Search

According to Tristan Bergen, a storm chaser on site, it is not one but two simultaneous tornadoes that hit the Aigues Mortes area in Gard. More than 300mm has already fallen in the north of Hérault. After the summer drought, the soil absorbs little. The reaction of waterways is very quick! The Mediterranean, overheated by summer heatwaves, is playing the role we feared. An additional 300mm is expected to fall in Hérault. The situation is deteriorating rapidly! (translated)

Unpopular opinion: the solution for our school is to go back to a system before the unified college. It makes no sense to push these young people who have no interest in studying all the way to the baccalaureate. It's a waste of time and resources for everyone. And it creates bitterness once the inevitable failure arrives. We need to stop and professionalize much earlier. But for that, we must accept that not everyone should be thrown into the same pot of mediocrity. However, in France, we love that. (translated)

Le ratio like/RT/bookmark est totalement pas cohérent avec le nombre de vues du tweet qui a l'air bloqué. Pas organique. X France est donc toujours sous la coupe des aigris/obscurantistes...vous savez ceux qui parlaient de "contenus gris désamplifiés"... C'est même grossier sur ce tweet.😂 #Twitter #RéseauxSociaux #Censure

Fake NV – how a cloned newsroom turned an AI video into a $140 million corruption scandal For two days in September, a website that looked almost indistinguishable from one of Ukraine’s best-known news organisations carried an extraordinary corruption story. It claimed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau had raided former defence procurement chief Arsen Zhumadilov and discovered more than $140 million in cash packed inside refrigerator boxes. One box supposedly carried the words “For the Servant of the People” – an apparent reference to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political party. The raid never happened. The photographs and video presented as evidence were fabricated, and the news organisation reporting the story was not the New Voice of Ukraine but a cloned version of it. The episode is a compact example of an increasingly effective disinformation technique. Rather than inventing a new propaganda outlet and trying to build its credibility from scratch, an operator can simply steal the identity of an established newsroom and place fabricated material inside an otherwise convincing copy of its editorial environment. A newsroom copied almost in full The counterfeit site appeared at nvukraine.com, while the authentic New Voice of Ukraine operates at nv.ua and english.nv.ua. Registration records examined by fact-checkers show that the false domain was created on 21 September 2026, two days before the fabricated article appeared. According to NV’s own investigation, the imitation went much further than copying a logo: the operators reproduced the site’s visual design, sections, branding, contact information and genuine editorial material. A snapshot of legitimate NV content from 23 September appears to have been copied onto the counterfeit site, into which the operators inserted a single false article. That article claimed that NABU had searched premises connected to Zhumadilov, who had headed Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency until August, and seized $140 million in cash. The story was published in several languages, including Ukrainian and English, suggesting that the operation was intended not only for Ukraine’s domestic information space but also for foreign audiences following the war and Western support for Kyiv. AI supplied the supposed evidence The false article was supported by a video purportedly showing the money discovered during the raid. NABU said no such search or procedural action had taken place and identified the footage as fabricated using artificial intelligence. Independent fact-checker Lead Stories found no credible Ukrainian or international reporting confirming either the raid or the alleged seizure, while searches of NABU’s own published material produced no evidence supporting the claim. The operation therefore combined two separate forms of synthetic credibility. The AI-generated footage supplied what looked like visual proof, while the cloned NV website supplied institutional proof: an apparently reputable Ukrainian newsroom supposedly confirming that the event had happened. Neither element needed to withstand close scrutiny for long. Together, they only needed to appear credible enough to be copied, quoted and redistributed before the deception was exposed. From a fake Ukrainian source into the Russian information ecosystem On 24 September, the story began moving through large pro-Russian Telegram channels. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications traced early amplification to Golos Mordora, with roughly 149,000 subscribers, and Militarist, with around 277,000. Within less than an hour, other channels including VOBLA, Rossiya Seychas and Ostashko! Vazhnoye were circulating versions of the same claim. It subsequently appeared on X and on Russian-language websites including e-news.su and pressa24.ru. Babel calculated that posts carrying the fabrication had accumulated approximately 370,000 views by the morning of 25 September. The story also moved beyond the Russian-language ecosystem. English-language versions appeared in online communities including Lemmy and Hexbear, while accounts on X shared direct links to the counterfeit NV article. NV later reported that larger Russian media and propaganda outlets, including RIA Novosti, Life, Vesti, Ukraina.ru and Mail.ru, had reproduced or discussed the claim. