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#Attribution
Dagens Nyheter 2d

A new report from the research network World Weather Attribution describes how climate change and the strong weather phenomenon El Niño significantly worsened the fires in Indonesia during the fall of 2026, leading to widespread devastation and health problems for millions of people. #Klimatförändringar #ElNiño #Indonesien (translated)

www.dn.se
Så förstärkte El Niño de enorma bränderna i Indonesien: ”Stängde av kranarna”
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BFMTV 2d

The Minister of Public Service, David Amiel, announced the allocation of additional index points to the lowest-paid public agents to correct the compression of salary scales, without increasing the value of the index point for all civil servants. #Fonctionnaires #Salaires #Gouvernement (translated)

www.bfmtv.com
Salaires des fonctionnaires : des points d'indice supplémentaires pour les agents les moins bien payés, annonce le gouvernement
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E
Emmanuel Macron 4d
president of France and Co-Prince of Andorra since 2017

"At the moment I am speaking to you, we do not have sufficiently established elements to make an attribution. At this stage, one cannot say that there would be outside powers behind these calls," said Emmanuel Macron to the press during a summit of European leaders in Dublin. #AlerteÀLaBombe #Éducation #Sécurité (translated)

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Margus Tsahkna 5d
Estonian politician (born 1977)

The author said they stood with their friend and colleague Jean-Noël Barrot and supported France’s attribution to Iran of cyberattacks that they said had targeted refrigeration systems at more than 700 retail sites on 11–12 October. They described the alleged sabotage of civilian infrastructure as unacceptable. #Cyberattaques #Infrastructure #Solidarité #FR #IR

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Sébastien Lecornu 7d
Prime Minister of France since 2025

The author indicated that, in response to the rise in energy prices, the ceiling for the fuel allowance paid by the employer had been increased from 300 to 1,000 euros and that the payment conditions had been removed. He specified that the allowance could reach 1,000 euros without any allocation conditions, then began to mention a condition related to "the absence of..." without finishing his sentence. #PrimeCarburant #Energie #SoutienEmployeur #FR (translated)

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Le Monde.fr 1w

More than 200 female authors published a statement in "Libération" to denounce the persistent sexism in the awarding of literary prizes. #browserissues #networkproblems #adblockers (translated)

www.lemonde.fr
Plus de 200 autrices dénoncent le « sexisme » des prix littéraires dans une tribune à « Libération »
2967
Le Parisien 2w

A Moroccan Ballon d'Or voter revealed that he faced external pressures influencing his vote for the prestigious award. #Football #BallonDor #Maroc (translated)

www.leparisien.fr
« Il existe des tentatives d’influence » : le juré marocain du Ballon d’or évoque les « pressions » qu’il a subies pour son vote
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Actu Foot 3w

Actu Foot reported reactions from international media after the awarding of the Ballon d'Or 2026 to Harry Kane, notably praising his humility. BILD and The Guardian considered the trophy deserved, while La Gazzetta dello Sport described him as a star established by his goals and victories. Marca mentioned the absence of controversies surrounding the player as a possible factor in the choice. RTBF presented Kane, aged 33, as a hardworking and team-oriented scorer, little interested in "bling-bling." The Argentine media Olé, on the other hand, stated that Messi remained their best player, while noting that Europeans had chosen the Englishman from Bayern as the best player of the season and placed Messi in 5th place. Actu Foot indicated that these reactions had been relayed through RMC Sport. #HarryKane #BallonDor #Football (translated)

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La Libre.be 3w

Donald Trump is multiplying electoral promises in anticipation of the midterm elections, linking the allocation of aid and benefits to the victory of the Republicans, which raises questions about the feasibility and ethics of his commitments. #DonaldTrump #Elections2026 #PromessesElectorales (translated)

www.lalibre.be
"Si nous ne gagnons pas, il n’y aura pas d’argent": les promesses électorales de Donald Trump posent question
2890
Krzysztof Graj 4w

