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The arrival of the new editorialist Charles Sapin, close to the controversial magazine Valeurs actuelles, is causing a crisis within the editorial staff of France Inter, resulting in a strike vote by the staff who refuse his presence due to his values deemed incompatible with those of the public service. (translated)

🇮🇳 EXINDIA? MODI, STOP POLICING FAITH. India is strongest when it is pluralist, constitutional and free. I fully support tough punishment for: forced conversion, threats, coercion, fraud and deception. But I reject laws that use vague concepts such as “allurement” or “undue https://t.co/g2CKgVqkXT #India #Pluralism #ReligiousFreedom #IN

Ce que s’autorise @franceinter comme écarts (pluralisme, neutralité, décence, etc.), et en pleine campagne électorale, ne peut qu’encourager, en réaction, les propositions les plus radicales de réforme de ce service public: statut, budget, etc. Les personnes qui travaillent dans cette radio et n’approuvent pas un tel dévoiement devraient s’en préoccuper au plus vite. #FranceInter #ServicePublic #LibertéDExpression

O Estado não é dono dos nossos filhos. A própria Constituição Federal estabelece que a educação é dever do Estado e também da família, além de garantir a liberdade de aprender e ensinar e o pluralismo de ideias e de concepções pedagógicas. A educação começa dentro de casa. As famílias precisam ter liberdade para participar ativamente da formação de seus filhos e escolher, dentro da lei, o modelo de ensino que melhor corresponda aos seus valores e convicções. Defender a regulamentação do homeschooling é defender essa liberdade, dentro das regras de segurança constitucional frente às famílias que desejam exercer essa escolha. No Senado, vou lutar para transformar essa liberdade em uma opção efetivamente garantida pela legislação brasileira. Por nossas famílias. Por Santa Catarina. Pelo Brasil.🇧🇷👍🏻 #Educação #Homeschooling #Liberdade

RENTRÉE DE FRANCE INTER : TÉLÉRAMA S’INSURGE CONTRE LE PLURALISME - Dans un article intitulé "Soni Mabrouk en majesté sur France Inter, Thomas Legrand banni d'Inter", le magazine culturel s’alarme d’une « inquiétante rentrée médiatique ». Pourquoi ? Parce que Sonia Mabrouk a rejoint BFMTV et a été invitée sur France Inter pour en parler et, surtout, parce que Charles Sapin, journaliste passé notamment par Le Figaro, Le Point et désormais directeur adjoint de la rédaction de Valeurs actuelles, devient éditorialiste politique de la matinale dominicale de France Inter. Un choix que la direction de France Inter justifie, nous dit Télérama, au nom du « pluralisme ». Les guillemets employés autour du mot en disent déjà beaucoup. Comme si le pluralisme était une notion suspecte dès lors qu’il conduit le service public à ouvrir son antenne à une sensibilité conservatrice. LE PLURALISME, MAIS ENTRE SOI Car, à lire l’article, une étrange conception de la diversité des opinions se dessine. Pendant dix-huit ans, Thomas Legrand a pu être l’une des voix politiques de France Inter sans que Télérama y trouve particulièrement à redire. Qu’il se soit même vanté, en off, d’utiliser l’antenne d’une radio publique au service de ses combats politiques ne semble guère troubler le magazine. En revanche, l’arrivée de Charles Sapin, journaliste à Valeurs actuelles, pour une chronique hebdomadaire parmi de nombreux autres éditorialistes suffit à provoquer l’émoi et l’indignation de Télérama. Autrement dit, les nombreuses sensibilités de gauche présentes dans l’audiovisuel public seraient parfaitement légitimes et n’auraient jamais à justifier leur présence, tandis que les voix venues de la droite devraient, elles, sans cesse démontrer qu’elles ont le droit d’y être - comme si le pluralisme devenait suspect dès lors qu’il s’exerce réellement. LA DROITE COMME ANOMALIE Le traitement réservé à Sonia Mabrouk procède du même réflexe. Invitée par Benjamin Duhamel sur France Inter pour évoquer sa nouvelle émission sur BFMTV, la journaliste voit Télérama insister sur sa proximité avec des sensibilités conservatrices, dénoncer la « surreprésentation » d’invités « marqués à droite et à l’extrême droite » dans ses premières émissions et s’inquiéter de ses prises de position personnelles. On peut évidemment discuter ses choix éditoriaux, comme ceux de n’importe quel journaliste. Mais en quoi sa présence sur France Inter pour présenter et défendre sa nouvelle émission serait-elle problématique ? Faudrait-il considérer qu’une journaliste identifiée à droite n’a pas sa place sur une antenne du service public, même lorsqu’elle y est invitée pour être interrogée et confrontée à des questions ? Cette inquiétude paraît d’autant plus paradoxale que l’audiovisuel public a précisément vocation à refléter la diversité des courants de pensée et d’opinion. Le pluralisme ne consiste pas à tolérer ponctuellement celui qui pense différemment au sein d’un environnement idéologiquement homogène. Il suppose que des sensibilités différentes puissent être entendues, confrontées et, surtout, trouver durablement leur place à l’antenne. LE SECTARISME EN GUISE DE VIGILANCE C’est finalement ce qui frappe dans cet article : Télérama semble confondre vigilance démocratique et défense d’un entre-soi idéologique. C’est même précisément cela, le pluralisme. Le service public n’appartient ni à la gauche, ni à la droite, ni à une famille culturelle ou politique particulière. Il appartient à tous les Français, qui le financent et dont les opinions sont infiniment plus diverses que celles que certains voudraient entendre sur ses antennes. #Pluralisme #Média #FranceInter