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a Kremlin representative involved in contacts with the United States, also shared it on 25 September. This amplification is significant, but it should not be confused with proof of authorship. Publicly available evidence shows how the false story entered and spread through a Russian and pro-Russian information ecosystem. It does not establish which organisation registered the cloned domain, generated the video or directed the operation from the outset. Why copy NV? The operation relied on source laundering. A claim originating directly from a Russian Telegram channel that Ukraine’s defence procurement system had concealed $140 million would immediately carry an obvious political context. A claim apparently uncovered by an established Ukrainian newsroom looks very different. Once the fabricated NV article existed, subsequent accounts could cite what appeared to be an independent Ukrainian source rather than present the allegation as their own. Each repost moved the story another step away from its manufactured origin. The use of an English-language version strengthened that mechanism for audiences outside Ukraine. The underlying narrative was also carefully chosen. Corruption in Ukrainian defence procurement is a genuine subject of public scrutiny and investigative reporting, so the fabricated story did not require audiences to accept an entirely unfamiliar premise. It inserted a false event into a real area of political concern. That mixture of authentic context and fabricated evidence can be more persuasive than a completely invented story because much of the surrounding information feels recognisable. What can – and cannot – be attributed Ukrainian authorities and NV describe the episode as a Russian information operation, and its distribution can be documented extensively across pro-Russian and Russian media channels. The available public evidence, however, does not identify the organisation that created the counterfeit website, nor does it link the operation forensically to a named Russian intelligence service, military unit or state contractor. The most precise description is therefore a Russian-aligned disinformation operation whose fabricated material was systematically amplified through the Russian information ecosystem. That distinction matters. Distribution can be observed directly; command-and-control is harder to establish and should not be inferred without evidence. The newsroom itself becomes the deepfake The most important feature of the operation was not the $140 million figure or even the AI-generated video. It was the counterfeit newsroom surrounding them. The operators copied a real publication, populated it largely with genuine material and inserted a single false story, allowing the fabrication to borrow the accumulated credibility of journalists who had nothing to do with it. This points to a broader evolution in synthetic media. AI can fabricate an image, a voice or a video, but an influence operation can now fabricate something larger: the source that supposedly verified the evidence. In the Fake NV operation, the article, the video and the website reinforced one another, creating not simply a false story but a manufactured chain of credibility. Sources The New Voice of Ukraine — investigation into the cloned website https://english.nv.ua/nation/nv-discovers-fake-copy-of-website-with-planted-story-cites-russian-links-50644601.html The New Voice of Ukraine — Russian amplification of the $140 million fabrication https://english.nv.ua/russia-spreads-fake-140-million-ukraine-corruption-story-during-dmitriev-u-s-talks-50644647.html Lead Stories — independent fact-check https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-story-claims-140-million-found-at-home-of-ukraines-zhumadilov-marked-servant-of-the-people-nv-website-originated-it.html Babel — AI video and distribution analysis https://babel.ua/en/news/130469-a-video-is-sharing-online-about-140-million-found-in-the-possession-of-the-ex-head-of-the-defense-procurement-agency-this-is-an-ai-video-distributed-by-a-clone-of-ukrainian-media Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — initial debunk https://spravdi.org/en/ai-fake-about-140-million-amid-us-talks-how-russians-impose-the-image-of-corrupt-ukraine-on-the-west/ Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — NABU confirmation https://spravdi.org/u-merezhi-poshyryuyut-shi-fejk-pro-nibyto-obshuky-nabu-v-eksgolovy-agencziyi-oboronnyh-zakupivel/ Detector Media — distribution and NABU response https://detector.media/infospace/article/252806/2026-09-25-u-merezhi-pidrobyly-sayt-nv-dlya-poshyrennya-feyku-pro-obshuky-v-eksochilnyka-agentsii-oboronnykh-zakupivel/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode10 #FakeNV #NewVoiceOfUkraine #Ukraine #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #ClonedMedia #FakeMedia #FakeNews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #AIVideo #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #CorruptionNarrative #UkraineCorruption #DefenceProcurement #NABU #ArsenZhumadilov #Telegram #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