𝗣𝗮𝗸𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻–𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮 — 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟱,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝗶𝗺 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗮 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝘄𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘁𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 A burst of false reports surrounding India's protests over the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls provides a clear example of how genuine political unrest can become a target for cross-border information manipulation. What remains considerably less certain is the scale and command structure of the campaign. Indian intelligence officials have alleged that more than 5,000 social-media accounts were created in Pakistan within roughly two weeks to exploit protests against the electoral-roll revision and the Election Commission. According to reporting based on Intelligence Bureau sources, the accounts were intended to circulate claims of police violence, casualties and government repression, while encouraging those narratives to travel beyond Delhi into other parts of India. Several of the individual fabrications are independently verifiable. One account using the identity “Anushi Tiwari Indian” and the handle @indiantiwari01 circulated old footage with claims that Delhi Police had opened fire on demonstrators. Different posts attributed multiple deaths to the supposed firing and claimed that opposition leader Rahul Gandhi had been shot or injured. Fact-checkers established that footage used to support such claims came from earlier events, including the 2024 farmers' protests, rather than the demonstrations then taking place in Delhi. Delhi Police publicly identified the account and said it had a history of distributing doctored material, old footage and fabricated narratives. Police subsequently registered four cases concerning alleged misinformation around the protests, while officials said hundreds of posts had been removed. India Today later reported that the Delhi Police Cyber Cell had traced the account's IP address to Pakistan and that the account was subsequently withheld in India. Earlier investigations had also documented the same persona circulating misleading material about Indian political and security events. That evidence establishes a meaningful Pakistan-linked component to the disinformation environment. It does not, however, independently establish a 5,000-account ISI network. The larger allegation comes primarily from Indian intelligence reporting. The Statesman, citing an IANS report and an Intelligence Bureau official, said accounts were being operated from several locations including Bhimber, Rawalakot, Sialkot and Peshawar rather than primarily from Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Officials alleged that operators were supplied with narratives to circulate and instructed to tag users outside India to increase their reach. The same reporting connected the activity to “Operation Ground Wire”, described by Indian sources as an effort to recruit Indian nationals to generate material that could then appear to originate domestically. The concept predates the October protests. A September investigation by CNN-News18 alleged that a platform called Bharat Bytes News had been used to recruit young Indian contributors for politically sensitive assignments, with material subsequently handled from Pakistan. There is an important evidential gap. No public list of the alleged 5,000 accounts has been released. There is no published network graph, platform transparency report, forensic infrastructure analysis or dataset allowing independent researchers to reproduce the Intelligence Bureau's assessment. Nor has public evidence demonstrated that all the accounts described in media reports belong to a single centrally controlled network rather than several clusters, individual propagandists and opportunistic accounts exploiting the same political crisis. The attribution to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence is therefore an intelligence claim rather than an independently demonstrated technical attribution. Reporting by Indian outlets repeatedly cites intelligence and police sources, but the underlying evidence has not been released publicly. At the time of this review, no equivalent technical report from Meta, X, Google or another major platform had been identified that confirmed the existence of a 5,000-account ISI-controlled operation. This distinction matters particularly in the India–Pakistan information environment. Both states routinely accuse the other of covert influence and disinformation. Pakistan itself has alleged Indian-backed social-media operations targeting Pakistani institutions, and Islamabad has previously rejected Indian security allegations as politically motivated. That does not invalidate evidence surrounding particular Pakistan-based accounts, but it raises the evidential threshold required for attributing thousands of accounts to a state intelligence service. There is another reason for caution. The information environment around the Indian protests contains misinformation from more than one political direction. Independent fact-checkers have identified AI-generated protest scenes, old videos recaptioned as current events and fabricated images supporting competing narratives. In an earlier case involving the Cockroach Janta Party protests, BOOM and Alt News found that Delhi Police themselves had incorrectly dismissed authentic footage as fake. Government attribution should therefore be treated as evidence to investigate, not as a substitute for forensic verification. No confirmed individual mastermind can presently be named for the October 5,000-account operation. “Anushi Tiwari Indian” is a documented online persona, not a