I'm already a bit tired of this war Nawrocki–Tusk over who wants to lower fuel prices more and who will hit their opponent harder. On a daily basis, I deal with law and legislation, so instead of another press conference, I prefer to try to do something more useful. Let's think about whether it is possible to create a mechanism that works independently of who is currently in power and who lives in the Presidential Palace. Let's tentatively call it the Fuel Price Stabilization Mechanism - nothing more spectacular comes to mind. I’m not talking about flashy slogans like administrative price setting or the prime minister should lower it, or the president presented a bill, so the problem is solved. I’m talking about an automatic system established in law. I imagined it so that if for a certain period, the reference price of oil or wholesale fuel exceeds a set threshold, a temporary reduction in excise tax is automatically triggered. Without a political decision being made anew each time, because that leads to endless arguments at the expense of citizens. The law specifies in advance: - when the mechanism is triggered, - by how much the burden is reduced, - how long it operates, - when it automatically expires. Of course, within the limits of EU law. Because it is worth reminding a rather prosaic fact - a member state cannot arbitrarily eliminate fuel taxation. Here the 2003/96/EC directive comes in, determining minimum levels of taxation for gasoline and diesel. So just as it should be done - first the law and only then the slogans - I’m directing this to my favorite camp, the surroundings of the office. Now there remains a more important problem. If we lower the excise tax, the budget receives less money. This cost does not disappear, it does not magically evaporate. You can't just move it to the "someone may pay later" column. That’s why the mechanism should have a second arm - a temporary levy on the truly extraordinary portion of profits in the fuel sector. But not on the entire profit and definitely not on the normal operation of the enterprise. Not because the company dared to make a profit but solely from that portion that exceeds the previously defined reference level. The current government project wants to use a similar construct - the reference point is margins from 2025 increased by 20%, and only the excess is taxed. The tax rate in the project is 60%, and the projected revenues are about 4 billion PLN. The government indicates that the funds are meant to compensate for the loss of VAT and excise tax revenue resulting from protective actions. However, I would change one fundamental thing. Only PROSPECTIVELY. First, we establish the rule, then we apply it. Not the other way around. This significantly reduces the dispute over retroactivity and legal safety - the reason for Mr. Nawrocki's veto. Revenues from such a levy should be additionally separated and accounted for solely for the purposes of the stabilization mechanism. Then we can show the citizen a simple calculation: - the budget lost X from the temporary excise tax reduction, - the extraordinary levy brought Y, - and the difference is Z. No miracles or political alchemy - simplicity in full scope. But there is still one problem. If the state reduces the burden by 20 groszy per liter, it doesn’t automatically mean that the driver will see 20 groszy less on the sign. Part of the relief may be taken by the margin because who doesn’t want to make a profit... That’s why there should be parallel, public monitoring: - raw material price, - wholesale price, - taxes, - average margin, - retail price. If there is an anomaly, we have UOKiK and competition law instruments. There’s no need to immediately create a state office to set the price of diesel at 7:43 in the morning. And a final safeguard. The price returns below the statutory threshold for a certain period? The reduction expires, the levy expires. The system returns to normal mode. (translated)
