively portrayed as the sole culprit. No one takes responsibility for the failure of their own interpretation of the firewall against the right, wrote Baha. #Politik #SachsenAnhalt #CDU (translated)

Sequencing biases significantly alter microbial networks & keystone taxa identification in Cinnamomum migao rhizosphere & phyllosphere, emphasizing the need for careful interpretation of microbial interactions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666517426001227 #microbiology #ecology

Ian Brossat, PCF senator, criticizes the government's interpretation of the high school protests, asserting that accusing France Insoumise of manipulation is out of place, while a coalition of national education unions announces a third act of mobilization for more resources in schools. #LycéensMobilisés #ÉducationNationale #FranceInsoumise (translated)

Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

🚨🚨💣 BIG CASE SURROUNDING MOHAMED "MOMO" SANHADJI, head of security for the French national team for over 20 years. 🇫🇷😳 The investigation revealed by L'Équipe describes how this man, who has become extremely close to many stars of French football, allegedly used his connections to obtain loans, gifts, trips, and personal services. Among the disclosed elements 👇 💰 To buy a house for €440,000, Sanhadji is said to have asked for money from about fifteen players. €215,000 was ultimately loaned to him, notably: • Kylian Mbappé, through Fayza Lamari: €120,000 • Raphaël Varane: €20,000 • Sabri Lamouchi: €20,000 • Laurent Blanc: €20,000 • Yann M’Vila: €15,000 • Mattéo Guendouzi: €7,500 🤫 He allegedly asked several to keep these loans secret, even writing: "otherwise I’m dead." 🦷 Fayza Lamari also supposedly paid €7,000 for his dental expenses. The Mbappé family also financed the travel of their sons' football club for a tournament and invited him and his family to PSG-Bayern in 2023, including a night at the Royal Monceau. 📲 His closeness with the Mbappé clan was such that Fayza Lamari supposedly went through him to send messages to Didier Deschamps, notably after Kylian Mbappé was not selected in the fall of 2024. She also allegedly asked him to intervene with the coach regarding Rayan Cherki. ✈️ Sanhadji also allegedly solicited several personalities to finance his vacations. After facilitating administrative procedures for relatives of Franck Ribéry, he was offered a stay in Sicily worth €6,000. 🇲🇦 Jamel Debbouze allegedly invited him to his riad in Morocco, with a driver and buggy, after Sanhadji secured a spot for his son in a highly sought-after training at Clairefontaine. 🎟️ In 2022, Patrice Evra allegedly offered him €10,000 if he managed to retrieve 80 tickets for the Champions League final Liverpool-Real Madrid at the Stade de France. 💶 Mattéo Guendouzi also allegedly considered donating part of his bonuses from the 2022 World Cup to the police accompanying the French team. Sanhadji allegedly asked him to keep it "very discreet" and to have it justified accountably. ⚖️ Mohamed Sanhadji is currently being charged and is under judicial control. Philippe Diallo explained to the investigators that his behavior was contrary to the ethical and deontological charter of the FFF. His entourage contests the interpretation of certain elements and indicates that he "will reserve his statements for the justice system." 🇫🇷 #Football #FF #Enquête (translated)

A British start-up aims to train artificial intelligences using the worst gaming sessions of players to improve their interpretation of the real world, despite industry skepticism regarding the effectiveness of this method. #IntelligenceArtificielle #JeuxVidéo #ModèlesDuMonde (translated)

Le maire de Saint-Denis, Bally Bagayoko, conteste les accusations selon lesquelles il aurait allumé un feu de poubelle lors d'une manifestation lycéenne, dénonçant des mensonges après que des vidéos montées en boucle aient suscité des interprétations controversées de son acte de soutien aux élèves. #SaintDenis #BallyBagayoko #FakeNews