verified real-world identity. Earlier reporting on the broader Ground Wire allegation named individuals said to be Pakistani handlers, including a person identified as Abdullah Shad and a Pakistani military officer described as Lieutenant Colonel Zia. Those identities have not been independently established through publicly available judicial records, financial evidence or a technical attribution report, and there is insufficient evidence to identify either man as responsible for the current 5,000-account campaign. The most defensible conclusion is narrower but still significant. A cluster of false narratives exploiting India's election-related protests existed; several prominent examples have been independently debunked; and at least one central amplifier has been reported by police investigators as Pakistan-based. The much larger claim — that more than 5,000 newly created accounts form a coordinated ISI operation — remains plausible but unproven on the public evidence currently available. For an information operation, that gap between what can be demonstrated and what intelligence authorities say they know is itself part of the story. 𝗦𝗢𝗨𝗥𝗖𝗘𝗦 1. The Statesman — “Pakistan creates 5,000 fake social media accounts amid anti-SIR protests: IB official”, 14 October 2026. This is the principal published source for the 5,000-account figure, alleged geographic distribution and Operation Ground Wire connection. The Statesman https://www.thestatesman.com/india/pakistan-creates-5000-fake-social-media-accounts-amid-anti-sir-protests-ib-official-1503650989.html 2. India Today — “ISI-linked accounts post fake Rahul injury video, deaths amid Delhi protests”, 13 October 2026. Documents the fake Rahul Gandhi injury story, false casualty reports and attribution supplied by security sources. India Today https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/anti-cec-protests-isi-linked-pakistan-accounts-spread-false-rahul-gandhi-injury-claim-fake-deaths-amid-delhi-protests-3016235-2026-10-13 3. India Today / PTI — Delhi Police investigation, four FIRs and approximately 500 posts removed, 13 October 2026. India Today https://www.indiatoday.in/cities/delhi/story/delhi-police-files-four-firs-removes-500-posts-over-protest-misinformation-3016760-2026-10-13 4. The New Indian Express — Delhi Police warning concerning @indiantiwari01, 12 October 2026. Includes the police's public identification of the account and its description of previous fabricated narratives. The New Indian Express https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/delhi/2026/Oct/12/delhi-police-warns-of-action-over-fake-claim-of-firing-at-rahul-gandhi-rally-300-posts-taken-down 5. India Today — “Pakistani Fake News Account Banned on X Over Fabricated Videos on Delhi Protests and Rahul Gandhi”, 15 October 2026. Reports the Cyber Cell finding that the account's IP address traced to Pakistan. India Today https://www.indiatoday.in/india/video/pakistani-fake-news-account-banned-on-x-over-fabricated-videos-on-delhi-protests-and-rahul-gandhi-ytvd-3017879-2026-10-15 6. The Quint / WebQoof — independent verification of old footage falsely presented as Delhi Police firing on protesters. The investigated post from @indiantiwari01 had accumulated more than 35,000 views when checked. TheQuint https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof/old-video-farmers-protest-falsely-linked-to-cjp-delhi-police-firing-fact-check 7. BOOM — “Old Farmers Protest Video Falsely Shared As Fatalities From October 10 Protest”, 10 October 2026. Independent visual verification of another falsely contextualised protest video. BOOM https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/old-farmers-protest-video-falsely-shared-as-fatalities-from-october-10-protest-32352 8. Newschecker — independent fact-check of the false Delhi Police firing and casualty story, 13 October 2026. Newschecker https://www.newschecker.in/fact-check/old-video-shared-as-delhi-police-firing-at-rahul-gandhi-led-march-against-cec 9. DFRAC — earlier investigation of the “Anushi Tiwari Indian” persona during the September BRICS information environment. This establishes that the account's misleading activity preceded the October protests. DFRAC_ORG https://dfrac.org/en/2026/09/16/brics-summit-disinformation-fake-and-misleading-claims-flood-social-media/ 10. ETGovernment — Maj Gen Rajan Kochhar (Retd), analysis of the earlier Ground Wire allegations, September 2026. Importantly, the article itself stresses that claims concerning named operators, payment mechanisms and Bharat Bytes require independent verification. ETGovernment.com https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/amp/blog/the-evolution-of-proxy-warfare-how-narrative-manipulation-is-transforming-india-pakistan-conflict/134347274 11. BOOM — AI-generated imagery falsely connected to the election-related protests, 12 October 2026. Demonstrates that the broader information disorder was not confined to the specifically Pakistan-attributed examples. BOOM https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/ai-visuals-falsely-shared-as-real-fuel-misinformation-amid-cec-protests-32353 12. Alt News — investigation showing that Delhi Police had incorrectly labelled genuine July protest footage as fake. Relevant to the need for independent verification of official fact-checking claims. Alt News https://www.altnews.in/hindi/baton-with-nails-videos-indeed-from-july-20-protests-delhi-police-pibs-fact-check-incorrect/ 𝗞𝗘𝗬𝗪𝗢𝗥𝗗𝗦 #Disinformed #Disinformation #Propaganda #InfluenceOperations #India #Pakistan #ISI #ElectionSecurity #ElectionIntegrity #SIR #SpecialIntensiveRevision #DelhiProtests #RahulGandhi #GyaneshKumar #SocialMedia #FakeAccounts #FakeNews #InformationWarfare #CognitiveWarfare #HybridWarfare #OSINT #DigitalPropaganda #ForeignInfluence #InformationOperations #FactChecking #CyberSecurity #OperationGroundWire #PakistanIndia #PoliticalDisinformation #InformationIntegrity