🇫🇷 FLASH | Léa Salamé confirme qu’elle se met en RETRAIT du JT de France 2 après la candidature de Raphaël Glucksmann : "J'en avais pris l'engagement dès le premier jour et je m'y tiens. Je me mets en retrait de la présentation du journal de 20h, le temps de la candidature de mon compagnon, comme je l'avais fait lors des deux dernières élections européennes. Le 20h est un carrefour stratégique où les interviews des candidats et les reportages sur la campagne seront autant de temps forts de l'année à venir. Partout où se tiendra la campagne, je m'efface. Partout ailleurs, je suis, reste et resterai toujours journaliste. Une journaliste qui, avant d'être la compagne de quiconque, est une femme libre et intègre. Cette décision, prise en accord avec ma direction, est évidente et difficile. Évidente, car elle découle de la déontologie stricte que je me suis toujours imposée. Elle protège d'abord la rédaction de France Télévisions, ce qui compte plus que tout à mes yeux. Difficile, car j'aime le journal que nous avons construit collectivement, soir après soir, depuis un an. Notre seule boussole : les faits, l'indépendance et le pluralisme. De tout cela, je suis fière. Immensément fière. Ces valeurs continueront à animer le travail des 400 journalistes et de Jean-Baptiste Marteau qui fabriqueront tous les soirs le 20h. Merci infiniment, chers téléspectateurs, pour votre fidélité et votre soutien. On se retrouve très bientôt sur les antennes de France Télévisions". #LéaSalamé #Journalisme #France2

Très intéressant ! (cf vidéo ⤵️) Un « influenceur » raconte comment il a été « recruté » par le gouvernement pour contrer « la propagande russe » (symptomatique et asymptotique 😏) sur les réseaux sociaux. Ce sont ceux qu’on retrouve sous nos posts dès qu’on ose critiquer le soutien à l’Ukraine. Par exemple. Plus il parle, plus il s’enfonce en montrant sans le vouloir à quel point tout ça est opaque, nébuleux, biaisé, très loin des standards minimaux qu’on peut exiger d’une démocratie. « Moi j’ai été approché par le ministre des Affaires étrangères, pour toutes ces histoires de réserve diplomatique etc. (??) » « Ils sont venus discuter avec certaines personnes qui font de la géopolitique sur Internet (lol) » « J’ai vu les gens en question 2 fois et on a juste discuté de la propagande russe, mais aussi iranienne, chinoise » (2 réflexions : on reconnaît tout de suite la patte néocon : l’Axe du Mal. Manque la Corée du Nord et ce sera parfait... Et ensuite : dans quel cadre ces réunions ? Certes pas de subventions, mais des questions se posent dans une démocratie normale : Où ? Une réunion ministérielle ? Où sont les compte-rendus ? Qu’en dit la CADA ? Réunion organisée sur quelle ligne budgétaire ? On est dans un état de droit ou un club de boy scouts néocons ??) Je vous conseille d’écouter l’intégralité du débat : on voit comment, sans même se poser une seule fois la question, l’auto-proclamé Axe du Bien estime qu’il y a une Vérité géopolitique au même titre que la vérité scientifique. Cette vérité géopolitique c’est de soutenir, forcément, l’Ukraine, l’OTAN, etc. Si vous vous en éloignez, c’est nécessairement que vous êtes sous influence russe, directe ou indirecte, ou vous-même un agent russe. Qu’il faut donc vous débusquer et sûrement vous rééduquer. Évacué le débat démocratique, qui touche AUSSI aux questions de politique étrangère, évacuée la tradition diplomatique française d’équilibre des puissances, évacuée la possibilité qu’on puisse vouloir sortir de l’OTAN et de l’UE sans que ça ait le moindre rapport avec un narratif russe (en écrivant cela, ils me diront que je viens de prouver que je suis un agent russe : raisonnement circulaire !), etc. Vision totalitaire. Sans surprise, et je pense que ceux qui y succombent ne s’en rendent même plus compte. C’est ça le plus dangereux. Il est temps que notre pays se ressaisisse et accepte juste à nouveau le pluralisme d’opinions et la liberté d’expression sans tomber dans l’absurde et dangereuse névrose maccarthyste ! #LibertéDexpression #Pluralisme #Géopolitique