‼️🇫🇷 𝗔𝗟𝗘𝗥𝗧𝗘 𝗜𝗡𝗙𝗢 — La Cour de cassation REJETTE le pourvoi déposé contre la décision déclarant pénalement irresponsable Mohamed L., le meurtrier d’Alban Gervaise, médecin militaire et père de trois enfants ÉGORGÉ devant une école catholique à Marseille en 2022. Mohamed L. avait attaqué Alban Gervaise à coups de couteau, le frappant à une dizaine de reprises, notamment à la gorge. Trois expertises psychiatriques ont conclu à une abolition de son discernement au moment des faits, évoquant une « bouffée délirante aiguë ». Interné en psychiatrie en juin 2025, Mohamed L. est désormais autorisé à RENTRER CHEZ LUI le soir et le week-end depuis juin dernier, son hospitalisation ayant été allégée. Aucune mesure d’éloignement de la famille de la victime n’a été prononcée. Christelle Gervaise, veuve de la victime, contestait notamment l’absence de prise en compte de la consommation de cannabis du meurtrier et demandait une évolution de la loi sur l’irresponsabilité pénale. La Cour de cassation a également REFUSÉ de transmettre sa question prioritaire de constitutionnalité au Conseil constitutionnel. (Source : Le Figaro) #Justice #Droit #France

🚨🇲🇱 OFFICIEL ! LES NOUVEAUX MAILLOTS DU MALI SONT DÉVOILÉS… ET GRANDE NOUVELLE : ILS SERONT DISPONIBLES À LA VENTE EN FRANCE ! 👕🔥🇫🇷 Les Aigles sont désormais équipés par WATEAM SPORT, la marque de Dawala (fondateur du Groupe Wati-B, entre autres), qui succède à Airness. 🦅 Les maillots seront disponibles en exclu sur le site de WATEAM SPORT, ainsi qu’en quantité limitée dans des boutiques Foot Korner de la région parisienne (Châtelet, Saint-Denis et Aéroville). #Mali #Football #Maillots