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Krzysztof Graj 4w

AFRICA DAILY REPORT — 21 OCTOBER 2026 1. Sudan–South Sudan — Abyei market strike death toll rises to 153 Importance: 10/10 — Critical. An Abyei official said 153 people had died in a drone strike on a market, up from an earlier estimate of 73. He blamed Sudan's army; attribution was not independently established. Reuters verified aftermath footage and MSF treated wounded patients. South Sudan summoned Sudan's ambassador. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/drone-strike-disputed-sudan-south-sudan-area-kills-dozens-minister-says-2026-10-20/ 2. Nigeria — First Ebola case of current regional outbreak confirmed in Abuja Importance: 10/10 — Critical. Nigeria confirmed a Bundibugyo Ebola infection in a woman receiving treatment in Abuja. Authorities identified 44 contacts for tracing. She had travelled through Uganda after visiting eastern DR Congo; the place of exposure remains uncertain. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/nigeria-confirms-ebola-case-health-minister-says-2026-10-20/ 3. Kenya — Ebola infections reach nine; no spread beyond known cluster Importance: 10/10 — Critical. Kenya confirmed a ninth Ebola infection in a close relative of the first patient who was already quarantined. Officials reported no evidence of transmission outside the cluster; 134 of 135 identified contacts had been traced and quarantined. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/kenya-confirms-new-ebola-case-total-nine-health-ministry-says-2026-10-20/ 4. Mali — More than 40 civilians reportedly killed in Menaka region Importance: 10/10 — Critical. Security and community sources reported that gunmen on motorcycles killed more than 40 civilians in northeastern Mali. Community representatives blamed Islamic State militants, but independent confirmation remains limited. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/20/more-than-40-civilians-killed-in-mali-attack-blamed-on-islamic-state/ 5. Ethiopia–Eritrea — Abiy warns over alleged rebel support Political/security development — Neutral coverage. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed warned Eritrea against supporting armed opponents of his government. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of backing rebels; Eritrea disputes the allegations. Renewed fighting in Tigray raises fears of regional escalation. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/20/ethiopia-pm-warns-eritrea-of-severe-consequences-if-supports-enemies/ 6. Burkina Faso — Transitional legislature restores death penalty Political/legal development — Neutral coverage. Burkina Faso's transitional legislature approved a penal code restoring capital punishment, abolished in 2018. Authorities cite security and public order; human-rights organisations criticise the reversal. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/21/burkina-faso-reinstates-death-penalty-justice-ministry/ 7. Senegal — Sonko questions G20 debt-treatment approach Political/economic development — Neutral coverage. Ousmane Sonko criticised the government's approach to G20-backed debt treatment, arguing that revised repayment schedules might be preferable to a complex restructuring. Senegal is negotiating with creditors and the IMF. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/20/senegal-debt-crisis-sonko-warns-g20-plan-could-backfire/ 8. Senegal — Unions prepare 72-hour strike over living costs Importance: 8/10 — High. Protesters in Dakar demanded implementation of agreements and protection of purchasing power. Trade unions prepared a three-day general strike; health representatives warned of disruption to public services. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/21/senegalese-workers-protest-rising-living-costs-ahead-of-three-day-general-strike/ 9. Egypt — Parliament postpones debate on possible Saudi military support Political/security development — Neutral coverage. Egyptian lawmakers postponed until October 26 debate on presidential authority to provide military support to Saudi Arabia if requested. No military action was authorised. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/20/egypt-parliament-delays-debate-on-possible-saudi-military-support/ 10. South Africa — Former deputy police chief denied bail Importance: 8/10 — High. A Johannesburg court denied bail to former deputy police commissioner Shadrack Sibiya, who faces sexual-offence and trafficking allegations. He denies the charges and has not been convicted. SOURCE — FULL DIRECT ARTICLE URL: https://apnews.com/article/south-africa-police-chief-rape-bail-bf977846391fb14ec6f40f23350fa316 #Africa #AfricaNews #AfricaDailyReport #TopNewsOfAfrica #Egypt #EgyptPolitics #EgyptParliament #SaudiArabia #EgyptSaudiRelations #MilitaryCooperation #MiddleEastSecurity #Ebola #EbolaOutbreak #EbolaVirus #PublicHealth #HealthEmergency #Nigeria #Abuja #Kenya #DRCongo #DiseaseSurveillance #AfricaCDC #Sudan #SouthSudan #Abyei #DroneStrike #CivilianCasualties #SudanConflict #Mali #EthiopiaEritrea