On the occasion of the anniversary of the massacre in Sant'Anna di Stazzema, President Sergio Mattarella emphasized that the memory of these tragedies is not only a responsibility but also a liberating act, and he warned against the return of war conflicts and the necessity to protect civilizational values and pluralism. (translated)

In his message for the anniversary of the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema, President Sergio Mattarella warns that the wills of power and the aims of domination are emerging again, emphasizing the importance of testimonies and values to counter violence and promote respect for pluralism and individual identity. (translated)

Liberals toppled kings, emperors, warlords, priests: victories won through struggle against reactionary forces at every step. Today, against MAGA, same struggle for liberal values—individual over collective, reason over dogma, pluralism over tribalism https://t.co/cpad4sppGQ #LiberalValues #ProgressiveStruggle #AgainstMAGA #Nospecificcountrycodesarementionedinthetweet.

A Crown Instead of the Barracks: An Idea From Outside the Box Could Egypt’s exiled opposition use constitutional monarchy to dismantle the legitimacy of the 1952 coup? By Adham Hasanin Egyptian journalist and political writer, based in the Netherlands To understand what follows, a reader unfamiliar with Egypt needs one basic fact: since 1952, Egypt has never been governed by anyone who did not first wear a military uniform. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and today Abdel Fattah el-Sisi four men, four eras, one common origin. All rose through the armed forces. All inherited a state built by a coup that year, when a group of officers calling themselves the "Free Officers" overthrew King Farouk I and, within a year, abolished the monarchy altogether and declared a republic. For seventy-three years, the underlying equation has not changed: the army rules, power passes from one officer to the next, and legitimacy is drawn from the barrel of a gun rather than the ballot box. Every conceivable form of opposition has been tried legal parties and banned ones, Islamist movements, liberal and leftist coalitions, the 2011 popular uprising, and the 2013 elections whose result was overturned by force within a year. All of them hit the same wall: a military institution that reproduces itself under different names, while the core of the system remains untouched. So what if the problem, all along, has not simply been who rules, but the constitutional framework that makes military rule possible in the first place? And what if the answer lies not in swapping one president for another, but in dismantling the underlying equation itself, through a framework Egyptian opposition movements have never seriously tried: a purely ceremonial constitutional monarchy, on the model of Belgium, the Netherlands, or Spain where the head of state becomes a symbol above the political fray, while the army is permanently expelled from politics and returned to its barracks. This is not a call to revive a particular family, nor nostalgia for a golden age that never quite existed. It is a proposal for a political and strategic tool that has not yet been used in the intellectual arsenal of Egypt’s opposition in exile a tool that deserves serious discussion, regardless of whether it is ever literally realised or simply serves to expand the boundaries of what is politically thinkable. I. Why 1952, Not 2013 or 2011, Is the Root The strategic error made by most Egyptian opposition movements from the Muslim Brotherhood to the April 6 Youth Movement to the various civil opposition parties has been treating each political crisis as an isolated case: Mubarak was corrupt and had to be toppled; Sisi staged a coup that must be condemned; the interim military council was a transitional phase to be endured. This piecemeal approach treats the symptoms while leaving the original illness untouched. That original illness is the very structure of legitimacy established by the coup of 23 July 1952. The Egyptian republican system, from Nasser to today, has never built its legitimacy on a genuine democratic social contract. Instead, it has rested on a fixed trinity: the rhetoric of "revolution against feudalism and colonialism," charismatic individual leadership, and military protection of the regime framed as the guarantor of stability. This trinity has repeated itself from Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak to Sisi, with only cosmetic variations. Each new president was never a break from the system he was its continuation. When the opposition says "let us return to the constitutional framework that preceded the coup," it is not criticising a particular policy. It is declaring that the legal foundation of everything that came after 1952 was illegitimate from the start. Here lies the rhetorical power of "returning to the pre-1952 order": it does not merely demand swapping one ruler for another. It withdraws historical legitimacy from the entire republican military system including today’s regime, which draws its own declared legitimacy from that same "1952 legacy." II. Why a "Ceremonial Crown," Not "the Return of a Ruling Family" Here is the most important distinction anyone advocating this idea seriously must grasp: the project does not rest on restoring any particular individual from the Muhammad Ali dynasty, nor on nostalgia for King Farouk or his ancestors. The real power of the idea lies in the constitutional form, not in the person who happens to sit on the throne. Three successful European democracies illustrate the model clearly. Belgium, where King Philippe is a purely constitutional symbol with no real executive power, while the state is run through an elected parliament and a complex coalition government reflecting the country’s linguistic and political diversity. The Netherlands, where King Willem-Alexander formally opens the parliamentary year and signs laws, but where actual decision-making rests with the prime minister and the elected parliament. And Spain, where the king represents symbolic continuity of the state above party politics, while the military and security services answer entirely to civilian authority a transition achieved after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, when King Juan Carlos I voluntarily relinquished the extensive executive powers he had inherited and backed free elections, most dramatically in February 1981, when he personally ordered the armed forces to remain loyal to the constitution during an attempted military coup, causing it to collapse within hours. The common thread across these three models is not "the presence of an ancient royal family." It is the principle of separating symbol from power. The monarch in these countries does not rule; he represents. He issues no political decisions; he provides the continuity and symbolic stability that allows party political competition to revolve beneath him, without every transfer of power becoming an existential crisis of legitimacy. This is precisely what Egypt’s military republican system lacks: a neutral mechanism for guaranteeing state continuity that does not depend on the person of the