UAE / Sudan – when an influence operation tried to enter the United Nations A network of roughly 300 apparently independent social-media influencers. A human-rights organisation borrowing the identity of a real NGO. Personal dossiers on European politicians and journalists. And testimony prepared for delivery at the United Nations without revealing the state interest behind it. These were elements of an influence operation uncovered by Anthropic and disclosed in September 2026. The company says it linked the activity with high confidence to UAE government officials. Tracked as GTG-84002, the operation targeted several overlapping issues: the Muslim Brotherhood, perceptions of the war in Sudan and international mechanisms examining the United Arab Emirates' role in the conflict. What distinguishes the case is not simply its use of artificial intelligence. It is the attempt to make state-aligned messaging appear to originate from independent influencers, human-rights organisations and potentially witnesses addressing an international institution. An influence network built around 300 fake voices Anthropic identified a single actor using Claude to support a sustained influence campaign. At its centre was an AI persona called “Deadshot”, running on the operator's own platform. A master doctrine file repeatedly instructed the system to support what it described as a coordinated international effort to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood. The operator simultaneously managed several components of the campaign, including approximately 300 inauthentic influencer accounts across social-media platforms. Internal material examined by Anthropic described the apparent independence of this network as its greatest strategic advantage. That phrase captures the central method. The objective was not simply to broadcast a political position but to conceal where that position originated. One visible example appeared on 4 June 2026, when accounts participated in a coordinated campaign using #SudanIslamists and near-identical graphics connecting Sudanese Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood with regional instability. Anthropic says the amplification network was centrally funded and coordinated. Its investigation also found that the operator financing the social-media network was connected to the wider influence operation. A human-rights organisation that was not what it appeared to be Social media was only one layer. The operator also created a front NGO that copied the identity of a genuine Swiss organisation and used that borrowed legitimacy to publish human-rights material produced for the campaign. Anthropic's description elsewhere also refers to the identity of a real Sudanese human-rights organisation being used in connection with the preparation of testimony. The public report does not fully clarify whether these references describe the same front or separate elements of the operation, so they should not be treated as definitively identical. The underlying technique, however, is clear: political material was designed to appear as if it originated from independent civil society rather than from actors linked to a government. This is particularly significant in the human-rights environment, where the perceived independence of an organisation or witness can determine how seriously evidence is received by journalists, diplomats and international institutions. The attempt to reach the UN The most consequential part of the operation concerned the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. According to Anthropic, the operator used Claude to ghost-write complete testimony intended to be delivered by two individuals during the session. The texts were prepared under explicit constraints ensuring that neither statement would mention the UAE. This did not amount to a conventional government submission. The intention, according to Anthropic's reconstruction, was for material serving the interests of a party connected to the Sudan conflict to reach an international forum through apparently independent voices. But an important limitation remains: Anthropic could not confirm that the testimony was ultimately delivered. The company similarly could not establish whether other dossiers produced by the operation reached their intended recipients or influenced policy. It therefore assessed the campaign as Category Three on the Brookings Breakout Scale – activity distributed across several platforms, but without evidence of broad public impact sufficient for a higher classification. The distinction matters. The evidence demonstrates a sophisticated attempt to influence international debate; it does not demonstrate that the attempt succeeded. Politicians, journalists and UN investigators became targets The operation was not limited to generating public content. Anthropic found that the operator researched and compiled detailed profiles of 18 members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists. Some material was prepared for direct delivery to senior UAE officials. The network also assembled what Anthropic describes as “counter-accountability dossiers” on UN Special Rapporteurs who had criticised the UAE's conduct in relation to Sudan. This places the campaign in a broader context. Since Sudan's civil war began in April 2023, the role of external powers has become an increasingly important part of international scrutiny. Sudan has accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, allegations Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. In 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE before the International Court of Justice, accusing it of complicity in genocide against the Masalit through alleged support for the RSF. The UAE rejected the allegations. The ICJ subsequently removed the case from its list after finding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the UAE's reservation to the relevant provision of the Genocide Convention. The ruling therefore did not determine whether Sudan's substantive allegations were true or false. That contested international environment helps explain why narratives about Sudan, human rights and accountability were valuable targets for an influence operation. AI as an operating system for influence The role played by Claude is also important to understand accurately. Anthropic did not find that artificial intelligence independently conceived or directed the campaign. Human operators established the objectives, political doctrine and targets. AI instead helped operationalise them. Across hundreds of sessions, Claude was used to transform predetermined political objectives into social-media narratives, human-rights reports, testimony, intelligence-style briefs and detailed profiles of individuals. The same system could support narrative production, target research and preparation of material for different audiences. That represents a more significant development than simply using generative AI to produce propaganda faster. Traditional influence operations require different teams to research targets, write content, manage personas, adapt messages and prepare briefing material. Generative AI can compress several of those functions into a single operational workflow. The result is not necessarily more convincing propaganda. It is potentially cheaper, faster and more scalable influence infrastructure. From fake influencers to institutional influence Anthropic says it linked the operation to UAE government officials with high confidence. Its assessment was based partly on internal material naming senior Emirati officials as intended recipients of the work, alongside other evidence available to its investigators. That remains an attribution by Anthropic rather than a judicial finding or publicly released forensic attribution by a government agency. The distinction should be retained. The larger significance of GTG-84002 lies in the architecture of the campaign. A network of fake influencers could create the appearance of public opinion. A cloned human-rights organisation could provide institutional credibility. AI-generated reports could give political narratives the appearance of research. Profiles of journalists and politicians could support more precise targeting. And ghost-written testimony could potentially carry the same message into an international institution without revealing the political interest behind it. This is a different model from the familiar troll farm. The objective is no longer simply to make propaganda look popular. It is to make state-aligned messaging look independent – and, if possible, to move it from social media into the institutions where international policy and accountability are debated. SOURCES: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 International Court of Justice — Sudan v. United Arab Emirates https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197 International Court of Justice — press releases and case documents https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197/press-releases United Nations Geneva — Sudan v UAE proceedings at the ICJ https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/04/105241/world-court-begins-hearing-sudans-complicity-genocide-case-against UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs — UAE response to Sudan's allegations https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/4/10/10-4-2025-UAE-UAE UN Digital Library — Sudan's letter concerning alleged UAE support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?ln=en UN Digital Library — UAE response concerning allegations of support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4046224?ln=en Ultra Sudan — reporting on Anthropic's UAE-linked influence-operation findings https://ultrasudan.usawtiq.com/أنثروبيك-أحبطنا-عملية-تأثير-إماراتية-استخدمت-الذكاء-الاصطناعي-لاستهداف-السودان/عامر-صالح/أخبار KEYWORDS #DISINFORMED #Episode8 #UAE #Sudan #UnitedArabEmirates #UnitedNations #UNHumanRightsCouncil #HumanRights #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeInfluencers #FakeNGO #NGOImpersonation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #NarrativeManipulation #InstitutionalInfluence #SudanConflict #SudanWar #MuslimBrotherhood #InternationalRelations #Geopolitics #Anthropic #ClaudeAI #OSINT #WRLD