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2
20minutes 4w

The article examines the potential influences of foreign accounts on social networks, particularly on X, during the protests of October 17, revealing massive support for the social movement ahead of the events while highlighting the lack of clear attributions of foreign interference at this stage. #MouvementSocial #IngérenceÉtrangère #RéseauxSociaux (translated)

www.20minutes.fr
Violences du 17 octobre : Y a-t-il eu des ingérences étrangères sur les réseaux sociaux, notamment sur X ? Dur à dire
2789
Krzysztof Graj 4w

𝗨𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 — 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗯𝘂𝗶𝗹𝘁 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗔𝗜, 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝘃𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀 A newly exposed US political influence network appears to have been designed around a different target from most election propaganda. Its primary audience was not necessarily the voter reading a website, but the automated systems that search the web on behalf of AI chatbots. Threat-intelligence company VisionHeight initially identified 37 anonymous websites presenting themselves as state or local news organisations, opinion publications and national issue sites. By 15 October, the company's co-founder and chief technology officer, Nitsan Daniel, told CyberScoop that the investigation had expanded the observed footprint to 𝗮𝘁 𝗹𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝟭𝟰 𝗨𝗦 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝟰𝟲𝟬 𝗽𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀. The states identified were Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin. The infrastructure shows unusually strong signs of coordination. All 37 domains in the original dataset were registered during a single evening; 36 were registered within approximately eight minutes. On 30 September alone, the network published roughly 𝟭𝟬𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬 𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲-𝗿𝗲𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗹 using common templates and four recurring layouts. VisionHeight assesses that the scale and production pattern strongly suggest extensive automation, although that does not by itself prove which generative-AI system, if any, produced the text. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗺𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗲𝘃𝗮𝗹. Candidate profiles can run to about 5,000 words, accompanied by similarly long voter guides containing 50 to 63 questions phrased in the style of queries someone might put to an AI assistant. Across the network, formulations such as a candidate being “the stronger choice” were repeated hundreds of times. One profile contained the phrase 34 times. In several voter guides examined by VisionHeight, the favoured candidate was named more than 110 times while an opponent appeared only six or seven times. The websites were also configured to make themselves unusually accessible to AI. Their crawler instructions explicitly welcomed 17 automated systems associated with companies including OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Perplexity, Meta, Amazon and Apple. Some pages were marked in machine-readable metadata as news articles, while apparently separate publications cited one another. The result is a manufactured ecosystem in which several apparently independent local sources can reinforce the same conclusion. That is the central technique. 𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗰 𝗔𝗜 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴-𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗮 𝗽𝗼𝗶𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴. The more immediate objective appears to be manipulation of the retrieval and search layer: place highly optimised material online, make it easy for automated crawlers to index, create the appearance of corroboration, and increase the chance that an AI assistant retrieves those pages when answering a political question. There is evidence that the network crossed that boundary. VisionHeight says it confirmed that 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗹𝗲𝘅𝗶𝘁𝘆 cited Tar Heel State Report as the first source in at least one response. Separately, one of the network's candidate pages reached third place in a Google search six days after publication, above Ballotpedia for the tested query. These findings demonstrate that the material can enter AI-relevant search and retrieval pipelines. They do 𝗻𝗼𝘁 demonstrate that the operation changed anyone's vote, nor establish how frequently major chatbots have used the network. The timing matters because AI has become part of the election-information environment. An AAPC Foundation survey of 1,568 likely US voters found that about one in five planned to use AI to investigate a race on their ballot, while 38 per cent reported having received election information through an AI-generated search summary. A separate NewsGuard audit found that leading chatbots frequently cited partisan websites disguised as local journalism without clearly identifying their political affiliations. The newly identified network appears to take that existing vulnerability one step further by constructing content specifically around the way machines search and summarise information. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗶𝘁? 𝗔𝘁 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗲𝗻𝘁, 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗱𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝘀𝘄𝗲𝗿. VisionHeight has not attributed the operation to any individual, campaign, company, political party or foreign government. No confirmed name of an operator has been publicly established. Nitsan Daniel is the researcher who helped expose the network, not a person connected to its operation. Some components have explicitly partisan branding. VisionHeight's indicators include domains such as Affordability Democrats, Democratic Women House, Public Safety Democrats and Republican Incumbent Watch, while the live Affordability Democrats site promotes Democratic candidates across 11 competitive House races. That provides evidence about the political direction of some of the published material, but it does 𝗻𝗼𝘁 establish who commissioned, financed or operated the infrastructure, and it would be unjustified to attribute it to the Democratic Party or any particular campaign. The network also appears broader than congressional politics. The live Tar Heel State Report has carried material on county commission and judicial contests, illustrating why the method may be particularly effective in down-ballot races where established local reporting is thin. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗸 𝘀𝘂𝗿𝗳𝗮𝗰𝗲. Propaganda no longer has to persuade a human being directly. It can instead attempt to shape the information environment from which an apparently neutral machine constructs its answer. 𝗦𝗧𝗔𝗧𝗨𝗦: Active / newly exposed and expanding as of 15–16 October 2026. 𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗙𝗜𝗗𝗘𝗡𝗖𝗘: High regarding coordinated infrastructure and AI-oriented design; moderate regarding the full current scale; attribution unknown. 𝗦𝗢𝗨𝗥𝗖𝗘𝗦 VisionHeight — primary investigation, “Someone Is Manipulating Your AI to Swing Your Vote” https://www.visionheight.com/resources/someone-is-manipulating-your-ai-to-swing-your-vote CyberScoop — Derek B. Johnson, 15 October 2026 https://cyberscoop.com/ai-chatbots-election-influence-hyperlocal-networks/ Tar Heel State Report — live network site used for OSINT verification https://tarheelstatereport.com/ Affordability Democrats — live network site https://affordabilitydemocrats.com/ AAPC Foundation — 2026 AI Voter Study https://theaapc.org/release-foundation-research/ NPR — reporting on voters using AI chatbots for the 2026 midterms https://www.wusf.org/2026-10-05/people-are-asking-chatgpt-to-help-them-decide-how-to-vote-in-the-midterms NewsGuard — “Pink Slime Is Infecting AI Chatbots Ahead of the Midterms” https://www.newsguardtech.com/press/pink-slime-is-infecting-ai-chatbots-ahead-of-the-midterms/ 𝗞𝗘𝗬𝗪𝗢𝗥𝗗𝗦 #Disinformed #Disinformation #Propaganda #InfluenceOperations #AI #ArtificialIntelligence #AIChatbots #ElectionSecurity #USMidterms #USElections #InformationWarfare #CognitiveWarfare #OSINT #ThreatIntelligence #CyberSecurity #DataPoisoning #RetrievalManipulation #SearchManipulation #GenerativeAI #LLM #AIManipulation #PoliticalInfluence #FakeNews #LocalNews #PinkSlime #Perplexity #ElectionIntegrity #InformationIntegrity #DigitalPropaganda #AIsecurity