ruler or his security apparatus. When Egypt’s military-republican president is absent, it is always the army that fills the vacuum, because it is the only institution built to be the "guarantor of stability." Under a ceremonial monarchical model, by contrast, it is the king not the army who represents that symbolic guarantee, genuinely opening the door to removing the military institution from the political equation altogether. III. Egypt’s Standing Under the Monarchy: An Honest Reckoning, Not Blind Nostalgia For a Western reader with little prior knowledge of Egypt’s monarchical period (1922–1952), it helps to know this: Egypt was nominally independent under its own king from 1922, but Britain retained enormous informal control over the country’s foreign policy, military bases, and the Suez Canal throughout the period a reality that shaped everything that follows. Any honest invocation of "Egypt’s standing under the monarchy" must avoid the trap of mythologised nostalgia that many advocates of this idea fall into. Egypt in that era was no lost paradise, and any honest article must say so plainly. The Egyptian pound, for instance, often invoked as a symbol of "national currency strength" in that period, was not strong because of independent Egyptian monetary policy. It was pegged to the British pound sterling as part of Egypt’s complete colonial financial dependency until 1947, with Egypt exercising no independent oversight of its own currency whatsoever. The pound’s strength, in other words, was not a sovereign Egyptian achievement it was a reflection of British imperial power ruling Egypt from behind the throne. But this does not mean Egypt lacked a genuine regional standing worth studying. Cairo, in the 1930s and 1940s, was the undisputed cultural capital of the entire Arab world: the Egyptian film industry produced more than half of all Arabic-language cinema; its theatre scene, led by figures like Youssef Wahbi and Naguib al-Rihani, and its music, with Umm Kulthum and Mohammed Abdel Wahab, set the standard across the region; Cairo University was the first modern university in the Arab world; and the Egyptian press was the reference point for Arab public opinion from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Cairo was, quite simply, to the Arab world what Paris was to Francophone Europe: an unrivalled centre of cultural and intellectual gravity. This standing was not necessarily a product of monarchy itself, so much as a product of a relative space of political and press pluralism that allowed Egyptian civil society to flourish, despite all the flaws of the political system and the interference of both palace and occupier. The lesson here is not "bring back the king and the standing will return." It is: when even a limited margin of civic freedom exists, Egypt flourishes culturally and intellectually almost by its own nature. And that margin is precisely what has been entirely absent across the past seven decades of unchallenged military rule. IV. What Reform Would Actually Require Not Repeating the Old Mistakes Any serious advocacy of this model must include, even briefly, a clear vision for avoiding the flaws of the old monarchical system itself otherwise the proposal collapses into simply replacing one form of authoritarianism with another wearing a different crown. First, the armed forces would need to be placed fully under a civilian ministry of defence, with its budget subject to transparent parliamentary oversight the exact opposite of its current status as a state-within-a-state, and equally opposed to its role under the monarchy, when it often served as an instrument of British influence. Second, a judiciary fully independent of both palace and government alike, unlike the old model, which saw direct royal interference in political life as when King Fuad I dismissed the elected government of Prime Minister Saad Zaghloul’s successor, Mustafa al-Nahhas, in 1928, in one of the clearest "constitutional coups" in modern Egyptian history. Third, a parliament that genuinely represents the people rather than landowners and the aristocracy, as was the case before 1952, when membership in the Senate was effectively conditional on the ability to pay land taxes meaning political representation was, by law, restricted to the wealthy. Fourth, genuine economic sovereignty, with a truly independent national currency rather than one pegged to a foreign power’s currency, unlike the historical dependency of the Egyptian pound on sterling. These four principles are enough to clarify that the project on offer is not a literal "return to the past," but a borrowing of the constitutional form (symbolic monarchy) combined with an explicit rejection of its old substance (colonial dependency, palace interference, parliamentary feudalism). V. The Role of Egyptian Movements in Exile: Between Goal and Instrument This raises the most practical question of all: how might Egypt’s opposition abroad actually adopt this idea, and in what capacity? The honest answer is that the power of this proposal does not necessarily lie in its literal fulfilment, but in its dual strategic function. On one hand, it can be advanced as a genuine political goal adopted by broad coalitions of Egyptian movements coalitions that might include Islamists, liberals, leftists, and traditional monarchists, united around a single shared premise: rejecting the legitimacy of the 1952 order and everything that followed from it, even if they later disagree over the precise final shape of the state. On the other hand and this matters more in practice the idea can be deployed as a rhetorical instrument of pressure to widen a Egyptian political debate currently trapped between two false choices: "continued military rule" or "no alternative, chaos awaits." When the opposition puts forward a clearly defined third model a European-style constitutional monarchy it breaks this false binary and opens new intellectual space in Egyptian public discourse, even if the project is never realised in its literal form. This kind of "leverage idea" is common in the history of political movements worldwide: it is not necessarily proposed to be fulfilled immediately in full, but to redraw the boundaries of the politically possible, and to force the existing regime to defend its legitimacy rather than simply assume it. Conclusion: An Invitation to Debate, Not a Ready-Made Prescription This article does not claim that restoring a monarchical form would magically resolve Egypt’s chronic crisis of legitimacy, nor does it ignore the immense difficulties facing any transformative project under a military institution as economically and securitywise entrenched as Egypt’s is today. But it raises a question that deserves serious debate among Egypt’s opposition in exile, rather than automatic dismissal simply for being unfamiliar: Has the Egyptian opposition exhausted every available tool for dismantling the legitimacy of 1952, or has it remained trapped in the same old binary swapping one ruler for another while the framework that makes military rule possible remains untouched? The idea is on the table now, not as a finished solution, but as an overdue invitation to think outside the box.