J’ai hésité à commenter. Mais là, le festival devient difficile à ignorer. Les déclarations de certains de nos responsables politiques sur la Russie et l’Ukraine ont été tellement nombreuses, minables et à côté de la plaque qu’il est difficile de savoir par où commencer. Paul Gasnier en a fait un beau topo. Qu’est-ce qui est le pire ? Dupont-Aignan, qui déballe tranquillement la propagande russe sur les « nazis ukrainiens » ? Ségolène Royal et ses mensonges sur Boutcha et Marioupol ? Les chefs de partis qui décident de taper sur Macron, alors que les patrons de la DGSE et de la DGSI étaient également présents à la réunion ? Les journalistes qui accusent Macron de « bordéliser » le débat politique, alors que de nombreux chefs d’État européens ont exprimé les mêmes craintes ? Ou Mélenchon, qui accuse l’Ukraine d’être responsable de la menace russe en Europe… parce qu’elle a l’outrecuidance de se défendre et de rendre les coups sur le territoire de son agresseur ? Nous ne sommes pas à la hauteur. La propagande russe a bousillé les cerveaux d’une partie de nos responsables politiques et de nos concitoyens à un niveau devenu dangereux. Pas une voix pour les poutinistes en 2027. #Ukraine #Russie #Politique

@info360_si Aigul Hakimova, ki protestira proti logičnemu ukrepu nove vlade, je zastopnica Kulturnega društva gmajna, ki se je v času Goloba zelo uspešno prisesalo na javna sredstva tako, da bi bilo primerno razkritje tudi tega motiva za goreč "boj" proti novi vladi. https://t.co/PqSiYwteOS #Protest #Vlada #KulturnoDruštvo

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan met en garde contre l'incapacité de la France à faire face à la menace russe, jugeant inacceptable de s'engager dans une guerre alors que le pays traverse une crise énergétique exacerbée par les conflits au Moyen-Orient. #CriseÉnergétique #GuerreMoyenOrient #ÉlectionPrésidentielle

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, candidat à l'élection présidentielle pour Debout le France, a affirmé que l'arme de dissuasion nucléaire ne doit pas être partagée, alors que la Finlande rejoint l'initiative française de dissuasion nucléaire avancée face à la menace russe. #MenaceRusse #DissuasionNucléaire #Présidentielles2027

De toezichthouder CTIVD maakt zich zorgen over het ongebreidelde gebruik van AI door de inlichtingendiensten AIVD en MIVD, aangezien er onvoldoende waarborgen zijn om de risico's te beheersen, en pleit voor centrale kaders en methoden om de situatie te verbeteren. #AIgebruik #inlichtingendiensten #toezicht