1163
Oberlé Daniel 4w

🩺📋 Soins oncologiques de support : l’INCa fixe des critères de qualité pour les structures de ville, les structures hospitalières et les professionnels. ✅🗂️ Une autoévaluation déclarative, proposée tous les deux ans, permet aux structures conformes d’être signalées dans les annuaires régionaux des DSRC. 📒 Qualité de l’offre en soins oncologiques de support — Cahier des charges national ✍️ Institut national du cancer (INCa) — mai 2026 - pôle Prévention, organisation et parcours de soins. Coordination et rédaction : Bayane Ouali-Lajnef, Jingyuan Lin, Anne Duviard, Claude Linassier ; relecture : Romain Arini (p. 17) Capsules Audio de Pratiques en Santé 🎙️🎥 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9h9yhkyFWE Analyse de Pratiques en Santé et lien vers la source ℹ️➕ https://www.pratiquesensante.com/blog/pratiques-15/qualite-de-l-offre-en-soins-oncologiques-de-support-cahier-des-charges-national-6270 📌 Le document définit les critères de qualité attendus des structures et des professionnels qui délivrent les soins du panier national de soins oncologiques de support, en ville comme à l’hôpital (p. 7-12). Il fournit un outil d’autoévaluation et d’engagement comprenant une grille de critères et une charte (annexe I, p. 22-27), ainsi qu’une liste non exhaustive des formations identifiées pour les professionnels, mise à jour en 2024 (annexe II, p. 28-35). Il précise les conditions de référencement et d’attribution d’une mention de conformité dans les annuaires régionaux des DSRC (p. 13-16). Il s’adresse également aux acteurs de coordination de ville, notamment les communautés professionnelles territoriales de santé (CPTS), les dispositifs d’appui à la coordination (DAC) et les maisons de santé pluriprofessionnelles (MSP), et peut servir de référence aux établissements souhaitant contractualiser une offre en soins de support (p. 6). 🇬🇧: Quality of the offer in supportive oncology care — National spécifications - Quality of the offer in supportive oncology care — National specifications #️⃣ #pratiquesensante #SoinsDeSupport #Cancérologie #QualitéDesSoins #ParcoursDeSoins #Autoévaluation #AprèsCancer #CoordinationVilleHôpital

www.youtube.com
Cahier des charges INCa fixe des critères de qualité
1046
Joan Stavo-Debauge 4w

The Prime Minister's statement prepares for the worst and deliberately incites a rise to extremes, which divides the political community and commands violence, because, as Paul Ricœur wrote, "attribution to one side is only a matter of elimination: if you are not on one side, you are on the other." (translated)

2676
David Ho 4w

Just as fossil fuel companies and their cronies sow doubt about scientific knowledge on climate change in order to prevent the development of non-fossil fuel resources, they’re doing the same thing now to climate attribution science to avoid accountability for climate damage. Pay attention!