The British government has approved the acquisition of Warner Bros Discovery by Paramount Skydance for $110 billion, despite initial concerns about competition and media pluralism, although legal challenges remain in the United States that could delay the merger until 2027. (translated)

În discursul său de la Universitatea de Vară de la Băile Tușnad din 2026, Viktor Orbán, având rolul de lider al opoziției după o înfrângere electorală semnificativă, a încercat să își reafirme relevanța politică subliniind că proiectul său rămâne activ, în ciuda pierderii puterii, și a criticat actualul guvern pentru concentrarea autorității și diminuarea pluralismului, într-o manieră defensivă care reflectă schimbarea dramatică de context în care se află. #ViktorOrbán #FIDESZ #Tușnad

Sur Crépol, l’ARCOM a donc sanctionné CNEWS pour avoir dit… le réel ! Et qui était à l’origine de cette saisine ? RSF !!! L’ARCOM qui a d’ailleurs remis en demeure CNEWS en juin pour manque de pluralisme suite à une saisine de… RSF Le président de l’ARCOM soumis à RSF ? https://t.co/rmpJO0T3mg #LibertéDePresse #Pluralisme #Censure

'Islamisering krijgt steeds meer vorm' Komend schooljaar opent de eerste Islamitische basisschool in de provincie Groningen. De school gaat alleen nog de islamitische feestdagen vieren. Traditionele Nederlandse feestdagen Kerstmis, Sinterklaas en Pasen worden overgeslagen. Belachelijk vindt opiniemaker @SchaepmanSander. 'We krijgen een parallelle samenleving.' #nieuwsvandedag #Islamisering #onderwijs #pluralisme