Arkhimedes lei suu tablettáin, ko roomalaš sođâlii kodij sun. Kuulâk-uv luándulávt? Ij veikâ. Mut jis mii “päivittip” ovdâáigá puohân, te mii puáttep just tassaa. Meendu puoh kulttuurijn láá uđđâsmittemvuáváliih olgospyehtimah boares čäällijn, já tast láá savâstâllâmh ortografiist, sääniin, toimâttâsmerhâšuumijn já tekstâ heiviitmist tááláá lohhei. Ohtâ antikvaar-kävilij eeđâi munjin kuásik, ete “ääigi patina addel árvu” já tot puáhtá leeđ eromâšlii originál já halpâ kopio kooskâ. Mun avám Constantin Noica “Pasepeivi esseeh”, puátám Humanitas-koostâttâs 1992 ovdâsaanán já loovâm, ete “ortografia lii päivittum”. Noica lohâm puávtáččij leeđ moonnâm 1930- já 1940-lovoid čoođâ. Mut mii moonâp taan ääigi čoođâ tááláá čalmeglásáiguin, mukkâsávt Uberist, iige mii tarbâš peljeđ, ete mii eksip — teikâ ete mii ep iber taan ääigi säänih, maid puávtáččij äigiđ “jurgâliđ” vuáláá merkimeh. Mii jis mii väldip maid taan ääigi aviisijd já “päivittip” toh? Já mii puávtáččij maiddái rebrandistiđ taan ääigi ilmoottâsijd, vâi mij neuroneh iä tarbâš pargođ nuuvt ennuv, tego mii leččijme escape roomist. Mon tiet mii čuožžop tääl? Mii puávtáp päivittiđ maid historjá oppikirjijd já čäälliđ, ete Syrakusan Arkhimedes kodottui roomalaš sođâliist ton ääigi ko sun räknij matematiik suu tablettáin. Vuáđu-idea bisánis, ij-uv? Tuše ääigi já ááigikyevdil majgân. Já vala ohtâ ašše: mon tiet matemaatikah iä “päivit” Pythagorasta? Sij puáhtih nubástittiđ merkimeh. Sij puáhtih čielgiđ tuođâštâs nubbe láávlá. Sij puáhtih meid ráhtiđ kuvâ online animaatioin, mii šadda uáppeeh čalmij ovdâst. Mut Pythagoras teoreema bisánis Pythagoras teoreeman. Te ko mii lohep boares čällee, mon tiet mii ep bisânit maid suu ääigi kielâ — já tileest mii pyehtip pieijâđ tááláá čielgâttâsâid merkimeh? Já majemuš koččâmuš Humanitasân já ollâopâttuvâi kirjálâšvuotâ- já kielâtietâ olmoošân: jis tááláá skuvlâlâžžeh “päivittih” tii moonnâm muutá lovvee # já emojiiguin, leččij-uv tot tii mielâst pyeri? #Humanitas #ConstantinNoica #Noica #PasepeiviEsseeh #Arkhimedes #Pythagoras #Hashtag #Emoji #MrStorywise #PäivittumOrtografia #KielâHistorjá #20260920_1926 #Anarâškielâ #InariSami #Suomi #Finland #Kirjálâšvuotâ #Historjá

⏱️ 𝗧𝗘𝗥𝗠𝗜𝗡𝗘́ ! 𝗡𝗜𝗖𝗘 𝗥𝗘𝗧𝗥𝗢𝗨𝗩𝗘 𝗟𝗔 𝗩𝗜𝗖𝗧𝗢𝗜𝗥𝗘 𝗔̀ 𝗗𝗢𝗠𝗜𝗖𝗜𝗟𝗘 !!! ❤️🖤 PREMIÈRE VICTOIRE DEPUIS 326 JOURS POUR LES AIGLONS À DOMICILE !!! 🤯🤯 La boucle est bouclée : leur dernière victoire était face à Lille, et leur nouvelle victoire se fait... face à Lille. Coup dur pour les Dogues qui auraient pu revenir à hauteur de Monaco. #Football #Aiglons #Victoire

🚨🚨 326 JOURS APRÈS, L’OGC NICE REMPORTE ENFIN UN MATCH À DOMICILE EN LIGUE 1 !!! ❤️🖤 Victoire 2-1 des Niçois contre le LOSC… QUI ÉTAIT PREMIER au début de cette 5eme journée !!! 👏 LES AIGLONS PEUVENT ENFIN SOUFFLER CE SOIR. 😮‍💨 https://t.co/DMTxMBFMwb #OGCNice #Ligue1 #Victoire

Je pense qu’il faut prendre au sérieux la candidature de Nicolas Dupont-Aignan à l’élection présidentielle. Il est doté d'une solide expérience et dispose d’un budget de campagne de plusieurs centaines de millions de roubles. #ÉlectionPrésidentielle #Politique #NicolasDupontAignan