1980
Krzysztof Graj 4w

𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 – 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹’𝘀 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲 Ahead of Israel’s 27 October election, hundreds of social-media accounts have been presenting themselves as ordinary Israelis while injecting political messages into genuine domestic conversations. They appear as women, reservists, secular voters, religious activists and frustrated citizens. Some attack Benjamin Netanyahu, others have previously promoted narratives associated with the Israeli right, while many focus less on parties than on a broader message: Israel is divided, its institutions cannot be trusted and its political system is approaching crisis. A detailed investigation by the OSINT company Golden Owl has mapped this activity as a substantial Iran-linked influence network. Its October analysis identified at least 694 accounts, with 445 attributed at high or medium-high confidence to the operation. Between 11 August and 11 October, the network generated at least 4.7 million views and more than 160,000 interactions. The researchers found no evidence that these accounts were simply a group of independent Iranian commentators expressing political opinions. Their assessment rests instead on coordinated behaviour, false identities, account histories, copied content, language patterns and platform metadata linking significant parts of the infrastructure to Iran. 𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝟯𝟱 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝘀 The investigation developed in two stages. Golden Owl’s first report, published in September, identified an operational core of 35 accounts: 32 personas presenting themselves as Israelis and three Hebrew-language media-style channels. During the 30-day period measured in that study, active accounts generated 947,322 impressions and more than 9,000 interactions. The October investigation expanded the dataset dramatically. Researchers analysed more than 560,000 data points, including tens of thousands of accounts, relationships between them and more than a quarter of a million posts. The wider network showed repeated patterns of identical texts, synchronised activity and accounts created in batches. The numbers therefore describe not a sudden explosion from 35 to hundreds of accounts, but the gradual exposure of a much larger infrastructure surrounding the original core. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 Some of the strongest evidence comes from the histories of individual personas. One account had spent years posting exclusively in Persian under the handle “mardeankabooti” before reappearing in August 2026 as an apparently Israeli user called “Alon Strauss”, complete with an Israeli flag and Hebrew political messaging. Other personas presented themselves as Israeli professionals, activists or ordinary citizens while X transparency information showed connections through the Iranian version of the Android application or locations inconsistent with their claimed identities. The account “Yaara Shalev” presented itself as an Israeli woman concerned with democracy and peace. Investigators found that photographs used to construct the identity were inconsistent, including borrowed and apparently AI-generated imagery. A small Hebrew-language channel called KigVoice, previously identified in Israeli government reporting as part of an Iranian influence environment, repeatedly published material that later appeared on the much more visible Yaara account. In one sample, 14 of 40 KigVoice posts subsequently resurfaced as captions or opening lines in Yaara’s content. Another persona, “Miriam Kozak”, had built an audience of more than 18,000 followers and had already been exposed as fictitious by Israeli researchers in 2024. Its political messaging changed substantially over time, moving between narratives associated with different sides of Israeli politics. That inconsistency is important: the apparent purpose was not necessarily to build a stable ideological following, but to enter whichever political argument offered the greatest opportunity to intensify division. 𝗔𝗜, 𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 The Iran attribution is based on more than political content. Researchers identified accounts using the Iranian version of the X Android application, repeated connections to previously identified Iranian influence assets, copied posts appearing across supposedly independent personas within minutes, and Hebrew containing unusual grammatical errors or Persian and Arabic keyboard artefacts. Generative AI also appears to have become part of the production process. Some accounts inadvertently published fragments resembling chatbot instructions, while other posts displayed patterns consistent with machine-generated Hebrew. AI-generated videos and synthetic profile imagery further reduced the cost of maintaining large numbers of apparently distinct personalities. However, none of these indicators was treated as proof on its own. Golden Owl explicitly excluded accounts where the evidence was insufficient and notes that VPNs, travel and platform location labels can create misleading signals. The attribution rests on multiple independent indicators converging across the network. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗮𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗻𝗲𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆 The network repeatedly exploited issues that genuinely divide Israeli society: responsibility for the 7 October attacks, the war, the hostages, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, economic pressure, emigration and confidence in state institutions. It also circulated misleading information about the election itself, including false voting dates, claims that voting had been postponed and posts suggesting online voting mechanisms that do not exist in Israel’s parliamentary election system. The pattern suggests a strategy broader than conventional electoral campaigning. Rather than consistently promoting one political faction, the network appears designed to weaken confidence in the government, military, democratic institutions and the electoral process itself. An influence operation does not need to persuade Israelis to support a particular candidate if it can convince different groups that defeat would prove fraud, betrayal or systemic failure. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝘀𝗿𝗮𝗲𝗹𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝘄𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗿𝘀 One of the network’s most effective characteristics is that it does not depend solely on its own followers. Fake personas enter comment sections and political discussions involving real Israeli journalists, politicians and ordinary users. Authentic Israelis then repost or interact with the material, sometimes carrying it far beyond the original account. Golden Owl does not classify those genuine users as participants in the operation. In most cases they appear to be unwitting amplifiers. But once a message passes from a fabricated Iranian-operated persona to an authentic Israeli account, its foreign origin becomes much harder for the next person to recognise. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟰𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬-𝗯𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗱 A much larger figure has also appeared in recent reporting. In the first two days after the October 2023 Hamas attack, social-media intelligence company Cyabra identified more than 40,000 fake profiles participating in online discussions across major platforms. Their content generated hundreds of thousands of interactions and had a potential reach estimated at 531 million profiles. Those numbers are important historical context, but they should not be merged with the current Golden Owl investigation. There is no public evidence demonstrating that all of those 2023 accounts and the 2026 Iran-linked election network belonged to one continuous command structure. The 531 million figure is also an estimate of potential exposure, not proof that 531 million people saw or believed the content. 𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻? No confirmed individual operators have been publicly identified. Names such as Yaara Shalev, Miriam Kozak and Alon Strauss are personas, not verified identities of the people controlling the accounts. Golden Owl says its evidence supports an association with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with previously documented Iranian influence infrastructure, but it does not establish which Iranian institution, intelligence service, military organisation or contractor directs the network. That distinction is essential. Public OSINT supports attribution at the Iran-linked operational level. It does not currently justify naming individual Iranian officials as the people commanding this specific campaign. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗼 The Israeli case illustrates a broader change in influence operations. The synthetic asset does not have to be a spectacular deepfake of a politician. It can be an apparently ordinary citizen who comments on politics, argues with neighbours, describes personal experiences and gradually becomes part of an authentic community. That can be more difficult to recognise because the propaganda does not arrive looking foreign. It arrives looking local. And when hundreds of fabricated citizens enter the same national conversation, they can manufacture the impression that political anger, despair or distrust is more spontaneous and more widely shared than it really is. 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Golden Owl — Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Exposing-the-Iranian-Regime-Influence-Machinery-Against-Israeli-Society Golden Owl Golden Owl — The Other Face of War: Iranian Regime–Linked Manipulation of Israel’s 2026 Election Debate https://web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app/resources/research/Iranian-Regime-Linked-Manipulation-of-Israel-2026-Election-Debate Golden Owl The Jerusalem Post — Iran-linked social-media accounts posing as Israelis to target election https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-909863 The Jerusalem Post Ynet — Fake Israelis, real influence: Iran-linked network infiltrates Israel’s election debate https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syp119nqqzg ynetglobal Calcalist — Iranian influence network exposed ahead of Israel’s election https://www.calcalist.co.il/calcalistech/article/s1q0ifijzl calcalist Vesty / Ynet — Iranian fake-account network and October update https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/rkwokjssgg vesty Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs — Iran’s active Hebrew-language influence campaign https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26/en/mashlat_Roaring_Lion_israel-and-us-strikes-in-iran-daily-status_2_3_26.pdf Government of Israel Israel Central Elections Committee — official 2026 election timetable https://www.gov.il/en/pages/time--table-26 Government of Israel Channel NewsAsia — historical Cyabra analysis of more than 40,000 fake profiles after 7 October 2023 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/how-fake-news-israel-hamas-stokes-outrage-hatred-and-potential-violence-southeast-asian-tiktok-5603221 𝗞𝗲𝘆𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 #DISINFORMED #Episode20 #Iran #Israel #IsraelElection2026 #IranianInfluence #IranianDisinformation #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FakeAccounts #FakePersonas #SyntheticIdentity #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #NarrativeManipulation #PoliticalDisinformation #ElectionDisinformation #X #Twitter #Bots #BotNetwork #KigVoice #YaaraShalev #MiriamKozak #DigitalInfluence #InformationManipulation #ElectionIntegrity #GoldenOwl #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

web-dev-production-7a35.up.railway.app
Exposing the Iranian Regime’s Influence Machinery Against Israeli Society
699
Krzysztof Graj Oct 14

𝗧𝗵𝗲 $𝟰𝟯 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗿𝗼𝘆𝗮𝗹 𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗭𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗸𝘆𝘆 𝗻𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿 𝗯𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵𝘁 A Norwegian royal residence, a $43 million price tag, an offshore company historically linked to Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a video apparently produced by the American entertainment outlet E! News. The story contained enough authentic details to look plausible. It was also fabricated. At the end of September 2026, social-media accounts began circulating a video claiming that Film Heritage Inc., a Belize-registered company with historical links to Zelenskyy and his family, had purchased the Norwegian royal estate of Skaugum for approximately $43 million. The property was described as covering 240 acres, while the supposed transaction was linked to Zelenskyy’s visit to Norway for the funeral of King Harald V. Independent investigations found no evidence that such a sale had ever taken place. 𝗔 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗯𝘂𝗶𝗹𝘁 𝗮𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀 The fabrication was carefully constructed around genuine information. King Harald V had died in August 2026, and Zelenskyy and First Lady Olena Zelenska travelled to Oslo for his funeral on 9 September. Skaugum is also a genuine royal estate in Asker with a long history as a residence of Norway’s heir to the throne. The false report turned those facts into a fictional property transaction. It claimed that Zelenskyy had previously attempted to buy the estate, that the Norwegian royal family had rejected an earlier approach and that the purchase had finally been completed after the property supposedly became a financial burden. No documentary evidence supporting any of these claims has emerged. Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs later confirmed to fact-checkers that the allegation was false. Searches of established Norwegian and international media also produced no credible reporting about the supposed transaction. 𝗔 𝗻𝗲𝘄𝘀𝗿𝗼𝗼𝗺 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗲𝘅𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝘄𝗼 𝗱𝗮𝘆𝘀 The most important part of the operation was not the property claim itself. It was the source apparently verifying it. The video was designed to resemble an E! News report, borrowing the visual language of the established American entertainment brand. But investigators found no such story on E! News’s genuine website, social-media channels or archived pages. Instead, the accompanying article appeared on eonline.news, a domain closely resembling E! News’s legitimate eonline.com address. Registration records showed that the imitation domain had been created on 27 September 2026 — only two days before the story was published. The accompanying video also showed signs of synthetic production. Fact-checkers examining the material identified indications that AI tools had been used in the narration and audiovisual elements. The operation therefore did not simply invent a news story. It created an apparently credible media environment around it. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗻𝘆 𝗶𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗹𝘀𝗲 𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 The supposed buyer was also carefully selected. Film Heritage Inc. was not invented for the fabrication. The Pandora Papers previously documented a genuine historical connection between the Belize-registered company and Zelenskyy’s former business network. Leaked documents showed that Zelenskyy and his wife had held an interest in another offshore company through Film Heritage before changes were made to the ownership structure around his 2019 presidential campaign. That authentic history gave the new fabrication an additional layer of plausibility. The same company name has previously appeared in false narratives alleging extravagant purchases by Zelenskyy, including supposed luxury-property and casino acquisitions. Those stories were also unsupported by evidence. This illustrates a recurring feature of effective disinformation: not every component has to be false. A genuine company can be combined with a genuine trip, a genuine property and a genuine media brand to manufacture an event that never occurred. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝘁𝗿𝘆𝗼𝘀𝗵𝗸𝗮 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗻𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation assessed the operation as consistent with the Russian Matryoshka disinformation playbook. The technique strongly resembles previously documented Matryoshka activity: impersonating established Western media organisations, creating fabricated video reports and distributing them through coordinated or pro-Russian social-media networks. French authorities have documented Matryoshka since 2023 as a pro-Russian influence operation targeting media organisations, public figures and fact-checkers. Investigations have shown repeated use of counterfeit reports imitating major European and North American news brands. The Norwegian-estate story fits that pattern closely. The attribution nevertheless requires precision. Independent evidence establishes that the E! News report was fake, that a newly created imitation website was involved and that the story circulated through pro-Russian information channels. Publicly available forensic evidence does not yet identify a specific individual or technical operator who created this particular asset. It is therefore more accurate to describe the Matryoshka connection as a well-supported analytical attribution rather than a publicly proven chain of command. 𝗪𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 The most important element of the operation is not really the $43 million figure. It is the construction of credibility around it. A genuine royal funeral supplied the timing. A genuine Norwegian estate supplied the location. A genuine offshore company supplied a documented connection to Zelenskyy. A counterfeit E! News website supplied apparent journalistic confirmation. Synthetic audiovisual material supplied what looked like additional evidence. Each element reinforced the others. This reflects a broader change in contemporary disinformation. The most sophisticated operations no longer rely exclusively on fabricating photographs, videos or statements. Increasingly, they fabricate the source that supposedly verified them. The deepfake is sometimes the entire newsroom! 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 Lead Stories — investigation into the fake E! News report https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/10/fact-check-enews-did-not-publish-report-about-zelenskyy-buying-43-million-dollar-mansion-from-norways-royal-family.html Center for Countering Disinformation of Ukraine — Norwegian royal estate fabrication https://cpd.gov.ua/en/international-threats-en/europe/fake-about-zelenskyys-purchase-of-a-norwegian-royal-family-estate/ Ellinika Hoaxes — investigation and Norwegian government response https://www.ellinikahoaxes.gr/2026/10/09/agorase-o-zelenski-ektasi-240-stremmaton-apo-ti-vasiliki-oikogeneia-tis-norvigias-gia-43-ekatommyria-dolaria/ The Royal House of Norway — funeral of King Harald V https://www.royalcourt.no/news/the-funeral-of-king-harald-v The Royal House of Norway — Skaugum and the Royal Estates https://www.royalcourt.no/the-royal-court/the-departments-the-royal-court/the-royal-estates-and-parks President of Ukraine — Zelenskyy and First Lady attend King Harald V’s funeral https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-ta-persha-ledi-vzyali-uchast-u-ceremoniyi-106293 OCCRP — Pandora Papers investigation into Zelenskyy’s offshore network https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-pandora-papers/pandora-papers-reveal-offshore-holdings-of-ukrainian-president-and-his-inner-circle AFP Fact Check — previous false luxury-purchase narrative involving Film Heritage https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.36PG6EC VIGINUM / SGDSN — Matryoshka technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240611_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Matriochka_EN_VF.pdf CheckFirst — Operation Overload / Matryoshka investigation https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-an-ai-fuelled-escalation-of-the-kremlin-linked-propaganda-effort/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode19 #Zelenskyy #Ukraine #Norway #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Matryoshka #OperationOverload #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #ClonedWebsite #FakeNewsroom #ENews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #VoiceCloning #SyntheticMedia #Deepfake #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #FilmHeritage #PandoraPapers #Skaugum #NorwegianRoyalFamily #Propaganda #DigitalInfluence #FactChecking #VIGINUM #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

leadstories.com
Fact Check: E! News Did NOT Publish Report About Zelenskyy Buying $43 Million Estate From Norway's Royal Family | Lead Stories
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Franceinfo Oct 13

Errors in the calculation of property tax, such as the incorrect allocation of areas, can lead to significant refunds, as evidenced by a Parisian homeowner who recovered 700 euros after correcting his tax assessment. #TaxeFoncière #ErreurDeCalcul #RécupérationFinancière (translated)

www.franceinfo.fr
"J'ai pu bénéficier de 700 euros" : les erreurs de calcul sur votre taxe foncière peuvent vous coûter cher
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Margus Tsahkna Oct 12
Estonian politician (born 1977)

The author said they had joined fellow foreign ministers in recognising the UK’s attribution of Iranian involvement in the 27 September incident at RAF Fairford and had condemned Iran’s violent attacks and other hybrid activities. They added that threats to military facilities used by allies affected everyone. #Iran #UK #Diplomacy #UK #IR

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